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Abstract 
Unlike the duties of clinicians to patients, professional standards for ethical practice are not 
well defined in public health.  This is mainly due to public health practice having to reconcile 
tensions between public and private interest(s).  This involves at times being paternalistic, 
while recognising the importance of privacy and autonomy, and at the same time balancing 
the interests of some against those of others.  The Public Health specialist operates at the 
macro level, frequently having to infer the wishes and needs of individuals that make up a 
population and may have to make decisions where the interests of people conflict.  This is 
problematic when devising policy for small populations; however, it becomes even more 
difficult when there is responsibility for many communities or nation states.  Under the Treaty 
on European Union, the European Commission was given a competence in public health.  
Different cultures will give different moral weight to protecting individual interests versus 
action for collective benefit.  However, even subtle differences in moral preferences may 
cause problems in deriving public health policy within the European Union.  Understanding 
the extent to which different communities perceive issues such as social cohesion by 
facilitating cultural dialogues will be vital if European institutions are to work towards new 
forms of citizenship.   
 
The aim of EuroPHEN was to derive a framework for producing common approaches to 
public health policy across Europe.  Little work has been done on integrating ethical analysis 
with empirical research, especially on trade-offs between private and public interests.  The 
disciplines of philosophy and public policy have been weakly connected.  Much of the 
thinking on public health ethics has hitherto been conducted in the United States of America, 
and an ethical framework for public health within Europe would need to reflect the greater 
respect for values such as solidarity and integrity which are more highly valued in Europe.  
Towards this aim EuroPHEN compared the organisation of public health structures and public 
policy responses to selected public health problems in Member States to examine how public 
policy in different countries weighs competing claims of private and public interest.  Ethical 
analysis was performed of tensions between the private and public interest in the context of 
various ethical theories, principles and traditions.  During autumn 2003, 96 focus groups were 
held across 16 European Union Member States exploring public attitudes and values to public 
versus private interests.  The groups were constructed to allow examination of differences in 
attitudes between countries and demographic groups (age, gender, smoking status, 
educational level and parental and marital status).  Focus group participants discussed issues 
such as attitudes to community; funding of public services; rights and responsibilities of 
citizens; rules and regulations; compulsory car seat belts; policies to reduce tobacco 
consumption; Not-In-My-Back-Yard arguments; banning of smacking of children; legalising 
cannabis and parental choice with regards to immunisation.  This project proposes a 
preliminary framework and stresses that a European policy of Public Health will have to 
adopt a complex, pluralistic and dynamic goal structure, capable of accommodating variations 
in what specific goals should be prioritised in the specific socio-economic settings of 
individual countries.   
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Executive Summary 
 
Background 
Definition of Public Health 
In 1952 the WHO proposed a definition of public health which encapsulated a wide variety of 
state activities such as preventing epidemics, increasing sanitation, safeguarding food and 
water as well as monitoring the health status of the population.  As Public Health has evolved 
in recent years the WHO’s definition has been criticised, particularly on the basis that it fails 
to capture the breadth and aims of public health action which extend beyond improving health 
per se.  A number of alternative definitions have been proposed based on the shift away from 
viewing health simply as an absence of illness or prolonging life towards viewing health in 
terms of wellbeing. 
 
While traditional Public Health emphasised the role of the state and public organisations more 
recent definitions seek to emphasise collective responsibility for health and a concern for the 
underlying socio-economic and wider determinants of health.  In this regard Public Health is 
concerned with issues of equity in the distribution of health in a population and the creation of 
societal conditions to allow healthy choices to be made if desired.  This involves the 
organised efforts and informed choices of society, organisations, public and private, 
communities and individuals.  As a result Public Health is now viewed as “the science and 
art of preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting health through organised efforts of 
society”.  Public health practice is characterised by: its emphasis on collective responsibility 
for health and the prime role of the state in protecting and promoting the public's health; a 
focus on whole populations; an emphasis on prevention, especially the population strategy for 
primary prevention; a concern for the underlying socio-economic determinants of health and 
disease, as well as the more proximal risk factors; a partnership with the populations served.   
 
Tensions between private and public interest 
Public health practice has to reconcile tensions between public and private interest, at times 
being paternalistic, while recognising the importance of privacy and autonomy, and at the 
same time balancing the interests of some against those of others, and/or society as a whole.  
In practice, one or more tensions may arise between private and public interest within the 
development and practice of public policy.  For example what the individual thinks is in his or 
her best interests may: 
• Be contrary to what others think is in the individual’s best interests.  Such policies would 
be paternalistic.  Children are a special case where parents and others may have conflicting 
views of the child’s best interests; 
• Conflict with the best interests of one or more other identifiable individuals.  Here public 
policy has an adjudication role and may consider desert and duties of care; 
• Conflict with general societal interest i.e. interests of one or more individuals who are not 
identifiable or yet to be born.  For example, arguments of justice might require a 
maximisation of return from scarce societal resources. 
 
The duties of clinicians to patients are well established.  In contrast, professional standards for 
ethical practice are not well defined in public health, because a public health specialist 
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operates at the macro level, in some cases far removed from the context of health care,  and 
frequently has to infer the wishes and needs of individuals that make up a population and may 
have to make decisions where the interests of people conflict.  This is problematic when 
devising policy for small populations; however, it becomes even more difficult when there is 
responsibility for many communities or nation states.   
 
Rationale 
Under the Treaty on European Union, the European Commission was given a competence in 
public health.  Different cultures will give different moral weight to protecting individual 
interests versus action for collective benefit.  There is likely to be scope for variance with 
expansion of the European Union.  However, even subtle differences in moral preferences 
may cause problems in deriving public health policy within the European Union.  
Understanding the extent to which different communities perceive issues such as social 
cohesion by facilitating cultural dialogues will be vital if European institutions are to work 
towards new forms of citizenship. 
 
Normative Ethics 
The central question of moral philosophy, is how should one live? Normative ethics provides 
substantive proposals as to how live, how to act, what sort of person one should be.  In 
particular, it attempts to provide a moral framework governing these principles, in terms of 
what is right and wrong and in turn to specify associated rights and duties etc..  Since such 
basic moral principles will probably be stated in more general terms, it may not be clear as 
what should be done in a particular case, especially in morally complex situations.  This is 
more likely within a normative framework derived from several fundamental principles which 
conflict or appear to conflict.  It may even be difficult to assess how one fundamental 
principle should be applied in a particularly controversial issue. Applied ethics is therefore the 
branch of moral philosophy that seeks to apply the general principles of normative ethics to 
such complex problems. 
 
The EuroPHEN project is primarily concerned with normative ethics.  It is applied in the 
sense of application to the field of Public Health. But it aims to ask address the question How 
should one practice as a Public Health Professional? (as opposed to how should one live?).  
There will be associated normative questions such as What are the priorities for Public 
Health? How should policy be derived? Who should be involved? How should policy be 
implemented?  There is a continuum, into more applied situations in relation to specific public 
health policy areas, which EuroPHEN also explored. However, the focus of EuroPHEN was 
to address normative issues.  
 
The rival normative theories explored within EuroPHEN address how people ought to act, 
morally speaking. They are not claims about how people do act. EuroPHEN has explored how 
public policy makers act by describing the legislation and policies that and how citizens 
respond to these specific policies. However, it is important to be clear about the distinction 
between what ought to be and what is. A claim about how people/professionals ought to act 
should not be mistaken for a description of how people/professionals actually act. The 
importance of this distinction is that it is not possible to disprove an assertion as to what ought 
to be done in a particular circumstance just by producing evidence demonstrating that 
people/professionals do not act in this way. It is also important to distinguish substantive 
moral claims of normative ethics with mere descriptions of the moral beliefs or ethical codes 
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of some group or organisation. These codes may have legal or quasi legal standing, for 
example in regulating professional behaviour. However, there is a distinction between how a 
particular body thinks its members should act, as opposed to how they really should act. It is 
also necessary to distinguish to moral from the legal. Just because the law permits or even 
requires that we act in a certain way, does not mean that such an act or omission is morally 
valid.  
 
Aim 
To derive a framework for producing common approaches to public health policy across the 
European Union by examining concepts of European and universal ethical standards by 
conducting work in three areas, namely public health policy and practice; ethical analysis; and 
empirical research on public attitudes. 
 
Methodology 
Three main strains of analysis were carried out within EuroPHEN.   
 
Ethical analysis was performed of tensions between the private and public interest in the 
context of various ethical theories, principles and traditions including Liberalism, Social 
Justice, Kantism, Utilitarism, and Communitarianism.  Little work has been done on 
integrating ethical analysis with empirical research, especially on trade-offs between private 
and public interests.  The disciplines of philosophy and public policy have been weakly 
connected.  Much of the thinking on public health ethics has hitherto been conducted in the 
United States of America, and an ethical framework for public health within Europe would 
need to reflect the greater respect for values such as solidarity and integrity which are more 
highly valued in Europe.   
 
The project systematically compared the organisation of public health structures and public 
policy responses to selected public health problems in Member States.  Our analysis provided 
insight into how public policy in different countries weighs competing claims of private and 
public interest, and also grounded the qualitative explorations of the public attitudes to these 
policies.  A number of policies were analysed in greater detail to provide background for the 
qualitative analysis.   
 
A qualitative analysis was conducted to explore public attitudes and values to public versus 
private interests for a number of topics including attitudes to community; funding of public 
services; rights and responsibilities of citizens; rules and regulations; compulsory car seat 
belts; policies to reduce tobacco consumption; Not-In-My-Back-Yard arguments; banning of 
smacking of children; legalising cannabis and parental choice with regards to immunisation.  
96 focus groups were carried out across 16 European Union Member States (two locations in 
each country).  Focus groups are particularly effective in highlighting both arguments used 
and the social and cultural context for individual believes as well as raising questions and 
perspectives that may not naturally occur during other qualitative methodologies.  In this 
regard it was felt that while focus groups do not measure strength of options held, they would 
be particularly useful for establishing shared frames of reference and meaning.  The groups 
were segregated according to gender; age (20-30 or 45-60 years); marital status; parental 
status; standard or further education; smoking status.  The focus groups were tape-recorded, 
transcribed, and translated into English and the transcripts were then analysed and coded 
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manually.  Particular attention was paid to the reason(s) used to by participants to justify their 
decisions. 
 
Some elements of the work packages of EuroPHEN could have been conducted at a national 
level, but there are a number of reasons why the project should have been conducted at a 
European level.  For example, the challenge of developing a framework for public health 
ethics is common to all Member States, and economy of scale and effort will allow them all to 
benefit from the involvement of ethics and public health experts from across Europe.  
Research conducted at a European level is more likely to provide information to Member 
States on the views of all their ethnic communities of European origin. 
 
Implication of Codes of Clinical Ethics for Public Health 
Formal and informal professional medical codes of ethics exist in most countries.  These 
ethical standards have tended to concentrate on the morality of interactions between 
individuals, such as doctor and patient and give limited or no attention to the macro level 
ethical issues nor the tension between private and public interest.   
 
Many European Codes of conduct require that clinicians make the care of their patient their 
first concern.  Such a requirement has limited meaning in a clinical context where doctors 
have many patients, and not all can be their first concern.  At a population level such an edict 
has even less meaning, although there could be an obligation on a public health professional 
to make the care of the population for which they are responsible their first concern.   
 
It is important to note that community is not a homogenous whole and to recognise that there 
are different cultures and disenfranchised members within the community.  A community is 
made up of overlapping groups that can have special interests.  The health of the population is 
the aggregation of the health of individuals even though there may be something more that is 
observed when people come together.  Communities are in flux and always changing.   
 
One of the most obvious ways that a clinician must demonstrate respect is in the context of 
privacy and consent.  For clinicians this concerns the privacy of the individual patient and in 
general doctors must not disclose information to any person without the consent of the 
patient, unless ordered to do so by a Court or Tribunal.  In the case of public health the issue 
becomes more problematic and disclosure of information maybe necessary to protect the 
interests of the patient, the welfare of society or of another individual or patient.   
 
Public health institutions should respect the confidentiality of information that can bring harm 
to an individual or community if made public.  All data and information should be respected 
as confidential, but as at an individual patient level, there may be circumstances when public 
interest requires that confidentiality should be broken.  In such circumstances care must be 
taken to restrict the breach of confidence to ensure that there really is a genuine public interest 
requirement and that only the minimum amount of information is disclosed to appropriate 
third parties, who are also aware of their obligations. 
 
In general consent must be given by the individual before giving any treatment or care, and 
competency is an important element of informed consent.  The requirement to obtain consent 
before a health professional gives any treatment or care has become a norm within the clinical 
institution, however with regard to public health it is impossible to inform every member of a 
community of a public health decision, let alone obtain each person’s consent in a meaningful 
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way.  Differences would also be expected with regard to the type of consent mechanisms 
which different communities will expect.  The need to consult and obtain consent is of less 
importance if public health policies are developed with and owned by the community.   
 
Within a public health setting communicating with populations is much more difficult than 
listening and talking to a single patient.  As such a number of factors must be recognised.  
Population communication strategies need to be comprehensive to meet the very different 
needs of all members of the population.  Public consultations need to be sophisticated to 
ensure that the views of as many people as possible in the population are listened to, not just 
those more skilled in lobbying or in more powerful positions.  The means of obtaining this 
input should be grounded in the needs of the public, embedded within the community itself.  
Sometimes the process needs to be proactive, sometimes reactive however the methodology 
regarding the consultancy process must be clear and tailored to the needs of the issue.  
Particular attention should be paid to identifying disenfranchised members of society.  It 
should be made clear that the process of informing the public about their rights and 
responsibilities as a citizen is a process that is lifelong, starting with school education. 
 
Clinical professional codes tend to stress the need to respect diversity and not discriminate 
regarding patients or colleagues on the basis of a range of items (personal beliefs, religion, 
nationality, race, political affiliation, gender, ethnicity, age, socio-economic grouping or 
patient disability).  At the level of public health policy, certain of these items which are 
connected to health may be the basis for positive discrimination (age, socio-economic group, 
patient disability). 
 
Public health ethical codes could contain a requirement to treat people with respect and 
consideration for dignity, privacy etc at a population level.  Respect for dignity and integrity 
should not be seen as implying that a public health professional must do everything that an 
individual or even what the majority of a population may want.  Rather their interests should 
be considered along with the interests of other individuals and groups in the population.   
 
The general medical codes make reference to the importance of maintaining and enhancing 
confidence between physicians and patient, emphasising the duty to maintain a good standard 
of practice and care.  A critical feature of this that the public health professional should be 
self-reflective as to their own personal beliefs to insure that as far as practicable these should 
not prejudice decision making.  Public health policy should be implemented in a transparent 
manner that facilitates accountability, including the provision of all information and evidence 
used to inform the decision making process. 
 
In regard to public health there is a possibility that conflicts of interests will be seen to 
undermining public trust.  There should be trust in a public health professional to protect and 
promote the well-being of the population as a whole.  However, this trust has been eroded by 
various public health scares and scandals, e.g.  Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)/ 
new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD), and the combined measles, mumps and rubella 
(MMR) vaccination. 
 
Public health professionals are continually managing risk, and hence it is appropriate to 
expect them to identify and minimise risks for a population, just as clinicians are required to 
minimise risk to patients and clients.  However it is impossible to reduce all risk, and the risk 
for some may increase, in the same way that the interests of a few individuals may be 
impaired by policy that is in the general societal interest. 
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The various European clinical codes emphasise the needs of the individual patients over that 
of the cost of treatment.  For a public health professional, prioritisation and resource 
allocation decisions are a daily reality.  Within public health practice it is impossible to avoid 
making choices between people.  At a population level discrimination is required when 
making prioritisation decisions based on capacity to benefit, cost-effectiveness etc.  
Sometimes public health professionals become involved in making decisions, when they must 
discriminate between the interests of individuals, e.g. in communicable disease control.  
However, the important ethical issue is that this discrimination is fair and equitable.  Similarly 
situated individuals should have equal access to health care services.  Where one individual or 
group has greater capacity to benefit or more people may benefit because an intervention is 
more cost-effective compared to another, then it is just, indeed arguably ethically required, to 
make such choices.   
 
Philosophical Theories 
Liberalism 
The question what implications does liberalism have to public health policies? entails 
different answers depending on the interpretation given to liberalism.  For the so-called 
mainstream welfare liberalists the importance of individual autonomy is inviolable but they, 
unlike the libertarians, claim that human wellbeing requires a certain amount of positive rights 
and corresponding duties.  In primarily self-regarding matters they speak for individual 
autonomy and for state neutrality between different conceptions of good.  They value 
individuality, individual rights, freedom and equality, and their belief in rationality allow 
them to believe in social improvement. 
 
The most important question concerning the proper limits of individual liberty is whether 
public health policies and public health care respect people’s own wishes and interests, and, at 
the same time, protect them from each other’s conflicting choices, even if it sometimes means 
that people’s preferences have to be laundered in order to achieve tolerance and reciprocal 
forbearance.  If I am ready to participate in medical costs of clotted arteries, caused by 
indulgence in rich, unhealthy eating habits, an anti-smoking butter-and-eggs eater should be 
equally ready to participate in costs caused by smoking.   
 
In a liberal society public health authorities should promote autonomy-respecting health 
programs which ideally aim at rendering people aware of the conditions of their own health.  
What they are not allowed to do is to find ways to manipulate, threaten or coerce people into 
choosing healthier life-styles.  Individuals should be entitled to make their own decisions, 
when these decisions concern only or primarily themselves.  This means that people can quite 
legitimately make choices which are bad for their own health.  The greater knowledge and 
impartiality of the authorities guarantee their expertise in the epistemic sense, but when it 
comes to matters which fall within the scope of people’s self-determination and autonomy, 
they are morally on their own.   
 
Kantian perspectives 
Public health programs are driven by the impetus to do good in society and therefore enact 
moral prescriptions on how to live lives individually and collectively:  Many individuals are 
forced to give up risky behaviour such as smoking, eating fat, living a motionless live or 
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performing stressful work.  Should citizens contribute to the health, prosperity and wealth of 
the community?  How may collective, organized public health measures be productive in this 
respect?  The common approach in public health and public health policy is to discuss what 
kind of goals have to be set and to what extent individuals may be forced, that is, to what 
extent public health programs may be voluntary or mandatory.  In this respect, public health 
policy makers and practitioners traditionally act upon their own interpretations of what is in 
the public interest, although these interpretations diverge throughout the European Union 
depending on the political and public health traditions in the various member states. 
 
The Kantian, liberalist view, however, puts another question: what should be the social 
process through which to set the goals of Public Health and what should be the responsibility 
of public health professionals, who claim to do good on behalf of society?  On the Kantian, 
liberalist view autonomy and freedom are not characteristics of isolated individuals living 
their own separate lives, but are inherent features of social practices leading up to a vital and 
creative communal life.  Public health, collective and coercive measures – do not smoke, do 
not eat fat, exercise, refrain from stress, etc.  – may in fact weaken responsibilities of 
individuals and communities.  If the mishaps associated with driving, smoking, eating fat, 
exercising too little, living too ambitious lives and other kinds of behaviours considered to be 
unresponsive to society’s needs and goals, carry with them severe social and legal 
repercussions, citizens may decide to give up all sorts of social behaviour which are vital and 
creative to individuals and communities.  By cutting down responsibilities, individuals and 
communities may draw the boundaries of their selves and their identities more narrowly than 
they otherwise would have done.  Instead of making explicit public announcements of 
mandatory measures, the public health community better takes an interactive approach with 
the public and better considers autonomy and freedom as allies to promote the capacity, 
creativity and vitality of citizens living their lives as members of social networks and society. 
Utilitarianism 
It is often stated that utilitarianism is the dominant theory behind public health.  While there is 
some truth to this, it presents a gross over-simplification.  This is because there is no one 
definition of utilitarianism nor of public health.  The normative content and depth of 
utilitarianism is to a large degree determined by the definition given to utility, and further 
prescriptive variations are brought in by the different side-constraints laid upon utility 
calculations.   
 
Public health is concerned with the health of the whole population and attempts to reduce 
morbidity or mortality within the whole population.  In this way it could be seen to echo the 
basic utilitarian ideals of impartiality, as the focus is raising the overall health of the public, 
rather than that of any one individual or group.  Utilitarianism tends to make comparisons 
between various courses of actions and deem one better than the other based on which of 
alternatives leads to the best end results with the lowest cost e.g. preventive is better (cheaper) 
than cure.  Many public health interventions e.g. vaccinations and water fluoridation, are 
justified by variations of the utilitarian credo that we should aim at the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number.  The occasional adverse effects are seen to be acceptable because of the 
benefits to the rest.  Similarly the more drastic measures sometimes taken in the name of 
public health, like quarantine, are justified by the benefits to the many.  Utilitarianism is often 
criticised for allowing the sacrifice of individuals in the name of benefit to the greatest 
number and here Public Health faces similar kinds of charges.  Jeremy Bentham might have 
allowed the sacrifice of individuals because of public health considerations, whereas John 
Stuart Mill, found it necessary to restrict utilitarian considerations with those of individual 
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liberty.  While Mill might have allowed quarantine because of harm to others’ considerations, 
and would have allowed warnings on products known to be dangerous to one’s health, he 
might have had a thing or two to say about banning self-harming goods and about other 
clearly coercive measures.   
 
Side-constraints are also called for by today’s Public Health authorities.  Most feel that there 
are limits to the sacrifices that can be asked for in order to reach the greatest health benefits.  
If public health were utilitarian, it would most likely be described as objective and ideal, 
rather than subjective or preference related.  That is, health as the goal is for the most given 
objective criteria and it is seen as an ideal.  Whether Public Health would be described as 
positive or negative utilitarianism will depend on whether the emphasis in the definition is 
given to reducing ill-health or to increasing the overall health.  Public health tends to assess 
each intervention on its own merits which would fit better with the ideals of act utilitarianism 
than rule utilitarianism.  To the degree that public health is interested in the cost-effectiveness 
of its methods, it comes closer to economic utilitarianism (this is sometimes called health 
economics) than to the moral and political forms of utilitarianism.  Preference utilitarians 
have problems with the objectivity of the definition of the good in public health, and even 
more Utilitarians would find the idea of health as the main good to be promoted too narrow in 
scope.  Those Utilitarians with Millian ideas on the importance of individual liberty would 
find the paternalistic undertones of public health difficult to accept; and while most 
Utilitarians would praise the impartiality of public health, many find its emphasis on the 
collective unsatisfactory. 
 
Solidarity 
Individuals may be motivated to act in the interests of others out of a sense of solidarity. This 
is an awareness of unity and a willingness to bear the consequences of it. Through our societal 
role we are a member of various groups. For example, family, religious group, ethnic sub-
population, each group is defined in terms of a common history, common convictions and 
ideals. The group is linked by a desire to further common interests or by interests in common 
which motivate collective action. Within group solidarity, the main focus is on the best 
interests of the group. The individual is part of the group and benefits if the group flourishes, 
but it is the collective interest that is the main concern. Within moral solidarity, the main 
focus is a third party individual and what doing things for them because it is the right thing to 
do. While there may be some expectation that others would act in the same way if the 
positions were reversed, in the pure sense of moral solidarity, the action is purely altruistic, 
and there is no expectation of personal reward of acting morally in doing the right thing. 
Within constitutive solidarity, the main focus is the individual themselves. They are working 
with other people, and so indirectly assisting others to advance their goals but the focus is 
benefit to self. 
 
Communitarianism 
Liberal theories give priority to the rights of the individual above those of society.  The 
individualists tend to distinguish between who one is and the values one has.  Rawls 
attempted to make this distinction in his description of the original position and the veil of 
ignorance in which participants are supposed to be ignorant of any information about their 
beliefs, norms, class, status, etc.  Sandel argued that the liberal vision of the individual as the 
autonomous chooser of his or her own purposes presupposes that the chooser is sufficiently 
sovereign over, and therefore distanced from them.   
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Communitarians believe that this conception of the self is illogical. A self that is as open-
ended as the liberal conception requires would not be so much free as identity-less.  Only a 
thickly constituted self shaped in its very being by traditions, attachments, and more or less 
irrevocable moral commitments can actually make choices that count.  Individualists fail to 
recognise that membership of a community is not necessarily voluntary, and that the social 
attachments which determine the self are not necessarily chosen ones.  MacIntyre argued that 
one understands a person’s life only by looking at his/her actions within a story, a narrative. 
Each person’s narrative converges with the narratives of other people, who in turn become 
part of each other’s narrative. The community (family, tribe, neighbourhood) sets up the form 
and structure for these narratives.  Taylor, went further and instead of seeing community as 
being important in interpreting the individual sphere, he believed that community was a 
precondition for moral autonomy.  Taylor argued that even the extreme libertarian acquires 
the desire for individual autonomy by virtue of participating in a civilisation that has learned, 
over the course of many centuries, to put a premium upon such aspirations. Taken out of a 
social-historical context, the very desire for control over one’s autonomy would be void of 
meaning.  Therefore, precisely those aspirations that define the autonomous individual are the 
expression of a debt to one’s society, and hence represent social obligations, that are 
overlooked in libertarian theories. 
 
In order to be sustainable, moral principles should be congruous with the values and practices 
of the society in which they are to be applied.  One of the consequences of this is that it may 
not be possible to conceive morality in universal terms.  Universal and absolute justice, for 
example, may be another illusion of individualism.  Since the values that people hold derive 
from their communities, it is feasible that concepts such as justice may not be universal or 
absolute, if each community has a different understanding of what such moral values entail.  
Walzer argued that it is not possible to talk about justice without considering the sorts of 
goods that a particular society distributes among its members.  Of course, these goods can 
also be socially constituted by shared experiences, communal meanings, and traditions of self-
understanding that evolve through history. Therefore liberal justice cannot presume to 
maintain neutrality toward ends and goods.   
 
When an individual attempts to define their personal moral code they ask who am I? how am I 
situated? and what is to my benefit? as well as establishing what is good for the community?, 
because, as Sandel pointed out, we are “partly defined by the communities we inhabit”" and 
are therefore “implicated in the purposes and ends characteristic of those communities.”  The 
exclusive pursuit of private interest erodes the network of social environments on which we 
all depend.  The ability of an individual to exercise their autonomy depends upon the active 
maintenance of the institutions of civil society where citizens learn respect for others as well 
as self-respect.  Similarly community flourishing is dependent upon the contribution of its 
members to shared projects.  The relationship of private and public interest is manifested by a 
mesh of complimentary and reciprocal rights and duties.  There is a recognition that there are 
common challenges faced by members of a community which can be addressed by common 
thought if not common action, with a spirit of solidarity to provide a voice and support for 
less well situated community members. 
 
Personalism 
Personalism is a wide-ranging cultural movement which can be divided into several trends 
from a philosophical viewpoint, but they have in common that their position is integrated and 
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re-elaborated within a ‘foundational’ perspective and a particular philosophical anthropology: 
it considers the human person integrally and adequately understood. Some of the elements 
within personalism are particularly relevant in terms of public health ethics: (a) Respect for 
life: public health actions are aimed at protecting and promoting human life and health; (b) 
Sociality and solidarity: social solidarity means and contains a commitment to bridge the gap 
between the different segments in society and to integrate them into a community; (c) 
Responsibility: the responsibility to prevent and protect from avoidable diseases; the duty not 
to create irresponsible burdens for the society; the responsibility for people in need. This 
responsibility is also related to co-responsibility, where there is an encounter between the 
individual and collective responsibility. 
 
Analysis of Public Health Structures and Policies 
There is considerable variation between EuroPHEN countries in terms of the funding and 
organisation of health services and public health, for a combination of historical and political 
reasons.  In some countries, public health is a branch of medicine, in others it does not exist as 
a medical specialty, in others it is a multi-disciplinary specialty, and in yet others it is not 
recognised as a profession in its own right.  These factors also impact on the breadth of public 
health practice, ranging from biomedical interventions to policies to address inequalities.  For 
details see full report.   
 
Whilst most EU countries have comprehensive health policies which seek to prevent disease 
as well as develop health services, it does not necessarily mean that they have public health 
systems, such as an organised or connected group of agencies with a primary public health 
focus.  In addition, methods of improving the health of the population depend upon a number 
of interrelated factors.  These include: time; place; government style and political direction; 
degree of authority vested in, and exerted by, the state.  Public health practice also varies 
according to the disciplinary base which may be narrow, predominantly focused on a medical 
model, or may be broader including a wider range of disciplines including political sciences.  
Public health practice also varies in response to new and urgent health priorities and changing 
governments and government bodies. 
 
Individual countries within the EU are also expected to vary regard their underlying moral 
values and importance given to private verse public interests.  This project has attempted to 
explore some of these concerns, however it should be noted that this is difficult due to 
methodological issues.  We found that some countries tend to adopt relatively consistent 
patterns of the degree of liberalism versus paternalism whatever the public health issue 
studied (for example, Scandinavian countries tend to be more paternalistic, Western and 
southern European are more liberal).  In addition, there is a degree of consistency between 
which public health policies are more liberal versus paternalistic depending on the issue, 
irrespective of the individual country (tobacco control and communicable disease control tend 
to have more paternalistic policies). 
 
Returning to the issue of principle of subsidarity one can question to what extent these 
differences between public health structures is a concern.  Common to all aspects of European 
Public Health is the shared interest of European Union to provide its population with 
opportunities for better health and ensuring a high level of human health protection.  The 
precise mechanisms, structures and policies which each country uses to pursue these goals are 
likely to have greater efficacy as allowances can be made for differences in epidemiology, 
historical and moral weighting.   
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In the areas where the EU has not sought to harmonise policies between Member States 
through Directives, individual countries may be expected to vary to a greater extent and 
reflect their underlying moral values.  Indeed we found through the analysis on the 
philosophical basis of public health policies revealed that there is a wide variation within and 
between the countries examined in terms of the degree of paternalism versus liberalism in 
their approach to the various public policies examined. 
 
Most countries are paternalistic with regards smoking and communicable disease control, and 
the general trend is to increase the degree of paternalism with regards these two areas of 
policy.  With regards smoking, the EU has led the way for increasing state control over 
smoking in public places, advertisement, sponsorship, and health warnings on packaging, and 
all countries have followed this guidance although Germany is slower than others, due to 
influential tobacco lobbyists and an emphasis on personal freedom in lifestyles.   
 
With regards communicable disease control, the increased profile of this area of public health 
following real or threatened international outbreaks and incidents (the rise of tuberculosis, 
SARS, avian and pandemic flu, bioterrorism) has led to the development of new legislation in 
some countries which increase the state’s power to contain and control, within limits. 
 
The Scandinavian countries, together with Poland, also tend to be more paternalistic within 
drugs policy compared to other western European countries.  However many of the previously 
more liberal countries are now moving towards a more paternalistic goal of abstention rather 
than harm reduction, perhaps as a consequence of a previously more liberal approach which is 
perceived to have failed or due to European politics. 
 
Immunisation policy is perhaps surprisingly more liberal in Scandinavia but this may be due 
to a historical high level of trust in the authorities thereby requiring less legislation to ensure 
adequate levels of vaccination coverage.   
 
There are explicit laws to regulate genetic testing in employment and prohibit discrimination 
in many Member States.  Although in many countries there are exemptions from the 
protection of individual rights if testing would protect self and/ or others.  Most countries are 
non-specific with regards to discrimination on the grounds of genetic tests.  Because of the 
complexity of this issue and the continuous advances of this branch of science, these issues 
are under review in many countries and most seek to protect the individual worker.  The 
overall direction is to be more paternalistic in terms of laws and punishments for non-
compliance in order to protect the individual’s rights, with exemptions in certain situations, in 
keeping with EU regulations.   
 
There is increasing protection of children and vulnerable adults in clinical research across 
most countries in order to protect the individual rather than undertake research for the public 
good in line with EU Directives and the Declaration of Helsinki.  There is variation in the 
degree to which these are implemented and worded and questions remain as to whether they 
provide the level of protection envisaged in practice.  Austria, Spain, the UK and Ireland have 
only partial or no formal restrictions on payments to adults with capacity, a more liberal 
approach than the other countries which restrict this Austria, Germany, Italy and Sweden 
require the appointment of a proxy for the purposes of consent in incapacitated adults to be 
made through the courts, in other countries it is more liberal.  Germany has the greatest 
restriction on research in children, and also has the greatest protection for pregnant women in 
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research.  This more paternalistic approach to protect the individual may be related to 
historical factors relating to the Nazi era. 
 
Understanding how historical events and underlying moral values have shaped contemporary 
public policy is important to the development of international public health policy.  Although 
all EU countries are subject to various Directives, these are translated into practice in different 
ways and to different degrees depending on the fit with existing policies and practices.  The 
Scandinavian countries have a stronger history of paternalism with regards public policy and 
this is evident in the sections above.  Childhood immunisation is a notable exception, 
although this may be due to a strong historical trust in authority as noted above which has not 
necessitated state intervention.  Another notable exception is Germany which has public 
policy which differs from the European norm in two main areas: that of tobacco control where 
it is more liberal, and that of the protection of research subjects where it is more paternalistic.  
It has been speculated that this may be related to activities of the Nazi era, with contemporary 
governments keen to not repeat events of the past.  Poland stands out in a number of areas of 
public policy as being more paternalistic than some other countries, in particular 
immunisation, communicable disease control, and drugs policy, these may be related to its 
communist past.  Ireland generally is congruous with other member states except in the field 
of water fluoridation where it is the most paternalistic of all countries as the only country to 
mandatory fluoridate water supplies.  Southern and Western European countries are generally 
more liberal, for example in terms of drugs policy, although France and Belgium are unusual 
in not banning corporal punishment in educational settings to protect children.   
 
In summary, some countries tend to adopt relatively consistent patterns of the degree of 
liberalism versus paternalism whatever the public health issue studied (for example, 
Scandinavian countries tend to be more paternalistic, Western and southern European are 
more liberal).  In addition, there is a degree of consistency between which public health 
policies are more liberal versus paternalistic depending on the issue, irrespective of the 
individual country (tobacco control and communicable disease control tend to have more 
paternalistic policies).   
 
Empirical research on public attitudes 
Attitudes to a smacking ban 
No consensus was observed regarding the merits or demerits of smacking children among the 
focus group participants.  There was however a general consensus that a ban on smacking was 
neither useful nor desirable by the majority of participants in most countries except Sweden and 
Finland where legislation has been in place for some time.  In summary, the right of a parent to 
choose whether to smack or not appears strongly defended in most countries.   
 
Attitudes to regulation regarding wearing car seat belts 
Most focus group participants were convinced of the benefits of seat belt use and hence 
restrictions in personal freedom may be perceived as less severe if one wears a seat belt 
habitually.  Habitual behaviour has been recognised as one of the most influential factors in 
improving overall compliance rates and its importance is reflected in the focus group data, 
being used to reinforce reasoning for both regular and irregular use of seatbelts.  The focus 
groups highlighted the inconsistencies in seat belt use dependent on the journey taken and the 
perceived risk of having an accident, despite a widespread agreement on the safety benefits of 
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seat belts.  The problems identified in the focus group data regarding law enforcement are a 
cause for concern.  In order to effectively promote seat belt use it is necessary for the police to 
adhere to as well as enforce the law, especially with such strong majority support for seat belts. 
 
Attitudes to legalising cannabis 
Therapeutic use of cannabis was regarded as acceptable by most respondents, in contrast, weak 
support was expressed for legalising possession and use by the general public.  There was an 
association between perceived harm of cannabis and respondents’ support of legalisation.  This 
was consistent with the views of harm for cigarettes and alcohol.  Slight variations were 
observed within age groups, with older groups expressing stronger opposition to legalisation.  
Creation of new users was clearly the main concern, with potential benefits including increased 
revenue through taxation and the regulation of cannabis products to minimise health impacts.  
There was little support amongst the general public for increased prosecution of personal 
possession and use.  It may be that respondents supported efforts to separate and regulate soft 
and hard drug markets to combat cannabis acting as a gateway to hard drugs or excessive use of 
soft drugs.  This research indicates that to counter cannabis acting as a gateway it may be more 
effective to exploit the existing view held by the general public that cannabis is a soft drug in 
contrast to other highly addictive and damaging hard drugs. 
 
Attitudes to water fluoridation 
Most participants were against water fluoridation, although groups in Greece, Ireland, Poland, 
and Sweden were more in favour.  Many felt dental health was an issue to be dealt with at the 
level of the individual, rather than a solution to be imposed en masse.  While people accepted 
that some children were not encouraged to brush their teeth, they proposed other solutions to 
addressing these needs rather than having a solution of unproved safety imposed on them by 
public health authorities that they did not fully trust.  They did not see why they should accept 
potential side-effects in order that a minority may benefit.  In particular water was something 
that should be kept as pure as possible, even though it was recognised that it already contains 
many additives.  In summary while the vast majority of people opposed water fluoridation, this 
may be indicative of shifts away from public support of population interventions towards 
private interventions, as well as reduced trust in public agencies.  Thus if research were to 
demonstrate more clear benefits of water fluoridation over and above that which can be 
achieved by use of fluoride toothpaste, then the public may become more supportive.  However, 
lobby groups are likely to remain influential. 
 
Attitudes towards compulsory immunisation  
Support for compulsory immunisation was strongest in countries where certain immunisations 
are already compulsory (Greece, Italy and Poland).  In most other countries discussions 
focused on the concept of risk (both to the individual and to other people), perceptions of 
infectious disease as a foreign threat, issues of trust in the advice of health professionals and 
fears over vaccine safety.  The question of parental choice versus State compulsion was very 
much a secondary concern.  The data suggests that the public’s continuing concern over the 
safety of (particular) vaccinations must be addressed if levels of immunisation coverage are to 
be increased and maintained.  Focus group participants held most trust in the advice of their 
family doctors and these health professionals need to be supported in their commitment to 
immunisation if they are to encourage concerned parents to have their children immunised. 
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Attitudes towards a smoking ban in public places 
There was strong support for the state encouraging people to stop smoking; however 
paternalistic approaches such as a total ban and raising taxes were not widely supported.  There 
was widespread support, including among smokers, for smoking restrictions in public places, 
however this was because smoking was seen as being anti-social rather than because of the 
health effects of passive smoking.  Smokers were concerned that they were increasingly 
stigmatised.  Defining what counted as a public space was seen as problematic and required a 
pragmatic approach.  The data indicates that smoking regulation plays an important role in 
defining a non-smoking environment, as well as setting social norms and expectations.  
Regulation also plays an important part in allowing people to request others not to smoke.   
 
Attitudes to Not-In-My-Back-Yard issues 
The questions about how focus group participants felt about plans to build a home for people 
with mental illness in their neighbourhood formed part of a larger discussion about Not-In-
My-Back-Yard (NIMBY) issues, and trust in information provided by government and public 
agencies.  In addition to asking about how the focus groups felt about building a home for 
people with mental illness in their neighbourhood, they were also asked similar questions 
about plans to build a mobile phone mast and a chemical plant making everyday items, like 
plastic or pharmaceuticals.  Familiarity with mental illness inversely predicted the perception 
of dangerousness of people with schizophrenia and to a lesser extent also inversely associated 
with fear and social distance.  Familiarity was also inversely associated with perceived 
dangerousness of and desire for social distance from people with major depression.  On the 
whole, participants within the focus groups who had some degree of familiarity with mental 
illness tended to be more positive about locating a home for people with mental illness in their 
neighbourhood. 
 
Attitudes towards obeying rules and social norms 
The focus group participants were asked whether they would obey a sign saying they should 
not walk on the grass.  The major justification for the respondents’ behaviour was based on 
the likely consequence of disregarding the sign.  The sign acted to prime participants to the 
state/health of the grass, but also to the grass as the outcome of the park keepers’ work and 
hence the impact of their action on others’ work and efforts.  In this regard they were also 
highly conscious that it was not the consequence of their single action but the collective 
impact of many people walking on the same route which was likely to cause harm.  While a 
few respondents did mention the possibly of being fined, the possibly of being told off (or to 
move) and being seen to be breaking a social norm was more important.  In addition 
respondents were aware that their own actions would be used by others to justify breaking the 
rule and lead to greater harm to the grass and they were therefore willing to obey the sign to 
set an example. 
 
Attitudes to parental rights 
State involvement in public health policies related to the upbringing of children was not always 
accepted by focus group participants.  The majority stated that parents were probably the best 
judge of their children’s interests, although they agreed that in extreme cases the State should 
intervene.  There were discussions on the influence of the State and concerns were raised about 
a slippery slope of government involvement.  Participants acknowledged parents’ obligation to 
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act as role models.  A number of participants employed the greater good argument and stated 
that they would accept a public health measure that would be beneficial to vulnerable members 
of society, even if it infringed on their rights as parents.  Questions were raised regarding trust 
and the enforceability of policies.  In summary focus group participants felt that a parent’s right 
to bring up their child as they wished should be respected.  Although in principle they believed 
that the State was generally acting in the public interest and accepted State guidance, some 
participants rejected State intervention on the grounds that these interfered with individual 
choice.   
 
Attitudes to incentives and enforcement  
Focus group participants generally expressed a preference for incentives rather than 
enforcement in relation to immunisation, smoking and fluoridation.  Many participants felt that 
if they were given good clear information then most people would voluntarily choose to accept 
a public health measure perceived as beneficial to (sections of) the population.  Social pressure 
and pressure from health professionals were also cited as incentives to act or not act in certain 
ways, including taking the decision to immunise and to not smoke in public places.  Participants 
also expressed concern over the difficulties in enforcing measures such as a ban on smacking 
children in the home.  The data suggests that public health policies are more likely to succeed 
and have the greatest support where incentives, rather than enforcements, guide behaviour and 
leave the public with some elements of choice and control.   
 
Attitudes to trust 
Trust in government is low following recent food and health scares throughout Europe.  With 
regard to the various public health policies explored in the focus groups, participants did not 
totally trust the information they were given by government sources, but in similarity with 
other studies the participants were more trusting if the information came from sources seen as 
independent such as scientists, health professionals or family doctors.  Most felt that they 
should have access to all the information so that they could make their own decisions and that 
this information should be provided by experts who were independent from economic 
interests.  However they were also aware that such openness carried the potential that 
information may be misunderstood, cause unnecessary worry/panic and harm national 
security interests.  Overall the participants accepted some censorship of information which 
they characterised as different from the State actively publicising misleading information.   
 
Attitudes to community 
Most of the focus group participants took a broad view of community, able to identify 
different communities that they belonged to, and with what degree of attachment.  The most 
important community was the family and immediate social networks, which were usually 
geographically defined although not entirely.  In the younger age groups, more reference was 
made to global and virtual communities, reflecting their assurance with technology and 
possibly a politics that encompasses specific issues rather than a geographically rooted 
politics (i.e.  municipal)  Some of the in-country views were coloured by recent historical 
events – bombings and terrorist acts, the unification of Germany, post-communist society in 
Poland.  There were issues around ethnic groupings raised in many of the groups – mainly 
outsider groups which were often singled out as being different, and threatening in some way 
– either by affecting national identity, or just by their difference which was a source of 
anxiety.  This was more often apparent in the older demographic, but not entirely – in the UK 
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younger fathers were vocal in expressing views that seem to demonise certain ethnic groups.  
Society and community are concepts that are used to define a set of values – and people 
identify such values more easily on a smaller scale although many accept that they belong to 
more than their local communities and families.  Community and social networks were 
acknowledged to be important to the health of society and the sense of well-being that people 
have, but there was also an awareness of the possibility of unhealthy communities – corrupt, 
bullying and/ or threatening ones.  The past was not always considered to have been better 
than the present – with a few exceptions.  Most people accepted that there were societal 
benefits from closer neighbourhood networks, but they were equally quick to point out the 
disadvantages – the nosey neighbour syndrome.  However some of the groups were very 
concerned about youth – young people growing up with material benefits but no parental 
guidance – rich and poor alike.  Fear of youth was expressed in some of the groups, pity in 
others.  The fast pace of life was commented on by many of the groups, but there did not 
appear to be any desire to give up the material benefit that work often brings to return to the 
past.  There were exceptions – Poland being notable, though in this case, very little material 
benefit had flowed from the collapse of communism to the respondents who expressed the 
most dissatisfaction with their society.   
 
Attitudes to Solidarity 
Focus respondents were asked whether they preferred to live in a country where the 
government provides a high level of public services, but taxes are high to pay for them 
(Country 1) or one where taxes are low but people are expected to pay for insurance in case 
they become unemployed or ill and to make provision and social care when they are older 
(Country 2).  The main advantages of Country 1 were seen as being that everyone is taken 
care of and has the same opportunities within a more mature and caring society.  The 
disadvantages of country 1 were seen as a lack of choice, inefficiency, abuse by scroungers 
and loss of motivation and vibrancy in the wider society.  The advantages of an individual 
model of society within Country 2 were principally promotion of enterprise, entrepreneurship, 
activity, creativity, enthusiasm, hard work, greater efficiency and competition leading to 
greater choice and ultimately improved standards of public provision.  The minority of 
participants who leaned towards this system were all confident in their ability to prosper and 
play the system to maximum advantage to them.  The disadvantages attached to Country 2 
were significantly harsher than those attached to Country 1 – and for people repelled by this 
system these disadvantages were completely untenable.  The disadvantages of Country 2 were 
the perpetuation of inequality, social unease, crime, anxiety and worry.  Generally the 
majority felt that the foolish should be taken care of as well – based largely on the fear that it 
could happen to me.  Overall the majority of the respondents involved in the study would 
prefer to live in country 1.  Few, however, reason in black and white and for all but a few 
countries a mid-point appears most desirable and realistic.  Even groups that expressed a 
preference for country 1 demonstrated a certain malaise or dissatisfaction with a nanny state.   
 
Attitudes to Rights and Responsibilities 
Many found it relatively easy to give examples of their rights but much more difficult to think 
of responsibilities.  The most frequently mentioned rights (in order of frequency) were: right 
to an education; right to healthcare; freedom of speech/thought; freedom of choice; right to 
vote/democracy; right to basic level of income/pension/ social benefits; justice/civil 
rights/right to protest; right to work/not work; personal safety/security; housing; freedom to 
practice religion; respect/dignity; enough food and basic life needs; right to free movement 
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and travel; equality; right to life/die; freedom of association/membership of trade union or 
political party.  In order of frequency, the duties spontaneously mentioned were: to have 
public spirit, civil courage, show solidarity and contribute to society; to obey the law; pay tax; 
respect others; to look after your family especially children (and insure that they are educated) 
and the elderly; behave responsibly; respect environment; look after your self; to vote; to 
work; military service. 
 
Most groups recognised that it was human nature to want rights rather than responsibilities 
and having more rights than responsibilities should be the norm in a liberal society.  Some 
blamed the media for the greater attention paid to rights rather than responsibilities.  Young 
men with families, particularly in the UK, felt that their responsibilities extended to 
themselves and their families only.  Many thought that paying tax off-set the majority of 
responsibilities.  People felt that there was a power imbalance with the State enforcing citizen 
responsibilities but not their rights and that they were not consulted and what responsibilities 
they should have as citizens.   
 
However, it was also recognised that people may have responsibilities, but this does not 
always mean that they fulfil these duties.  It was suggested that the perceived breakdown in 
society was in part because responsibilities were not enforced.  Responsibilities were not 
always seen as being bad.  Indeed, some wanted more responsibilities or felt that some 
citizens abuse their rights.  Responsibilities were more oriented towards the personal or 
individual rather than society, with a loss of what is termed civic courage.  It was recognised 
that citizens should have responsibilities in order for society to function and that rights come 
with responsibilities.  It was important to act in the way that you would want others to behave 
towards you.  Living in a community, personal freedoms may have to be constrained if there 
were consequences for others.  Some participants criticised those who wanted to isolate 
themselves from society and the associated duties as a citizen.  Many participants discussed 
rights and responsibilities in terms of a social contract.  If rights were not protected by the 
State and citizens did not get anything in return for upholding responsibilities, many people 
did not feel an obligation towards social duties. 
 
Self-Interested Altruism and ‘It-Could-Be-Me’ 
Almost every respondent ended up expressing a clear preference for Country 1, and most of 
these motivated their stand in ways pointing towards a stance that can be broadly described as 
solidaric.  However, one particular minority reasoned in a more complex way.  They started 
out with an initial preference for Country 2, motivating this stand with the claim that they 
would fare well within this type of policy, while recognising that several others would not, 
and therefore benefit more by it (due to lower taxes and access to a larger range of alternative 
health service providers).  However, having made this initial declaration, they then added that 
although they indeed believed themselves not to belong to the losers in Country 2, it could be 
me (ICBM), and on this basis they concluded that, all in all, C1 was after all the more 
desirable option. 
 
In our modern consumerist society, appeals to individuals to acquiesce to public policy that 
may not appear to be compatible with their direct or immediate private, interest, may not be 
effective.  Of course, individuals may feel good by acting out of what appears to be altruism, 
but when designing messages for the public, policy makers need to ensure that citizens 
implicitly understand what they will be getting out of the policy in terms of their second order 
preferences.  For example, that it will save them having to pay tax in the long run, or they 
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would be similarly supported of it were to happen to them in the future, or it means that they 
may live in a society compatible with their goals.  Thus policy makers need to be much more 
sophisticated in their campaign messages and hence need to research public attitudes, 
concerns and motivations more carefully.  While the principle of autonomy is not a good basis 
for deriving an ethical framework for public health practice, political realities mean that if 
policy is to bring about improvements to the public health in a consumerist society, it will be 
necessary to work in partnership with the self-interested altruist. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The societal practice of public health is driven by goals that are expressed explicitly by 
various policy documents and regulations and/or implicitly by the way in which public health 
is organised, structured and motivated.  Even if obvious ambiguities built into notions such as 
public and health are disregarded, there is a significant variation between European countries, 
as well as between different temporal eras of one and the same European country, with regard 
to what these goals are taken to be.  From the point of view of a forthcoming European 
harmonisation of public health this fact is a serious challenge.  Three main types of goals in 
this respect are proposed: promotion of population health; promotion of health related 
autonomy and promotion of health-related equality.  Thus it is necessary to address the issue 
of what the goals of public health should be, and relate this issue to the more specific query of 
whether different types of goals may be appropriate for different countries depending on 
further factors, such as economic growth, actual health levels, etc.  Answering this question 
affirmatively, it is concluded that a European policy of Public Health will have to adopt a 
complex, pluralistic and dynamic goal structure, capable of accommodating variations in what 
specific goals should be prioritised in the specific socio-economic settings of individual 
countries. 
 
Policy implications 
The EuroPHEN partners do not wish to make specific recommendations with regards to a 
code of professional ethics for Public Health.  The normative framework that should underpin 
public health and issues in its implementation are laid out within the entire report.   
 
Of particular importance are the sections of the report relating to the values of public health, 
and the challenge posed to public health professionals to reconsider their relationship with the 
public and the goals underpinning policy.   
 
There are differences in approach to policy between Member States, which reflect local 
circumstances in terms of epidemiology and history, as well as variation in moral weight 
given to public versus private interest.  However, these differences do not represent 
insurmountable challenges to developing professional codes for Public Health to be used 
within Member States or European Union institutions, nor for developing policy and 
European Directives. 
 
The empirical research demonstrates current thinking among citizens towards public health 
and public policy more generally.  The research also provides an indication of more effective 
ways of developing and implementing policy that attracts greater public support. 
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In summary, the following points should be considered: 
 
1 Public health should strive to create an environment and structures that facilitate 
individual health, wellbeing and flourishing, and facilitate the interdependency between 
individuals necessary to achieve individual flourishing. 
 
2 Public health should achieve population health in a way that respects the rights of 
individuals and the interests and interdependencies of communities.  For some communities 
individual-focus bioethics is likely to be unsuitable and policy makers must be sensitive to the 
different needs and moral values of different communities.   
 
3 Public health policies must take heed of the pre-eminence of autonomy in European 
society.  However, the ability of citizens to make autonomous choices, sometimes for what 
may appear to be irrational behaviours that put them at increased risk of morbidity or 
mortality, should not be seen as an impediment to making improvements in the health of the 
public.  Indeed, central to the normative framework proposed by EuroPHEN is the need to 
strengthen the autonomy of the public to promote the capacity, creativity and vitality of 
citizens living their lives as members of social networks and society. 
 
4 Citizens consider themselves as consumers of healthcare who see health services as 
their right as tax payers.  However rights have reciprocal responsibilities, and the public must 
be reminded of these.  The method of informing the public about their rights and 
responsibilities as a citizen is a process that is lifelong, starting with school education.   
 
5 Public health has a strong role to play in ensuring that people feel part of a society so 
that they can make a contribution to society.  Identifying disenfranchised members of society 
is difficult because by definition they tend to be invisible and inaudible.  They may not want 
to be identified because they think society is not relevant to them. 
 
6 The public are unlikely to support policies which they do not understand or which they 
see as unconnected to their lives. 
 
7 Public health policy should be implemented in a transparent manner that facilitates 
accountability, including the provision of all information and evidence used to inform the 
decision making process.  Policies which are seen as un-enforceable will not only decrease 
support but also weaken support for public health policies in general.   
 
8 There is a need to actively build trust in public health policy and for public health 
structures to be seen as independent from lobby groups, political, commercial and monetary 
influence.   
 
9 A balanced approach is required between incentives and restrictions.  The public 
generally prefer incentives to change behaviour etc, rather than more explicit, direct 
restrictions on what may be considered to be civil liberties.  However, public health polices 
must be cautious regarding the use of inducements as these can create distrust.  Inducements 
directed towards the medical suppliers of public health services can be seen as creating 
commercial interests which may biased what is best for the individual.  Inducements directed 
at the general public can raise conspiracy type worries, especially in those cases where public 
information is lacking or where there is conflicting information given from alternative 
sources.   
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10 Public health institutions should respect the confidentiality of information that can 
bring harm to an individual or community if made public.  In cases where there is high 
likelihood of significant harm to the individual or others, suitable mechanisms should be in 
place to retain a level of confidentially that minimises the breach in privacy.   
 
11 Where there are risks to health, public health institutions should act in a timely manner 
on the information available, taking into account the reliability of the data and other priorities. 
 
Future Research needs  
Further qualitative research 
It would be beneficial to conduct further qualitative research focusing on the meaning of 
community and solidarity.  The research could explore to what extent they are important within 
a 21st concept of citizenship and community.  EuroPHEN conducted focus groups in 16 
countries, but in further research it may be more effective to reduce the countries, but increase 
the demographics groups studied, and to have similar group profiles in all countries researched.  
It would be beneficial to explore these concepts in specific groups e.g.  ethnic/religious groups, 
gay community etc.  EuroPHEN included Poland, but with the further expansion of the EU, 
additional perspectives should be included by conducting the research in other central and 
eastern European countries and Turkey. 
 
It seems to be a valuable prospect to conduct such research on the basis of developed versions 
of the initial focus group methodology. Among other things, adapted elements from other 
methodologies (for example, willingness to pay approaches), may be brought into the focus 
group set-up to facilitate more close investigations of attitudes to conflicts of interest, 
community concepts, etc 
 
Quantitative research 
The findings of EuroPHEN should be used to develop questionnaire surveys.  Health economics 
techniques could be used to assess strength of support/opposition to Public Health policy e.g.  
willingness to pay, or compensation required.  
 
Of particular interest is to survey, first, attitudes to particular types of policies/policy areas, 
and, second, particular types of value sets that may conflict in the public health context – such 
as, equality, economic and social efficiency, community autonomy, and individual liberty. It 
is moreover of interest to correlate the results of such surveys to economic features (such as 
growth) of the nations of the respondents, religious confession etc. 
 
In light of the results of EuroPHEN, one other factor which is of considerable interest to 
survey quantitatively is citizens trust in various social institutions with regard to issues related 
to public health and health policy. Comparisons between different countries and connections 
to other issues, such as the development of ethical guidelines for the public health profession, 
and the value sets mentioned above. 
 
A Normative Ethics Framework for Public Health   EuroPHEN 
  25 
Research with the Public Health Community 
It was originally the intention of the EuroPHEN Partners to develop an ethics normative 
framework that could be used by public health professionals.  The partners decided that further 
work would be needed to do this involving a consultation process, similar to that used by the 
Public Health Leadership Society in the USA.  Although the EuroPHEN Partners do not feel 
that a list of principles would not be helpful, as it could address the complexity of public health 
practice in its various settings.  This consultation should also include a discussion of goals and 
methods of Public Health and examine the impact of private sector, lobby groups. 
 
There are three basic models for how this may be done: 1) a top-down approach, where public 
health agencies and organisations (e.g. the European Public Health Association [EUPHA] and 
the professional bodies in Member States)  are brought together to create a shared outlook. 2) a 
bottom-up approach, where the ideas of individual Public Health-professionals are surveyed 
in various ways (using quantitative and/or qualitative methodologies). 3) a combination of 
these. Of these, the third option looks like the most promising, but it is also methodologically 
challenging when it comes to bringing the top and the bottom together. In the first instance, an 
international conference could be organised to initiate this process. 
 
Conceptual projects 
Perhaps the most important issue arising from the EuroPHEN report is the need to further 
consider the goals of Public Health. This is an important conceptual task for Public Health 
Professionals, public, politicians and other stakeholders. 
 
Further philosophical research is required to explore concepts such as solidarity, equality and 
attitudes to risk.  Such research should attempt to describe what specific public health policies 
would look like if based on a particular normative framework, to examine the differences 
between liberal, Kantian, communitarian, utilitarian approaches.  It would also be beneficial to 
consider how to communicate/promote public values in private societies. 
 
With special consideration to European harmonisation in the area of public health, it is of 
interest to relate these investigations to broader considerations about the forms and ideologies 
of European secularised societies, since these approach issues about the various points of 
conflicts between general society, sub-community- and individual interests mentioned above. 
In also connects to the issue of the importance of trust, and the related and crucial issue of 
who or what should be given the power/authority to represent the basis of knowledge that 
needs to underpin any activity within the public health area 
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1 Definition of Public Health 
 
In 1952 the WHO defined public health as “the science and art of preventing disease, 
prolonging life and promoting mental and physical health and efficiency through the 
organised community efforts for the sanitation of the environment, the control of 
communicable infections, the education of the individual in personal hygiene, the 
organisation of medical and nursing services for the early diagnosis and preventive treatment 
of disease and the development of social machinery to ensure to every individual a standard 
of living adequate for the maintenance of health, so organising these benefits as to enable 
every citizen to realise his (sic) birthright of health and longevity”.1 
 
This early definition proved controversial for failing to capture the breadth of public health 
action and the aims of public health which extend beyond improving health per se, such as 
equity on the distribution of health in a population and the creation of societal conditions to 
allow healthy choices to be made if desired. 
 
As a consequence, other definitions have evolved over time, such as that used in the 
influential Acheson Report on the public health function in England2 as “the science and art 
of preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting health through the organised efforts of 
society”.  This is the definition adopted by the UK Faculty of Public Health, which also states 
that public health: “is population based; emphasises collective responsibility for health, its 
protection and disease prevention; recognises the key role of the state, linked to a concern for 
the underlying socio-economic and wider determinants of health, as well as disease; and 
emphasises partnerships with all those who contribute to the health of the population”.3 
 
The definition above was modified further in another UK report into the public health 
function4, to include a more explicit definition of the breadth of involvement of society, “the 
science and art of preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting health through the 
organised efforts and informed choices of society, organisations, public and private, 
communities and individuals”.   
 
Other definitions include the American Institute of Medicine’s report on the Future of Public 
Health.5  This defines the mission of public health as “...fulfilling society’s interest in 
assuring conditions in which people can be healthy.  Its aim is to generate organised 
community effort to address the public interest in health by applying scientific and technical 
knowledge to prevent disease and promote health.  The mission of public health is addressed 
by private organisations and individuals as well as by public agencies”. 
  
A later publication from the USA Public Health Service outlined the ten core activities of 
public health as: “preventing epidemics; protecting the environment, workplaces, food and 
water; promoting healthy behaviour; monitoring the health status of the population; 
mobilising community action; responding to disasters; assuring the quality, accessibility, and 
accountability of medical care; reaching out to link high risk and hard to reach people to 
needed services; researching to develop new insights and innovative solutions; and leading 
the development of sound health policy and planning”.6  
 
A former Harvard Professor of Public Health stated that Public Health “is concerned with 
preserving and enhancing the health of populations…What is the distinction between 
medicine and public health?...In general, as a personal physician aims to maintain the health 
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and to diagnose and treat diseases in an individual, the goal of the public health professional 
is to understand and meet the health needs of communities, groups, and nations.  Where 
medicine follows a personal service ethic, conditioned by an awareness of social 
responsibilities, public health is governed by an ethic of public service, tempered by concern 
for the individual”.7  
 
Public health practice has also been characterised by8: its emphasis on collective 
responsibility for health and the prime role of the state in protecting and promoting the 
public's health; a focus on whole populations; an emphasis on prevention, especially the 
population strategy for primary prevention; a concern for the underlying socio-economic 
determinants of health and disease, as well as the more proximal risk factors; a partnership 
with the populations served.   
 
It has been noted that despite the range of definitions of public health, they have the following 
features in common: the general public interest; a focus on the broader determinants of health; 
and a desire to improve the health of the entire population.9  Earlier definitions also referred 
to the administration of health care services.   
 
In recognition of the need for a clear, unifying vision of public health, a recent definition has 
been proposed, “collective action for sustained population-wide health improvement” 9  The 
authors of this definition have identified five key themes of modern public health practice, 
these are: leadership of the entire health system; collaborative actions across all sectors; a 
multi-disciplinary approach to all determinants of health; political engagement in the 
development of public-health policy; and developing partnerships with the populations 
served.  The authors state that whilst each theme is required in modern public health practice, 
these themes are seldom reflected in the reality of practice.  This is for a number of reasons 
including: large and complex problems; neglected workforce and infrastructure; inadequate 
training programmes; funding directed to bio-medical research and the role of vested 
interests.9 
 
A crucial observation with regard to all of the proposed definitions of Public Health is that 
they not only provide a descriptive demarcation of what practices are to count as Public 
Health, but also hold out normative criteria, typically in the form of aims or goals that Public 
Health is said to necessarily strive for.  In the past, this has been unproblematic, since there 
has been sufficient consensus on what these goals should be.  However, different nations in 
fact formulate very different overarching goals for their respective Public Health policies.  In 
many cases, the traditional goal of improving the health of the population is still paramount.  
However, in several countries, an equality-oriented goal has been formulated as well, 
focusing not so much on the entire population, but on certain segments of the population that 
are worse off with regard to health, and it is not given that spending Public Health resources 
for improving the health of this segment will be optimal for improving the health of the entire 
population.  Moreover, in a few countries, like Sweden, the official goal of Public Health is 
no longer formulated in terms of improving population health, but rather in terms of providing 
the citizens with equal societal preconditions for attaining good health.  Besides the element 
of an equality-oriented aim, this goal exchanges the aim of actually improving population 
health with societal means with the aim providing people with opportunities for attaining 
good health – opportunities which they may choose not to make use of. 
 
In addition to this, the project has also revealed that different member states seem to have 
very different views on what sectors of societal practices are seen as connected to public 
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health.  In some countries, the demarcation is rather narrow - focusing mainly on sectors 
directly involved in or closely related to health care – while in other cases, every societal 
endeavour is explicitly seen has having a relation to Public Health practice. 
 
In light of this development, the EuroPHEN project has made two methodological operational 
choices.  First, Public Health practices have been identified not on the basis of having an aim 
to improve population health, but having the aim of attaining some state with regard to 
population health seen as desirable within the society in question.  In that way, countries 
pursuing societal activities with regard to population health which are not said to aim simply 
for improvement of this health can nevertheless be said to pursue a practice of Public Health. 
Second, when specifying the range of practices that have to be involved in order for a Public 
Health practice to be in place, great flexibility has been applied in order not to exclude any 
country on the mere basis of definition. 
 
The first of these methodological choices has two further fruitful implications. First, since it 
separates the issue of what Public Health is and what Public Health should be aiming for, it 
makes possible ethical reflection with regard to Public Health without having this conflated 
with a terminological discussion.  Thus, it becomes possible to say that in all European 
countries there are Public Health practices, but differing views on what they are for, and what 
ethical restrictions should be applied to them.  Which of these latter views are the more 
plausible ones, and how they differ in relation to more basic ethical positions, can then be 
discussed as a straightforward ethical issue.  Second, from the perspective of European 
harmonisation, this makes possible the perspective that, although different countries aim for 
different things and apply different restrictions within their respective Public Health practices, 
they have in common that they all have such practices.  Thus, the political process can 
concentrate on finding a common enough basis of political and ethical values and norms for 
reaching the desired level of harmonisation, while permitting variations between countries 
with regard to what actual activities are pursued within Public Health. 
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2 Clinical Ethics Frameworks 
 
Formal and informal professional codes of ethics exist in most countries (Appendix 1).  These 
ethical standards have tended to concentrate on the micro level, focusing on the morality of 
interactions between individuals, such as doctor and patient.  However, there has been less 
attention on the macro level ethics, on the tension between private and public interest. 
 
2.1 Respect for human life 
 
A number of the Codes require health professionals “to show respect for human life”.10  The 
Norwegian code11 requires doctors to cherish human health, respect human rights, truth and 
justice in relation to the patient and society.  Given the history during the 1930s and 1940s of 
medical experiments and abuse conducted by doctors in Germany, it is not surprising that the 
German code12 requires doctors to respect all human life beginning with conception with 
reverence, and not use medical skills in contradiction to the laws of humanity, not even when 
under threat.  The Polish code13 states that a physician’s vocation is the “protection of human 
life and health, the prevention of disease, the treatment of patients and the relief of suffering”.  
However, even in countries without a Fascist or Communist past, the professional codes can 
stress the importance of independence.  For example in Ireland “medical care must not be used 
as a tool of the State, or be granted or withheld or altered in character under political 
pressure”.14 
 
2.2 Putting the patient first 
 
In many countries, for example in Germany12, it is explicitly stated that the preservation and 
restoration of the patients' health shall be the paramount obligation.  In Poland, “the 
physician's ethical imperative is the good of the patient”13, and in the UK, doctors must make 
the care of their patient their first concern.  Irish doctors should “do their best to preserve life 
and promote health”.14  The goal for Norwegian doctors11 is to heal, ease and comfort and to 
help the ill to regain their health and the healthy to preserve theirs.  They must also look after 
the single patient interests and integrity.   
 
Respect and dignity for patients underlie clinical practice.  In Poland “the physician should 
treat his/her patients with consideration and courtesy and show due respect for their personal 
dignity and privacy”. 13  UK doctors must “treat every patient politely and considerately”, 
“respect patients’ dignity and privacy” and “listen to patients and respect their views”.  
Nurses in the UK15 are also expected to respect the patient or client as an individual.  Irish 
doctors14 should always treat patients with dignity and respect, and rude and insensitive 
behaviour towards patients or their relatives is unacceptable.  Norwegian patients should be 
handled with warmth, caring and respect. 11  Working with the patient should be based on 
mutual trust and where it is possible build on informed agreement. 
 
Many European Codes of conduct require that clinicians make the care of their patient their 
first concern.  The obligation of a public health professional is to make the care of the 
population for which they are responsible their first concern.  However, the various clinical 
codes are unreasonable in expecting a health professional doctor to make the care of each of 
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their patients their first concern, as these interests may conflict.  A clinician may not have 
thousands or even millions of patients to care for, but they will certainly have more than one 
at a time, and even if it is something as basic as deciding which patient to see first, means that 
the care of one is being placed before that of another.  Similarly, a public health professional 
cannot make the interests of every individual, there are just too many people, and there may 
be tensions between these interests.  For example what the individual thinks is in his or her 
best interests may: 
• be contrary to what others think is in the individual’s best interests.  Such policies 
could be described as being paternalistic.  Children are a special case where parents 
and others may have conflicting views of the child’s best interests; 
• conflict with the best interests of one or more other identifiable individuals.  Here 
public policy has an adjudication role and may consider what each individual deserves  
and duties of care; 
• conflict with general societal interest i.e.  interests of one or more individuals who are 
not identifiable or yet to be born.  For example, arguments of justice might require a 
maximisation of return from scarce societal resources. 
 
2.3 American codes of ethics 
 
The American Medical Association (AMA) has adopted nine Principles of medical ethics (see 
Appendix).16  In the preamble to the Principles, the AMA observed that “The medical 
profession has long subscribed to a body of ethical statements developed primarily for the 
benefit of the patient”.  The preamble goes on to state that “a physician must recognize 
responsibility to patients first and foremost”.  However, there is also a recognition that 
physicians have responsibilities “to society, to other health professionals, and to self”.  The 
Principles themselves share many features of codes of conduct for doctors in Europe and 
indeed other professional groups (for example the American Bar Association.17 Thus there is 
little merit is examining further the applicability of the AMA Code to public health.   
 
2.4 American Principles of Public Health Ethics 
 
However, the Public Health Leadership Society (PHLS) in the United Sates have developed 
Principles of the Ethical Practice of Public Health18, that may be of relevance to public health 
in Europe, or be of value in developing a Europe specific code of practice.   
 
The use of the term Public Health can be very broad, making interpretation of the PHLS18 
Principles problematic.  The American PHLS18 principle 1 lays out the goals for public health 
as principally addressing “the fundamental causes of disease and requirements for health, 
aiming to prevent adverse health outcomes” (P1).  This is reinforced in principle 5 which 
refers to “policies and programs that protect and promote health” (P5).  The guidance notes19 
that accompany the Principles suggest that the Code is meant to cover the entire field of 
public health, including but not limited to government institutions and schools of public 
health.  For a code to be useful it must include health promotion and not just disease 
prevention.  It needs to address broader access and distributive issues.  Probably poverty is the 
most important determinant of ill health.  The problem is that it is difficult to use phrases such 
as “we need to reduce poverty” or to make reference to difficult population policies such as 
antenatal/neonatal screening or “reducing population growth to create a healthy population” 
without sounding glib or insensitive.   
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With the range of definitions described in Section 1 of this EuroPHEN report, a major 
difficulty is to define what is meant by public health or in the case of the PHLS Principles18, 
what is mean by the term community health (P2).  Many of the Principles refer to community.  
For example: “protect the confidentiality of information that can bring harm to an individual 
or community” (P10); “policies, programs, and priorities should be developed and evaluated 
through processes that ensure an opportunity for input from community members” (P3); 
“provide communities with the information they have that is needed for decisions on policies 
or programs” (P6); “advocate and work for the empowerment of disenfranchised community 
members” (P4) , “obtain the community’s consent” (P6).  The guidelines often refer to 
community as though it is a homogenous whole, although they do recognise that there are 
different cultures and disenfranchised members within the community.   
 
For example, is it a healthy community in the sense of a group of individuals who live happily 
together to advance common goals.  A community is made up of overlapping groups that can 
have special interests.  The health of the population is the aggregation of the health of 
individuals even though there may be something more that is observed when people come 
together.  Communities are in flux and always changing.  Public health should strive to create 
an environment and structures that facilitate individual health, wellbeing and flourishing, and 
facilitate the interdependency between individuals necessary to achieve individual flourishing.  
Public health should achieve population health in a way that respects the rights of individuals 
and the interests and interdependencies of communities.  By using a phrase such as “public 
health should achieve community health in a way that respects the rights of individuals in the 
community” the PHLS18 have slipped into using language of individual-focus bioethics.   
 
2.5 Privacy and confidentiality 
 
One of the most obvious ways that a clinician must demonstrate respect is in the context of 
privacy and consent.  The German physician “is bound to observe medical confidentiality.  
Information acquired by the physician in the course of his/her professional duties, concerning 
the patient and his/her background is confidential.  The death of the patient does not release 
the physician from the duty of confidentiality.” 12  In Poland13, doctors must also observe all 
confidential information, even beyond the patient’s death.  In the UK nurses are required to 
“protect confidential information”15 and doctors must respect and protect confidential 
information.10  The Irish GMC14 states that “Confidentiality is a time-honoured principle of 
medical ethics.  It extends after death and is fundamental to the doctor/patient relationship”  
The Irish GMC14 requires that the doctor must not disclose information to any person without 
the consent of the patient, unless ordered to do so by a Court or Tribunal or if disclosure was 
necessary to protect the interests of the patient, the welfare of society or of another individual 
or patient.  Norwegian doctors11 must preserve confidentiality and show discretions regarding 
those she/he lets know.  The Norwegian regulating body11 believes that the ethic for 
confidentiality should be more expansive than that which is provided for in law. 
 
The American PHLS18 states that “Public health institutions should protect the confidentiality 
of information that can bring harm to an individual or community if made public.  Exceptions 
must be justified on the basis of the high likelihood of significant harm to the individual or 
others.”  The accompanying notes admit that the aims of this Principle are modest and that 
there are problems in defining the sorts of information being referred to.  There is also no 
guidance on when disclosure would be appropriate.  The PHLS guidance notes19 relate their 
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confidentiality Principle with the requirement that “Public health institutions should act in a 
timely manner on the information they have within the resources and the mandate given to 
them by the public.”  In most countries, public health officials often do not have a mandate.  
They are employees of the State and are funded by taxes etc to carry out various functions.  
Thus they have responsibilities rather than a mandate.   
 
2.6 Consent 
 
UK nurses15 must obtain consent before giving any treatment or care.  Giving information is 
also another important element of informed consent so UK doctors must give patients 
information in a way they can understand.  Doctors in Ireland should, in general, ensure that a 
patient and family members, subject to patient consent, be as fully informed as possible about 
matters relating to an illness, and questions answered in non-technical terms.  The 
requirement to obtain consent before a health professional gives any treatment or care is a 
very clinically orientated instruction.  It is impossible to inform every member of a 
community of a public health decision, let alone obtain each person’s consent.  The American 
PHLS guidance notes19 suggest that principle 6 of their Code is the community-level corollary 
of the individual-level ethical principle of informed consent.  As a consequence, the 
community should be informed of the potential risks and benefits of the program etc.  
However, as the guidance notes admit, the principle does not specify how that consent should 
be obtained or discuss what community consent means.  Does it mean active consent via 
referenda or passive consent demonstrated by a no or only a few letters of complaint or 
because there are no demonstrations in the street?  There is unlikely to be a consensus and so 
there is the problem of what to do when there is dissent.  There is a danger of a tyranny of the 
majority if a small or even a significant minority are ignored.  However, there is also a risk of 
permitting a tyranny of the minority, if a small percentage of people are able to block a policy 
that it is in the wider interest.  The need to consult and obtain consent is of less importance if 
public health policies are developed with and owned by the community. 
 
2.7 Communication 
 
Communicating with populations is much more difficult for a public health professional 
compared to listening and talking to a patient sitting with a doctor.  On a one-to-one basis a 
doctor can tailor the amount and format of information according to the needs of the patient.  
At a population level this is much more difficult as there is immediate feedback.  Population 
communication strategies need to be comprehensive to meet the very different needs of all 
members of the population.  Public consultations need to be sophisticated to ensure that the 
views of as many people as possible in the population are listened to, not just those more 
skilled in lobbying or in more powerful positions. 
 
Many of the PHLS Principles18 stress the importance of involving the public to encourage 
public ownership.  It is easier to implement a policy if the policy is owned by the public.  
Public health professionals need to understand what a reasonable person would think.  This 
comes from a collaborative ethos, in a meaningful way, rather than paying lip-service to 
consultation, or out of political correctness.  The means of obtaining this input should be 
grounded in the needs of the public, embedded within the community itself.  Sometimes the 
process needs to be proactive, sometimes reactive.  The responses that you get from 
consultation will significantly depend on who is approached.  People with vested interests are 
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more likely to respond, but they will also be better informed about the issues.  Some times 
there is a need to consult with ordinary people sometime community representatives. 
 
The responses obtained from public consultation may sometimes be ignored because they are 
not what was expected (or hoped for).  However, this may be due to providing insufficient 
information and prejudice (or asking the wrong questions, or the wrong people, with the 
wrong methodology. 
 
People should feel part of a society so that they can make a contribution to society.  Public 
health has a role in helping to achieve this.  Health care should be equally accessible to people 
of equal need.  Reducing inequalities is worthwhile in its own right.  It is not possible to 
ensure that health and a natural good should be equally distributed because of genetic 
inequality etc. 
 
People need to know service exists and barriers to accessing these services should be 
minimised.  The process of informing the public about their rights and responsibilities as a 
citizen is a process that is lifelong, starting with school education.   
 
Identifying disenfranchised members of society is difficult because by definition they tend to 
be invisible and inaudible.  They may not want to be identified because they think society is 
not relevant to them. 
 
If a policy is worthwhile then it would be unjust not to know that it is worthwhile and how it 
should be best implemented 
 
Public health policy should be implemented in a transparent manner that facilitates 
accountability, including the provision of all information and evidence used to inform the 
decision making process. 
 
2.8 Discrimination and respect for diversity 
 
The UK medical code requires that “In all these matters you must never discriminate unfairly 
against your patients or colleagues” and that personal beliefs do not prejudice patient care.  In 
Germany12 doctors are also required to ensure that they do not discriminate between religion, 
nationality, race, political affiliation, or social position.  The Irish code14 requires that doctors 
“must practise without consideration of religion, nationality, gender, race, ethnicity, age, 
politics, socio-economic grouping or patient disability.”  The Irish guide14 also says that 
“treatment must never be refused on grounds of moral disapproval of the patient’s behaviour.”  
 
Requirements, for example with the PHLS Code18, to respect “diverse values, beliefs and 
cultures” while important to facilitate ownership and acceptance of a policy, does not mean 
that they have to act on views expressed.  However there is a need to recognise diverse 
values. 
 
The PHLS accompanying notes19 state that types of diversity, such as culture and gender, 
were intentionally not mentioned as any list would be arbitrary and inadequate.  It is true that 
it would be difficult to produce such a list, but without such detail, recommendations have 
reduced utility.   
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2.9 Professional responsibility 
 
As the UK GMC10 states, a doctor must always be prepared to justify their actions.  Many of 
the professional codes stress the importance of behaving in a proper manner so as not to bring 
the profession into disrespect.  For example, the German code12 requires that doctors will 
preserve the honour and noble tradition of the medical profession to the best of their ability, 
exercise their profession scrupulously and with dignity and also protect the freedom and 
reputation of the medical profession.  The UK medical code10 is more explicit about the 
requirement to identify and report unprofessional behaviour by acting quickly to protect 
patients from risk where there is good reason to believe that “you or a colleague may not be fit 
to practise”.  Similarly in Ireland, where risk to a patient exists in relation to a colleague’s 
conduct or competence, doctors should express their concern to the colleague concerned in the 
first instance, followed by local systems and then if necessary reporting to the Medical Council. 
 
In Norway11, if a doctor has concerns about a fellow worker e.g.  that they are ill or misusing 
drugs, they are also told to first raise this directly with their colleague.  Care should be taken 
especially with medical students and junior doctors.  If this does not solve the matter, the 
Norwegian doctors11 should take the matter up with the administrator’s superior or the health 
authority.  An onus is also placed on doctors to take care of their own health and seek help if 
it is needed. 
 
The relationship with colleagues is important when defining what it means to be a 
professional, in terms of teamwork, training, and maintaining professional standards.  UK 
nurses must co-operate with others in the team.  German doctors12 must pay respect to their 
teachers and colleagues.  UK doctors10 should work with colleagues in the ways that best 
serve patients’ interests.  The Irish guide14 suggests that doctors should give professional 
support to each other and that denigration of a colleague is never in the interests of patients 
and should be avoided.  In Norway11, doctors are also warned to be careful when criticising 
colleagues especially in front of patients and others, but they are also reminded that they must 
always have the patient’s best interests at heart. 
 
Self regulation is an important criterion for the definition of a profession.  The Irish guide14 to 
ethical conduct and behaviour defines misconduct in terms of what other colleagues expect.  
Thus misconduct is considered to be: 
“(a) Conduct which doctors of experience, competence and good repute consider 
disgraceful or dishonourable; and /or 
(b) Conduct connected with his or her profession in which the doctor concerned has 
seriously fallen short by omission or commission of the standards of conduct expected 
among doctors.” 
 
Another characteristic of a profession is the maintenance of “professional knowledge and 
competence”. 15  The Polish code states that “It comes within duties of each physician to 
constantly supplement and improve his/her professional knowledge and skills as well as to 
share own experience and skills with other fellow-physicians.” 13  Similarly in Norway11, 
doctors are instructed to maintain their knowledge and seek to improve it.  Public health 
specialists would share concerns about professional standards in terms of training and 
maintaining professional competency. 
 
The PHLS Principles18 refer to the main sills, processes and activity used by public health 
professionals such as seeking “the information needed to implement effective policies and 
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programs”(P5) and engaging “in collaborations and affiliations” (P12).  Acting in “a timely 
manner” (P7) on this information, and maintaining professional competence (P11) are also 
required, which are competencies that would be expected within any professional code of 
ethics. 
 
The PHLS guidance notes19 for principle 11 suggest that the criteria for professional 
competence would have to be specified by individual professions, such as epidemiology and 
health education.  As with the various professional codes of conducts for clinicians, 
professional competence is key if a public health professional is to do their role, but also to 
effectively work with other stakeholders, including those within the general public.  However, 
as various professional bodies have discovered, designing a system to facilitate and monitor 
these competences can be complex and is often bureaucratic.   
 
2.10 Trust 
 
The German code12 also refers to the importance of maintaining and enhancing confidence 
between physicians and patients.  This issue is also prominent in the UK, where doctors10 are 
required to “be trustworthy”.  The UK nursing code15 is explicit about the link between acting 
as a responsible professional and trust:  “Patients must be able to trust doctors with their lives 
and well-being.  To justify that trust, we as a profession have a duty to maintain a good 
standard of practice and care.  avoid abusing your position as a doctor.” In Ireland, it is 
recognised that “the position of trust and privilege held by doctors in the community is 
founded not only on technical knowledge and skill, but also on high standards of personal and 
professional behaviour at all times.” 
 
Maintaining trust is a recurrent theme throughout the PHLS guidelines.18  For example, the 
accompanying text for P12 specifically refers to conflicts of interests undermining public 
trust.  As with doctors and nurses, public health professionals must also be trustworthy, 
although the degree of dependence of an individual patient’s life, let alone that of a healthy 
member of the general public, on the actions of a public health professional is of course less.  
There should be trust in a public health professional to protect and promote the well-being of 
the population as a whole.  However, this trust has been eroded by various public health 
scares and scandals, e.g.  Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy(BSE)/ new variant Creutzfeldt-
Jakob Disease (CJD), and the combined measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccination. 
 
Public health professionals will have personal beliefs too, as with clinical decision making, 
these will always be there at a sub-conscious level, but as far as is practicable should not 
prejudice decision making. 
 
Requirements to treat people with respect and consideration for dignity, privacy etc would 
apply at a population level too.  Of course, respect for dignity and integrity does not mean that 
a public health professional must do everything that an individual or even what the majority 
of a population may want, just that their interests should be considered along with the 
interests of other individuals and groups in the population.  All data and information should 
be respected as confidential, but as at an individual patient level, there may be circumstances 
when public interest requires that confidentiality should be broken.  In such circumstances 
care must be taken to restrict the breach of confidence to ensure that there really is a genuine 
public interest requirement and that only the minimum amount of information is disclosed to 
appropriate third parties, who are also aware of their obligations. 
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2.11 Managing risk  
 
UK nurses are instructed to “act to identify and minimise risk to patients and clients.”15  
Public health professionals are continually managing risk, and hence it is appropriate to 
expect them to identify and minimise risks for a population, just as clinicians are required to 
minimise risk to patients and clients.  However it is impossible to reduce all risk, and the risk 
for some may increase, in the same way that the interests of a few individuals may be 
impaired by policy that is in the general societal interest. 
 
The intention behind PHLS Principle 9 is unclear: “Public health programs and policies 
should be implemented in a manner that most enhances the physical and social 
environment.”18  It is certainly true that the physical environment can impact upon the social 
environment and vice versa, and the individual interacts with both forms of environment.  
Indeed the associated notes for this principle attempts to explain that “this Principle stems 
from the assumptions of interdependence among people, and between people and their 
physical environment”.  Conflating physical and social environment within this 
recommendation adds addition complexity.  Indeed even the term physical environment is 
multi faceted and could cover both the natural and man-made built environment.  The notes 
go on to explain that “it is like the ethical principle from medicine, ‘do no harm’, but it is 
worded in a positive way”.  The PHLS18 may therefore be referring to the Precautionary 
Principle, although there are subtle but important differences in the ways that the 
Precautionary Principle is interpreted in North America compared with Europe.  It may be an 
overstatement to say that Public Health policy must enhance the physical environment but 
there should be an obligation to consider environmental impact. 
 
2.12 Prioritisation and evidenced-based health care 
 
The Norwegian Code11 does refer to the need for interventions to be evidenced based.  A 
doctor shall, by examination and treatment only use those methods which are recognised as 
acceptable.  Methods which put the patient in danger must not be allowed.   
 
The various European clinical regulatory organisations may have in mind a requirement to 
think about providing the best care to treat a patient’s disease rather than consider the cost 
implications.  The Norwegian code11 was slightly different as it states that a doctor should 
take in account the economic state of the society when making treatment decisions.  The Code 
says that methods which are unnecessary or over costly should not be used.  However, the 
Code goes on to say that a doctor must not in any way seek to punish single patients or groups 
with economic burdens, or prioritise.  If there is a lack of resources in the doctor’s own work 
area then they should make these known.  While, it reasonable for a doctor to point out unmet 
need, it is sometimes difficult to reconcile directives to always prioritise patient care, without 
considering what implications the cost of a particular treatment may have on the budget 
available for other patients.  The Polish code alluded to scarcity of resources, requiring 
physicians to “perform all diagnostic, therapeutic and preventive procedures with due 
exactitude and appropriate allocation of time”. 13  The Irish guide is more explicit: “Funds 
for healthcare are limited.  A decision to spend money in one area may involve not having it 
available in another.  The Council considers that doctors have a place in helping to ensure 
the efficient and effective use of resources and in giving advice on their allocation.  Lack of 
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facilities does not excuse failure to help patients.  Doctors have an obligation to point out 
deficiencies to the appropriate authorities and should not yield to pressures for cost savings if 
it means acting against the interests of patients.” 14 
 
Equity is another important goal of public health, and hence American PHLS18 stresses that 
Public Health should strive to secure “basic resources and conditions necessary for health 
are accessible to all” (P4).  Of course within the American health care system where a 
significant minority of the population are without health care coverage, this would be a major 
challenge.  Public health agencies in the USA are relatively weak and have limited scope for 
influencing how and where money is spent within clinical care settings  
 
For a public health professional, prioritisation and resource allocation decisions are a daily 
reality.  Within public health practice it is impossible to avoid making choices between 
people.  At a population level discrimination is required when making prioritisation decisions 
based on capacity to benefit, cost-effectiveness etc.  Sometimes public health professionals 
become involved in making decisions, when they must discriminate between the interests of 
individuals, e.g.  in communicable disease control.  However, the important ethical issue is 
that this discrimination is fair and equitable.  Similarly situated individuals should have equal 
access to health care services.  Where one individual or group has greater capacity to benefit 
or more people may benefit because an intervention is more cost-effective compared to 
another, then it is just, indeed ethically required, to make such choices.   
 
Most European Member States have financial restrictions on their health budgets.  However, 
when a healthcare system is struggling to constrain costs, it is even more important to have a 
clear ethical normative framework and an explicit set of human values against which to 
prioritise requests for health care.  It is also important that public health professionals do not 
lose sight of the need to understand how disease is related to suffering.  Thus public health 
policy should be dependent on a medical model of health.  The implicit debate as to why 
public health should be focused on the need to increase health and well being, should be made 
explicit.  There is a reductionist tendency of public health as a discipline to medicalise the 
health of the public.  For example, public health professionals seem insistent on making 
people live as long as possible, irrespective of the consequences on quality of life.  Public 
health professionals do recognise the importance of quality of life and hence should add life 
to years as well as years to life.  However, they tend to have a more restrictive concept of the 
Good Life and hence have difficulty recognising that people truly are able to have a better 
quality of life when undertaking unhealthy behaviours.  Thus not only are smokers likely to 
have a shorter life expectancy, legislative frameworks and social cultures of stigma and blame 
may mean that they have reduced quality as well as quantity of life. 
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3 The EuroPHEN Project 
3.1 The Rationale for EuroPHEN 
 
Under the Treaty on European Union, the European Community was given a competence in 
public health.  Article 3(o) of the Treaty establishes a broad aim of making “a contribution to 
the attainment of a high level of health protection”.  Article 129 specifies that this is to be 
achieved by the encouragement of co-operation between the Member States and, if necessary, 
the provision of support to their action; the promotion of co-ordination of policies and 
programmes of the Member States; and the fostering of co-operation with third countries and 
the competent international organisations in the sphere of public health.   
 
Within the descriptive summary of the Treaty on European Union20, “threats to the public 
health” was identified as one of the “daunting array of challenges” faced by a European 
Union at the threshold of the 21st century.  Whilst recognising that these threats had to be 
confronted “at a time when political institutions everywhere are under question by an 
increasingly well-informed public”, it was also recognised that in the light of recent public 
health scares, people want a high level of health protection.  The Treaty underscored that a 
high level of human health protection will be ensured in the definition and implementation of 
all Community policies and activities.  In fact, Directorate General Health and Consumer 
Protection (DG SANCO), had as its mission “to ensure a high level of protection of 
consumers” health, safety and economic interests as well as of public health at the level of the 
European Union.  As a result, Community Action will be directed towards improving public 
health, preventing human illness or diseases and obviating sources of danger to human health.  
The priorities in the “Proposal for a programme of Community action in the field of public 
health (2001-2006)”21 emphasised the Community’s broad health strategy for the future and 
how it should work to “achieve a coherent and effect approach to health issues across all the 
different policy areas”.  A key element of this was a new public health framework to enable 
the Community to respond more effectively to its obligations by setting out clear objectives 
and policy instruments.   
 
Different cultures will give different moral weight to protecting individual interests versus 
action for collective benefit.  Deriving international public health policy will be problematic if 
communities within particular countries do not share the same moral values.  It is unlikely 
that gross differences will exist within the European Union, although there is likely to be 
more scope for variance with expansion of the European Union.  However, even subtle 
differences in moral preferences may cause problems in deriving public health policy within 
the European Union. 
 
Beagle and Bonita2 recognised that international comparisons of national health systems have 
focused on the organisation and delivery of personal medical care services.  In contrast, there 
have been few comparable studies focusing on public health systems.  From a research 
perspective, they thought that it would be desirable to assess all aspects of national public 
health institutions and organisations, including central and local governmental and non-
governmental organisations, the capacity of the entire public health work-force and the 
priority given to public health policies in order to categorise national public health systems 
and relate these to measures of health status of populations.  They concluded that  
“unfortunately, the data required for such a formal assessment are not available”.   
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An evaluation10 of five infectious disease outbreaks, with various transmission routes, 
involving more than one Member State, identified critical weaknesses in co-ordination, 
funding and reporting.  The authors recommended that the European Commission further 
develop existing disease-related surveillance networks.  They further commented that “this 
will need to be done within a framework in which organisational, financial, and legal 
uncertainties are clarified”.  If the co-ordinated approach that they and others11 recommend is 
to be successful it with be important to understand the philosophy underpinning the various 
national approaches to communicable disease control. 
 
As Van der Werff has pointed out: comparative studies may “get no further than a  
‘description’ and ‘explanation’ of the similarities and the differences; the effectiveness and 
efficiency of particular public health approaches may not be identified and measured”.12 He 
went on to say that “comparative analysis has proven to be a creative source of information 
on the application of public health approaches across countries… when public health 
approaches are compared, it is essential to make sure that the situational context of each of 
the compared approaches is carefully analysed and well understood before conclusions are 
drawn”.  Van der Werff recognised that “the health system in any country is part of its social 
and political setting.  Different ideologies, norms and values are at the roots of the position 
placed by society on health, the choices made with respect to the balance between 
collectivism and individualism, and the decisions taken on the degree of equity in the 
distribution of services and resources”.   
 
The need to conduct international comparative assessments of public health policy was also 
recognised by Detels et al.: “The magnitude and success of public health efforts will vary both 
in time and place in different areas of the world.  Nevertheless, the principles of public health 
remain the same.  The actions which should be taken are determined by the nature and 
magnitude of the problems affecting the health of the community.  What can be done will be 
determined by the scientific knowledge and resources available.  What is done will be 
determined by the social and political commitment existing at the particular time and 
place.”13 
 
In 1998, the Societé Française de Santé Publique performed a survey on behalf of the 
European Commission (Employment and Social affairs) to determine the views of European 
public health professionals on priorities for action in public health within Europe.14 In each 
Member State (except Luxembourg) the Societé identified a representative of one of the 
national public health associations.  These representatives were asked to collect the views of 
at least 30 of their members, representing as far as possible differing roles and strands of 
opinion within public health.  Public health specialists were asked to identify priorities for EU 
action (Table 1).  They were asked to base their choices on four criteria: 
! An emergent issue in one or more countries which could become a major public health 
problem at a European level; 
! A public health problem existing in several or all countries of the European Union; 
! A public health problem for which action by the EU could contribute to convergence of 
national or local policies, with beneficial consequences; 
! A subject where community action would produce a more effective response than national 
or local ones alone. 
 
A very large number of topics were proposed.  The 76 French respondents for example, cited 
250 separate issues.  Many respondents stressed issues of particular importance in their own 
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countries or regions.  For example accidents were given greater prominence by Greece, Spain 
and Portugal than by northern European countries.   
 
Table 1: Two most frequently cited priorities from each country (where priorities were 
ranked 
Country Top two priorities 
Austria Health promotion; Re-orientation of health care systems 
Denmark Environmental health; Tobacco 
Finland Illegal narcotic drugs; use of alcohol 
France Increase of inequalities in health status and in health care accessibility; 
Health impact of environment damage 
Germany Inequality and health; Ageing and health 
Ireland Car accidents (and other accidents); Drugs 
The 
Netherlands 
Lifestyle, including addiction (drugs, tobacco, alcohol); Chronic illness 
(including ageing) 
Portugal Communicable diseases; Addiction 
Spain Social inequalities and health; Control of tobacco, alcohol and drugs 
Sweden Inequality in health; Care of the elderly 
UK Tobacco; Inequalities 
 
There was also considerable variation in the way in which issues were categorised.  The 
authors of the report believed that “these were not simply chance differences and appeared to 
reflect firmly held national differences as to how various issues were regarded”.  Weil and 
McKee15 believed that the survey had demonstrated that “achieving consensus” on priorities 
among public health professionals at a European level is not easy.  As has been shown with 
clinical medicine, natural cultural factors are important in how issues are interpreted so that 
detailed discussion at a European level is constrained by differing understandings of common 
terminology.  The report concluded that, “public health in Europe is extremely 
heterogeneous.  This diversity gives public health at a European level strengths and 
weaknesses.  A strength is the diversity that provides many different perspectives from which 
one can see an issue, as well as providing a wealth of different approaches to common 
problems.  A weakness has long been the difficulty in this diverse community speaking with a 
single voice”. 
 
Hutt specified five moral imperatives of government for its regulatory process: to protect the 
public from harm; to preserve maximum individual choice; to guarantee meaningful public 
participation in the decision-making process; to promote consistent and dependable rules 
applicable to everyone and to provide prompt decisions on all issues that arise in a regulatory 
context.16 One of the challenges for public policy is to reconcile the potential conflict between 
the first two of these imperatives.  Douglas Weed argued that philosophical perspectives 
underlie and influence complex decisions in public health but are rarely described by decision 
makers.  He believed that ethics seems particularly relevant to public health since decision 
making entails balancing benefits and risks to individuals and to society.  He went on to 
suggest that “If public health professionals embrace the need to examine and proclaim their 
philosophical foundation, then a guide encompassing ethics, ontology, and epistemiology is 
needed.  Call it a guide to the philosophy of public health.”17 
 
Weed proposed a three stage process for deriving a philosophy of public health.  “In the first 
phase … practitioners would use a philosophical idea to illuminate an issue in the practice of 
public health.  Philosophers in turn would use a public health problem to illustrate some 
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aspect of philosophy… In the second phase… more formal philosophical analyses would be 
applied to problems that comprise the ‘matter’ of public health … In the final phase, a 
philosophy of public health would emerge from an examination of the discipline itself as a 
discipline.  A philosophy of public health would consist of a general theory of public health in 
which the problems examined and solutions proposed in the previous phases would be 
incorporated and synthesised.” 
 
Some elements of the work packages of EuroPHEN could have been conducted at a national 
level, but there are a number of reasons why the project should have been conducted at a 
European level.  For example, the challenge of developing a framework for public health 
ethics is common to all Member States, and economy of scale and effort will allow them all to 
benefit from the involvement of ethics and public health experts from across Europe.  
Research conducted at a European level is more likely to provide information to Member 
States on the views of all their ethnic communities of European origin. 
 
3.2 Normative Ethics 
 
One of the classical questions of philosophy, and the central question of moral philosophy, is 
how should one live? Variations on this question are what I do with me life?  What I make of 
myself?  What kind of person I become?   These questions are of importance to all of us, 
although few people normally reflect on them in depth, and if we do, only on rare occasions. 
Moral philosophy, however, attempts to answer the question of how one should live.  Moral 
philosophy can be divided into three basic disciplines: normative ethics, applied ethics and 
metaethics.  Normative ethics provides substantive proposals as to how live, how to act, what 
sort of person one should be. In particular, it attempts to provide a moral framework 
governing these principles, in terms of what is right and wrong and in turn to specify 
associated rights and duties etc.. Much of philosophical argument within normative ethics 
revolves around whether there is a single moral principles from which all other moral 
principles can be derived, or perhaps a comprehensive list of basic moral principles, or at least 
a list of the most important principles. The language of principles is more appropriate than 
that of rules, although some normative theories do construct arguments for rules that apply for 
the entire universe for now and all time. 
 
Since such basic moral principles will probably be stated in more general terms, it may not be 
clear as what should be done in a particular case, especially in morally complex situations. 
This is more likely within a normative framework derived from several fundamental 
principles which conflict or appear to conflict. However, it may even be difficult to assess 
how one fundamental principle should be applied in a particularly controversial issue. Applied 
ethics is therefore the branch of moral philosophy that seeks to apply the general principles of 
normative ethics to such complex problems. Not surprisingly, the moral judgements offered 
within applied ethics can be particularly controversial, e.g. in the context of abortion, 
euthanasia, capital punishment etc. Normative ethics, and in turn, applied ethics are only 
guides in helping to answer moral decisions about whether a particular mother should have an 
abortion, a particular patient should be assisted to die or a particular murder should be 
executed. The distinction between each stage of considering the normative, the applied and 
the particular  is blurred, and more of a continuum from the generality to the specific. 
Metaethics deals with more of the process of how to address moral problems, rather than their 
solution. Although such considerations are important in assisting the concerns of normative 
and applied ethics. For example, when a claim is made that an action is wrong, what exactly 
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does wrong mean? When weighing considerations and claims, what facts are relevant to take 
into account, and how is such knowledge derived. Such questions address the nature rather 
than the content of morality. 
 
The EuroPHEN project is primarily concerned with normative ethics. It is applied  in the 
sense of application to the field of Public Health. But it aims to ask address the question How 
should one practice as a Public Health Professional? (as opposed to how should one live?). 
As with the higher level question, there will be associated normative questions such as What 
are the priorities for Public Health? How should policy be derived? Who should be involved? 
How should policy be implemented? As before, there is a continuum, into more applied 
situations in relation to specific public health policy areas such as tobacco consumption 
reduction, drug control, communicable diseases. EuroPHEN will explore such specific policy 
areas too, however, the focus remains to addressing the normative issues relating to public 
health practice.  
 
The rival normative theories explored within EuroPHEN address how people ought to act, 
morally speaking. They are not claims about how people do act. EuroPHEN has also explored 
how public policy makers act by describing the legislation and policies that they have 
developed and seek to implement. EuroPHEN also explored how citizens respond to these 
specific policies. However, it is important to be clear about the distinction between what 
ought to be and what is. A claim about how people/professionals ought to act should not be 
mistaken for a description of how people/professionals actually act. The importance of this 
distinction is that it is not possible to disprove an assertion as to what ought to be done in a 
particular circumstance just by producing evidence demonstrating that people/professionals 
do not act in this way. Descriptions of the way people do behave are of relevance to ethics. 
Empirical claims may be relevant to defending ethical claims, but is important to remember 
that the two sorts of claim are qualitatively different.  
 
EuroPHEN also explored clinical professional codes of ethics in various countries. However, 
it is also important to distinguish substantive moral claims of normative ethics with mere 
descriptions of the moral beliefs or ethical codes of some group or organisation. These codes 
may have legal or quasi legal standing, for example in regulating professional behaviour, but 
they are frequently derived by committees of professionals with limited or no ethics training 
or input from philosophers. This is not to say that such codes do not have value, indeed may 
have moral value. However, there is a distinction between how a particular body thinks its 
members should act, as opposed to how they really should act. The fact that someone makes a 
moral claim does not necessarily mean that it is morally correct. Just as the earth is not flat 
because someone says that it is. It is also necessary to distinguish to moral from the legal. Just 
because the law permits or even requires that we act in a certain way, does not mean that such 
an act or omission is morally valid. For example, slavery was and killing (in terms of capital 
punishment) is still permitted in some countries. The study of how groups or societies think 
they should act is more properly within the domain of sociologist, historians or 
anthropologists, rather than philosophers. The study of the moral beliefs of different cultures 
does demonstrate that societies have disagreed about moral problems and disagreements 
between protagonists of conflicting positions can help in highlighting strengths and weakness 
or moral arguments. However, it is likely that difference is professional codes, legislation, 
policy etc between European Members States is likely to represent historical and 
epidemiological differences, rather than fundamental differences in what is held to be morally 
correct in one country compared to another.  
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3.3 EuroPHEN Aim and Objectives 
3.3.1 Aim 
 
To derive a framework for producing common approaches to public health policy across the 
European Union by examining concepts of European and universal ethical standards by 
conducting work in three areas: 
• Public health policy and practice; 
• Ethical analysis; 
• Empirical research on public attitudes. 
 
3.3.2 Objectives 
 
1.  To compare and contrast organisation of public health structures in Member States. 
 
2.  To compare and contrast the priority lists identified within Member States. 
 
3.  To compare and contrast public policy responses to selected public health problems in 
Member States and to examine how public policy in different countries weigh competing 
claims of private and public interest. 
 
4 To identify ethical issues that may arise from tensions between the private and public 
interest and to analyse these tensions in the context of various ethical theories, principles 
and traditions. 
 
5.  To identify the elements or characteristics of a public policy programme that influence 
when and why societal intervention is or is not appropriate.   
 
6.  To examine how citizens in different countries and cultures weigh competing claims of 
private and public interest and view the appropriateness of public health intervention at 
national or European level. 
 
7.  To understand the implications of any differences between Member States in priority given 
to individual and public interests when attempting to devise international law for public 
health problems that cross national boundaries. 
 
8.  To assess the feasibility and desirability of common approaches to public health within the 
European Union and internationally within universal ethical standards. 
 
9.  Dissemination of project findings to inform policy makers within Member States and 
European Institutions when discharging their public health responsibilities with national 
legislation and the Treaty on European Union. 
 
10.  To put in place project management arrangements to ensure that European funding is 
used prudently and that the project produces the promised outputs. 
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4 Philosophical Theories 
4.1 Social justice and deliberative democracy 
 
Decision-making is a process that is innate to both practicing medicine and running a 
professional practice.  This process can affect the community as a whole, since it involves 
decisions concerning resource distribution and therefore the patients, as the progress of their 
illness can be altered.  The majority of the decisions made are quite complex.  In the resource 
distribution processes, on a macro-level, the complexity lies in the finite nature of these 
resources, and so priorities need to be established.  So, when resources are channelled towards 
a certain illness or patient group, they are taken away from the care of other patients or 
illnesses.  Economists define this concept as opportunity cost.  This concept refers to the costs 
attributable to the financing possibilities that have been foregone in the distribution of the 
resources toward other demands or needs due to established priorities.  This also includes the 
Pareto efficiency concept, according to which, the good that results from the allocation of 
resources to a specific area should outweigh the bad that is produced in the areas where they 
have not been allocated.22 In other words, the measurement of efficiency in the distribution in 
health resources distribution involves an opportunity cost assessment of that decision and, 
therefore, a cost comparison of the various opportunities that are in the need of these 
resources. 
 
From a philosophical viewpoint, the efficiency concept is based on utilitarianism, whose 
utilitarian rule promotes pursuing the greatest good for the greatest number for people as a 
moral basis in decision-making regarding resource distribution.23 Therefore, utilitarianism 
bases its decisions on the application of the cost-benefit analysis, which, in the realm of health 
decisions, takes on the forms of cost-effectiveness analysis and cost-utility analysis.  
Utilitarianism critics maintain that, as a social justice theory, it does not completely respond 
to the Aristotelian maxim of treat equals equally and unequals unequally.  Thus, the 
utilitarian rule could assign the resources intended for unequal needs in an egalitarian manner.  
In other words, utilitarianism would penalise the assigning of resources to those illnesses that 
were not very prevalent, where the decision would result in only a slight improvement or 
where many people would have to be treated only to gain a very small number of successes.  
For the purpose of correcting these potential limitations of utilitarianism, other authors 
propose egalitarian liberalism, whose main advocate was John Rawls.24 This theory of justice 
considers the inequality of opportunities and promotes the so-called, in public policies, 
positive discrimination strategies as a way to correct them.  Rawls’ approach has been the 
object of many moral philosophy reviews, grouped under the concept of social justice 
theories.25 Some authors have proposed the application of these social justice theories to 
health resources distribution.  Finally, the liberal libertarian theories propose that it is the 
market that should promote a fair distribution of health resources, through the laws of supply 
and demand.  These three great social justice theories are complemented with theories that 
emphasise the procedure that accompanies decision-making and, more specifically, the 
democratisation of the decision through the incorporation of the preferences of those affected.  
Among these theories, communitarianism and republicanism are two worth mentioning.  The 
latter obtained its name from the republican works of Cicero in ancient Rome.   
 
The social justice theories mentioned determine the moral bases and, to a certain extent, the 
procedures in which the resource distribution decisions are made.  The complexity of these 
decisions, nevertheless, often makes the application of these theories difficult.  We have an 
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example of this complexity that arises during health resource distribution decision-making in 
the possible contradiction that is produced when having to join liberal egalitarianism, which 
stems in Spain from the General Health Law of 1986, with utilitarianism, which bases the 
cost-effectiveness analysis on that which certain health decisions are based.  A second type of 
theory is proposed, for the purpose of resolving this type of ethical dilemma, which places 
greater emphasis on the procedures through which the decisions are made.  Deliberative 
democracy, or democratic deliberation stands out among these types of theory due to its 
clarity.  This theory originates from the tradition of Pericles of ancient Athens.  26  
Deliberative democracy advocates are set apart, as they come from both the republican-
communitarian and the liberal tradition, where the former seek consensus in obtaining the 
common good, while the latter seek recognition from the masses and, therefore, try to reach 
an agreement regarding the differences in the decision-making processes.  Despite this 
differential nuance, democratic deliberation supports, from a moral standpoint, the adoption 
of the reciprocity principle in decision-making processes.  In this way, deliberative democracy 
would constitute a form of governance in which the free and equal citizens and their 
representatives would justify their decisions through a process in which the reasons that are 
the basis for the decision would be exchanged.  These reasons would be mutually accepted 
and the arguments upon which they were based would have to be accessible to the 
deliberating parties.  The decisions that would be allowed would be those to which all would 
be committed to observe at the present time and to submit to further deliberation in the future.  
27  
  
4.1.1 Principles and criteria of deliberation democracy 
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson describe the principles that should meet deliberative 
democracy and the criteria that allows the assessment of its application in health decision-
making.27 28 Among the deliberative democracy principles are: to facilitate the arguments of 
collective decisions, introduce different viewpoints to the issues that affect the public, 
promote decision processes based on mutual respect, and correct the misunderstandings 
associated with the incorrect interpretation of information or the absence thereof.  According 
to these authors, the criteria that the health decisions should meet should be: accessible, 
moral, respectful and revisable.  One example of a health decision recently made in Spain is 
that of the therapeutic visas or restrictions in the prescribing of specific drugs.  This decision 
can be analysed according to the aforementioned four criteria of deliberative democracy.  
Using these criteria, it can be determined whether the moral positioning has been honoured, 
whereby the authorities should justify their decisions to those who are obligated to comply 
with them.  In this way, the decisions are submitted to the principle of reciprocity.   
 
According to the first criteria regarding accessibility, the decisions concerning therapeutic 
visas should be based on public accessible scientific arguments, easily understood by the 
citizens and professionals who must comply with them and approved by experts unaffiliated 
with the organisation making the decision.  Thus, the decision concerning therapeutic visas 
would be considered accessible if it were submitted to public hearings and defended by the 
health authorities in front of patient representatives, doctors, health professionals, health 
service providers and the pharmaceutical and insurance industries.  The moral criterion 
assumes the setting up of a deliberation forum in which all the agents or stakeholders 
involved would justify their position and views as regards the visa, done so for the common 
good and not in favour of their individual interests.  Recently, one example of the variety of 
perspectives with which the visa’s introduction can be contemplated has been described.  
These two criteria allow the supposition that if someone is convinced that their position is 
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just, responding in an adequate manner to the collective’s needs, they should have no 
objection to defending it publicly and submitting it to public deliberation.   
 
The third revision criterion, that of mutual respect, involves two facts.  The first presumes the 
readiness to listen to and accept others’ values and viewpoints.  The second leads to the 
admission that another’s moral position is as valid as one’s own.  Mutual respect is a moral 
attitude that does not have to lead to agreement between the parties.  So, if, in fulfilling this 
criterion, the moral disagreement persists, Gutmann and Thompson propose seeking 
alternatives that, without eliminating the disagreement, reduce conflict and allow 
compromises to be reached.  An attempt is made to economise the moral disagreements.  In 
the case of the therapeutic visas application, the moral disagreement could be economised in 
different ways.  These include those that are found in a prevalence study of the clinical 
conditions for which the medicines that are the object of the visa are indicated, an analysis of 
the health conditions for which they are being prescribed, more detailed information for 
doctors and patients as regards the circumstances and criteria for which these have been 
approved and the potential improvement in the health care for the patients affected by the 
visa, either through the patient associations cooperation or through improvements in 
specialised care accessibility.  Some of these action plans could take place before the use of 
visa is implemented.  The suitability of the visa could also be assessed through an analysis of 
the results obtained in terms of health outcomes.   
 
Finally, the last criterion concerning decision assessment is that of revision or provisionality.  
Likewise, it is believed that the deliberation process should be reiterative and, thus, all 
decisions should periodically be submitted for review if they are to maintain fairness.  In this 
way, a decision would be charged if new scientific evidence were to arise that changed the 
justifications and arguments that are the basis of the decision, or if the moral values or the 
context in which the decision was made were to change, With these four criteria, deliberative 
democracy adopts the principals of reciprocity and that of accountability as basic elements of 
the health decision making process.27 29  
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4.2 Liberalism and Public Health 
 
The question what implications does liberalism have to public health policies? entails 
different answers depending on the interpretation given to liberalism.  Instead of being a 
unified doctrine, liberalism is a ramified set of ideas on liberty and individual autonomy.  
Some proponents of liberalism stress the value of economic liberty and the freedom of the 
markets and speak for hands-off policies, while others emphasise the first orderness of 
negative individual rights.  These, roughly defined disciples of classical liberals can be further 
divided in libertarians for whom all interference by the state is unjustifiable and in new 
conservatives who try to combine classical liberalism,  its individualism and laissez-faire 
capitalism with what they see as not only justifiable but also necessary interference in moral 
issues.   
 
Some conservatives want to enforce cultural unity and patriotism like Roger Scruton while 
some others, like John Gray, claim that a (classical) liberal society cannot guarantee the 
physical and moral wellbeing of all its members.  In addition, and to make things more 
complicated, there are conservatives who embrace conservative values but keep calling 
themselves classical liberalists – a prime example being David Conway who is convinced that 
growing crime rates are related to the collapse of two parent families and to the fact that 
welfare state has enabled young women to raise children without needing to be maintained by 
the fathers of these children – something a true liberal would hardly claim.30 The problemacy 
of different interpretations of liberalism is obvious in his statement that “the term ‘liberal’ has 
now come to stand in some countries, notably, the USA, for someone who supports 
egalitarian policies.  The classical liberal view has some to be called ‘conservative”.31 
 
The new conservatives have also joined ranks with communitarians in their critique of 
individual autonomy, which according to them, is valuable if and only if one’s personal 
choices promote good life, as they see it.  But, to demand that autonomous choices fulfil 
certain inner criteria in order to be respected makes this stand necessarily anti-liberal, no 
matter how individualist and liberty-oriented they might be in economics.  Millean 
individualism and autonomy would, according to these conservatives, only hurt the 
community and its members by undermining what is good for people.  This perfectionist, 
paternalistic and moralistic view is best depicted by quoting John Gray’s words: “the 
conservative individualist, unlike the Millean individualist, can have no objection to policies 
of legal prohibition of these sorts, where other measures are demonstrably ineffectual, and 
the activities proscribed pose a real threat to the values that sustain a liberal society”.32 
 
“Government has a legitimate interest in protecting us from self-harm, if only because there 
are few such harms that are not also harms to others.  …In the idiom of modern moral 
philosophy, government – and certainly conservative government – has good reason to 
undertake policies of paternalism and moralism, where these can expect a decent measure of 
success.”33 
 
For Gray as well as for many who share similar views, there are choices that nobody in their 
right mind would make.  And it is this keen interest in the content of our self-regarding 
choices, which makes it difficult to see them as sincere defenders of liberty – as they proclaim 
to be.  How is it possible to simultaneously praise individual liberty and its first orderness 
among values and claim that people be prohibited, if necessary by law, from making self-
regarding choices which by conservative standards are unintelligible to more rational citizens.  
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This controversy also means that this kind of emphasis on liberty cannot be seen as a true 
representative of liberalism. 
 
In addition to libertarians, we do have a variety of mainstream liberalists for whom individual 
autonomy in inviolable but who, unlike the libertarians, claim that human wellbeing requires 
a certain amount of positive rights and corresponding duties.  Most often these liberalists are 
known as welfare or egalitarian liberalists and sometimes they are referred to as revisionist or 
modern liberalists, especially when seen as a counterpart for classical liberalists.  They may 
be classified as deontologists or consequentalists or even rights emphasising but consequence 
sensitive (like Hart and Dworkin), the common nominator being that they all speak for 
individual autonomy in self-regarding matters and for state neutrality between different 
conceptions of good.  Also, they value individuality, individual rights and freedom and a 
certain notion of equality, and their belief in rationality allow them to believe in social 
improvement in Enlightenment’s spirit.  According to them, state’s role should be restricted to 
the prevention of harm, which may occur by actively harming people or, equally well, by not 
responding to their basic needs.  John Stuart Mill already pointed out the importance of 
positive conditions such as education for the meaningful realisation of individual liberty.  As 
Andrew Kernohan puts it: “liberals do not take a stand on the truth or falsity of a person’s 
beliefs about what constitutes the good life.  That is the point of the liberal commitment to 
tolerance and the neutrality of the state.  …However, there is one ethical belief on which 
egalitarian liberals must make a stand: egalitarian liberals are committed to the equal moral 
worth of persons…The liberal state is to remain agnostic about the truth or falsity of different 
substantive conceptions of how to lead a good life.”34 
 
This is exactly what separates liberalism from conservatives and communitarians for whom 
the state should take an interest in what constitutes a good, bad or evil life.  John Kekes, a 
conservative himself,  has interpreted the difference quite rightly: “The liberal intuition is that 
justice requires the recognition of the equal right of human beings to the resources they need 
for living autonomously.  The contrary intuition is that justice makes the right to such 
resources contingent on what their recipients deserves.  The liberal intuition is motivated by 
the egalitarian belief that at a fundamental level all human beings have equal worth.  The 
contrary intuition is motivated by the antiegalitarian belief that the worth of human beings 
varies with their moral merits”.  35 
 
In public health as well as in other areas of public policies, Kekes and other conservatives 
want to ask the liberal authorities “how could it be maintained that good and wicked people 
should be given the same amount of scarce resources?” (p208).35 For liberals themselves, the 
question is pointless since in equity’s name, only two issues need assessment.  Firstly, what 
people’s basic needs (no matter how defined) are and secondly, whether we have reason to 
believe that those in need genuinely benefit from assistance. 
  
4.2.1 What does liberty mean and why is it important? 
Liberal thinkers have usually defined freedom either as the lack of constraints or as the ability 
of individuals to decide for themselves what happens in their lives.36 Within the most classical 
forms of liberalism, to say that people are free means primarily that they are not legally or 
otherwise coercively prevented from acting according to their desires and plans.  In practice 
this would mean, for instance that no one should be legally denied access to houses with 
sanitation or medical services on offer.  This definition is, however, problematic since 
individuals are not always free, at least not according to everyday thinking, even if they are 
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not hindered from doing what they desire, or want to do.  If my poverty forces me to live 
without sanitation or lack of medication kills me and my family, it might be misleading to 
praise my freedom. 
 
On the other hand, the non-restriction of options and the capacity to make autonomous 
decisions have been seen as valuable in the liberal tradition.  Some theorists have thought that 
the value of freedom is intrinsic and intuitively detectable to anybody.  They think that it is 
symbolically important to individuals to know that there are more books in the nearby library 
than they are ever going to read, and more restaurants than they are ever going to visit.37 
These theorists may also believe that the freedom of choice exemplified by the books and 
dishes is somehow self-evidently valuable, and should in no way be restricted.  There are, 
however, difficulties with this argument for freedom and its symbolic value.  A wide range of 
choices can, of course, be symbolically exhilarating and personally satisfying but if this 
liberty seriously interferes with others’ liberties, not to mention their welfare interests, 
egalitarian liberalists should be ready to consider restrictions of freedom.  They should accept 
that some of the money meant for library books is spent, if politically so decided, in elderly 
care.   
 
In a liberal welfare state, one of the major challenges is the constant bargaining about 
resources between different sectors of public services like education, health, social security, 
public works and within these particular sectors.  This means that there may be major 
differences in views about the proportional importance of various preventive measures in 
matters concerning people’s health.  This constant battle for scarce resources has accentuated 
the need for efficiency in public services.  Although efficiency is a necessary instrumental 
value in the provision of these services, it may easily become an all-encompassing value for 
the most market-oriented politicians.  If this happens, concern for equality and individual 
autonomy quickly vanishes into thin air. 
 
Other champions of liberty have argued that the value of freedom is instrumental rather than 
intrinsic.  A society, they say, which does not unduly interfere with the choices of its 
members encourages their creativity, genius and industriousness.38 These qualities are seen as 
valuable because they lay the foundation for material wellbeing and cultural flourishing in a 
society, and bring happiness to the nation as a whole.  The flaw of this defence is that it 
cannot be supported by empirical proof.  A better way to defend the value of freedom can, I 
think, be found.  First, the value of freedom of action and choice is instrumental, and it is 
based on the fact that the non-restriction of a person’s options is, to some degree at least, a 
necessary condition for autonomous decision-making.  Second, autonomy and self-
determination are valuable in themselves, since they belong to the primary elements of a good 
and happy human life.  Material well-being is, no doubt, possible without liberty and 
autonomy, but whether or not such welfare is worth pursuing is another matter.  The 
happiness and wellbeing that most ethical theories see as the highest goal of human life 
conceptually presupposes that individuals are free to decide what the direction of their life and 
their actions is. 
 
According to the basic principles of Millean liberalism competent individuals are fully 
entitled to make choices which they themselves or others regard as irrational.  Rationality and 
irrationality can be defined in many ways, but no morally neutral description can in and by 
itself legitimise the use of coercion on others.  Besides, most forms of rationality are such that 
individuals cannot even in theory be forced to assume them.  The consistency and realism of 
people’s beliefs, which is sometimes seen as a hallmark of rationality, can be increased by 
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education but it can seldom be furthered by legal sanctions – Prohibition laws in the U.S.  and 
in Finland in early 20th century pretty much prove the point.   
 
Some moralists have challenged this strictly liberal view by arguing that irrational decisions 
are never autonomous: individuals who continuously make them should be likened to the 
mentally ill and the emotionally disturbed.  The proponents of more moderate doctrines have 
suggested, accordingly, that choices which are not rational should be restricted on the grounds 
that they are not sufficiently self-determined.  But seen from the Millean viewpoint this 
argument is skewed.  When competent human beings make informed decisions without the 
coercive influence of others, the ensuing actions are autonomous in the relevant technical 
sense even when they can be depicted as self-destructive or silly. 
 
4.2.2 Freedom and democracy 
In a heterogeneous, pluralist society, it would be difficult to find ethical and political 
principles that everybody can both condone and understand in the same way.  Hence it is not 
reasonable to see public health policies solely as part of political and democratic decision-
making.  Public health must be based on scientific research which gives essential background 
information about probabilities and causalities regarding possible health hazards.  This 
information, however, is not normative.  The fact that saturated animal fat is bad for our 
health does not mean that either sale or consumption should be prohibited because of this 
causal connection.  In a liberal society, the information should be available for all and people 
encouraged to choose healthier alternatives but the final choice should be left to people 
themselves.   
 
On one hand, in a democratic society, politics may dictate how resources are divided between 
and within different sectors of public services – whether for instance health education is seen 
as more important than cancer screening programs.  What majority politics, on the other hand, 
cannot do is to use arbitrarily chosen criteria to determine who is included and excluded.  
Commitment to equality and impartiality means that it would be justifiable, in consideration 
of both scarce resources and empirical medical evidence, to exclude, for example those under 
thirty from free routine cholesterol check-ups.  On the other hand it would not be justifiable to 
demand that citizens who are not committed to the use of vegetable oils, should pay for the 
tests themselves.  Egalitarian, welfare liberalism requires that people are not discriminated 
against because of their economic situation, beliefs, values and what others might call their 
moral worth.  Liberalism’s tight connection to democratic decision-making does not in itself 
imply majority rule in issues that reflect on individual rights.  Value neutrality demands that 
the authorities defend policies where antipaternalistic concept of liberty is combined with 
impartial concern for equally needy.   
 
The most important question concerning the proper limits of individual liberty is whether 
public health policies and public health care respect enough people’s own wishes and 
interests, and, at the same time, protect them from each other’s conflicting choices, even if it 
sometimes means that people’s preferences have to be laundered in order to achieve tolerance 
and reciprocal forbearance.  If I am ready to participate in medical costs of clotted arteries, 
caused by indulgence in rich, unhealthy eating habits, an anti-smoking butter-and-eggs eater 
should be equally ready to participate in costs caused by smoking.  In a liberal society public 
health authorities should promote autonomy-respecting health programs which ideally aim at 
rendering people aware of the conditions of their own health.  What they are not allowed to do 
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is to find ways to manipulate, threaten or coerce people into choosing healthier life-styles, 
simply because manipulation, threat and coercion undermine individual autonomy. 
 
4.2.3 Welfare of the population 
Individuals are usually the best judges of their own lives and their own life quality.  If they 
see their lives as good, then it is not the legitimate business of others to intervene without 
explicit permission.  Similarly if individuals deem their lives to be worthless other people 
should not automatically try to keep them alive.  But what if public health authorities want to 
restrict the liberty of individuals in order to promote the welfare of the population at large? 
The issues of medical prevention from quarantines to prescription drug laws draw their 
justification from the public good instead of the good of the ones whose freedom is restricted.  
But how to know when this public good or general welfare of the society it genuinely at stake 
and when certain precautions are based on irrational and moralistic fears that people may have 
towards each other? 
 
When it comes to social issues like protecting individual patients against the greater interests 
of the rest of the society, disagreements are likely to emerge.  In our heterogeneous liberalist 
societies, some people believe in torturing potential terrorists while some others do not even 
believe in quarantining people who carry fatal contagious diseases.  In both cases the conflict 
occurs between individual’s rights and the general welfare of the society.  In public health, 
potential measures may range from practices which can be regarded as strictly authoritarian 
and policies which would be accepted by the most extreme liberals.  On one hand, causing 
anguish and fear among people who relapse in their attempts to lower their slightly high 
cholesterol level cannot be justified in a liberal framework but, on the other hand, attempts to 
influence people’s behaviour by providing them with truthful information about the 
connection between lack of calcium, motion and osteoporosis cannot be seen constraining.  
Individuals simply cannot make autonomous decisions without adequate information.  And, in 
addition to that, they need critical thinking in order to be able to distinguish misleading 
marketing, propaganda and normative wisdom from scientifically justifiable facts. 
 
Unfortunately – and this cannot be emphasised too much - what some medical authorities tend 
to forget is that knowledge about the health hazards of certain life-styles does not mean that 
the citizens should act accordingly.  Individual citizens usually let their passing wants, life-
style values and other possible factors influence their preferences and choices even if they do 
believe the probabilities served by medical authorities.  In other words, anti-liberal medical 
authorities who prefer prohibitions and restrictions to information campaigns and health 
education, justifying them with the ineffectiveness of antipaternalistic means, are (in fact 
either mistaken in their views or) fundamentally insensitive as regards claims to personal 
autonomy and individual self-determination.  Public health authorities may try to say that it is 
not their aim to distress people and to promote authoritarianism, their sincere aim simply 
being to promote the physical wellbeing of the population.  Most of us are willing to admit 
that at least certain level of physical health is necessary to our all-over wellbeing but that this 
admission does not mean that health and wellbeing as seen by medical authorities would be 
the one and only or even highest goal in a liberal, democratic society.  Public authorities 
should recognize that civil liberty is among the values which ought to be protected by policy 
makers.   
 
A firm commitment to liberty should imply that the freedom of individuals to smoke, drink, 
eat saturated fatty foods and avoid exercise annuls the official obligations and entitlements to 
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interfere with the self-chosen life-styles of the adult population.  Someone might want to 
argue that the only things that can be achieved by unhealthy life-styles are transitory pleasures 
now, and an increased probability of illness and premature death in the future.  Still, in a 
liberal society the value of people’s transitory pleasures cannot be that easily discarded.  
Since a liberal society is based on the idea of neutrality in conceptions of good, avoidance of 
health risks and maximisation of physical health does not become a duty just because it 
happens to maximise the good as seen by the public authorities, however well-informed and 
rational they may be.  In a liberal democracy, individuals should be entitled to make their own 
decisions, when these decisions concern only or primarily themselves.38 This means that 
people can quite legitimately make choices which are bad for their own health.  The greater 
knowledge and impartiality of the authorities guarantee their expertise in the epistemic sense, 
but when it comes to matters which fall within the scope of people’s self-determination and 
autonomy, they are morally on their own.   
 
4.2.4 An example: how can autonomy be respected in health education? 
Granted that autonomy is valuable and that it should be respected in health policies what does 
this mean for health education which is the corner stone of what public health authorities are 
supposed to do in a liberalist society? Gerald Dworkin has presented the following list of 
attitudes, norms and preferences which are usually associated with respect for autonomy in 
policy-making: 
1. We have favourable attitudes towards those methods of influence which support the self-
respect and dignity of those who are being influenced. 
2. Methods of influence which are destructive of the ability to individuals to reflect 
rationally on their interests should not be used. 
3. Methods should not be used which affect in fundamental ways the personal identity of 
individuals 
4. Methods which rely essentially on deception, on keeping the agent in ignorance of 
relevant facts, are to be avoided. 
5. Modes of influence which are not physically intrusive are preferable to those which are. 
6. There will be some restrictions on the time in which the changes take place and the ability 
of the agent to resist the effects of various modes of influence. 
7. We prefer methods of influence which work through the cognitive and affective structure 
of the agent, which require the active participation of the agent in producing the change, 
to those which short-circuit the desires and beliefs of the agent and make him a passive 
recipient of the changes.39 
 
Although Dworkin’s points are rather general, many of them can be employed almost directly 
to the assessment and redefinition of health education.  The following practical guidelines, 
which are partly overlapping, are perhaps the most important that can be derived from 
Dworkin’s ideas: 
1. Modes of health education that violate the autonomy of individuals should not be 
encouraged. 
2. Self-evidently, health education should not involve punishment. 
3. Modes of health-education that enhance the autonomy of individuals ought to be 
encouraged. 
4. Health education should not be frightening or overly emotional, nor should it evoke 
feelings of guilt or build up undue pressures in the life-styles chosen by individuals. 
5. Health education should be ideally to disseminate truthful information about the causes of 
ill health and the dangers confronting people at home, at the work place and elsewhere. 
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6. Since lying and deception are to be condemned, public health authorities should not 
conceal, or omit to inform people about, the good effects of life-styles which are regarded 
as unhealthy, for instance, the advantages of consuming moderate quantities of alcohol.40 
 
If all these norms are taken seriously, health education ceases to be a mechanical means to 
promote people’s physical wellbeing, and becomes an autonomy-enhancing method of health 
policy.  The best way to define this policy is to say that, instead of trying to make people 
healthy against their own wishes, health education should aim at making people aware of the 
conditions of their own health.  Individuals cannot be legitimately forced into physical 
wellbeing regardless of their self-determined decisions, but they can, and should, be informed 
about the factors that are relevant to their health.  The availability of the information can 
eventually lead to the improvement of the physical wellbeing of the population, but if it does, 
this should be treated as a bonus, not as the primary goal of health education.   
 
In addition to face-to-face clinical paternalism and public health education, the populations of 
our societies are also subject to more delicate and far more extensive forms of possible 
intervention.  These include laws regulations dangerous behaviour in everyday life, 
regulations concerning the manufacture, advertising, sale and consumption of drugs and 
intoxicating substances, and preventive medical and socio-political measures such as 
quarantines, vaccinations, and plumbing.  In fact, a surprisingly large part of these regulations 
and activities are ethically unproblematic, either because there are good non-paternalistic 
grounds for upholding and approving them, or because their paternalism is, measured by the 
standards of freedom and autonomy, clearly legitimate or illegitimate.  Quarantines and 
quarantine-like measures such as home arrest, electronic surveillance, compulsory 
hospitalization and imprisonment are justifiable, if they are justifiable, by an appeal to the 
potential harm inflicted on other people by carriers of communicable diseases.   
 
In a liberal, egalitarian society there are many qualifications which reduce the ethical 
acceptability of isolation policies in real-life situations: the threat posed on others may be 
symbolic rather than concrete, the isolation can be comparable to imprisonment of a person 
who has never committed a crime, the identification of the ones to be isolated would 
sometimes require serious violations of civil liberties, and compulsory hospitalizations lack 
medical purpose when no actual cure is available.  We should not forget either that elements 
of xenophobia, prejudice, moralism and misleading interpretation of probabilities may 
seriously endanger civil rights.  Once again, the promotion of so-called general good – 
whatever it happens to be – is not the only ethical consideration when coercive policies are 
discussed in a liberal framework.   
 
Liberal intuition in social and medical policies may lead to combining need-based positive 
claim-rights with the antipaternalistic, negative concept of liberty.  This implies that 
individuals should be left free to make their own choices, provided that the consequences of 
their decisions are not likely to have a negative effect on the basic need-satisfaction of others.  
In this model there is no assumption of other agents – be it the state, community, cultural 
leaders, religious teachers, being more knowledgeable than the individual themself regarding 
their life-style choices.  No one is supposed to possess normative wisdom entitling them to 
paternalistic behaviour if and when we are talking of ordinary adult citizens.  The prevailing 
premise is that human beings can and should be free even if their actions seem irrational to 
others.  As I said earlier, what distinguishes welfare or egalitarian liberalism or liberal 
egalitarianism (whatever name we want to use) from libertarianism is that the former take 
people’s needs fully into account in ethical and political decision-making.   
A Normative Ethics Framework for Public Health   EuroPHEN 
  63 
 
Libertarians can happily live among people who suffer from easily curable diseases and 
injuries but those who have taken to egalitarian ideals, even in their individualistic forms, 
cannot.  In health care policy-making liberal egalitarianism stands for an extensive system of 
public health care, accompanied with a zealous respect for the autonomy of patients and other 
users of the services.  Democracy in this model means both concern for the well-being of the 
population and consideration towards the privacy and freedom of individuals.  Respect for 
individuals should not be mistaken for unquestioning respect of group rights and group 
autonomy.  The ideal of toleration and respect for people’s values and beliefs does not mean 
that self-professed leaders can make, in the name of cultural, ethnic or cultural rights demands 
for special treatments or exempts in practices merely be reference to the fact that they 
represent a minority.  Taking individual rights seriously is the only way to at least try to 
guarantee that all citizens are equal members of a democratic – and liberal – society.   
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4.3 Kant’s philosophy and the understanding of public health 
 
Public health is to do good, either to promote health or to prevent disease.  Programs of 
promoting more exercise, avoiding fat, stopping smoking and reducing alcohol intake are all 
driven by the impetus to do good in society.  These programs thus enact prescriptions on how 
to live lives individually and collectively.  The goals and the means to be used are mostly 
framed in terms of individual and social responsibility: to what extent are individuals 
expected to take up responsibility for the care of their bodies and lives and to what extent may 
they be framed, enforced or limited in living their lives? May individuals be forced to be put 
in quarantine when afflicted by infectious diseases such as tuberculosis or SARS? May 
individuals be forced to give up risky behaviour such as smoking, eating fat, living a 
motionless live or performing stressful work? Should citizens contribute to the prosperity and 
wealth of the community? Should compulsory measures be permissible to ensure greater 
equity in society, in the sense that all citizens should share the risks and benefits of public 
measures? The answer to these questions given by the public health community would often 
be yes! The basic question that remains is to what extent individuals may be forced, that is, to 
what extent public health programs may be voluntary or mandatory. 
 
This tension between personal freedom and collective good is framed in terms of individual 
and social responsibility.  Whereas in former times the emphasis was put on personal 
freedom, in recent years a shift is notable towards the collective good: citizens have a 
responsibility, obligation or even a duty to contribute through their healthy behaviour to 
society at large.   
 
In this way the fundamental tenet of public health is by-passed: what is public health anyway? 
What is the deeper sense of the notion of public in striving for public health? Kant’s 
philosophy is relevant here, precisely because it asks fundamental questions about our views 
on the notion of public, of doing good, and of individual and social responsibility.  The basic 
line of argument in Kant’s philosophy is that any attempt to do good is inherently operating 
power.i In this respect any public health policy of benevolence is exerting power and control.ii 
But power has to be legitimized.  According to Kant the framing of any public problem 
cannot be based on doing good only.  Rather doing good should be framed as doing right and 
the notion of public should encompass the power position of those, including officers like 
public health professionals, who claim to do good on behalf of society. 
 
This chapter elaborates on the power and potential of Kant’s philosophy for the field of public 
health in three parts (after the first section which presents an introduction to and exposition of 
Kant’s moral and political philosophy).  These three parts deal with three principal ways that 
the public health community is avoiding the fundamental question: what is public health? 
                                                 
i In medical ethics and practical philosophy a distinction is made between beneficence and non-maleficence, that 
is between promoting good and preventing harm. This topic between the ‘positive’ and the ‘negative’ side in 
medicine and health care that is between disease and health is bypassed in this paper. The issue of power and its 
legitimate basis is fundamental both to preventing harm (or disease) and promoting good (or health).  
ii Foucault in fact has taken up this Kantian point, first in addressing in his doctoral thesis Kant’s ‘Anthropology 
in pragmatic perspective’, then in ‘Les Mots et Les Choses’, by arguing that in modern societies power operates 
not through repression, coercion and direct control, but through experts, science and expert knowledge. Whereas 
Kant looked for ways such power could be criticized and reflected upon, Foucault took up Kant’s point of subtle 
power in society as if such a power could not be resisted or criticized. Cf. Hemminger A. Kritik und Geschichte 
Foucault – eine Erbe Kants? Berlin: Philo, 2004. 
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The first way is to argue that the doing good or the preventing bad is justified because the 
good or the bad is intrinsically good or bad, whence the promoting of the good or the 
preventing of the bad is considered to be intrinsically justified.  Kant’s answer is that this is 
not enough; the crucial thing is to do just (or to do right). 
 
The second way is to frame public health measures in the oppositional scheme of individual 
versus social good (and responsibility), say, broadly speaking, the opposition between 
liberalism and communitarianism.  In this way public health issues seem to be necessarily 
framed as restricting or relaxing freedom of individuals as individuals or as members of 
groups.  Kant transcends this opposition showing that individuality can only be constituted in 
sociality, but, conversely, that sociality can only be constituted through individuality.  
Although Kant is considered one of the champions of liberalism – and indeed he is – his 
position is quite unique, because he holds a relational view on individuals and communities 
co-constituting each other, particularly focusing on substantive autonomy as a way of 
inclusion and social participation. 
 
The third way the public health community is avoiding the basic question by framing public 
health issues in terms of responsibility, that is, that one should respond to one’s actions to 
others.  This view implies that the consequences of one’s deeds are morally relevant by 
themselves.  The person who drinks, eats fat, smokes and lives a stressful live can be held 
responsible for his or her early death, whether it is due to myocardial infarction, lung cancer 
or some other medical condition.  Kant, however, notes that the effects of one’s deed do not 
carry any intrinsically moral load.  Two car drivers causing quite similar traffic accidents with 
quite similar consequences because of a quite similar cause, i.e.  some mechanical problem of 
the brakes, are quite differently judged knowing that the one driver was and the other driver 
was not neglecting regular check up of his or her car.  Most interpreters have argued that Kant 
is vehemently opposing utilitarianism – and indeed he was as we will see later on – but the 
ensuing conclusion that Kant is therefore a deontologist does not hold.iii Instead he holds a 
relational view on the actions and their consequences similar to his views on property and 
ownership: being the owner of some object, a house, a car or something else, is not a 
relationship intrinsic to the owner and that object, but is intrinsic to the relationship between 
persons, the one having certain entitlements and obligations whereas the other person has not. 
 
In exploring these three ways in which the public health community frames public health 
issues, the problems associated with the very notion of public in the conceptualisation of 
public health itself is, become evident.  Kant is one of the few philosophers (with John Dewey 
as another good exception), who deeply thought over the problematic nature of the notion of 
                                                 
iii This refers to the ‘new’ literature on Kantian philosophy, which exposes that Kant’s philosophy should be read 
much more in a pragmatic, ‘Aristotelean’, and political way. Cf. Herman B. The Practice of Moral Judgment. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993; O. O’Neill. Towards Justice and Virtue. Cambridge 
University Press, 1996; Allison HE. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990 ; 
Wood A. Kant’s Ethical Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
References to Kant’s political essays in this paper will be to the translations: Kant’s Political Writings, trans. 
H.B. Nisbet, ed. by H. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd enlarged edition, 1991) for “An 
Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?”, pp. 54-60; “On the Common Saying: ‘This May Be True in 
Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice: II. On the Relationship of Theory to Practice in Political Right”, pp. 
73-86; “Perpetual Peace: Appendix I On the Disagreement between Morals and Politics in Relation to Perpetual 
Peace”, pp. 116-125; “Perpetual Peace: Appendix II On the Disagreement between Morals and Politics in 
Relation to the Transcendental Concept of Public Right”, pp. 125-130 ; “The Metaphysics of Morals: The 
Theory of Right, PartII: Public Right”, pp. 136-175. 
A Normative Ethics Framework for Public Health   EuroPHEN 
  66 
public, again and again.  If this is taken into account, then public health may become a sound 
practice, a practice which not only performs benevolent programs and policies, but which 
critically reflects upon its own ends and goals and acknowledges its powerful position in 
modern society. 
 
4.3.1 Kant’s moral and political philosophy: an introduction 
Kant is considered as the most significant Western philosopher since Aristotle and the Greek 
tradition in philosophy ranging from Plato, Socrates and Epicurus.  Kant is believed to be the 
founding father of the concept of autonomy, both in the European and the Anglo-American 
context.  Beauchamp and Childress explain that respect for autonomy flows from Kant’s 
recognition that “all persons have unconditional worth, each having the capacity to 
determine his or her own destiny.  To violate a person’s autonomy is to treat that person 
merely as a means, that is, in accordance with other’s goals without regard to that person’s 
own goals”.41 Indeed, Kant has inspired and still inspires many debates in health care and 
public health, perhaps also because of his views on duties, obligations and responsibility, 
concepts which are so prone in debates on freedom and communality in health care, public 
health and in society at large; some authors inspired by Kant will reappear in this chapter. 
 
Kant’s philosophy has been interpreted in terms of autonomy, self-determination, integrity 
and privacy amidst the other thinkers of liberalism such as John Stuart Mill and John Locke.  
This interpretation is a very narrow conception of the philosophy of Kant.  Such a narrow 
conception fits the instrumentalization and rationalization in contemporary society and 
medicine, but is not adequate.  The central problem Kant was working on was on bridging the 
moral choices of the individual and the community, the secular and faith based systems of 
right and good, and the persons in power in society – including professionals in health care 
and public health – and the citizens in the community at large. 
 
The following case presented by Bernard Williams in his moral luck debate with Thomas 
Nagel, and further discussed by Donna Dickenson42 might help to introduce Kant’s 
philosophy: 
 
A traveller into a South American market square, Jim, meets Captain Pedro who is about to 
execute twenty Indians.  Pedro offers Jim a chance to save all the Indians but one, whom Jim 
must kill with his own hand.  If Jim refuses, Pedro says that all the executions will proceed; if 
he assents, Pedro promises that the other nineteen Indians will go free. 
 
Interestingly, Williams concludes, rather grudgingly, that the utilitarian prescription – that Jim 
should kill the Indian – is right in this case, but not for the conventional utilitarian reasons.  
Those who wants a more contemporary example may choose the example of the policeman 
and the terrorist and ask whether it is allowed to torture the terrorist in order to find out 
information about a bomb which certainly will take the lives of many innocent citizens.  In 
any case, a Kantian could and would argue, as many interpreters of Kant’s philosophy have 
concluded, that Jim should not shoot one of the Indians to save the others.iv 
                                                 
iv Kant discusses these issues in his essay: “On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives”. (see in: 
Abbott T.K. (trans.) Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics. London: 
Longmans, Green and Co.). In this essay Kant asks whether you should tell the truth to someone who comes to 
your door asking if someone who he says that he wants to murder is inside. Yes, says Kant, and up to now many 
philosophers, sympathetic to Kant’s philosophy, are struggling with this case, with the intent of ‘trying to rescue 
Kant from himself’. Cf. Proceedings of the Kantian Society 2007 (forthcoming). 
A Normative Ethics Framework for Public Health   EuroPHEN 
  67 
 
How should ethics deal with such a case? Kant gives two answers.  His first answer is the 
categorical imperative expressed as follows: “An action is morally right for a person in a 
certain situation if and only if, the person’s reason for carrying out the action is a reason that 
he or she would be willing to have every person act on, in any similar situation.” 
 
In this respect, two criteria are at stake: 
1.  The person’s reasons for acting must be reasons that others can act upon, at least in 
principle (a principle has to be universal); 
2.  The person’s reasons for acting must be the reason he or she would be willing to accept 
when applied to his or her self (a principle has to be reciprocal). 
 
The fundamental tenet of Kant’s philosophy focuses on the interior features and not on the 
consequences of an individual’s external actions.  Moral right and wrong do have to be 
distinguished according to Kant not by what a person accomplishes as such, but by the 
reasons a person gives for what he tries to do.  We can easily understand from the case above 
what Kant had in mind: the outcome of Jim’s action – either accepting or refuting the offer of 
Captain Pedro – is not less good  (if considered as good) or not less wrong  (if considered as 
wrong), if Captain Pedro would shoot the Indians whatever way Jim decided.v 
 
The second answer Kant gives is his tenet for “treating humanity as an end”, which can be 
expressed in the following principle: “An action is morally right for a person if, and only if, 
in performing the action, the person does not use others merely as a means for advancing his 
or her own interest, but also both respects and develops their capacity to choose freely for 
themselves.”  
 
Two criteria are involved here as well: 
1.  Respecting each person’s freedom by treating others only as they have freely consented to 
be treated beforehand; 
2.  Developing each person’s capacity to freely choose for him or herself the aims he or she 
will pursue. 
 
Thus, we might discuss the case of Jim and Pedro in terms of whether Jim’s freedom was 
respected.  No, Kant would say, not because Jim had no choice – he was given a choice – , but 
because Pedro’s offer included no moral choice set on Kant’s terms.vi 
 
The crucial thing Kant is saying is that it is not good outcome but the intrinsic features of the 
action themselves which determine whether actions are morally right or wrong: a personal 
                                                 
v This has been debated in philosophy under the label of the ‘moral luck’ banner, which is only one of the 
aspects Kant worried about, he was much more interested in the ‘other side of the medal’, namely in those cases 
where the outcomes were good, but not due to external contingencies, but due to ‘internal’ dispositions, being a 
crook, a Samaritan, or whatever, but NOT following the duty of the moral law: the paradigmatic case here is all 
those in power who always claim that a certain policy is the right thing to do in terms of what is ‘good’ to do 
(and not ‘right’ or ‘just’). 
vi The issue, as discussed by Dickenson (see Moral Luck in Medical Ethics and Practical Politics. Hants: Gower 
Publishing Company Ltd, 1991, p. 5), is that Kant is concerned with the question that there is a “quintessential 
form of value, moral value, which is ‘unconditioned’, that is free from external contingency; but other 
contingencies have to be considered, such as ‘constitutive luck’, that is, good fortune in having the ‘right’ or the 
most praiseworthy inclinations, abilities, or temperament (p. 5) – say Jim had the moral luck for doing the good 
thing because he was lucky enough for his character. Again, this passes the point Kant was trying to capture, i.e. 
to do good by doing right or just (in particular for those who are in power). 
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promise, a debt to another person, a relational feeling such as in a parent-child, brother-sister, 
or friendship relation or the fairness of distribution do carry their own intrinsic features.  
Friendship includes that one should not give up one friend in order to gain two other friends.  
Pedro’s action to shoot one Indian in order to rescue the others is not better or worse 
considering his state of mind, being a Samaritan (because of its nature of character or his 
Spartan education to fear nothing or his religious belief to do only good things).  Kant 
vehemently opposes the other grand tradition in ethics, namely the consequential or utilitarian 
ethics, which says that the right action for a particular occasion is the one that produces 
greater utility than any other possible action.  In the case described above the best action to do 
then is not that which produces the most utility for the person performing the action nor that 
action which produces the most utility for all persons affected by the action, including the 
person performing the action.  That Kant opposes utilitarian philosophy is important for two 
reasons: one is that Kant is particularly focusing on the problem how an individual’s and 
community’s moral life can be enriched intrinsically; the other that Kant builds his 
philosophy on the Aristotelian virtue ethics: Kant’s work is much more on moral character 
instead of rigid duties and obligations as many have interpreted Kant. 
 
Kant’s central notion therefore is not autonomy as such, but human dignity, reason and 
responsibility.  Kantian ethics directs the individual to associate with and speak out in the 
community, thus not focusing on a liberal, atomistic view of individuals, but on a social self 
that lives in and through the community.  Reversely, Kant was very much interested in how 
communities could enrich themselves.  The paradigmatic case here is the bonding of parents 
and children in order to let the children leave those social bonds and find their own yet new 
social bonds. 
 
Most philosophers have interpreted Kant’s philosophy as a universalistic, deontological 
ethics.  However, Kant’s philosophy is not strictly deontological as many have interpreted.  
Kant’s search for ethical principles is not a search for (universal) features of human beings.  
Rather is it a search for how ethical systems have to be constructed.  It is not the state of mind 
of Pedro which decides on the goodness of his actions (whatever way he would have decided: 
either to reject or to accept Pedro’s proposal).  So it is not the internal disposition of the 
ethical agent per se which counts, it is the practice and the ethical fabric of this practice which 
is decisive.  One way to clarify this is to look at the example of the police officer shouting at a 
skating girl: “The ice over there is weak”.vii Who wants to understand what the police officer 
is doing here has to focus on what the police officer is doing, namely warning! Crucial to the 
acting of the police officer are not intentions – the officer might be in a good mood, the 
skating girl is her daughter or the officer is driven by philanthropy, sense of duty, or stickling 
for regulations and discipline.  Perhaps there were no intentions at all.  Instead, the kernel 
here is the practice of warning: its style, conventions, rules, etc.  The warning itself is 
considered by Kant as an action with moral worth, neither because the police officer has good 
intentions nor because the warning produces the wished for result by saving the girl.  
Whatever result and whatever accompanying dispositions of the officer in warning the skating 
girl, WARNING (in such circumstances) is by itself an ethically sound practice. 
 
Kant’s philosophy is indeed universalistic in the sense that his universal principle of right, in 
conformity with his categorical imperative, says: “Any action is right if it can coexist with 
                                                 
vii See for such a very apt analysis of ‘rules’ and ‘rationalities’ of practices: De Vries G. Zeppelins – Over 
filosofie, technologie en cultuur [Zeppelins – About Philosophy, Technology, and Culture]. Amsterdam: Van 
Gennep 1999, p. 132. 
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everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of 
choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law.”  
 
But mostly, it is neglected that the second and most important aspect of this universalism, is 
in fact the reciprocal feature of the categorical imperative.  If I am willing to claim that 
people should not eat fat because they show risky health behaviour, other people might ask 
for reasons why I show my own sort of risky behaviour, say being very ambitious and leading 
a stressful life.  If someone argues that he or she does not want to live in a kind of world with 
people showing risky behaviour, other people can argue why they should live in a risk-
averting world.  Rights (and norms) are in Kant’s view relational affairs, but not only 
negatively.  Property rights are relations between people, not only in the sense that other 
people are forbidden to trespass my home or that my home remains mine still when I am not 
at home, but they are also productive in social behaviour: I can invite people at my home, I 
can show hospitality, I can ask other people for having meetings to associate, and so on.  Yet, 
most of our rights (and ethical norms), so Kant claims, are not strict and conclusive, but are 
mostly provisional.  Kant is here quite modest, since he is dealing with the fundamental 
question who shall be judge of political right? In the absence of perfect divine judgment and 
of reliable judgment on the part of rulers, politicians, and public officials, Kant identifies the 
public sphere as the most important place to approximate perfect judgment on matters of 
right. 
 
Thus, Kant is not a top-down but a bottom-up ethicist.  His maxims or rules of conduct are 
Wittgensteinian sort of rules “containing as much of the particulars of person and 
circumstance as the agent judges are necessary to describe and account for his proposed 
action”.43 Kant’s ethical agents are not naïve; they are embedded in life forms and practices.  
The man on the boat saving his wife knows that saving his wife matters to him, but saving her 
on a Tuesday is not relevant (but might be later on as a celebration day).  This is the big 
difference with Rawls and Habermas.  Saving as a practice has its own ethical fabric and is 
therefore not unconditional, e.g.  by saving someone while throwing someone else overboard.  
In this way Kant’s moral philosophy is connected to his political philosophy.  Any practice 
cannot be justified in terms of doing good (or preventing bad) only.  The principles making up 
the ethical fabric of that practice have to be the right principles.  Right in the sense that 
practices encourage citizen autonomy along with civil rights, rights of participation and the 
social basis of the use of these rights.   
 
4.3.2 The first way: Doing good and the problem of instrumental 
rationality 
There are many challenges to the public health.  Obesity is a world-wide problem; pollution 
causes many thousands of deaths; HIV spreads over the world; infectious diseases, once 
conceived of as being eradicated, threaten modern societies; burnout and stress endanger 
wealth and prosperity and the young and women increasingly drink and smoke.  In the early 
1980s, carefully controlled, scientifically designed health promotion interventions – such as 
the many heart disease prevention programs (the Stanford three- and five-community studies, 
the Minnesota Heart Health plan, the Pawtucket trials, the Karelia intervention, the highly 
intensive and individualized Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trials (MRFIT) – did not 
produce much success.  Thus, the public health community urgently felt the need for some 
wins in improving the public health approach.  One of the main thrusts to achieve this was via 
reduction in tobacco consumption.  The evidence on the morbidity and mortality associated 
with smoking is clear (although still disputed by some in the tobacco lobby).  By presenting 
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this evidence to the public and use of various incentives and restrictive measures, public 
health professionals have succeeded in reducing smoking prevalence from 70% in the 1950s 
to 30%.  As a consequence harm from smoking related disease is prevented.   
 
The pessimistic view on public health is exposed by critical thinkers such as Buchanan44.  The 
optimistic view is held by communitarian thinkers such as Beauchamps.  Both views can be 
found in the public health community, although the science driven health promotion paradigm 
dominates.  This unstable opposition between the pessimistic and the optimistic view on 
public health will not be resolved in this chapter.  On the contrary, we have to delve deeper, 
because this analysis will show that a common theme underlies both sides.  A good start is to 
analyze one critical thinker, namely Buchanan.44 
 
The major line of argument against current public health practice Buchanan derives from the 
philosopher Charles Taylor – particularly his analysis The Malaise of Modernity (1992) – 
which traces two important principles, on the one hand the dark side of individualism and on 
the other hand the primacy of instrumental reason.  The latter is especially picked up by 
Buchanan.  Instrumental reason is the separation of ends and means, hence determining the 
best available means for the ends set by public health.  As defined by Taylor: “By 
‘instrumental reason’, I mean the kind of rationality we draw on when we calculate the most 
economical applications of means to a given end.  Maximum efficiency, the best cost-output 
ratio, is its measure of success” (p10).  Indeed, many of the ends set by the public health 
seem to be fixed and indisputable: stop smoking, avoid fat, exercise more, eat healthy food, 
etc.  The only remaining issue then is what the best and most effective means are.  On this 
basis Buchanan criticizes the public health community: “the quest for a science of health 
promotion both reproduces and reinforces the instrumental outlook that Taylor and others see 
at the core of our modern moral malaise” (p11).  Indeed, relevant passages can be extracted 
from the public health field to sustain this claim: “research programs have been established 
to identify and test the most effective methods for achieving individual behavioral change” 
“randomized control trials are the most rigorous tests of health behavior interventions”, and  
“the search for truth and for an ultimate understanding of the forces that make humans think, 
feel, and act as they do is the long-term goal”45.  In these and other cases there is no 
discussion on the ends themselves.  The criticism Buchanan44 exposes is to focus again on the 
values underlying the process of setting the ends: well-being, virtues, autonomy, solidarity, 
etc.  We do see here how Buchanan departs from Kant’s philosophy stating that in 
scrutinizing public health ends, as Buchanan says quoting from Kant’s philosophy: “Act so 
that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of another, always as an end and 
never as a means only”. 
 
Kant’s categorical imperative indeed forms an important yardstick for evaluating the ends set 
by the public health community.  However, Buchanan’s44 main argument here is that if, and 
only if, the ends have been set reasonably, through some sort of deliberative process, then the 
rest follows.  Thus, as Buchanan says, “It does make a difference, for example, whether young 
people consciously and deliberately choose not to use drugs, or whether their attitudes are 
effectively altered through ‘indirect influence techniques’ and ‘conditioning in low thought 
situations’.” Likewise, people may lose weight by taking pills, but they will not gain the 
dignity and self-respect that comes through exercising self-control.  Buchanan44 quotes the 
sociologist Robert Bellah at length who spells out the implications for health promotion: “The 
purpose … is not to produce or control anything but to discover through mutual discussion 
and reflection between free citizens the most appropriate ways, under present conditions, of 
living the ethically good life … It is precisely the point about praxis [social practice] that it 
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has no extraneous product.  It has an end, namely, the good of human beings, but that end is 
attained through itself, that is, through action or practice that is ethical and political ….  For 
‘helping professionals’, this would involve toleration of high levels of uncertainty in trying to 
aid people to improve their own skills of practical autonomy, rather than categorizing them in 
terms of preconceived theories with resulting automatic formulas for treatment.(p19)” 
 
In line with Bellah’s reasoning Buchanan44 asks for modesty on behalf of public health 
professionals and rightly so.  High levels of uncertainty should be the credo as well as the aim 
to interact and deliberate over the ends to be set.  This has a strong Habermas’ kind of ring, 
which indeed can be extracted from Kant’s philosophy as Habermas did.  But Kant is quite 
sceptical about this approach of social deliberation as it stands alone.  The reason is that any 
practice which aims at doing good has a drive of domination and control.  As Dahrendorf 
writes, “it is difficult to think of human association without an element of domination.  Where 
there is society, there is power”.viii  
 
This approach set by Buchanan44 and others is deeply flawed.  It avoids the fundamental 
problem.  The public health community feels intrinsically responsible for promoting public 
health and rightly so.  If smoking leads to morbidity, and particularly in innocent people, e.g.  
children, pregnant women, asthmatic people etc., then certainly one would like to develop 
programmes and policies to promote the good and to prevent the bad.  If providing healthy 
food programs in schools and at work improve health, one would surely enact such programs.  
“Nevertheless, … the inherent exercise of power [in developing techniques to effect behavior 
change] remains a problem”.ix The key tenet here is that both sides identify the problem of 
domination, power and control at the same level, namely at the level of the relationship 
between ends and means.  Buchanan and other critics of the public health endeavour to solve 
the problem by improving the setting of the ends.  Thus, Buchanan refers to Selznickx: “The 
claims of efficiency are strong, but they cannot justify practices that reduce human beings to 
‘means only’.  Such practices make them victims of domination”.  Domination is the key term 
here, indeed, but cannot be rescued in terms of social deliberation for setting the ends alone, 
since it still aims at benevolence alone.  The proponents of the public health paradigm hope to 
solve the problem through relaxing the methods, that is by flexibly moving between the 
offerings of methods on a voluntary or a mandatory basis, but again lacks the legitimate basis 
by denying justice.  Both approaches will not do as Kant’s philosophy exposes.  For, public 
health intrinsically engages in a practice of doing good, that is, to aim at making people do 
                                                 
viii Marshall TH, Bottomore T. Citizenship and Social Class, London: Pluto Classic Press, 1992, p. 26. In the 
public health literature this is also known as the ‘democracy problem’, that is should experts of the public set the 
ends of public health policies (cf. Murray CJL, Salomon JA, Mathers CD and Lopez AD, eds. Summary 
measures of population health – concepts, ethics, measurement and applications. WHO Geneva 2002, 
particularly part 12 and 14.) 
ix quoted from Buchanan, p. 15 c.f. Nordenfelt L. Towards a new paradigm for health promotion. Medicine, 
Health Care and Philosophy 2000; 3:317-319, who makes the argument that Buchanan does not criticize the 
biological kind of public health, say for instance environmental policy or biomedical prevention. The problem is 
however deeper, because it affects both sides, e.g. enacting laws for banning smoking relates both to behaviour 
of people and ‘biological effects’, i.e. the reduction of lung cancer caused by passive smoking. It is about the 
question of making to do people what one wants them to do through more or less persuasive or even compulsive 
measures (referring to Nordenfelt p.319).  
x Buchanan claims that Selznick ‘brings home the Kantian point’. In fact, he doesn’t as is argued in this paper: 
the setting of the ‘ends’ should be captured within the framework of Kant’s political philosophy, which claims 
that the setting of the ends cannot be based (in any politics or policy) on the notion of benevolence alone, but has 
to be framed within the notion of the just or the right. 
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what one wants them to do through more or less persuasive or even compulsive measures.xi 
Kant offers here a painstaking analysis in stating that enacting policies to do good can never 
be based on benevolence itself, as utilitarianism, communitarianism, or (egalitarian) 
liberalism would have it.xii 
 
Admittedly, many public health programmes and policies do not aim at promoting good 
behaviour only, proposing health and related conditions in terms of equity and fairness, say 
by promoting equal opportunities and defining health as a resource for social participation.  If 
so, then such programs and policies cannot frame the issue in terms of benevolence.  The 
benevolent policy should also be a just policy, a policy that performs the right thing. 
 
In this sense the passive smoking case is such an intriguing case.  For, few public health 
officials seem to acknowledge that the end of reducing passive smoking should be disputed – 
this is the point of Buchanan44 – whence compulsive measures are ethically justified because 
the harm to be prevented is so huge.  Even raising questions with regard to this strict banning 
policy provokes disbelief and disdain amongst public health professionals.   
 
Here is the problem: where is the injustice which should be repaired and compensated for or 
which should be prevented? Those who think that this is a silly question, might get the 
boomerang back.  For, anyone who defies this question, claims that doing good is by itself the 
legitimate ground for enacting public policies.  Yet, this would implicate that all kinds of 
behaviour considered deviant by the majority of the population – ranging from homosexuality 
to nasty fat people to eccentric artists – can be banned under the label of doing good to 
society.  Reversely, this implies that all kinds of behaviour considered virtuous by the 
majority of the population can be the legitimate ground of public policies. 
 
This leads to the moralizing of politics, whether this is inspired, in the words of Taylor, by the 
dark side of individualism or the bright side of communality.  This leads to a political 
philosophy which starts from the distinction between the individual and the social, instead of 
the distinction between the private and the public, which plays a crucial role in Kant’s 
political philosophy and which has been taken up by Dewey more than a century later.   
 
4.3.3 The second way: individual and social responsibility 
Public health programs enact prescriptions on how to live lives individually and collectively.  
The goals and the means to be used are mostly framed in terms of individual and social 
responsibility, whence the tension between personal freedom and collective good arises. 
 
The basic point Kant makes is that the fundamental opposition is not individual – social, but 
public – private.  Here is how Dewey formulates the problem: “Just as behavior is not anti-
social or non-social because privately undertaken, it is not necessarily socially valuable 
                                                 
xi cf. Nordenfelt L. Towards a new paradigm for health promotion. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 2000 
xii We should distinguish between the moral and political aspect of the problem of doing good. Much of what 
Kant argues regarding moral behaviour is related to the interactions between moral agents. But the power of 
Kant’s analysis lies in his political philosophy, that is, the way rulers and civic officials – which the ‘helping 
professionals’ of public health are – exert control and domination. The policies of rulers and officials cannot be 
based on benevolence alone. Utilist reasoning says something like to do good is to produce the most happiness, 
communitarianist reasoning that which produces most to the community, and liberals which produces the most 
freedom (either in a strict individualistic or egalitarian way, the latter if it takes the distributing effects of 
freedom into account probably comes most close to Kant). 
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because carried on in the name of the public by public agents.  (…) We distinguish private 
and public buildings, private and public schools, private paths and public highways, private 
assets and public funds, private persons and public officials.  It is our thesis that in this 
distinction we find the key to the nature and office of the state.  It is not without significance 
that etymologically ‘private’ is defined in opposition to ‘official’, a private person being one 
deprived of public position.” 46 
 
It is precisely this notion of public official which plays such a crucial role in Kant’s political 
philosophy in which he talks about public and private reason (a topic also picked up by 
Hannah Arendt).  A private use of reason is, Kant says, “that which a person may make of it 
in a particular civil post or office which is entrusted to him”.47 In such a case the audience to 
which the office holder addresses himself is restricted.  Then, Kant says while pleading for 
the public use of reason: “But I hear from all sides the cry: don’t argue! The officer says: 
‘Don’t argue, but rather march!’ The tax collector says: ‘Don’t argue, but rather pay!’ The 
clergyman says: ‘Don’t argue, but rather believe!’ (…) Here freedom is restricted 
everywhere”.47 Kant’s use of the notion of private reason is therefore specific.  What he has in 
mind, is not that private reasoning is merely personal or individual, but is restricted to the civil 
post or office. 
 
The gist of Kant’s thinking is that public officers are facing a double task.  They are, as an 
officer holder, bound to the regulations, instructions and conventions of their office.  In these 
cases their position is defined by the authority of their office, whence their audience is 
restricted and their use of reason merely private.  In these circumstances public officers 
communicate with each other but on Kant’s view much of that communication presupposes 
some authority, say the policy, style or culture of some ministry department, committee or 
organization.  Only, if an officer rejects such authority and “as a scholar addressing the real 
public (i.e.  the world at large) … speaks in his own person”,47 a public use of reason takes 
place. 
 
Kant used the dichotomy public and private upside down.  The word public denoted in 
German political and juridical circles the domain of public affairs reigned by the prince.  Kant 
turned the meaning of the term public around, and used it to break up the power of the state 
and its executive organs.  Yet the countervailing power is not the public out there, the public 
in Kant’s view is a space where the regulators and executors can throw off the yoke of power 
and authority.  Kant was talking about the liberating forces in the regions of power, not in the 
wider audience itself.xiii Kant is trying to liberate forces within the offices of power 
themselves, claiming that this yielded reflective understanding to the centre of power.  
Freedom benefits the sovereign; otherwise the sovereign would be deprived, as Kant wrote in 
1793, “of any knowledge of matters which he himself would change if only he knew them.  
Hence, to limit this freedom would bring him into contraction with himself”.xiv Kant is here not 
acting in the deliberative mood; instead he is working in the reflective mood.xv 
                                                 
xiii Kant was much more sceptical about the power of this wider audience than Habermas and Rawls later on 
presumed.  
xiv Laursen, p. 258.JC. The Subversive Kant: The Vocabulary of 'Public' and 'Publicity'. In: Schmidt J., ed. What 
is enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century answers and Twentieth-Century questions. Berkely: University of 
California Press 1996; (chapter 9), pp. 253-269. Here and elsewhere Laursen claims that Kant implicitly exposes 
a subversive political view. This might be so in authoritarian Prussian society, but Kant touches a ‘deeper’ 
problem: the reflective nature of power and the union of power with morality. 
xv Habermas did misinterpret the ‘communicative’ (or in his terms the deliberative) part of Kant’s philosophy, 
since the communication is meant to ‘reflect’ on the authority of the restricted audience. 
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In this sense Kant opposes the dominant tradition in political philosophy – from classical to 
contemporary views – which directs our thinking to the subjects of power, but not with those 
who exercise the power that impedes or promotes justice.  This relates to politics with its 
dramatic and heroic ring – we know Watergate, we know September 11th, we know Iraq; this 
also relates to the daily routine of political power with its marginal and incremental effects on 
the lives of citizens, multiplying the matters of justice and injustice.xvi 
 
Kant is therefore using the terms public and private different as contemporary strands of 
politics and political theory, such as liberalism, usually frame it.  The latter pose government 
versus citizen, coerciveness versus individual liberty, and public versus private.  From such 
oppositional perspective all sorts of infringements on the citizen, on individual liberty, or on 
the private sphere, if allowable at all, require scepticism, are in need of legitimisation, and ask 
for public consent.  This important strand of thinking is present in Kant’s work as well.  After 
all, as Reiss notes, Kant was a champion of liberalism.48 However, there is a second strand of 
thinking in Kant’s work.  Kant is putting emphasis here on the morality of political power.  
Hence, he focuses on the use of (private and public) reason by rulers, politicians, 
administrators and other public professionals.  They should become self-determined, 
judgmental and responsive officials and should be reflective on their own governing 
practice.49 In this sense, there is a need to enact learning processes and to develop institutional 
mechanisms to provoke voice within the power circles of social, economic and political life.50 
 
The tenet of Kant’s political philosophy is therefore: rulers and public officials always argue 
for the justness of their policies in terms of benevolence.  Even in the case of war, it is argued 
by the rulers in power that wars are in general not doing the good thing, but this one war is 
just because it produces the good thing: the security, the wealth and prosperity of the country, 
or whatsoever.  This pertains not only to international politics or national politics, but the 
more so to all those public officials who operate the administration, the economy and the civil 
society.  Although public health scientists and professionals tend to see themselves distanced 
from politics and administration, as being at the service of the public, in Kant’s view they are 
in power, whence eager to justify their policies and methods in terms of benevolence.  
Autonomy and freedom are therefore not features of individuals and communities per se, but 
characteristics of an institutional practice in which public policies are criticized and reflected 
upon in terms of just and unjust and right or wrong.  Individuals and communities co-
constitute each other through autonomy and freedom. 
 
4.3.4 The third way: the framing of the public problem as responsibility 
The public health field frames the notion of public in terms of responsibility for the 
consequences of behaviour.  Smoking is bad behaviour because it hurts many people.  Eating 
fat or exercising too little is bad because it weakens health and fitness, hence disturbing 
prosperity and wealth of the community.  Kant considers this way of reasoning as a dead end. 
Why is this so? The point Kant is making is that the goodness or badness in the consequences 
of human actions can never be the sole ground for approving or disapproving or enforcing 
behaviour.  It is not the consequences themselves but the way people relate to each other 
                                                 
xvi Cf for this intriguing view Thompson D.F., Political Ethics and Public Office. Harvard University Press, 
1987; esp. p. 7. This does not exclude that Kant in other places does use the notion of ‘subject’ in the ordinary 
sense that the citizen is ‘subjected’ to the head of the state or the ruler. Cf. On the Relationship of Theory to 
Practice in Political Right, p. 84 and p. 85. 
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through these consequences which is crucial.  Why is it ethically justifiable to – or at least 
ethically reasonable to ask the question whether one should – put a person afflicted with a 
highly infectious disease in quarantine? Not because of the consequence itself, but because 
the way we relate to each other through the consequences of our acts: spreading infections to 
other people can’t be the ethical fabric of a sound practice.  Otherwise one cannot make a 
difference, as Tomas Nagel does, between the person who knows and one who does not know 
they are infected with HIV, while both are infecting someone else with HIV after sexual 
intercourse, which in reality did occur.  The person who does know they are infected with 
HIV, hereby knowing that he or she might through his or her actions willingly hurt other 
people, does injustice.  Yet, two persons, one infected with HIV and the other one not, both 
knowing this and agreeing on sexual intercourse, although highly undesirable and probably 
disapproved by many in society, would not be unjust by itself (in Kant’s moral philosophy, 
that is his philosophy regulating behavioural practices between free and autonomous persons, 
this could be considered actually impermissible).  Both cases undoubtedly lead to a different 
ethical judgment.  Here Kant comes close to Mill’s argument that freedom can be infringed 
when causing harm to others through operating his or her freely chosen actions.  Yet, there is 
an important difference.  Even if the other person ends up being inflicted with HIV, this 
would not count as being unjust per se.  Harm has been done, but no injustice – which is 
something else than the problem of significant harm.  This is the major difference between 
Mill and Kant.  Doing harm is one thing, doing unjust harm is another thing. 
 
Italian law penalizes persons smoking in the presence of a pregnant woman or a breast-
feeding woman – no substantive harm is directly suffered by this particular woman (or child) 
from the exposure to smoke from one cigarette.  One could argue that this is a relatively 
trivial case.  The harder case is whether – on the collective level – one is ethically justified to 
force people such as in the case above to avoid having intercourse (or, more preferably for 
many perhaps, to force to have only safe sex, e.g.  because of costs for society, the suffering 
of the families of the two persons, or whatever).  Similarly, passive smoking can be conceived 
of as unjust because of the costs for society, in which case, the Italian law mentioned above, is 
just because it symbolizes and expresses the collective concern.  Indeed, this would be the 
line to follow in what Kant argues.  But again, any proposal in this direction cannot be based 
on benevolence only.  It has to be just. 
 
Why is Kant so eager to preserve this distinction between doing good and doing right, 
between consequences of human actions and (un)just consequences? Four reasons come to the 
fore, the first political, the second epistemological, the third conceptual, and the fourth ethical.   
 
The first reason is the formulation of a problem as a public problem.  Dewey takes here the 
Kantian point: the distinction between the social and the individual is no reliable yardstick for 
any public policy, for as Dewey says “The public cannot be identified with the socially useful” 
(p.13).  So the notion to do good cannot be the defining and justifying ground of the public.  
The public has to be defined differently, namely in terms of “the indirect consequences of 
transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences 
systematically cared for”, that is consequences which are considered as unjust, say companies 
which dump chemicals in farmers’ grounds, fast food companies who erect shops close to 
schools, etc.  Why are they unjust? Because consequences are of two kinds, those which 
affect the persons directly engaged in a transaction, and those which affect others beyond 
those immediately concerned.  In this distinction we find the germ of the distinction between 
the private and the public.  The former is related to the domain of ethics: moral and immoral 
behaviour to be regulated, the latter to the domain of politics (where the moral judge in most 
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cases according to Kant should be the public sphere with the vitality of associating and 
respecting freedom). 
 
Thus, Kant attempts to keep the bonds between the subject as the author of the action and the 
action (with its consequences) as its object.  Yet, simultaneously, he tries to keep the judging 
in terms of just and unjust, since this is the basis for “systematically cared for”.  In 
contemporary philosophy of risk this is seen as the outstanding challenge: either to shift away 
from the notion of authorship and extending the sphere of risks so extensively with the 
perverse effect that then “the more pressing and urgent is the search for someone responsible, 
that is, someone whether a physical or legal person, capable of indemnifying and making 
reparation.  It is as though the multiplication of instances of victimization gives rise to a 
proportional increase in what we might well call a social resurgence of accusation.  The 
paradox is immense: in a society that speaks of solidarity, out of a deliberate concern to 
reinforce a philosophy of risk, the vindictive search for whoever is responsible becomes 
equivalent to a reintroduction of the culpability of those identified as the authors of any harm 
done”.51 
 
The second reason is that Kant doubts that all the consequences can be known.52  Only those 
consequences that arise in the direct transactions between persons can be known.  Kant is 
discussing the scope of responsibility: how far in space and time does the responsibility for 
our acts extend? This scope is unlimited on his view for “the chain of empirical effects of our 
acts is virtually endless” (ibid p.30).  Kant’s rationalism has been considered by many (e.g.  
Nussbaum) been as opposed to emotionalism, say, the role of emotions, character and social 
circumstances.  In fact, Kant took the opposition to the utilitarian view on action, since the 
objective evaluation of harm tends to obliterate the evaluation of the subjective link between 
an action and its author, thus putting the moral value of security at top level instead of 
justness (that is of solidarity: we feel at face value that unjust consequences should be cared 
for and retributed).  Kant reflects here on the tradition in Christianity and philosophy: 
responsible is to account for, that is, can be imputed to someone (an individual or a 
community) which comes from the Latin word putare, which actually implies the notion of 
calculation (in Latin: comput), suggesting the idea of a kind of moral bookkeeping of merits 
and demerits, thus of receipts and expenses, credits and debits, with an eye to a sort of 
positive or negative balance (p. 14). This relates to the Christian idea of the great book of 
debts: the book of life and death.  Only a super being, a divine being, can master such a book.  
Kant’s idea is that as rational beings gifted with the capacity of giving reasons for acting and 
exerting agency, we sense the justice and injustice of actions on the face of it.  However, the 
calculation of all the consequences of our acts, individually or collectively, is impossible as is 
the calculation of all the (unintended) consequences of our interventions to prevent unjust 
consequences.  We see, feel, sense and judge (in)justice of our actions directly, but we can’t 
see, feel, sense, and judge all the consequences of our actions. 
 
The third, conceptual reason is that Kant rejects moral value as a preference set, or as moral 
choice set.  Versus choosing, he sets his notion of willing.53  The basic idea here is that Kant 
says that in many situations of individual and collective lives where we value affairs, our 
valuation is not the scanning of a delimited range of acceptable moral options and then 
picking out the most attractive member in the set.  Besides the problem of settling the difficult 
question how to choose the moral choice set anyway, Kant here opposes the restaurant menu 
paradigmatic case (although he admits that in many areas of our lives, we can follow this line: 
discuss things in terms of a choice set, preferences, selection and opportunity costs).  But for 
most of the situations in which our (moral) valuations are at stake, we really follow a radically 
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different structure of reasoning which does not fit into these categories.  If we would relate 
with a partner or marry someone, we do not line up people to choose or select the one we 
would like to have as our partner.  Similarly this is the case with acting as a parent, a friend, a 
colleague, a professional, or whatsoever. As Dan-Cohen notes, “When we are in the grip of 
moral truth, we are moved by its intrinsic value, rather than by its comparative advantage 
over other acceptable alternatives” (p. 130).  Giving up one friend to gain two or more other 
friends is not included in the meaning of friendship.  Now certainly in Kant’s philosophy a 
difficult metaphysical picture is underlying his philosophy: “the moral law is no more an 
option for the will than resisting gravity is an option for an apple” (p. 136), but any person 
can sense the inevitability of the moral position: being a parent is to care for your children 
whatever costs this takes, for your self or for others; to defend your country, implies to take 
care for society and dear ones at the cost of your self, etc.  Why can we then on Kant’s view 
take collective measures to systematically care for the consequences of female incision, the 
silent raping and violence at home – say the missing 40 million women in our world statistics 
as put forward by Amartya Sen –, or the repair of the loss of life years and loss of QALY’s in 
lower social-economic groups? Not because of the consequences themselves, but because in 
our moral values of home, partnership, friendship, parenthood, but also neighbours and 
fellow citizens, lie intrinsic value structures which defy the actions stated before.  It is not 
because of the consequences per se, but because these consequences can and should be 
considered as unjust and therefore as to be taken systematically cared for.  Not the harm, but 
the injustice, that is, the infringing of the inner structure of these values, is at stake. 
 
Similarly, public health measures do have to take up health as an intrinsic value, not as an 
outcome or as a consequence of the myriad of micro-decisions of individuals and 
communities, but as a personal and social condition of vitality, creativity and sociality.  In 
such cases we repair and should repair unjust inequalities in terms of opportunities, social 
capacities and environmental conditions. 
 
In short, a conception of autonomy and freedom that consists of options and the agent’s 
choosing among them is quite at odds with Kant’s description of the moral experience and his 
conception of the freedom of persons and communities. 
 
The fourth, ethical reason is Kant’s notion that responsibility is the constitution of individual 
and collective selves and identities.54  Choosing is a poor model for how personal and 
community life is constituted.  The one view is the separatist conception: I could have gone to 
law school, to medical school, to philosophy school; I could have lived a life with smoking or 
non-smoking, drinking or not-drinking, eating meat or not eating meat, being ambitious or 
not, living a stressful live or not, having children or not.  The assumption is that I or You or 
We understand our autonomy as a matter of choosing important aspects of our lives from a 
variety of options and opportunities.  This is the typical utilitarian (or Anglo-American) 
viewpoint.  On this view the identity of either individuals or communities is considered to be 
fixed (antecedently to or independently of the person’s or group’s life).  One can just choose 
one or the other option! 
 
The other constitutive view holds that a self, either of an individual or a group, is constituted 
or shaped by its life, that is, the identity is inseparable from the person’s or group’s life. 
 
This is a difficult terrain in philosophy of identity and responsibility.  But the point Kant is 
making here is that responsibility constitutes selves and communities in a reciprocal way.  We 
may explain this by the reciprocal way of how being responsible implies both taking subject 
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and object responsibility.xvii If I am causing an accident by my negligent driving, I can take up 
object responsibility (causing the accident), but also taking up subject responsibility 
(admitting that it is due to my negligent driving).  If my child breaks the window of my 
neighbour, playing hockey or soccer, then I can take up object-responsibility (accusing my 
self and paying up for the broken window), hereby taking up subject-responsibility: It was my 
child and I am responsible as a subject for my child’s actions.  BUT: taking up object-
responsibility and hence subject-responsibility I constitute my identity, being a father, and 
constitute a social and group identity, this is the way fathers (or mothers) should take up 
responsibility (both in an object sense and a subject sense).  Kant takes up the communitarian 
view here, namely by constituting selves one constitutes collective identities and reverse. 
 
Now the issue is that the bond between those two forms of can be broken up: I might deny 
that I am the parent, I might deny that I am responsible for my child’s actions (say he or she is 
22 and has done something wrong, e.g.  smoking in the presence of a pregnant women or 
living an ambitious life or becoming an addict), I might deny that the child is my own blood; 
or I might deny that the child in fact did it, that the window was already broken, that the local 
community does not provide a playing ground for hockey or soccer.  In both directions, the 
parent severs the bond between subject and object responsibility, but also the parent constitute 
different identities: I am not the parent, my child is an addict or lunatic, the local community 
does not take care for children. 
 
Besides the point that Kant agrees and would agree with liberals such as Locke and later on 
Mill and others that most of these affairs should be the affair of citizens and not of the state, 
that is, that the regulation of the interplay between subject and object responsibility should 
have the judge of the public sphere (and not government or any other public institution, 
whence a restriction on mandatory measures proposed by the public health community as an 
expert and public official laying down measures top down instead of promoting the capacity 
and vitality of the civil society), there is another point.  This is, that in this back and forth 
process, identities are constituted and constructed. 
 
4.3.5 Concluding remarks 
In this review of Kant’s philosophy and its potential for an ethics of public health, we have 
seen how Kant disposes with the command and control structure society, which typically 
featured in 18th century authoritarian Prussian society.  Instead he asks for recognition of the 
morality of any top down politics and policy and the role of public officials in society.  
Although many public health professionals and experts would consider themselves at far 
distance of politics and bureaucracy – aren’t they serving the public? – Kant is precisely 
addressing the issue how reasonable and just policies serving the public should be enacted.  
The underlying impetus can’t be the principle of doing good, it should be accompanied by the 
judgment of justness.  Just in Kant’s term is quite different than notions of equity or fairness 
presuppose.  It is about (indirect) consequences of actions outside the domain of control and 
care by communities and other forms of association.  In this respect Kant’s view on three 
points have been attempted to made clear: 
1.  his view on instrumental rationality: the setting of ends and correlatively the selection of 
preferable methods 
                                                 
xvii This is taken from the philosopher Meir Dan-Cohen, who takes up on the one hand the Kantian view but on 
the other hand (what he claims) the social view; my point is that the crucial philosophical lesson of Meir-Cohen 
is perfectly in line with what Kant was aiming at. 
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2.  his view on public and private (experts and officials) transcending the distinction between 
the individual and the social 
3. his view on responsibility hereby constituting identities of individuals and communities 
 
The bottom line of Kant’s thought is to reject the top down, command and control structure of 
societal regulation.  Instead he is avant la lettre proposing concepts of governance, voice and 
citizenship which are now quite important issues in contemporary political philosophy.  In 
this sense the point of this paper is quite provocative: claiming that the rigid, principle based 
and duty freak kind of reading of Kant’s philosophy should be reclaimed by a reading which 
focuses much more on the virtue based, anthropological and pragmatic side of Kant’s 
philosophy, as well as on the importance of Kant as a political philosopher (reading his moral 
philosophy and philosophy of right in terms of his political philosophy rather than the other 
way around which is the received view, but which is commentated and has been substituted 
by the new reading following critics such as Allison, Wood, O’Neill, Herman, and many 
others. 
 
Thus, Kant is putting emphasis here on the morality of political power.  It is remarkable to see 
how Kant’s work parallels Hirschman’s work, who also puts much emphasis on the producing 
forces of knowledge, products and power.  The issue for Hirschman is that many goods, 
private but certainly public goods, are complex goods.  In most institutional domains such as 
health care, education, childcare, and labour arrangements, the quality of public products is 
not easy to determine.  This applies the more so, when services are developing.  In those cases 
it is unclear what is actually offered; there is no clear yardstick to determine good care, good 
education, etc.  Participants do not know what they want, and in fact, producers of such 
services do neither.  In such situations it is much more adequate to improve the functioning of 
these institutions: “The reality of the situation is that demand for a service has arisen in 
advance of real knowledge of how to satisfy it … the institutional question is here not of 
protecting the consumer, but of educating the producer and providing him with as much 
information as possible about his performance”.55 So, we need to enact learning processes, 
but the focus is on the producers of social and political life and the institutional mechanisms 
to provoke voice.56 In Kantian terms, it is about the power circles of social, economic and 
political life. 
 
The other intriguing insight of Kant’s philosophy is his presuppositions on the notion agency 
and responsibility.  In a revolutionary way Kant forecasts already some of the extreme 
consequences of our notions on deed, risk, and moral worth developing now in our society 
and culture of risk, responsibility and social management.  Kant was deeply involved in this 
area of concern, which seems to be highly relevant to the public health community and to 
current public health practice. 
 
To finalize this point, already elaborated in this chapter, we may capture the famous case as 
presented by Augustinus, the Church Father, concerning committing adultery and marriage 
misconduct.  He presents the case of the man versus his woman, but in our present world 
language it could also be a woman versus her husband, in which case the reasoning runs the 
other way, or it could also be two women or men.  Probably not accidentally, Augustinus did 
not consider these situations.  Here is the case Augustinus presents: A man in a hotel enters a 
room searching for the nice lady he saw in the lobby and ending up in bed with her.  Another 
man enters a room looking for the same woman, but mistakenly he enters his own room and 
he ends up in bed with his own wife.  The third man enters a room intending to go to bed with 
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his wife, but by accident enters the wrong room confronted with that same good looking 
woman of the lobby.  Who is responsible for what in these three consecutive cases? 
 
Similarly: I could meet an Italian, clearly visible pregnant woman and out of my anger with 
the Italian law, I light up my cigarette; I meet the same Italian woman but she is a happy 
smoker and responds to my lighting up the cigarette by smoking her own cigarette; and 
thirdly, I meet the same Italian woman, she smokes and asks me to light her cigarette, but I 
am penalized.  Again, who is responsible for what? 
 
The answer according to Kant has to be sought with reference to the social background for 
constituting and regulating individual and social behaviour.  Indeed, smoking (or other forms 
of bad behaviour) can be considered a public affair, if enacted as a public issue: as external 
costs of (indirect) consequences of acts to others: this is the business of politics on his view.  
It is not the kinds of measures, by law or other enforcing regulations which form the centre of 
politics according to Kant.  His emphasis is on the process through which we struggle to sort 
out what are public and private affairs with respect to the freedom of autonomous persons and 
communities.  But we cannot discuss such issues without acknowledging the fact that in this 
process identities and responsibilities of selves and communities are created, shaped and 
reshaped. 
 
Here comes the Kantian gist.  As always Kant is putting upside down our self-evident, 
common sense, and intuitive feelings and notions: All our collective measures to reinforce 
people’s sense of responsibility by making explicit public announcements on the various 
issues of responsibility – do not smoke, do not eat fat, do exercise, refrain from stress, and so 
on – are supposed to strengthen our identification with the appropriate sources of subject and 
object responsibility.  However, while trying to reinforce our notions of responsibility, public 
health measures as representative of other collective, coercive measures, may in fact weaken 
it.  If we learn that coercive measures apply to the operations of our free will, we may respond 
progressively contracting the latter’s domain.  The paradoxical effect here is that in many 
instances behaviour has to be moralized and blamed for: the person is an addict, the person 
has no control over his or her body and mind, the person has to be corrected.  Increasingly we 
have to describe actions in a deterministic vocabulary designed to place our free will, our 
selves, and our communal life at the periphery of self and communal life, that is outside the 
boundaries of social life.  This in fact leads to minimalist forms of constitution of selves and 
communities.  Instead of accusing liberalism, as Kant actually already conceptualized in the 
1790s (don’t forget that there was a strong communitarian and communist as well as a 
libertarian countermovement against Enlightenment in the late 18th century, a period which 
we now consider as the Golden Age of Enlightenment) of creating atomistic individuals, 
liberalism should be seen on Kant’s view as constituting selves, both individually and 
collectively.  There is no other way.  For, in some cases, we really need to restrict behaviour 
and to enforce legal sanctions as in the case of becoming murderers or terrorists – in which 
case there is a direct link between subject and object responsibility, at least a link which 
should be created according to Kant.  However, in most cases, similar approaches may be 
unintended and unwelcome.  If the mishaps associated with driving, smoking, eating fat, 
exercising too little, living too ambitious lives and other kinds of behaviours considered to be 
unresponsive to society’s needs and goals, carry with them severe social and legal 
repercussions, we may decide to give up all sorts of social behaviour which are vital and 
creative to individuals and communities.  By cutting down responsibilities, individuals and 
communities may draw the boundaries of their selves and their identities more narrowly than 
they otherwise would have done. 
A Normative Ethics Framework for Public Health   EuroPHEN 
  81 
 
Then we end up in the paradoxical in which in the Anglo-American approach we would be 
astonished to learn that the person who deliberately refrains from pulling the drowning child 
out of the pond is not legally responsible for the child’s death – which is in fact the legal case 
in the USA57  – versus the situation in Italy where the person who lights up a cigarette in front 
of a pregnant women will be penalized. 
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4.4 Utilitarianism and Public Health 
 
In contemporary bioethical literature it is customary for people not working in public health 
and not subscribing to utilitarian credos to hold that utilitarianism is the dominant theory 
behind public health.  In this short enquiry into the relationship between the two it is 
acknowledged that while there is some trivial truth to the claim, for the most, it presents a 
gross over-simplification of the matter and can, in fact, be very misleading.  The task in hand 
is made difficult by the fact that there is no one definition of utilitarianism, which, as a matter 
of fact, is a cluster of theoretical approaches that have been used to discuss a wide variety of 
issues from the proper treatment of animals to matters of economic efficiency.  The normative 
content and depth of utilitarianism is to a large degree determined by the definition given to 
utility in any given approach, and further prescriptive variations are brought in by the 
different side-constraints laid upon utility calculations, which have been part of the doctrine 
throughout its history.  The task of defining public health is not much more straightforward; 
politics, for one, has had great influence in determining the goals of public health, and even 
people currently working in the field do not to share a unified moral code.  “Today 
utilitarianism appears to be the dominant view of justice in medical and public health 
policy.” (p15)58    
 
“[Ethicists] have pointed out that the moral theory that underlies most public health 
actions is utilitarianism, which holds that actions are right in so far as they promote the 
greatest happiness (read: health) of the greatest number (p538).”59 
 
The validity of claims like these depends on what we mean by utilitarianism and what we 
mean by public health.  There are a number of ways to define public health, some of which 
simply emphasise a particular aspect of public health while some rule out competing 
definitions.  Public health can, for instance, be said to be concerned with the health of the 
whole population and it can be seen as an attempt to reduce morbidity or mortality within the 
whole population.  In this way it could be seen to echo the basic utilitarian ideals of 
impartiality (as opposed to any kinds of favouritism) and maximisation.60 From the view point 
of public health authorities it needs not to matter who the individuals are, it is about the health 
of the population in general that public health is interested in.  They are also clearly interested 
in the consequences of public health interventions in as much as the success of any public 
health policy is measured by whether it produces the intended benefits.  In actual decision-
making public health is a forward-looking venture; it is about whether this or that way 
forward will produce the desired end-results.  This would, at the very least, seem to make 
public health a consequentialist project.   
 
Utilitarianism tends to make comparisons between various courses of actions and deem one 
better than the other based on which of alternatives leads to the best end results with the 
lowest cost.  Preventive measures are an important part of public health and the justification 
often used is that in the long term they form the most cost-effective approach.  Warning 
people about salt, tobacco, fat and alcohol (provided that people listen) and banning these 
(provided that they obey) are more cost-effective ways of dealing with illness related to the 
over-indulgence of these substances than treating the diseases themselves. 
 
Many other public health interventions are justified by variations of the utilitarian credo that 
we should aim at the greatest happiness of the greatest number.61 Vaccination programmes 
and water fluoridation schemes are justified by the health benefits to the many.  The 
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occasional adverse effects are seen to be acceptable because of the benefits to the rest.  
Similarly the more drastic measures sometimes taken in the name of public health, like 
quarantine, are justified by the benefits to the many.  Utilitarianism is often criticised for 
allowing the sacrifice of individuals in the name of benefit to the greatest number and here 
public health faces similar kinds of charges.  This is an issue that divides the early utilitarians.  
The founder of classical utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham might have allowed the sacrifice of 
individuals because of public health considerations, whereas John Stuart Mill, only a couple 
of decades later, found it necessary to restrict utilitarian considerations with those of 
individual liberty.  While Mill might have allowed quarantine because of harm to others 
considerations, and would have allowed warnings on products known to be dangerous to 
one’s health, he might have had a thing or two to say about banning self-harming goods and 
about other clearly coercive measures.   
 
Side-constraints are also called for by today’s public health authorities.  Most feel that there 
are limits to the sacrifices that can be asked for in order to reach the greatest health benefits.  
Some lean towards the Millian ideas and think that individuals should have a role to play, and 
many others want to stress communal or cultural values instead. 
 
Traditionally public health has been interested in decreasing morbidity and mortality and by 
doing so it has committed to a medicalised view of health.  There is, however, a branch of 
public health, nowadays often called population health that has, instead of issues directly 
related to health and illness, concentrated on more general issues of poverty, inequality and 
lack of education.  Some have seen this as an indication that public health is not committed to 
a narrow definition of health, but that it concerns itself with wider issues.  Arguably, however, 
from the public health point of view, issues of injustice are to be tackled only in as much they 
contribute to the ill-health of the population and in that, it is the narrow definition of health 
that remains at the core of the matter.   
 
The main normative difference between (most) utilitarians and those subscribing to the ideals 
of public health could be said to lie in the understanding of what the overall goal of our 
actions should be.  Inasmuch as public health concerns itself with health only, it alienates 
many utilitarians who would hold that there is much more to happiness or utility than mere 
health. 
 
The goals of our actions can in utilitarian theories be defined in many different ways.  Some 
utilitarians go for the natural definition of physical pleasure, while others wish to include 
ideal or intuitive elements of a good life; some would argue that the goals can be include all 
non-fanatical preferences or rational desires, and yet others that what we really should be 
looking at are interests, well-being, or needs.60  Utilitarian theories can also be classified as 
positive or negative, depending on whether the main aim is to maximise the identified good 
(positive utilitarianism) or to minimise the recognized bad, such as pain (negative 
utilitarianism).  A further distinction in utilitarianism can be made between theories that are 
mostly interested in assessing the consequences of individual actions (act utilitarianism) and 
those theories which emphasise clusters of actions or general rules (rule utilitarianism).  
Economic utilitarianism is sometimes confused with moral and political utilitarianism, 
although the former is much narrower in scope.   
 
If public health were utilitarian, it would most likely be described as objective and ideal, 
rather than subjective or preference related.  That is, health as the goal is for the most given 
objective criteria and it is seen as an ideal.  Whether public health would be described as 
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positive or negative utilitarianism will depend on whether the emphasis in the definition is 
given to reducing ill-health or to increasing the overall health.  Public health tends to assess 
each intervention on its own merits which would fit better with the ideals of act utilitarianism 
than rule utilitarianism.  To the degree that public health is interested in the cost-effectiveness 
of its methods, it comes closer to economic utilitarianism (this is sometimes called health 
economics) than to the moral and political forms of utilitarianism. 
 
While there are utilitarians who subscribe to the ideas of public health, many do not.  
Preference utilitarians have problems with the objectivity of the definition of the good in 
public health, and even more utilitarians would find the idea of health as the main good to be 
promoted too narrow in scope.  Those utilitarians with Millian ideas on the importance of 
individual liberty would find the paternalistic undertones of public health difficult to accept; 
and while most utilitarians would praise the impartiality of public health, many find its 
emphasis on the collective unsatisfactory. 
 
If the key doctrine of public health is the greatest health of the greatest number, public health 
can be seen as a type of utilitarianism.  However, one the one hand, most people working in 
public health would like to include some side-constraints to this simplistic dogma and, on the 
other, most modern utilitarians would be unwilling to accept the narrow and objective account 
of utility as health.  There are normative and theoretical similarities between public health and 
utilitarianism, but to say that utilitarianism is the theory behind public health is to overlook 
countless subtle differences between the two.   
A Normative Ethics Framework for Public Health   EuroPHEN 
  85 
4.5 Solidarity 
 
Jørgen Husted62 made a distinction between two basic meanings of solidarity: communal 
solidarity where a group of people have a common interest and constitutive solidarity where 
people have an interest in common.   
 
He further subdivided communal solidarity into group solidarity and moral solidarity. 
 
4.5.1 Group Solidarity 
Within group solidarity, the common interest is the cement or organising principle of the 
group.  The members have a common interest in the sense that what is good or harmful to this 
interest is (or, at least, perceived to be) good or harmful to the individual too.  Husted gave 
various types of group to which an individual could belong.  For example, an ethnic minority, 
a profession, a creed, a unit of organised labour, local community.  Group members 
demonstrate solidarity by standing by its weak and needy members in the sense of looking 
after one’s own.  However, this pattern of behaviour is more than just helping people in need, 
which could be valuable in its own right as a form of moral responsibility, as it is implicit or 
even explicit that this form of solidarity is in the common interest.  As Husted points out: 
 
“By recognizing its collective responsibility towards its needy members the group secures 
the loyalty of all members to the common cause and thus, also in this way, promotes it.  In 
the same way the group is able to make legitimate demands on the individual to contribute 
their share to the lifting of the burden of the collective responsibility.” 
 
4.5.2 Moral Solidarity 
In situations where solidarity was not practiced for the common interest of an identifiable 
group, or only to a limited extent, Husted suggested that people may still demonstrate 
solidarity for the sake of the needy benefiting from it.  In such circumstances, the act is out of 
individual moral responsibility rather than collective responsibility to a group.  Instead of a 
defined group with shared aims and objectives there is a more general bond between 
individuals, a sense of sharing a common lot and recognising oneself in the other.  Husted 
suggested that the basic principle underpinning this form of solidarity is making the other 
person’s cause one’s own out of a sense of duty.   
 
Husted identified the following as important forms of moral solidarity: 
• Brotherhood (sisterhood) solidarity: For example supporting others elsewhere in the 
world in disadvantaged political  
• Charitable solidarity (neighbourly love or philanthropic solidarity): Provision of help 
out of a feeling of doing unto to others as they would want done unto them if they 
were also in need. 
• Social solidarity: Willingness of well-off citizens to help the poor and needy via 
income redistribution. 
• Egalitarian solidarity: Provision of social goods, for example health care according to 
need rather than ability to pay. 
• Humanist solidarity: For example humanitarian aid following a natural disaster or in a 
war zone or protests against oppression of others. 
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4.5.3 Constitutive Solidarity 
Unlike group solidarity where there focus is what is in the best interests of the group, and 
moral responsibility where the focus is on the best interests of needy individuals, constitutive 
solidarity (or alliance solidarity) is focused on the interests of the individual themselves.  In 
this latter situation the individual realises that the best way to advance their own individual 
interest is to form an alliance with others to establish some form of collective agreement 
specifying the expected contribution to the collective and what they can expect back in return.  
Husted gave two examples of this.  Firstly, workers may come together within a trade union 
to strengthen their ability to negotiate with employers by increasing the threat of industrial 
action.  Individual workers would have a weak negotiating position as the employer could 
pick them off one-by-one.  But if the entire workforce stands together and withheld their 
labour simultaneously the impact would be greater.  In return for paying their union fees and 
abiding by agreed industrial action, if necessary, the employee is likely to get better pay and 
working conditions.  The other example of constitutive solidarity, Husted also described as 
entrepreneurial solidarity.  In this form of solidarity, individuals come together as 
stockholders to establish a company, with the goal of the individual increasing his or her own 
capital.  Similarly, farmers could form a cooperative, for example to share equipment, 
marketing or negotiation processes with suppliers and customers.   
 
4.5.4 Solidarity with who’s interest? 
While Husted draws a distinction between common interest and interest in common it may be 
more productive to categorise his three main forms of solidarity group, moral and constitutive 
according to the main interest being considered within each.   
 
Within group solidarity, the main focus is on the best interests of the group.  The 
individual is part of the group and benefits if the group flourishes, but it is the collective 
interest that is the main concern. 
 
Within moral solidarity, the main focus is a third party individual and what doing things 
for them because it is the right thing to do.  While there may be some expectation that 
others would act in the same way if the positions were reversed, in the pure sense of 
moral solidarity, the action is purely altruistic, and there is no expectation of personal 
reward of acting morally in doing the right thing. 
 
Within constitutive solidarity, the main focus is the individual themselves.  They are 
working with other people, and so indirectly assisting others to advance their goals but 
the focus is benefit to self. 
 
4.5.5 Solidarity in the context of immunisation 
Parents have obligations to act in the best interests of their children. There are some risks 
associated with immunisation, and some may contest that these risks outweigh the benefits. 
Most experts would agree that it would be in the best interests of a child to be immunised 
against various communicable diseases. The exception to this, is a small minority of children 
where immunisation would be unsafe due to a contraindication, for example a known allergy 
or some other medical condition. However, these children can gain some degree of protection 
against a communicable disease, if a high proportion of the population are have been 
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immunised to prevent spread of the organism within the community – a situation described as 
herd immunity. 
 
When a parent is asked to consider whether they wish to have their child immunised, their 
prime concern, quite correctly, should be the best interests of that child.  However, they may 
also recognise an obligation to have their own child immunised in order to contribute towards 
achieving herd immunity and hence offer some degree of protection to those children for 
whom immunisation is contraindicated. Society could thus make a demand on parents to 
contribute to the goal of eradicating childhood infectious diseases through having their own 
children immunised.  However, the concept of herd immunity is better considered as an 
example of constitutive solidarity. Within constitutive solidarity, the individuals may realise 
that the best way to promote their individual interest, or in this case the interests of their child, 
is to join with others to set up some form of collective unit. In other examples of constitutive 
solidarity there is usually a contract of some form, or some way of formalising the 
relationship between individuals. This is not the case in the context of herd immunity. Parents 
do not formally meet with other parents to discuss immunisation decisions. They may meet in 
passing at a health clinic or at the school gates and share information about their children, or 
ask for advice on immunisation. However, they do not formally agree to immunise their child 
if other parents do the same in order to increase herd immunity, as this would not be feasible 
across a whole cohort of parents. 
 
Of course parents’ decisions about one child could have implications for other members of 
their family.  Thus immunising an older child could mean that they are less likely to bring 
home an infection from school and infect a younger, more vulnerable, sibling.  In this 
situation the parent must consider common interests of the family (communal solidarity) and 
interests in common with other families (constitutive solidarity) not to infect each other. 
 
4.5.6 Solidarity in the context of water fluoridation 
There is a group interest in maintaining the health of group members in order that they can 
both flourish as individuals and make their contribution to their community.  If people are 
suffering from toothache, and have to take time off work or are unable to function optimally 
in their various social roles, then this is not in the interest of the individual nor of the group.  
Other oral problems, such as gingivitis have been associated with other forms of morbidity 
e.g. as a route for infection.  While there may be obligations to the group to look after oneself 
in order to contribute to the group interest, this in itself is not an argument for a policy of 
water fluoridation in terms of group solidarity.  Poor oral health may have relatively small 
impact on the public health compared to cancer, heart disease etc., although dentists would 
legitimately claim that this morbidity is still of concern.  However, given that oral health has 
generally been improving over the last few decades, a policy of artificial fluoridation may be 
difficult to support in terms of a group solidarity argument.  Indeed, there would also be a 
common interest in not harming group members through causing fluorosis or other side 
effects that have been claimed (though not proven) from water fluoridation. 
 
Group members demonstrate solidarity by standing by its weak and needy members in the 
sense of looking after one’s own and in terms of water fluoridation the argument here is 
demonstrating solidarity with vulnerable children, who may not otherwise have access to 
sufficient fluoride to strengthen their teeth to take them into adulthood.  Indeed, we could go 
further and state that we should show moral solidarity with children whose parents are 
unwilling or unable to provide that child with a source of fluoride.  However, opponents of 
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artificial water fluoridation could argue that they are sympathetic to the needs of children, but 
could point to other effective mechanisms for ensuring that children have healthy teeth.  For 
example, by supervising brushing of teeth or use of tablets/rinses in school, or provision of 
free/subsidised dental care. If delivery of fluoride by the water supply was the only means, or 
the overwhelmingly most cost effective means of the population having stronger teeth, then 
there could be said to be an interest in common.  However, given the relatively easy and 
cheap access to fluoride by other means, it would appear difficult to use solidarity arguments 
to justify water fluoridation policies.  
 
Anti-fluoridation lobby groups claim that forcing them to drink artificially fluoridated water, 
when there are no practicable alternatives (i.e. use of bottled water for all their fluid needs) is 
a breach of their civil liberties. Indeed, we demonstrate moral solidarity by respecting the civil 
liberties of others. However, making a claim that adding fluoride to the mains water supply, 
does not in itself mean that civil liberties have been infringed, nor that there are other more 
compelling rights and responsibilities. 
 
4.5.7 Solidarity in the context of prohibition of smacking of children 
Restriction on the smacking of children are justified on the basis of looking after children. 
Here the arguments for moral solidarity seem stronger than for water fluoridation. Smacking 
bans seek to protect the child from physical and psychological trauma. However, there is also 
a common interest in teaching children that certain behaviours are dangerous and also how to 
conduct themselves properly within society. However, there are other means to achieve this. 
For example, by explanation and verbal reasoning, rewards and more appropriate 
punishments. This said there is also scope for showing solidarity with parents, to support 
them, within reason, in allowing them to bring up their children in the way that they think to 
be most appropriate. 
 
4.5.8 Solidarity in the context of banning smoking in public places 
The public health impact of smoking related disease is more serious than poor oral health.  
The common interest is clearer: smoking leads to diseases such as heart disease, cancer, 
respiratory disease with associated morbidity and mortality, and this is not in the interest of 
the group.  Smokers would therefore be under an obligation to place undue burdens on their 
fellow citizens due to lack of productivity or higher consumption of health care.  Of course, a 
smoker could argue that if smoking cigarettes gives them enjoyment, or aids relaxation, which 
means that they are better able to fulfil their societal roles, then their habit does not impair the 
group interest.  Similarly, they could argue that they are prepared to work harder or pay more 
taxes in lieu of other personal pleasures to offset any increased consumption of health care 
resources.  
 
However, the main solidarity arguments in the context of smoking are not related to the harm 
to the individual smoker, but obligations on smokers to show solidarity with other members 
of the group who do not smoke.  Thus, many of the bans of smoking in public places across 
Europe have been justified in terms of passive smoking and showing solidarity with 
vulnerable groups such as children, or occupational exposure to persons providing services to 
society e.g. by working in bars. Thus there restricting tobacco consumption demonstrates 
moral solidarity not to harm others through your actions. 
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Many smokers, aware of the health risks of cigarettes, wish to stop, but find difficulty in 
doing so because of the physical and psychological tobacco addiction. Being in an 
environment where they are surrounded by other smokers can be a challenge to their will-
power to give up cigarettes. Thus people who wish to stop smoking, have an interest in 
common in creating environments where smoking is not permitted and hence they are not 
tempted to join other smokers. Thus, from within constitutive solidarity, people who wish to 
stop smoking are working with others people, and so indirectly assisting each other to 
advance their goal of becoming ex-smokers. 
 
4.5.9 Solidarity in the context of Not-in-my-Back-Yard arguments 
Within the EuroPHEN focus groups, citizens were asked to imagine that there were plans in 
their neighbourhood to build, !a mobile phone mast, !a home for people with mental illness or !a 
chemical plant making everyday items, like plastic or pharmaceuticals.  They were asked how 
they would you feel about this. Such planning proposals may generate protests from local 
communities against locating them in their neighbourhoods i.e. Not-in-my back yard or 
NIMBY arguments.  The analysis of the focus groups will be presented later in the report, 
however in addition to NIMBY arguments where they were happy for the proposal to be built 
somewhere else, some people argued that not in anyone’s back yard either (NIABY).  
 
Consenting to the proposal for a home for people with mental illness, is a clear appeal to 
moral solidarity.  People with metal illness and learning difficulty may be a threat to 
themselves and hence are vulnerable.  It is therefore right to care for vulnerable people, who 
are ill through no fault of their own, just as we would want to be looked after if we needed 
such assistance.  The fact that there is a very small (and often over exaggerated) risk of people 
with mental illness harming others, is of a lower magniture compared to our responsibility to 
fellow group members, although through providing the care and any treatment that they may 
need, the risk of them harming others is also reduced. 
 
In comparison, the requirement for mobile phone masts is less clear in terms of solidarity. 
Effective communication is usually important for the smooth functioning of a group. 
However, it is doubtful that there is a common interest in mobile phone communication. 
Previous generations coped without such immediate forms of communication. Indeed, it could 
even be argued that frequent chatter about relatively trivial matters while sitting on a train, 
disturbing your fellow passengers is counter to the common interest. Any solidarity 
arguments in the context of a mobile phone mast, are more likely to take the form of 
constitutive solidarity. People have an interest in common in being able to use their mobile 
phone where and when they want, and hence must bear any negative consequences from the 
location of mobile phone masts in terms of aesthetics or potential harm from non-ionising 
radiation. 
 
The location of a chemical plant would also appeal to constitutive solidarity: the vast majority 
want the products produced therefore we have to share the risks associated with their 
manufacture.  (There are also benefits to the local economy in terms of employment). 
However, the danger with heavy industry associated with pollution, is that there will be 
inequalities, with some geographical areas bearing more of the risks of working in or living 
near polluting industry than others.  Thus there are obligations to show solidarity to people 
living in deprived areas, who perhaps are more desperate for the employment associated with 
such industry, and to try to reduce the risks associated with the manufacturing processes. 
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4.6 Communitarianism 
 
4.6.1 Communitarian criticism of Liberalism 
Michael Sandel63 critiqued the prevailing form of liberalism which is indebted for much of its 
philosophical foundation to Kant. He described this deontological liberalism, as follows: 
 
“’Deontological liberalism’ is above all a theory about justice, and in particular about 
the primacy of justice among moral and political ideals.  Its core thesis can be stated as 
follows: society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own aims, 
interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by principles 
which do not themselves presuppose any particular conception of the good; what justifies 
these regulative principles above all is not that they maximise the social welfare or 
otherwise promote the good, but rather that they conform to the concept of right, a moral 
category given prior to the good and independent of it”. (p1). 
 
Liberal theories give priority to the rights of the individual above those of society.  The 
individualists tend to distinguish between who one is and the values one has.  Rawls24 
attempted to make this distinction in his description of the original position and the veil of 
ignorance in which participants are supposed to be ignorant of any information about their 
beliefs, norms, class, status, etc.  Sandel63 argued that the liberal vision of the individual as 
the autonomous chooser of his or her own purposes presupposes that the chooser is 
sufficiently sovereign over, and therefore distanced from them.   
 
Communitarians believe that this conception of the self is illogical.  A self that is as open-
ended as the liberal conception requires would not be so much free as identity-less.  Only a 
thickly constituted self, shaped in its very being by traditions, attachments, and more or less 
irrevocable moral commitments can actually make choices that count.  Individualists fail to 
recognise that membership of a community is not necessarily voluntary, and that the social 
attachments which determine the self are not necessarily chosen ones.   
 
4.6.2 MacIntyre’s Narrative approach 
Alasdair MacIntyre64, particularly in his book After Virtue, challenged the perceived ills of 
modernity, including modern moral philosophy and political theory.  He believed that it was 
difficult to envisage each human life as whole because: 
 
“The social obstacles derived from the way modernity partitions human life into a variety 
of segments, each with its own norms and modes of behaviour.  So work is divided from 
leisure, private life from public, the corporate from the personal.  So both childhood and 
old age have been wrenched away from the rest of human life and made over into different 
realms.  And all these separations have been achieved so that it is the distinctiveness of 
each and not the unity of the life of the individual who passes through those parts in terms 
of which we are taught to think and feel.”64 (p204) 
 
Philosophical obstacles also arise, with a tendency to think atomistically about human action 
and to analyses complex actions and transactions in terms of simple components.  The unity 
of a human life becomes invisible if a sharp separation is made either between the individual 
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and the roles that he or she plays, or between the different roles that an individual has, so their 
life appears as little more than a series of unconnected episodes.  MacIntyre64 gave the 
example of a man digging the garden and someone asking what is he doing?  The answer 
could equally be digging; gardening; taking exercise; preparing for winter; or pleasing his 
wife.  Some of these answers characterise the agent’s intentions and others unintended 
consequences which he may or not be aware of.  An action is always an episode in a possible 
story.  And prior information is required about this man’s behaviour is required to understand 
how these different correct answers related to one another.  
 
MacIntyre64 argued that one understands a person’s life only by looking at his/her actions 
within a story, a narrative.  In the example of the gardener, MacIntyre64 places the activity 
both within an annual cycle of domestic activity i.e. of maintaining household-cum-garden 
but also as an episode within a narrative history of his marriage: two histories that happen to 
intersect. 
 
Each person’s narrative converges with the narratives of other people, who in turn become 
part of each other’s narrative.  The community (family, tribe, neighbourhood) sets up the form 
and structure for these narratives.  Thus, MacIntyre64 restricted his analysis of community to 
the family, the tribe and the neighbourhood.  According to MacIntyre the modern state 
exhibits a confusion of values, lacking a shared understanding of the content of values and 
common moral beliefs, which are necessary for a community to be genuine cohesive unit: 
 
“In a society where there is no longer a shared conception of the community’s good as 
specified by the good for man, there can no longer either be any very substantial concept of 
what it is to contribute more or less to the achievement of that good” 64 ( p232). 
 
MacIntyre64 recognised a role of fables and stories in teaching children right from wrong and 
just deserts.  However, MacIntyre was embarked on a philosophical rather than purely a 
sociological enterprise nor an understanding of child development: 
 
“Man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story telling 
animal.  He is not essentially, but becomes through his history, a teller of stories that 
aspire to truth.  But the key question for men is not about their own authorship; I can only 
answer the question ‘What am I to do?  If I can answer the prior question ‘Of what stories 
do I find myself a part?’  We enter human society, that is, with one or more imputed 
characters – roles into which we have been drafted – and we have to learn what they are 
in order to be able to understand how other respond to us and how our responses to them 
are apt to be construed.” 64 (p216) 
 
A narrative concept of selfhood has two requirements.  Firstly, a person is what they may 
justifiably be taken by others to be in the course of living out a story that from their birth to 
their death.  They are the subject of a history that is their own and no one else’s, with its own 
peculiar meaning.  Here, Macintyre refers to the work of Derek Parfit65 and others on the 
meaning of personal identity.  However, it is MacIntyre’s other aspect of narrative selfhood 
that is of more relevance to communitarian thinking. MacIntyre proposed that “I am not only 
accountable, I am one who can always ask others for an account, who can put others to the 
question64 (p218).  I am part of their story, as they are part of mine.  The narrative of any one 
life is part of an interlocking set of narratives.  Moreover this asking for and giving accounts 
itself plays an important part in constituting narratives.  Asking you what you did and why, 
saying what I did and why, pondering the differences between your account of what I did and 
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my account of what I did, and vice versa, these are essential constituents of all but the very 
simplest and barest of narratives. 
 
The question of interest for MacIntyre was “In what does the unity of an individual life 
consist?” 64  Thus his analysis of a life in terms of narrative, led him to answer the answer that 
“Its unity is the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life” 64 (p218).  Hence to ask what is 
the good for me? is to ask how best I might live out unity and bring it to completion.  Or to 
ask what is the good for man? Is to ask what all answers to the question what is the good for 
me? for all men (and women) must have in common.  MacIntyre emphasized that it is “the 
systematic asking of these two questions and the attempt to answer them in deed as well as 
word which provide the moral life with its unity. The unity of a human life is the unity of a 
narrative quest” 64  (p219).  These iterative and nested questions were also identified by 
Sandel who suggested that when an individual attempts to define their personal moral code 
they ask who am I? how am I situated? and what is to my benefit? as well as establishing what 
is good for the community?, because, as Sandel pointed out, we are “partly defined by the 
communities we inhabit” and are therefore “implicated in the purposes and ends 
characteristic of those communities.” 66    
 
MacIntyre concluded that “the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life 
for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to 
understand what more and what else the good life for man is” 64 (p219).  However he 
recognised that it was not possible to seek for the “good or exercise the virtues only qua 
individual.  This is partly because what it is to live the good life concretely varies from 
circumstance even when it is one and the same conception of the good life and one and the 
same set of virtues which are being embodied in a human life” 64 (p220).  MacIntyre64 
suggested that what is good for an Athenian general would not be the same as what it was for 
a medieval nun nor a seventeenth-century farmer.  
 
4.6.3 The problem with Universalism 
Here is perhaps one of the most controversial implications of communitarian theory.  In order 
to be sustainable, moral principles should be congruous with the values and practices of the 
society in which they are to be applied.  One of the consequences of this is that it may not be 
possible to conceive morality in universal terms.  Universal and absolute justice, for example, 
may be another illusion of individualism.  Since the values that people hold derive from their 
communities, it is feasible that concepts such as justice may not be universal or absolute, if 
each community has a different understanding of what such moral values entail.   
 
As MacIntyre pointed out, it is not just that different individuals live in different social 
environments, but also because people approach their own circumstances as bearers of a 
particular social identity. 
 
“I am someone’s son or daughter, someone else’s cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or 
that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan, that tribe, this 
nation.  Hence what is good for me has to be the good for one who inhabits these roles.  
As such, I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of 
debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations” 64 (p220).  
 
MacIntyre64 suspected that this way of thinking would be an anathema from the standpoint of 
modern individualism which is founded on the ability of the individual to be what they choose 
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to be.  Or an individual may acknowledge that they may be their parent’s child or a citizen of 
a particular country, but they can choose whether they wish to be held responsible for the 
actions of their parent or the state.  MacIntyre64 pointed to how some white Americans deny 
responsibility for the effect of slavery upon black Americans by saying I never owned slaves, 
or how some Englishmen or Germans do not take any responsibilities for the historical 
problems in Ireland or in the 1930s-1940s, respectively, because all of that happened before I 
was born.  Such attitudes attempt to detach the self from its social and historical roles.  Such 
individualistic thinking is clearly at odds with MacIntyre’s narrative view of the self in which 
the story of a life is always embedded in the story of communities in which an individual 
derives their identity. “I am born with a past; and to try to cut myself off from that past, in the 
individualist mode, is to deform my present relationships” 64 (p221).  MacIntyre64 was keen to 
stress that just because the self finds its moral identity within a community this does not mean 
that an individual has to accept the moral limitations of that particular community.  These 
moral particularities are only a starting point from which to search for the good, for the 
universal.  Here MacIntyre64 rejects the concept of universal maxims as proposed by Kant, for 
example, as “an illusion with painful consequences”.  He explains this be saying that “When 
men and women identify what are in fact their partial and particular causes too easily and too 
completely with the cause of some universal principle, they usually behave worse than they 
would otherwise do” 64 (p211). MacIntyre was critical of Hume account of virtue:  
 
“What Hume identifies as the standpoint of universal human nature turns out in fact to be 
that of the prejudices of the Hanoverian ruling elite.  Hume’s moral philosophy 
presupposes allegiance to a particular kind of social structure as much as Aristotle’s 
does, but allegiance of a highly ideological kind.  Hume thus provides … an 
unsatisfactory underpinning for an attempt to claim universal rational authority for what 
is in fact the local morality of parts of eighteenth-century Northern Europe” 64 (p231-2). 
 
4.6.4 Walzer and Spheres of Justice 
Michael Walzer67 also argued that to search for unity is to misunderstand the subject mater of 
distributive justice: 
 
“In the matter of distributive justice, history displays a great variety of arrangements and 
ideologies.  But the first impulse of the philosopher is to resist the displays of history, the 
world of appearances, and to search for some underlying unity: a short list of basic 
goods, quickly abstracted to a single good; a single distributive criterion or an 
interconnected set; and the philosopher standing, symbolically at least, at a single 
decision point”67 (p4). 
 
Since the values that people hold are derived from the community in which they live, moral 
concepts and virtues such as justice, if they are differently defined and manifested in different 
communities, cannot be said to be universal or absolute.  
 
4.6.5 Taylor and obligations to maintain social institutions 
Charles Taylor68, went further than MacIntyre and instead of seeing community as being 
important in interpreting the individual sphere, he believed that community was a 
precondition for moral autonomy.  Taylor68 believed that communitarians and individualist 
would all agree that we can only flourish as adults in relationship with friends, mates, 
children, and so on.  But that individualists may claim that this had nothing to do with 
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obligations to belong to political society.  Individualists may recognise involuntary 
obligations to parents, but these are obligations of gratitude, and parents are no longer 
essential parts of human development when we are ready to discharge these obligations.  
Similarly there are obligations to our children, to give them what we have been given.  
Taylor68 also saw these as involuntary obligations, even though we may chose to have 
children or not, as we do not choose the genes and hence physical and psychological 
characteristics of our children during the natural reproduction process.  Finally, there may be 
voluntary obligations to those with whom we have relationships through marriage, friendship, 
association etc.  But these are obligations to specific people and so not necessarily involve 
continuing associations, and prima facie they do not represent obligations to belong and 
contribute to society.  
 
Taylor68 argued that even the extreme libertarian acquires the desire for individual autonomy 
by virtue of participating in a civilisation that has learned, over the course of many centuries, 
to put a premium upon such aspirations.  Taken out of a social-historical context, the very 
desire for control over one’s autonomy would be void of meaning.  Therefore, precisely those 
aspirations that define the autonomous individual are the expression of a debt to one’s society, 
and hence represent social obligations, that are overlooked in libertarian theories. 
 
“Now, it is very dubious whether the developed capacity for this kind of autonomy can 
arise simply within the family.  Of course, men may learn, and perhaps in part must learn, 
this from those close to them. But my question is whether this kind of capacity can develop 
within the compass of a single family.  Surely it is something which only develops within 
an entire civilisation” 68 (p43). 
 
Taylor68 believed that humans are not born with the desire to be an autonomous agent.  They 
have to acquire it, but this is not achieved in every society, nor do all members of a society 
(which provides the environment for nurturing such capacities) fulfil their potential.  The free 
individual can only achieve and maintain his identity in a certain type of culture.  Taylor thus 
pointed to an obligation to engage in society to maintain and develop the rights so valued by 
libertarians: 
 
“We live in a world in which there is such a thing as public debate about moral and 
political questions and other basic issues.  We constantly forget how remarkable that is, 
how it did not have to be so, and may one day no longer be so.  What would happen to our 
capacity to be free agents if this debate should die away, or if the more specialized debate 
among intellectuals who attempt to define and clarify the alternatives facing us should 
also cease, or if the attempts to bring the culture of the past to life again as well as the 
drives to cultural innovation were to fall off?  How long would we go on understanding 
what autonomous choice was?  Again, what would happen if our legal culture were not 
constantly sustained by a contact with our traditions of the rule of law and a 
confrontation with our contemporary moral institutions?  Would we have as sure a grasp 
of what the rule of law and the defence of rights required?” 68 (p44). 
 
Taylor argued that: 
 
“The free individual of the West is only what he is by virtue of the whole society and 
civilisation which brought him to be and which nourishes him; that our families can only 
form us to this capacity and these aspirations because they are set in this civilisation; and 
that a family alone outside of this context – the real old patriarchial family – was a quite 
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different animal which never tended these horizons.  And I want to claim finally that all 
this creates a significant obligation to belong for whoever would affirm the value of this 
freedom; this includes all those who want to assert rights either to this freedom or for its 
sake” 68 (p45-46). 
 
He rejected the argument that after becoming an adult with the capacity to be an autonomous 
then there were no further obligations to sustain the civilisation that helped to nurture those 
capacities, in the same was as obligations to parents can be time-limited.  Taylor doubted 
whether: 
 
“We could maintain our sense of ourselves as autonomous beings or whether even only a 
heroic few of us would succeed in doing so, if this liberal civilization of ours were to be 
thoroughly destroyed … Future generations will need this civilization to reach these 
aspirations; and if we affirm their worth, we have an obligation to make them available to 
others.  This obligation is only increased if we ourselves have benefited from this 
civilisation and have been enabled to become free agents ourselves” 68 (p46). 
 
Walzer argued that it is not possible to talk about justice without considering the sorts of 
goods that a particular society distributes among its members.  
 
“Distributive justice is a large idea.  It draws the entire world of goods within the reach of 
philosophical reflection.  Nothing can be omitted; no feature of our common life can escape 
scrutiny.  Human society is a distributive community. That’s not all it is, but it is 
importantly that: we come together to share, divide, and exchange.  We also come together 
to make the things that are shared, divided, and exchanged; but that very making – work 
itself – is distributed among us in a division of labor.  My place in the economy, my 
standing in the political order, my reputation among my fellows, my material holdings: all 
these come to me from other men and women.  It can be said that I have what I have rightly 
or wrongly, justly or unjustly; but given the range of distributions and the number of 
participants, such judgements are never easy”67 (p3). 
 
Walzer claimed that: 
 
“…different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with 
different procedures, by different agents; and that all these differences derive from 
different understandings of the social goods themselves – the inevitable product of 
historical and cultural particularism” 67 (p6). 
 
This claim contains two elements.  Firstly, the idea that different goods constitute different 
distributional spheres within which it may be appropriate to have alternative means of 
allocation.  The distribution of  good such as health care would therefore be in accordance 
with the particular principles appropriate for health care and should not be corrupted by other 
goods, such as money, that properly belong to other spheres.  The second claim relates to 
different understanding of the social goods themselves which are socially constituted by 
shared experiences, communal meanings, and traditions of self-understanding that evolve 
through history.  Therefore liberal justice cannot presume to maintain neutrality toward ends 
and goods, as the very individualist rights and goals that they seek to protect are made 
available to the self via a process of communal definition that is not at the disposal of 
individuals.  
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Rousseau believed that citizens ought to love their country and in turn, their country ought to 
give them some reason for doing so.  Thus he asked: 
 
“How shall men love their country if it is nothing more for them than for strangers, and 
bestows on them only that which it can refuse to none?”69 
 
4.6.6 Communal provision 
This was a theme important to Walzer in his account of membership, which he believed was 
“important because of what members of a political community owe to one another and to no 
one else, or to no one else in the same degree”67 (p64).  Walzer also stated this in reverse by 
saying that “communal provision is important because it teaches us the value of membership” 
67 (p64).  Hence if there was no reason for community members to provide for one another, 
there would be no distinction between members and strangers and hence no reason for people 
to form and maintain political communities.  The first thing that they owe one another is 
communal provision of security and welfare.  Communal provision may be general or 
particular.  Walzer67 said that it was general whenever public funds are spent so as to benefit 
all or most of the members without any distribution to individuals.  It is particular when 
goods are actually handed over to all or any of the members.  Securing the food supply is 
general whereas distribution of food to the poor or malnourished is particular.  Walzer67 
suggested that Public Health is most often general, whereas individualised clinical care is 
particular.  Public health is general communal provision when it utilises population 
approaches e.g. information campaigns, mass water fluoridation etc.  The establishment of 
immunisation or screening programmes would be general since they are designed to meet the 
needs of the community as a whole.  The provision of the screening tests and vaccines to 
individuals would be particular, especially if targeted at particular age ranges or vulnerable 
groups.  Restrictions on consumption of drugs, alcohol and tobacco, could be portrayed as 
meeting the needs of individuals who use them, or consume them in too high quantities.  
However, arguably such restrictions are something that the rest of us need, to protect us from 
the effects of drug-related crime, passive smoking or drunk drivers. 
 
While Walzer67 used Public Health as an example of general provision, he recognised that it 
is provided at the expense of some members of the community, in particular it benefits most 
(usually), the most vulnerable members of the community.  For example, health and safety 
regulations covering housing under multiple occupation, or anti-pollution laws for people 
living in industrial areas.  The benefits, therefore are not strictly speaking mutual. Walzer67 
stated that every serious effort towards communal provision, insofar as the wealth of the 
community derives from the assets of its members, is redistributive in character. 
 
According to Walzer, the social contract is: 
 
“… an agreement to redistribute the resources of the members in accordance with some 
shared understanding of their needs, subject to ongoing political determination in detail.  
The contract is a moral bond. It connects the strong and the weak, the lucky and the 
unlucky, the rich and the poor, creating a union that transcends all differences of interest, 
drawing its strength from history, culture, religion, language and so on.  Arguments about 
communal provision are, at the deepest level, interpretations of that union.  The closer 
and more inclusive it is, the wider the recognition of needs, the greater the number of 
social goods that are drawn into the sphere of security and welfare” 67 (p82-3). 
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The exclusive pursuit of private interest erodes the network of social environments on which 
we all depend.  The ability of an individual to exercise their autonomy depends upon the 
active maintenance of the institutions of civil society where citizens learn respect for others as 
well as self-respect.  Similarly community flourishing is dependent upon the contribution of 
its members to shared projects.  The relationship of private and public interest is manifested 
by a mesh of complimentary and reciprocal rights and duties.  There is a recognition that there 
are common challenges faced by members of a community which can be addressed by 
common thought if not common action, with a spirit of solidarity to provide a voice and 
support for less well situated community members. 
 
4.6.7 Applying Communitarian approaches within Liberalism and 
Kantianism 
However, it should not be seen as impossible that the more traditional ethical positions of 
liberalism, Kantianism, utilitarianism etc. may be able to structure this communitarian idea in 
a way that makes the tensions between individual and public interest manageable.  Indeed, 
Durkheim attempted just such a revision of prevailing liberal and Kantian thinking.  The 
connection between the individual personality and social solidarity was of interest to 
Durkheim who described how “the individual, whilst becoming more autonomous, depends 
ever more closely upon society… In social life everything is individual, because society is 
made up only of individuals … But because individuals form a society, new phenomena occur 
whose cause is association, and which, reacting upon the consciousness of individuals, for the 
most part shapes them.  This is why, although society is nothing without individuals, each one 
of them is more a product of society than he is the author.”70  
 
Durkhiem suggested that there are two extreme positions around which moral theories can be 
grouped.  Liberalism views the individual as a radically autonomous self. Communitarianism 
views the individual as socially determined.71  Durkheim is often portrayed as a theorist of 
group solidarity and social order with no sympathy towards the individual.  However, he 
explored ways to express the normative relation between the private and public that would 
avoid reducing it to one of these contrary positions.  In so doing he attempted to defend 
liberalism from egoism, and communitarianism from fatalism, and the assimilation of the 
individual into the social mass.  His aim was a social theory that articulated and defended 
individual dignity and rights within a social tradition that valued the common good.  In his 
essay “Individualism and the Intellectuals”72, Durkheim conceded that some varieties of 
liberalism are egoistic and encourage individuals to become excessively preoccupied with 
self-interests and hence threatening the common good of society.  He was critical of some 
forms of liberalism which we described as a cult which see liberty as an idol for which they 
will willingly sacrifice all else72.  
 
However, Durkheim72 did not accept that utilitarianism provided a way forward.  While 
utilitarian purports to achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest number, Durkheim 
believed that it described a society that was no more than a group of disparate individuals 
pursing external goods such as wealth, status and power.  Here, Durkheim was taking a very 
narrow view of utilitarianism and did not explore the perspective of Utilitarians, such as Mill 
for example, who placed great value on the utility associated with individual freedom. Indeed, 
Utilitarians can also choose to value social goods associated with living and participating in 
communities. Thus, while Bentham described the community as “a fictitious body, composed 
of the individuals who are considered as constituting as it were its members” and went on to 
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say that the interest of the community is “the sum of the interests of the several members who 
compose it”73, a utilitarian calculation does not need to be so restrictive.   
 
Durkheim72 described another form of liberalism that he called moral individualism that is 
both moral and social.  He was clear that all communal life is impossible without the existence 
of interests superior to those of the individual.  Durkheim72 attempted to locate his beliefs 
within a republican tradition that describes rights and responsibilities arising from a 
commitment to public, not only to private concerns.  The moral individual was an active 
member of a political community whose obligations and desires are directed toward the 
community and whose benefits, in turn, are protected by society.  Thus there is no 
fundamental conflicts between private and public interest.  Writing just over a century after 
the French revolution, at a time of political uncertainty in France, Durkheim72 and other 
writers were concerned about a slide towards political anarchy.  Durkheim72 believed that 
whose who advocated threatening the rights of the individual is more likely to be anarchy 
because they threaten the moral and social traditions that bind citizens together within a 
society.  An overly restrictive society also denies the individual of much that makes his or her 
life worthwhile.  
 
4.6.8 Communitarian defence of Privacy 
A private interest in maintaining privacy may appear to be conflict is with that of the public 
interest.  However, taking the approach of Durkheim it is possible to argue that not just 
liberalism values individual privacy. 
 
Privacy may have a narrow or a wide definition74.  In its narrow formulation it relates 
exclusively to personal information about an individual and the degree to which third parties 
have access to this information.  In an even more restricted definition there is a requirement 
that this information should be undocumented.  Thus, if all information about an individual 
were published in the public domain, it would be impossible to infringe privacy, although 
there would be no privacy to invade because there would be nothing that was kept secret.  
Similarly, the concept of privacy would be meaningless if stranded alone on a desert island, as 
there would be no one from whom to kept things secret.  In its widest sense privacy extends 
beyond control over information (informational privacy) to include decisional privacy and 
physical privacy.  
 
The concept of private is both norm-dependent and norm-invoking, and hence the boundaries 
of privacy will vary from one culture to the next.  In some societies, cutting oneself off from a 
collective experience could be seen as cheating others of their right to share in it.  
 
Privacy is integral to our understanding of ourselves as social beings within varying kinds of 
relationships.  Having a private life is central to the development of a personal identity.  Thus, 
we may adopt apparently different identities in different circumstances, at home, work, during 
leisure/social activities.  These different personas are not hypocritical.  Privacy is crucial to 
the individual’s ability to maintain various kinds of relationships.  For example, a couple of 
lovers may be intimidated from being intimate if observed by a third party.  Such a concept of 
privacy is wider than relating purely to confidentiality (informational privacy).  However, 
intimacy is not merely the sharing of otherwise withheld information.  The context is also 
important.  For example one may reveal personal information to a doctor that one may be 
reluctant to share with friends, family or a lover.  But this does not necessarily mean that one 
has an intimate relationship with the doctor. Privacy is closely related to fundamental ends 
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and relations such as friendship, trust and love.  Not only is privacy a means for advancing 
these relationships, without privacy they are inconceivable.  Thus, when two people are in 
love with another person there is a process of spontaneous and mutual relinquishment of 
certain rights, which goes beyond mutual respect, in order to create a new shared domain of 
interest, defined in terms of their relationship.  Friendship can be seen as another sphere, 
which differs from love only in the degree to which the relationship is central to the lives of 
the individuals concerned.  The exchange of privacy rights will be accordingly reduced, 
depending on the strength of the friendship or acquaintance.   
 
Privacy should not be a negative concept whereby the individual is left alone and becomes 
isolated.  If privacy is to be worthwhile it should enable the individual to be an active member 
of society with a range of social relationships.  To this extent, despite arguments that privacy 
is a fundamental human right, privacy should be a means to an end.  When we voluntarily 
grant others access to our private sphere, this is an exercise of right to privacy not a waiver of 
that right. We exercise our right to privacy in order to advance other goals.  It is for this 
reason that an account of privacy incorporating love and respect is attractive: if we love, 
hoping to be loved in return, perhaps we should consider the common good in order to have 
our own interests recognised. 
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4.7 Ontological Personalism and Public Health 
 
4.7.1 The various meanings of philosophical personalism 
Personalism is a wide-ranging cultural movement which can be divided into several trends 
from a philosophical viewpoint. However, the philosophical trend described and analysed 
below is ontologically-based personalism along the lines of Thomas Aquinas75 and J. 
Maritain76 (in this chapter, for simplicity purposes, the word ‘personalism’ is often used: it is 
understood, however, that reference is always made to ‘ontological personalism’). From this 
point of view the individual is a subsisting substratum who reveals himself not only in a 
phenomenal event, but transcends his own manifestation in the inexhaustible richness of his 
spiritual being. The intention here is not to underestimate the contribution of other 
philosophical approaches, but rather to integrate them by acknowledging the human being’s 
substance as being a priority. The person is relationship to self (presence of self to self) and 
hetero-relationship (with the world and with others), but is not limited to the relational 
structure: the subjective-relational aspect does not fully explain the concept of human person 
because subjectivity presupposes a source to express itself, a being which unifies and vivifies 
the multiplicity of expressions and acts. The human being, capable of intellectual ability, 
conscience and freedom is also a spiritual being, an active source of spiritual nature which 
founds and demonstrates his operational capacities (pertaining to his nature) without limiting 
himself to them, in the same way as individual free acts do not correspond to freedom tout 
court, or individual thinking acts to the intellect. The capacities are not always active and 
therefore do not fully express their source; acts are changeable and contingent, leading back to 
the source of the permanent and unchangeable personal being which manifests their 
implementation, while at the same time being richer than the phenomenal event itself. The 
traditional philosophical principle of ‘operari sequitur esse’ expresses the need for an 
ontological foundation of the subject, highlighting the prevalence of being over acting.  
 
Applying the ontological approach to medicine and to biomedical sciences in general means 
not to expose corporeal features to objective external factors, defining as persons in their own 
right all individuals regardless from their ability77. 
 
4.7.2 Differences between ontological personalism and a Kantian 
perspective  
The specificity of the ontological personalism , is that it justifies its own ethics by a not to be 
set aside metaphysical dimension. Of course, the roots of such a position are to be found in 
the Greek philosophy characterized by a finalistic vision of the world and, therefore, of man. 
It is just in these characteristics and roots that ontological personalism substantially differs 
from apparently similar currents of thought such as communitarianism or Kantianism. The 
reason why ontological personalism cannot be confused with Kantian deontological ethics is 
that the latter appears as a formal ethics, with an immanent dimension whose foundation is 
man, even if in his rational and relational nature. In ontological personalism, the foundation of 
ethics is a transcendent source identified with a natural order of things which man is part of. 
That order can be clearly found in the very human nature. Therefore, the call to the 
metaphysics is fundamental and constitutive in ontological personalism and it avoids 
relativistic attitudes and solutions that can occur, on the contrary, in a Kantian perspective in 
which the concepts of society and culture maintain their importance in defining ethics. 
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4.7.3 The human person as a foundation of ethics 
The centrality of the human person features in the universe, in society and in history because 
he sums up and gives meaning to the world’s existence, he is the centre of society (which is 
made by people and for people) and finally he is the creator of history, whose source and 
explanation can be found in individual persons, their relationships and their actions. 
 
The human being, however, is also the basis and criterion of ethics. The person is the criterion 
of ethics in a subjective sense because an action is ethical whenever it expresses a personal 
choice, but also in an objective sense because the person is the foundation, measure and goal 
of the moral action. In other words, an action is ethical if it fully complies with the dignity of 
the human person and the values which are intrinsically inscribed within its nature. 
 
In addition, the value of the human person resides in its relationship with a transcendent 
dimension, a ‘creating Being’. Therefore, irrespectively of his qualitative and functional 
connotations, the person is worth in itself, just as such. The existence is a received and not a 
chosen good: hence it follows the impossibility to hold man as the absolute master of his own 
life, with all its consequences in bioethical matters. In other words, in ontological personalism 
the strong and structural dependence of man from the ordo creationis drastically limits man’s 
decisional power.   
 
This substantialist consideration leads to a perfect identification among the concepts of 
‘human being’ and of ‘person’ that in other currents of thought appear, on the contrary, 
autonomous and not always identifiable. 
 
An action is legitimate and morally approvable if, starting from awareness in choice, it 
respects the person and helps make his being and growth perfect. According to personalism, 
therefore, a core of structural elements exists in relation to human beings and to the natural 
order which have universal features and represent the reference point for moral rules. Our 
view of the world, of others, of history, may change and require new categories of 
interpretation (in this sense one could literally speak about ‘pluralism’), but the truth about 
humans is objective and independent of recognition by humans themselves: this is why 
human rights can be conceived as universal, that is, belonging to all human beings merely on 
the basis of being human, without any other determination of sex, race, religion, state of 
health, etc. From this viewpoint, human life is regarded as a fundamental asset, inviolable and 
untouchable because ‘it represents the condition of the human being itself, that is to say the 
prerequisite without which there is no individual’78.  
 
4.7.4 Ontological personalism in life sciences and its principles 
The previous paragraphs underline that human life is regarded by personalism as an essential 
asset ‘in the sense that it represents the human condition itself, that is to say the prerequisite 
without which the individual cannot exist’79.  Hence the identification of personalism with the 
theoretical model of the sacredness of life which is rooted in the principle of the inviolability 
of human life.  From this perspective personalism is different from the medical and bioethical 
trends of a contractual kind because it starts from a ‘strong’ position which allows no 
derogations and, most of all, no ‘interpretations’.  The utilitarian-contractualistic positions, on 
the other hand, are based on the search for a consensus on minimal bases using a top-down 
approach towards fragile consensus bases, founded not on philosophical-rational assumption, 
but merely on conventions.  Such approaches are characterized by a more pragmatic 
theoretical foundation that, on one hand, satisfies the practical demands of public health but, 
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on the other, tends to sacrifice the ontological depth of man to materialistic logics that show 
little regard for the anthropological factor. 
 
These assumptions lead to the basic principles of personalism which affect medicine and 
bioethics and are rooted in the concept of corporeity seen as a co-essential dimension and 
incarnation of the person80. 
 
It should be pointed out that, from a personalistic perspective, not all principles have the same 
relevance, but a substantial hierarchy is recognized, where the summit is occupied by human 
life as a non-negotiable value.  This is due to the fact that an individual’s life is regarded as a 
good not comparable to other goods or values and it therefore cannot be analysed in 
quantitative terms. 
 
4.7.5 The principle of respect of physical life 
This entails respect for the life of each human being, stating that the latter is inviolable and 
untouchable from the moment of conception, as a fundamental and irreplaceable individual 
value.  Physical life is the most important among empirical assets which comes before and 
leads to all other assets and values.  Hence any type of reduction of the human body to an 
object are regarded as an offence to human dignity.  
 
4.7.6 The therapeutic (or totality) principle 
It defines the conditions of ethical admissibility of medical intervention on the human body: 
acting on the part where disease is located to save a healthy organ, where there is no less 
invasive nor less destructive therapeutic action, given there is a reasonable likelihood of 
success, and having obtained the patient’s informed consent. 
 
4.7.7 The principle of liberty and responsibility 
Within the framework of personalism, the principle of autonomy cannot be applied 
universally because, as stated earlier, it is limited by the principle of respect for physical life 
and enhanced by the responsibility ensuing from freedom itself.  As opposed to the patient’s 
principle of self-determination, the doctor’s prerogative is acknowledged thus leading to the 
right to conscientious objection. 
 
4.7.8 The principle of sociality and subsidiarity  
This principle is probably the most relevant in terms of public health policies. It states that the 
common good should be pursued through every person’s good and cannot be in conflict with 
an individual’s good. If there is a conflict between them the hierarchy of the principles 
mentioned above shall assist in making a choice. According to the principle of sociality, 
individual life and health are personal but also social assets. The subsidiarity element, on the 
other hand, concerns the allocation of resources and the organisation of health policies; it 
requires that all members of the community, wherever possible, are granted equal access to 
treatments that are necessary and available (social justice), but also that those who need such 
treatments are helped most. The implication is therefore an approach to health policies based 
on solidarity, on the criterion of urgency, proportionality of treatment and causal selection. 
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4.7.9 The strongholds of ontological personalism 
Some of the proposals put forward by personalism are particularly relevant in terms of public 
health ethics. Four aspects are worth mentioning in particular: respect for life; sociality and 
solidarity; responsibility; the therapeutic principle referred to communities8182, 83.  
 
4.7.10 Respect for life 
The duty to respect life can be interpreted in different ways, but the aim here is not to describe 
them in detail. For the purposes of this paper the most relevant aspect is the social and 
solidarity element of respect for life. Over time several meanings have been attributed to this 
expression. 
 
Public health actions that are not aimed at protecting life and health are useless or ineffective 
and, in this sense, unethical. 
 
This position can even be shared by those who do not consider life as having sacred character. 
As a matter of fact, it is a position also accepted by those who refer to the postmodern concept 
of well-being ethics, thus attributing particular importance to the so-called quality of life84. 
Well-being and quality of life can indeed also include values such as respect for life and 
‘integrity’, that is to say leading life in accordance with the values that count44. The ethics of 
quality of life, however, inevitably clashes with the ethics of sacredness of life if the value of 
life is considered as being gradual, which means that it becomes the basis for economic-health 
choices. Such an approach inevitably goes against the principle of the inviolability of human 
life, paving the way for arbitrary discrimination. 
 
4.7.11 Sociality and solidarity 
If the values of sociality and solidarity are important for the whole of bioethics, this is all the 
more true in the case of public health.  Sociality and solidarity in public health can be 
expressed in different ways. In chapter, the chapter on solidarity, the basic meanings of 
solidarity according to Jørgen Husted are described.  Within ‘group solidarity’, the main focus 
is on the best interest of the group.  Within ‘moral solidarity’, the main focus is a third party 
individual and doing things for them because it is the right thing to do.  Within ‘constitutive 
solidarity’, the main focus is the individual themselves.  ‘Group’ and ‘moral’ solidarity are, 
according to Husted, two expressions of ‘communal solidarity’, where a group of people have 
‘a common interest’.  The author distinguishes it from ‘constitutive solidarity’, where people 
‘have an interest in common’.  
 
Personalism emphasizes the positive and moral value of solidarity, and considers it both an 
ethical-social principle, and a virtue.  According to personalism, solidarity is an other-directed 
behaviour, which places the interest of others ahead of one’s own interest; it is purely 
altruistic, and there is no expectation of personal reward.  Therefore, following Husted’s 
distinction, it might be considered a kind of moral solidarity. 
 
Morally good action requires not only a good act, but also good circumstances and a good 
intention.  This rule, derived from Thomas Aquinas’ ethics, is an integral part also of 
solidarity. Circumstances and intentions are necessary to mark out an altruistic act as morally 
good: the act, uprooted from circumstances and intentions, can easily be part ultimately 
selfish not in conformity with the entire good.  
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Solidarity highlights the intrinsic social nature of the human person, the equality of all in 
dignity and rights and the common path of individuals and peoples towards an ever more 
committed unity.  According to personalism, solidarity is not a feeling of vague compassion, 
but a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good, because we 
all are responsible for all.  Personalism recognizes the intimate bond between solidarity and 
the common good and between solidarity and equality among men and peoples.  
 
Referring to public health, this can be expressed mainly in two directions. First of all there is 
factual solidarity which the community is called upon to express towards vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups.  The second approach goes in the other direction and concerns the 
duties which individuals have to carry out in order to conform with those public health 
standards and which every person has to follow.  
 
The first method is an obvious characteristic of public health, the second is probably less.  
However, it is important to note that if it were absent, public health would probably be 
nothing more than patronizing on the part of Governments.  The protection of public health, 
on the contrary, also involves creating awareness among individuals, as well as people giving 
up part of their independence in favour of the common good85.  
 
According to Buchanan, “responsibility arises wherever individuals accept as personal 
concerns something which society presents to their attention”44 (p166). Clearly, sociality 
should not be reduced to blind compliance with norms on the part of individuals.  In Priester’s 
opinion every public health system ‘should generate a sense of community. Social solidarity 
means a commitment to reducing the gap between the different segments in society, 
integrating them into a community’86.  Bard also mentions integration, though interpreting it 
as a need for bioethics and public health to meet if we accept the idea that occurs quite 
commonly in literature on the subject, that a prerogative of bioethics is respect for individual 
rights, regardless of the best interest of the community which, on the other hand, remains the 
primary objective of public health87. 
 
4.7.12 Responsibility 
Another area of values closely related to sociality and solidarity concerns personal 
responsibility: “if there is a right to health assistance, there should also be a duty to respect 
it”88.  This duty is one of the expressions of responsibility.  Responsibility can also be 
expressed in many ways in public health. Three ways should be mentioned in particular. 
 
First of all, there is the responsibility, wherever possible, to prevent and protect from 
avoidable diseases and, more generally, to accept the indications given to all citizens on the 
subject of behaviour and lifestyles.  
 
The second is connected to the first responsibility and relates to the duty of not creating 
burdens for society by irresponsibly taking the risk of becoming ill. 
 
The third duty is to support people in need, as mentioned above with respect to solidarity and 
sociality. 
 
As regards responsibility, it is also important, from an ethical viewpoint, to find a balance, 
seeking to avoid excesses. The most evident excesses are ‘making the victim feel guilty’ (in 
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the case of people whose behaviour is at risk) and the deregulated freedom of choice 
regardless of duties89. 
 
Since public health is aimed at the community, mention could be made not only of 
responsibility which is a fundamental aspect of bioethics in general, but of co-responsibility, 
with reference to the overlap between individual and collective responsibility: if “individual 
freedom stops on the border with privation of liberty for individuals taken collectively”90 and 
if ‘collective responsibility is much more than the sum of individual responsibilities (and) 
expresses a change in relationships in the expression of responsibility, the shift towards a 
higher level of knowledge’91, it is clear that “the opposition of the two concepts represented 
by individual responsibility and collective responsibility would be absurd and the result 
would be a Manichean concept where one of the terms is in a privileged position compared to 
another”92. 
 
4.7.13 Individual health and public health: the therapeutic principle 
Scientists and philosophers seem to concur on a concept of health which ‘is not reducible to a 
mere neutral description of well-functioning of a being, but means at the same time a certain 
kind of good of and for being’93.  
 
‘Public health has a clear utilitarian or consequentialist component. It aims to promote 
human welfare and reduce human misery, and is solidly based on factual evidence. At the 
same time, it is limited by Kantian or deontological considerations, such as respects for 
persons and their rights. The hard question arise when individual rights clash with the 
general welfare’94.    
 
From a public health perspective, the challenge for the therapeutic principle is to find a 
balance between personal freedom and promotion of good health for the community: both 
personal freedom and goals shared by community are social values. Therefore it is necessary 
to resolve the question about how well-being is to be understood for public policy95.  
 
An answer is offered by E. D. Pellegrino and D. C. Thomasma: ‘The clinical relationship 
centers on a vulnerable, anxious, dependent often suffering individual person.  By offering to 
help, the clinician ‘professes’ to possess medical knowledge that [he/] she will use for the 
patient’s good.  The clinician serves the common good by [his/] her dedication to the good of 
individual patients.  Clinicians, physicians, and nurses are de facto advocates for the good of 
their patients.  For public health physicians and nurses the relationship is with the whole 
society.  The end or purpose of the relationship is the good of humans as collectively , the 
common good.  Public health physicians act for the good of all to the extent that medical 
knowledge can serve that good.  They are de facto advocates for the common good.  Their 
‘patient’ is society and its ills: they serve the good of society’s individual members 
secondarily by assuring a health community in which the individual can flourish’96.  
 
4.7.14 Conclusion 
The concept of human rights presupposes that some basic principles transcend cultural 
diversity. The major challenge consists in identifying those universal principles which regard 
public health. 
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Ontological personalism founds its philosophical system on the human value, in a global and 
integral sense.  This view is different from other similar approaches, which, however, also 
lead to diverging conclusions on the subject of ‘bioethics and public health’, hence some 
fundamental principles which constitute its solid pattern of interpretation.  In other words, 
ontological personalism is not opposed a priori to approaches which today represent the main 
philosophical foundation of public health, but it tries to provide a ‘strong’ anthropological 
background as a reference.  The same principles which North-American bioethics defined as 
guidance firstly for clinical decisions and then also for health policies, are incorporated by 
personalism, but integrated and re-elaborated within a ‘foundational’ perspective, not simply 
as an offer of equivalent alternatives.  This is shown, for example, by the hierarchy of 
principles which is indicative of a precise and consistent philosophical background.  The latter 
might be in conflict with ‘useful’ choices in a society which is increasingly attentive to 
spurious factors, such as efficiency and economics; in any case, it guarantees the value of the 
human person, not only and not so much because this is useful for society, but on the basis of  
the value of the individual per se. 
 
The substantialist interpretation of the human being implies a specific relationship between 
the good of the individual and that of the community. The common good or, in utilitarian 
terms, the good of the majority, cannot pass through the negation of the fundamental rights of 
the individual. At the same time, however, each person, according to the principle of sociality, 
realizes herself “sharing the realization of the good of other persons. In the case of the 
promotion of life and health, this involves that every citizen commits himself to consider his 
own life and that of other people not only as a personal but also as a social good. It binds the 
community to promote the life and health of everyone, to promote the common good 
promoting the good of everyone”’97. 
 
Personalism can help to create a synergy between the good of society from a medical point of 
view that results from the application of medical knowledge to cultivate the health of society 
as an organism, the good of society as society perceives it, the ontological good of society and 
the spiritual and non-historical good.  According to ontological personalism, human nature in 
the entirety of its complexity is the criterion of morality, both at an individual level (clinical 
ethics) and at a collective level (public health ethics).  This perspective can also furnish 
answers to resolve conflicts that may arise between the individual patient’s rights and the 
social common good.  
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5 Comparison of Public Health Structures and Policies 
within Europe 
 
5.1 Public Health Structures 
 
Whilst most EU countries have comprehensive health policies which seek to prevent disease 
as well as develop health services, it does not necessarily mean that they have public health 
systems, such as an organised or connected group of agencies with a primary public health 
focus.  In addition, methods of improving the health of the population depend upon a number 
of interrelated factors.  These include: time; place; government style and political direction; 
degree of authority vested in, and exerted by, the state.9  Public health practice also varies 
according to the disciplinary base which may be narrow, predominantly focused on a medical 
model, or may be broader including a wider range of disciplines including political sciences.9 
Public health practice also varies in response to new and urgent health priorities and changing 
governments and government bodies. 
 
There is variation in terms of which organisations provide public health activities, and 
countries vary in the degree to which activities are centrally led or devolved more locally.  
These all depend on the historical evolution of public health and the past and present political 
direction of the country.   
 
Public health as a label is not applied to exactly the same kinds of activities in different EU 
Member States.  Public health activities in one country might be considered as a branch of 
medicine, while elsewhere such activities are considered to be a branch of social policy, 
public policy, environmental health, school health or preventive medicine. 
 
Luxembourg is an example of this; there is no formally organised public health system, public 
health medicine is not a discipline, and there are no public health academic departments.  
However, a range of public health activities occur, provided by a mixture of non-
governmental and governmental organisations, including: antenatal screening; immunisations; 
cancer screening; surveillance of school age children and provision of health education in 
primary and secondary schools; monitoring of environmental standards; national drug policy 
and monitoring of biological and chemical hazards and information dissemination.98   
 
Even within countries which recognise public health as a specialist occupation (either as a 
medical discipline or as a related profession), there is wide variation in the degree of 
organisation of training and accreditation.  In France, the National School of Public Health 
was founded in the 1940s99, but it remains an underdeveloped and unattractive medical 
specialty.100  In Spain, specialist medical training in public health has only developed over the 
last 20 years, but uptake has been very slow.101  Similarly, in Portugal, the healthcare system 
has found it hard to recruit public health doctors, due to their low status, so general 
practitioners often have to take on responsibilities public health.102  This is also the case in 
Greece, despite public health being well organised in each of the regions.103  In the UK there 
is a long history of public health medicine and a Faculty of Public Health which has 
responsibility for the training and accreditation of public health specialists.  This has recently 
included non-medical public health specialists.104  
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In countries where either health insurance funds or national health services are largely 
responsible for public health, such interventions have often focused to a larger extent on 
biomedical interventions such as screening and surveillance, while health promotion and 
structural interventions to reduce social inequalities have been given lower priority.  This was 
the case in the UK, where public health services are organised through the National Health 
Service.105 In corporatist countries, public health services may be split between the 
responsibility of the insurance funds for healthcare and the responsibility of the state for 
public health.  In Germany, a shift in responsibilities for many health promotion and 
prevention services from public health services to the insurance funds has occurred and public 
health services have become much smaller and even less visible.106  In Austria, public health 
services occur as preventive medical services focussed on surveillance, screening and 
immunisation.107 Health promotion/ education activities have only recently been considered a 
part of public health services in Poland.108    
 
Because health policy in Belgium is devolved to the Communities (Flemish speaking in the 
north and French speaking in the south), public health services are not homogenous across the 
country.  Few health policies are enacted at the national level, for example taxation policy on 
alcohol and tobacco and the compulsory polio vaccination programme.109  In the Flemish 
community, the system is highly devolved to local practitioners who implement evidence-
based interventions to meet nationally set targets.109  In the French community the influence 
of the WHO came much later than to the Flemish community and their health policy has more 
emphasis on monitoring, surveillance and screening rather than addressing structural issues.109  
This situation is very similar to that in Spain where the underlying values for public health 
strategies vary from region to region, for example in Catalonia the focus is on interventions at 
the individual level, whereas in Valencia there is a much broader approach to public health.110    
 
In the Netherlands, public health occurs in addition to the healthcare system, involving many 
different agencies at both the local and national level.  It has a broad remit and is 
decentralised.111  Similarly, in Sweden, despite successes in programmes targeting specific 
diseases, the focus of public health at a local level is changing to address structural 
determinants of health.112  This is also the case In Finland too, where many initiatives are 
conducted at the community level and structures are targeted for change as much as 
individuals.113   
 
However, the difficulties involved in targeting structural and not biomedical influences are 
acknowledged in Denmark.  A combination of limited resources and lack of coordination due 
to the degree of decentralisation of health services, coupled with a traditional orientation to 
curative not preventive activities has made addressing structural influences on health 
difficult.114 
 
All of the countries with corporatist social health insurance financed healthcare systems, apart 
from Luxembourg, currently have highly devolved public health services.  For example, 
population health services in Germany are organised on a local level, and interventions are 
not necessarily co-ordinated between regions, despite the establishing of the German Forum 
for Prevention and Health Promotion in July 2002 at the federal level.  Surveillance 
procedures for communicable disease control were only standardised in 2000.106  A broad 
range of organisations are responsible for different aspects of preventive work which are both 
state and non-state, for example, under the Ministry of Health there is the Federal Office for 
Health Education in Cologne and a Central Association for Health in Bonn-Bad Godesberg, 
but there is also the German Centre of Public Health Care in Frankfurt, which is an 
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association of non-government organisations (NGOs) which are active in the field of 
prevention and health promotion.115    
 
It would seem harder to co-ordinate public health interventions in a corporatist healthcare 
system because, by its very nature, it is not centralised.  This is the case in Germany where 
public health decision making is devolved to the Länder level but national health policy must 
be reached by consensus by all Länder levels.116  For interventions such as cancer-screening, 
decentralisation may be viewed as a serious problem within the system.117 However, 
devolution to the local level can also be seen as a positive strategy for facilitating community 
empowerment and multiagency working for health.  Consequently, although decentralisation 
is a relatively new feature of public health services in the Netherlands, the shift was viewed as 
a necessary one in order to facilitate community involvement.  Some programmes have 
remained centralised – notably the National Vaccination Programme, and certain national 
screening programmes.111  
 
However, public health services in the social democratic countries are not necessarily 
characterised by centralisation.  In the social democratic states of Southern Europe (Spain, 
Greece, Portugal and Italy), health and welfare services are devolved to the regional or even 
local level.  However there has also been a domino effect in both Italy and Spain where 
policy innovation in one region has led to neighbouring regions implementing similar 
changes, including some policy changes at national level.118   
 
Public health services are also devolved and organised at the municipal level in Sweden and 
Denmark, with research and training being the concern of national level structures.112.  By 
contrast, the UK is extremely centralised and hierarchical – local Health Authorities have a 
responsibility for pursuing population based, public health strategies within a framework set 
out by the national Department of Health.105  The Polish sanitary-epidemiological system is 
similarly centralised and hierarchical.108   
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5.2 Communicable Disease Control 
 
The need to be sympathetic to the suffering of an individual patient may have to be tempered 
by a need to prevent spread of a disease to others.  Thus the normal protections to privacy and 
civil liberties within health care may be compromised in the public interest.  For example, in 
many countries informed consent is not required for passing on information about notifiable 
diseases to public health authorities.  However, even in this context, confidentiality still needs 
to be protected as far as possible to give reassurance to patients concerned about stigmatising 
diseases such as HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases.  Without some reassurances of 
privacy, potentially infective individuals may not come forward for testing and treatment.  
Control measures for gastrointestinal infections may require that affected food handlers are 
compulsorily excluded from work in the public interest.  However, compensation measures 
are important to discourage people from hiding their illness through fear of the economic 
consequences.  If persons (suspected to be) suffering from a communicable disease refuse to 
co-operate, they may be subject to involuntary detention, isolation, quarantine, testing, 
medical examination and, at the extreme, involuntary treatment. 
5.2.1 Involuntary detention, isolation and quarantine 
Individuals (suspected to be) suffering from particular communicable diseases may be subject 
to involuntary detention, isolation and quarantine in all of the countries examined: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and 
the UK.  In Poland, all residents and any sick persons arriving from abroad may be subject to 
compulsory hospitalisation, isolation and quarantine where they are suspected of having 
particular infectious diseases.  Contact cases are also subject to restriction on their movement.  
Inter-country variations exist in relation to the amount of time persons may be involuntarily 
detained, whether or not a court order is necessary for such detention to occur, and the extent 
of any punishments for failure to cooperate.   
5.2.2 Employment restrictions 
Persons with communicable diseases can be prohibited from attending work in Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Poland, Spain and the UK.  Regulation tends to be 
stronger for those working in the food industry (Austria, Denmark, Finland), and for those 
working with vulnerable groups including children, the elderly, and individuals who are 
hospitalised (Finland, Germany, Poland).  In Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland and the UK, 
persons who are isolated or prohibited from attending work can be financially compensated.  
Such compensation may take the form of a daily allowance (Finland) or may equate to 
sickness pay (Germany) or reimbursement for loss of income (Austria, Finland).  Employers 
may also be entitled to compensation during their employees’ period of absence (Finland, 
Ireland).  However, as an incentive for persons to accept voluntary measures, those who have 
been forcibly isolated may not be entitled to such financial compensation.   
5.2.3 Restrictions on children 
Children and young persons (suspected to be) suffering from a communicable disease may 
also face restrictions.  They may be ordered to be absent from school or any other educational 
institution for a prescribed period (Finland, Poland, UK), and, in the UK, all children below a 
certain age may be excluded from, or refused admission to, a place of entertainment or 
assembly, for example cinemas, arcades, sports grounds or public halls.  Parents and venue 
managers who fail to enforce the regulations may be subject to conviction and a small fine. 
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5.2.4 Involuntary Testing and Medical Examinations 
Medical tests and examinations may be conducted on individuals without their consent in 
Denmark, Germany, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and the UK.  Such 
measures may be restricted to those cases where there is an immediate danger for others 
(Denmark, Netherlands).  In Germany, while involuntary diagnostic examinations including 
the taking of blood and other specimens is permissible, further invasive examinations and any 
examination requiring anaesthesia cannot be performed without the consent of the patient.  In 
some countries involuntary testing and examination may be extended to the well contacts of 
people with a communicable disease (Finland, UK), those who live or work in specific places 
(Finland), or suspected carriers of communicable disease entering the country (Poland).  By 
contrast, only people suffering from tuberculosis (TB) can be subjected to involuntary testing 
in Austria.  There, failure to comply with the ordered examinations may be punishable by a 
small fine or temporary imprisonment. 
5.2.5 Involuntary treatment 
Individuals can be involuntarily treated in Austria (only against TB), Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland (although the legislation is vague), Italy and Poland.  Perhaps the most 
extreme example of involuntary treatment can be found in Poland.  In contrast to countries 
such as Denmark and Finland, where only patients with more dangerous infectious diseases 
can be subject to involuntary treatment, in Poland any resident may face obligatory treatment 
in a bid to prevent and contain all communicable diseases.  Further, non-Polish citizens or 
residents who are infected or who are suspected carriers of communicable diseases may face 
mandatory testing, hospitalisation and treatment as they enter Poland.  Finally, at risk sections 
of the population may face compulsory immunisation in Finland (where involuntary treatment 
is permissible) and in Germany (where it is not). 
5.2.6 Other involuntary measures 
Irrespective of the legal situation regarding involuntary treatment, other measures may be 
carried out without the patients’ consent.  For example, in Belgium, Denmark and Poland 
(where involuntary treatment is permissible) and in Germany, Sweden and the UK (where 
involuntary treatment is not permissible) measures such as the disinfection of living spaces, 
the disinfestation, treatment or extermination of insects or animals and the destruction of 
property may be undertaken without the consent of the patients. 
5.2.7 Compatibility with human rights legislation 
Such freedom-limiting interventions may infringe upon an individual's bodily integrity, civil 
liberties and human rights.  However, although international legislation, such as the Council 
of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
assert one’s “right to liberty and security of person” (Art.  5) and “to freedom of association 
with others” (Art.  11), caveats permit such rights to be contravened where justified in the 
interests of public health or to prevent the spread of infectious disease. 
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5.3 Drug Policy 
 
Fighting drug related problems and drug addiction are major public health challenges.  While 
society may wish to discourage drug use, it is having to face the reality that drug use is 
probably a permanent feature of 21st century European societies.  Many people are able to 
combine occasional drug use with their other family, economic and social commitments.  
Other drug users however, experience serious morbidity and mortality as a consequence, with 
associated implications for family members and crime etc.  While health education messages 
about the risks of drug use should continue, campaigns advocating abstinence have been 
replaced by more pragmatic approaches encouraging users to manage risk.  For critics, such 
messages appear to condone use of illegal drugs.  However, it is impossible to hold to a line 
of the danger of drugs when governments permit the use of legal drugs such as alcohol and 
tobacco which can be just as addictive, harmful to health and destructive to family life and 
societal networks.  Thus policies to decriminalise the use of softer drugs such as cannabis, 
attempt to distinguish their use from harder drugs such as heroin, even though there are still 
public health dangers of the former, in an attempt to make public health messages about the 
latter more credible.  Similarly, a consequential approach is used to justify the establishment 
of needle exchange programmes, recognising that some people will use intravenous drugs, 
and so they may as well be supplied with sterile needles and equipment to reduce the 
transmission of blood borne infections such as HIV and hepatitis. 
5.3.1 Cannabis  
There is no country in Europe where cannabis is actually a legal drug .119  In most European 
countries, drugs laws pertain to possession, supply, import etc.  –– rather than to drug use 
itself.  In Finland, France, Luxembourg, Greece, Sweden and Spain  drug use is illegal, 
although the criminal status of drug use has consistently been the subject of much heated 
debate in France .120  In Portugal, all drug use ceased to be a criminal offence in July 2001.  In 
Spain, Italy and Portugal,120   and recently in Luxembourg and Belgium (in 2001and May 
2003 respectively), cannabis possession for personal use is treated as an administrative rather 
than criminal offence in most cases.  Similarly first offences of possession are typically 
treated as an administrative rather than criminal offence in Ireland .  120  Possession for 
personal use has been criminalised in Poland recently and in Denmark offenders are generally 
prosecuted .  120 In most cases in Sweden, Greece, Germany and France, drug users receive a 
warning which may be accompanied by a request to contact a social or health service.  120 In 
Greece and Austria, users are put into treatment rather than prison.  120  In Finland, since 
2001, prosecution can be waived if the suspect has sought treatment for addiction .  120   
5.3.2 Classification 
In Austria, the UK, Finland, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands the legal sanction for drugs 
related offences depends on the relative harm of different drugs.119 Recent developments in 
drug policy in Belgium and Luxembourg and the UK, (where cannabis was reclassified as a 
Class C drug with effect from 1 January 2004.  Similarly in the Netherlands there is a 
distinction between hard (List I) and soft (List II) drugs, offences involving List I drugs 
would be more severely dealt with that those involving List II drugs.120 In Germany the drug 
classification reflects their relative medical utility.  This system classes cannabis, cocaine and 
heroin as Schedule I – non-marketable narcotics, Schedule II relates to unlicensed 
pharmaceuticals and Schedule III are marketable drugs available only on special prescription.   
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5.3.3 Harm reduction for injecting drug users 
Harm minimisation/reduction interventions include needle and syringe programmes (NSP), 
outreach training in safer injecting practices and methadone maintenance programmes.  
Facilitating safer drug use through needle exchange and the distribution of other paraphernalia 
to injecting drug users is recognised as an extremely efficient and cost-effective way of 
preventing the spread of HIV and other blood-borne diseases.   
5.3.4 Needle and Syringe Programmes (NSP) 
The public health rationale of NSP is focused on the prevention of HIV/AIDS and other 
blood-borne viruses.  Geographical coverage varies from one country to another.  Needles and 
syringes may be exchanged at various facilities, in all countries except Sweden.  Distribution 
through pharmacies and/or medical facilities takes place in Spain, Portugal, Denmark, France, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium and the UK.  Peer distribution takes place in Belgium, 
Czech Republic and the UK.  In Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Hungary, Austria and Norway there are also vending machines where materials may be safely 
disposed of.  The only supervised consumption facilities currently are in Germany, the 
Netherlands and Spain.   
5.3.5 Treatment programs 
Drug-free treatment for opiate use predominates in Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Poland, 
while substitution treatment for opiate use predominates in Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Spain, the UK and Greece.  There are 
differences over the main substitution drugs (buprenorphine; dihydrocodeine; Slow-release 
morphine; Heroin.119  Throughout Europe there are at least some legal provisions for 
alternative sentencing of problematic drug users convicted of non-violent drug related crimes.  
Some countries have specific provision for the compulsory detention and treatment of drug 
addicts as an alternative to a prison sentence (the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Poland).  In 
Greece and France there is also legal provision for compulsory detoxification, but these are 
very rarely, if ever, used.119  In April 2002, Denmark dropped legal provisions allowing for 
the forced treatment of drug addicts, although these provisions had never been used.121 In 
Austria, the UK, the Netherlands and Ireland, policy proactively encourages drug users in the 
criminal justice system to access treatment services.  In Sweden it is a requirement that those 
who enrol on a methadone substitution programme are not under arrest, sentenced to 
imprisonment or incarcerated.  In Poland there is also provision in law for both compulsory 
(maximum of two years) and voluntary treatment instead of a prison sentence to adult 
offenders.   
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5.4 Genetic Testing in Employment 
 
Regulations for Health and Safety in the workplace are important to insure that the interests of 
individual employees are not abused by employers in the drive for profit.  However, 
employees also have obligations: to their employer, by ensuring that they are fit to do the job 
they are paid to do; and to other employees and members of the public.  For example, 
employers must provide appropriate health and safety, fire and other protective equipment 
and the necessary training on how to use it.  Employees must attend such training and use the 
equipment provided.  Employees should not attend for work under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs, especially if their ability to use machinery, for example, is impaired such that they and 
third parties are put at risk as a consequence.   
 
The genetic testing of (potential) employees may be used to: predict the future health of 
employees; indicate genetic susceptibility to conditions linked to the working environment 
(e.g.  hazardous substances); test for previous exposure to potentially hazardous substances; 
and test for genetic disorders that could place the employee, fellow employees or the general 
public in danger.  Each of these possibilities has implications for predicted levels of sickness 
absence, loss of productivity, sickness benefits, pension entitlements, and the costs associated 
with health insurance and compensation payments.  Testing may also lead to genetic 
discrimination in the workplace.  However, genetic testing ignores non-genetic factors related 
to disease, cannot predict when or how seriously a person may be affected, and obscures the 
needs of employees without genetic pre-dispositions for a safe working environment.  The 
position of occupational health physicians is also problematic, as the usual obligation of 
doctor to their patient is potentially biased by other obligations that the doctor has to the 
organisation that employs them. 
5.4.1 Countries with explicit regulation 
In countries where genetic testing in employment is explicitly regulated employers may be 
prohibited from requesting genetic tests or obtaining the results (Austria), or they may only 
obtain such results if required by law (Denmark), if not prohibited by any other law (Ireland), 
if it is relevant to assess the employee’s ability to perform the work tasks (Denmark, Finland, 
the Netherlands), in order to protect the health and safety of the individual or third parties 
(Denmark), or for medical purposes (France, Sweden). 
5.4.2 Countries with no explicit regulation 
Despite references to the protection of personal data, privacy and health information genetic 
testing in employment is not explicitly regulated in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain or the UK.  However, non-legally binding recommendations, memoranda and 
codes of practice do advocate the prohibition of genetic testing in employment (Germany), the 
restriction of genetic testing to issues of public safety or medical purposes (Germany), and 
prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of genetic test data (Germany, Italy, Spain).  In 
Portugal, testing for pre-dispositions or exposure to hazardous substances could theoretically 
be justified in the interests of the employee’s health and safety as long as such tests do not 
degenerate into broader genetic testing, genetic discrimination or a means to avoid improving 
safety conditions for all employees.  In Spain, employers should be informed of those genetic 
test results relevant to an employee’s ability to undertake the job or the necessity of 
improving protective and preventive measures.  Finally, in the UK, employers may require 
employees to undergo genetic testing and may lawfully discriminate against individuals on 
the basis of their genetic test results.  A draft Code of Practice recommends that genetic 
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testing is only valid where an employee may be at risk in a particular working environment or 
may pose a serious safety risk to others.   
5.4.3 Health and safety and the protection of third parties 
Irrespective of whether genetic testing in employment is explicitly regulated, the relevant 
legislation, guidelines and recommendations in many countries contain a caveat to the effect 
that genetic testing may occur if in the interests of the health and safety of the individual or 
third parties.  Such exemptions apply in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Portugal, Spain and the 
UK, and are recommended in Germany.  Finland and the UK make explicit reference to 
employees engaged in safety critical work, such as transportation, the emergency services, 
signal workers, where issues of public safety arise.  Such employees may theoretically be 
subject to genetic testing or refused employment if they fail to comply. 
5.4.4 Punishments for the (mis)use of genetic test results in employment 
Employers may face fines or temporary imprisonment (Finland, France, Sweden) if they do 
not comply with the regulations or if they (mis)use employees’ test results  
5.4.5 Prohibition of discrimination in employment on the grounds of 
disability 
Despite the widespread inclusion of disability as a protected ground in anti-discrimination 
legislation in Europe, it is often unclear whether this extends to discrimination on the grounds 
of genetic predisposition or susceptibility to disease.  Only French legislation makes explicit 
reference to genetic test results.  The inclusion of genetic data is not explicit in anti-
discrimination legislation in Germany, Greece, Ireland, or Poland, or within the anti-
discrimination clauses of the national Constitutions in Portugal and Spain.  The situation is 
less clear in Italy where the legislation implies protection for people with diseases or 
disabilities of a genetic origin, but not necessarily for those with genetic predispositions or 
susceptibilities to disease.  In the UK, the Human Genetics Commission recommended that 
the Government introduce a new piece of legislation dealing specifically with genetic 
discrimination, but new legislation has not been forthcoming.   
5.4.6 The wider European and international position:  
The Council of Europe (1992, 1997) has asserted that genetic testing (in employment) should 
be voluntary and only undertaken for health purposes, scientific research, the direct protection 
of the person or third parties, or if lawfully required.  The Council of Europe (1997) and 
European Union (2000) also seek to prohibit discrimination on the grounds of genetic 
heritage or features.  The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 
(2003) concurred that any genetic testing in employment must be necessary for the protection 
of the health and safety of the employee or third parties, and that the principle of non-
discrimination be upheld.  At the international level, UNESCO (1997), the World Medical 
Association (1998) and the World Health Organisation (1999) have also recommended 
restricting genetic discrimination.   
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5.5 Immunisation strategies 
 
Childhood immunisation against diseases such as measles, mumps and pertussis (whooping 
cough) is the single most effective public health mechanism in raising health quality in both 
the developed and the developing world.  Immunisation protects the vaccinated individual 
from communicable disease, although the decline in incidence of infectious disease over the 
last 150 years has been largely achieved by other public health measures such as improved 
housing, nutrition and sanitation.  The degree of protection will depend on the efficacy of the 
vaccine and on the receptiveness of the individual.  While vaccines may provide incomplete 
protection which declines with time, the uptake of immunisation programmes is usually high.  
There have been numerous scares that have reduced the public trust and hence the uptake of 
vaccination.  While the magnitude of the precise risk of side effects with vaccines is 
controversial, the chance of severe morbidity and mortality following an unimmunised 
individual becoming infected is significantly higher.  The individual and public health would 
both therefore benefit by widespread take up of immunisation.  There will be some 
individuals who are unable to be immunised because of contraindications.  High vaccine 
uptake is particularly important to ensure herd immunity to break the chain of transmission 
within the community and hence protect those who have not been immunised because of a 
contra-indication.  A rational individual acting only in self interest may choose not to be 
immunised and hence avoid the small risk of vaccine complications, while still receive 
indirect protection against the communicable disease through herd immunity because others 
have been willing to accept the risks to receive direct protection.  However, if a substantial 
proportion of the population were to gamble in this way then herd immunity would not be 
achieved, and outbreaks of communicable disease would result.  In order to avoid this, 
governments use varying degrees of compulsion and incentives to require/encourage parents 
to act in what the Sate thinks is in the best interest of the child.  Similar incentive may be used 
to motivate health professionals to encourage such decisions. 
 
Currently there is wide variation between EU member states concerning vaccination policy, 
and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control is advocating a harmonisation of 
vaccine strategies.  The current strategies of different member states are based upon differing 
views of private and public interest. 
5.5.1 Compulsory immunisation 
In Belgium, Greece, Italy and Poland, immunisation against particular communicable diseases 
is compulsory.  Punishment for non-compliance includes fines in Belgium, Italy and Poland, 
and potential imprisonment in Belgium.  Currently, in Italy and Greece, parents are required 
to show their children’s immunisation certificates upon enrolment in school, however they 
cannot be refused admission if they are not fully immunised.   
5.5.2 Voluntary immunisation 
In all EuroPHEN countries other than Belgium, Greece, Italy and Poland, immunisation is 
voluntary.  This is based on a number of factors including a belief in parental choice, fears 
that compulsion could prove counter-productive, the Constitutional protection of private 
family life (Germany, Ireland), and trust in the State/public health authorities (Sweden, 
Finland).   
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5.5.3 Consent 
Consent to treatment is necessary to respect the autonomy of the patient in health care.  In 
countries where immunisation is compulsory, the State effectively over-rides the wishes of 
parents and parental consent may not be required.  However, in countries where immunisation 
is voluntary, parental consent is sought for child immunisations.  Consent may be verbal, 
written or implicit in taking one’s child to a medical appointment.  However, there is some 
ambiguity over consent for immunisations undertaken in non-clinical settings such as schools.  
In many countries, young people over the age of 16 may consent to or refuse immunisations.  
In some countries the child’s consent is considered or required at younger ages (or levels of 
maturity): 14 in Austria; 12 in Denmark and the Netherlands.  Under certain circumstances 
the State may intervene in parental decision-making, for example if parents disagree on 
whether to immunise (see the legal cases in the UK in 2003). 
5.5.4 State incentives for parents 
In countries where immunisation is voluntary the State may encourage parents to have their 
children immunised through the offer of incentives.  Non-financial incentives include the 
potential to refuse school enrolment to unimmunised children (Italy, Greece), social pressure 
from the State/health authorities (Denmark, Italy, Sweden) or other parents/society, and 
consent refusal forms that require parents to make an active decision about their child’s 
immunisation status (Ireland, Italy, the UK).  Incentives may also be financial.  For example, 
in countries where immunisation is compulsory parents may be fined if their children are not 
immunised (Belgium, Italy and Poland).  Other financial incentives include payment to 
parents whose children complete the immunisation schedule (Austria), and the potential 
reduction in State benefits to parents whose children are not fully immunised (under 
discussion in Ireland).  Finally, childhood immunisations are free in all countries, except 
Poland (where most immunisations are compulsory).   
5.5.5 State incentives for health professionals 
In most EU states incentives are in place for health professionals to increase immunisation 
take-up.  Financial incentives include fee per consultation or service (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany and Ireland), and bonus payments for reaching immunisation targets (UK 
and Ireland).  Non-financial incentives include professional (peer) pressure, consent refusal 
forms (in parts of Ireland, Italy and the UK), monitoring of immunisation rates (Greece) and 
continuing professional evaluation (Spain).   
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5.6 Protection of Children and Vulnerable Adults in Clinical 
Research 
 
The involvement of human beings in research is crucial in order to develop new medical 
interventions.  As we benefit from the altruism of previous generations to contribute to 
research, arguably there is a moral obligation on us to also participate so that future cohorts of 
patients may be helped.  However, research subjects should not be treated as means towards 
technological advancements.  Various examples of abuse of people in research during the last 
century led to the introduction of ethics review procedures and other legal and regulatory 
protections.  These safeguards are particularly important in the context of vulnerable groups 
such as children or people who lack mental capacity, and are unable to give informed consent 
in their own right.  Certainly such individuals should not be expected to be enrolled in 
research, where adults with mental capacity could be approached and asked to be research 
subjects.  But ruling out research on vulnerable groups completely would mean certain 
valuable categories of research could not be conducted, and as a result, for example, we could 
not assess the efficacy and safety of drugs in children or study the causes of mental 
incapacity.  Thus particularly strict ethical scrutiny is required in these circumstances to 
ensure that vulnerable groups subjected to no or minimal harm, while still ensuring that 
beneficial research is permitted.   
 
In 1947, the Nuremberg Code laid the foundation for guidance for research ethics principles 
and practices.  The World Medical Association’s Declaration of Helsinki (2000) and the 
International Conference on Harmonisation’s Tripartite guidelines for good clinical practice 
(1996) and in the Council of Europe’s additional draft Protocol to the Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine (1997) concerning Biomedical Research (2004) followed on from 
this.  The European Commission introduced a legal requirement for the ethical review of all 
clinical trials involving medicines across Europe and specified criteria to be considered when 
protecting the interests of research participants. 
5.6.1 Inclusion of Adults who lack capacity to consent 
Any informed consent given or refused by the adult prior to the onset of incapacity should be 
considered and the consent or opinion of a proxy acting in the best interest of the individual 
should be sought.  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and the 
Netherlands provide mechanisms by which proxy consent is provided on behalf of the 
individual.  The UK makes a distinction between medicinal product clinical trials and other 
invasive research where the former requires consent but the latter requires an opinion.  
Finally, in Sweden, it is only the opinion of a representative which is sought.  The proxy may 
be nominated by the individual prior to the loss of capacity; may fall naturally into the role; 
or may be appointed by a court.  In Austria, Germany, Italy and Sweden there is a system of 
proxy that is determined by the courts – this is not necessarily required in Belgium, Denmark, 
Spain or the UK.  In Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and 
the UK a relative can take on the role of proxy.   
 
Direct therapeutic benefit or benefit through an increase in knowledge to the individual or 
patient group should be a condition of participation in clinical research and involvement must 
directly relate to their condition as long as the risk to the individual is negligible as stated in 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being (Council 
of Europe Art 17 (2) (i)).  This Convention has been signed and ratified in Denmark, Greece, 
Ireland and Spain and thus provides a basis for policy.  Seven further countries have signed 
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but not yet ratified the Convention (Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland 
and Sweden.  It remains unsigned by Austria, Belgium, Germany and the UK).  Research on 
adults lacking capacity with no direct benefit is also permitted in Austria, Germany (under 
certain circumstances), the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.   
5.6.2 Inclusion of Minors in Research 
The age at which a minor has the capacity to understand and form an opinion on the 
information relating to a trial and the age at which the opinion of the minor should be 
respected and complied with in addition to, or over and above, the wishes of the parents, 
varies throughout Europe.  Where children are involved in research, it is a common condition 
across partner countries that there should be a direct benefit to the child and/or group and 
relate to a clinical condition of the child and/or group of that child.  Alternatively, that the 
research, by its nature, can only be carried out in that specific population for the benefit of 
that population.  Where there is no anticipated direct benefit there should be minimal risk.  It 
seems that all countries, with the reported exception of Italy and Ireland with respect to 
neonates permit research which is of no direct benefit to the child under the condition that 
there is minimal risk. 
5.6.3 Inclusion of Women in Research 
The need for extra protection for women of child-bearing age and the potential risks of 
exposing a developing foetus have been recognised.  From the data collated, it appears that 
there are four positions taken by countries.  Firstly, a country may have no specific policy on 
inclusion/additional protection as in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Sweden.  Secondly, Austria and Spain a have policy on additional protection 
but not on inclusion as is the case.  Thirdly, UK has a formal policy on inclusion but no 
formal policy on additional protection.  Fourthly, Germany has a formal policy on inclusion 
and additional protection. 
5.6.4 Inducement to research 
From the data received, inducement policies regarding adults with capacity are as follows.  In 
Belgium, Finland, Greece, Italy and Sweden no profit is allowed.  In Germany, the 
Netherlands and Denmark inconvenience is compensated in excess of travel expenses/loss of 
earnings.  And there are partial or no formal restrictions on payment in Austria, Spain and the 
UK.  Ireland would probably also fall into this latter category as there would appear to be no 
formal policy on financial inducements.   
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5.7 Smacking policy 
 
Article 19 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Treaty Body the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child, requires States to protect children from “all forms of physical or 
mental violence” while in the care of parents or others.  This is interpreted as requiring States 
to protect children from all corporal punishment.  Corporal punishment is in most countries a 
deeply embedded traditional practice and it is a deeply personal issue: most people were hit as 
children; most parents have hit their children.  Research on the prevalence of corporal 
punishment in Europe suggests that it remains high in many countries except those where it 
has been against the law for several years.  A wide range of literature suggests that 
professional opinion is divided on the use of smacking as a form of discipline of young 
children.  Some believe that smacking is an important component of discipline.  Others 
believe that smacking is at best ineffective and at worse leads to an escalation of unwanted 
behaviour or abuse. 
5.7.1 Smacking in schools 
In Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK corporal punishment in schools is expressly forbidden.  
In Poland, corporal punishment in schools in forbidden by the Educational System Act which 
provides a general requirement to respect the personal dignity of students.  There is not a 
special law that regulates students’ rights or specifically forbids corporal punishment at 
school, so more general legal acts have to be invoked.  In Italy corporal punishment has been 
unlawful in schools since 1928 and abuse of children is forbidden, however, smacking, 
slapping and similar punishments are not explicitly forbidden by law at school although 
teachers prone to this behaviour usually are told off by Educational Authorities.  In Belgium, 
a narrow interpretation of the law states that it is forbidden to beat children although there is 
no explicit reference to the school situation.  In France there is no explicit prohibition in law 
of corporal punishment in schools and light correction is tolerated.   
5.7.2 Smacking in the home 
In Denmark, Finland, Germany and Sweden smacking in the home is forbidden.  In Austria, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Poland and Spain the act of smacking is not explicitly named in 
the law.  In Poland, physical violence that causes non-accidental injuries (fractures, bruising 
etc.) against children in the home is forbidden However, slapping, patting etc., or actions that 
do not cause injuries are treated as a traditional part of upbringing, and are perceived as the 
so-called permissible reproach.  In Belgium, there is no law explicit for smacking of children 
in the home and corporal punishment by parents is tolerated in society.  In Greece, parents 
have a right to take corrective measures, although according to article 1518 of the Civil Code 
(1983) “only if these are necessary from a pedagogic point of view and do not affect the 
child’s dignity”.  In France, corporal punishment is lawful under the parental right of 
correction.  In Ireland and the UK the law provides defences for those who use corporal 
punishment to discipline children allowing reasonable chastisement or lawful correction.  In 
Netherlands there is no defence in legislation for the use of corporal punishment by parents, 
but it is commonly assumed that parents have this right. 
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5.8 Anti-Smoking Policies 
 
The European Union has sought to harmonise anti-smoking policies by setting directives 
which are implemented through national legislation.  There are a variety of measures which 
are used to decrease smoking including: increasing taxation; regulating advertisements of 
tobacco products; regulating tobacco packaging and products; restricting areas where people 
are able to smoke and increasing information and health campaigns on the dangers of 
smoking.  The regulation of licit drugs, such as tobacco and alcohol, requires governments to 
balance the rights of the individual to make their own choices in their own private sphere and 
the interests of the public good. 
5.8.1 Taxation 
According to the World Bank a price rise of 10% decreases consumption by about 4% in 
high-income countries.122  As a result in 1992 the EU sought to define the structures of 
taxation within Europe and to a certain degree harmonise taxation of tobacco.  The three 
directives on taxation of tobacco123 products placed taxes on cigarettes at a minimum of 70% 
of the final retail price (minimum rates of 57% for excise taxes and 13.04% for VAT).  These 
directives are currently under review.  Mediterranean states have a percentage tax system 
which exaggerates the price difference between cheap and expensive brands.  This allows 
some brands to remain low priced compared to Northern countries where the flat rate tax 
structure means there is little difference between brand prices.124  Higher taxes on licit drugs 
such as tobacco may encourage smuggling, black markets and criminality.  This is of higher 
concern for EU states which are neighbours to countries with less control over their borders 
and have lower taxation on tobacco goods.   
5.8.2 Restricting advertising of tobacco products 
In 2003 the EU brought the Tobacco Advertising Directive which took effect in July 2005.  
This EU directive applies to advertising and sponsorship in print media, on radio and over the 
Internet with a cross-border dimension.  A number of areas fall outside of its scope, including 
local advertising i.e.  in cinemas and on billboards as well as merchandising and local tobacco 
sponsorship where participants come from only one Member State.  Of the 25 member states 
only Germany and Luxembourg had not passed the required law by the 1st April 2006 
deadline.  Luxembourg is currently in the process of doing so; however Germany may be 
taken to the European Court of Justice.125 The tobacco industry has sought to overcome the 
restrictions on advertising by indirect advertisement; branding tobacco related products and 
brand-stretch  e.g.  Marlboro Classics range of clothing.   
5.8.3 Restrictions on smoking in public places 
European countries have various legalisations, most of which ban smoking in public places 
such as government buildings, schools, hospitals, and on public transport.  There are no 
Europe-wide laws covering all workplaces, but rather two directives offer limited protection 
from second-hand smoke.126 127  Each member state must implement these directives in their 
own legalisation.  The main argument which has been perused is that a worker has a right to a 
non-smoking work environment.  Only Ireland has a full ban on smoking in all workplaces 
(2004).  14 other countries, including France, Germany, Italy and Spain have regulated 
smoking in public places (i.e.  government buildings and transport) but made provisions for 
smoking in pubs and hospitality areas.  The hospitality industry is self-regulated in Germany, 
the Netherlands and Austria.  In Belgium and France separate smoking areas must provided.  
A Normative Ethics Framework for Public Health   EuroPHEN 
  122 
In Italy and Sweden smoking areas in public places must be in a separate ventilated smoking 
room.  In France, Germany and the Netherlands workplaces have special rooms for smokers.  
In Greece, Poland, Finland and Spain there are various exemptions for the hospitality 
industry128 . 
5.8.4 Health Information Campaigns 
In May 2001, an EU directive came into force which regulated tobacco products.129  The 
directive also increased the size of health warnings placed on cigarette packets from 4% to a 
minimum of 30% of the surface of the front of the packet and 40% of the back of the packet.  
The European Union its self also promotes non-smoking through campaigns and in 2005 
launched HELP – For a Life Without Tobacco.  The main aim of this campaign is to 
denormalise smoking within at risk groups (i.e.  adolescents and young adults - 15 to 30 years 
olds).   
5.8.5 Regulation of product 
The 2001 EU directive regulating tobacco products130 imposed upper limits on the tar (10mg), 
nicotine (1mg) and carbon monoxide (10mg) content of cigarettes.  The European tobacco 
industry may also be affected by a new chemicals directive, REACH (Registration, Evaluation 
and Authorization of Chemicals).  This framework requires the testing of many chemicals that 
are used in consumer products to establish their effects on health.  The law is expected to be 
adopted by the end of 2006.131  The EU also supports the production of tobacco through the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  In 2004 the Council of Agriculture Ministers agreed to 
de-couple subsidies from production starting in 2006 and to be completed by 2010.  After 
2010 half of the subsidy will fund wider rural development and the remainder will be paid to 
farmers in the form of a single farm payment that does not encourage tobacco production.132 
5.9 Urban Planning Procedures 
 
It has long been recognised that there are important links between environment and health.  
Inequalities in health will be explained by genetics and lifestyle choices as well as by the 
physical and social environment in which we live.  It will be important to attempt to remove 
or reduce threats to the public health although this does not mean that industrial activities are 
necessarily all bad, even where processes and outputs are potentially dangerous to health, as 
the economic contribution to the local economy can help reduce poverty.  Public policy needs 
to be guided by equity and justice, and economic benefits to the local community must be 
proportionate to the risks to health.  Similarly, on an individual basis, where private interest is 
outweighed by public interest e.g.  where there is compulsory land purchase, compensation at 
the appropriate market rate is necessary.  At all stages, public consultation is important, with 
rights to object to planning decisions.  Public policy also needs to recognise that protection of 
the natural environment is also a social good and a moral obligation, and hence advancement 
of human interests should not be our only concern.   
5.9.1 Strategic planning 
The size and nature of a project influences at what level of government planning permission is 
refused/granted.  In general, smaller projects are dealt with at the regional or sub-regional 
level and larger projects at the regional or national level.  Strategic Development Plans (SDP) 
can strongly influence decisions on planning applications.  In the UK all SDPs are 
discretionary and act more as statements of intent.  Planning permission can be given or 
withheld irrespective of whether or not the project fits in the SDP.  In Germany all planning 
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decisions made at the local or regional level must accord with SDPs concerning ecological 
issues and these are made at the regional level.  Countries such as Denmark use a zonal 
system, where there are various land-use categories and any plan must fit into these zones.  It 
is the same in Poland but the plans on a local level are not obligatory so only 14 % of the land 
in Poland is covered by local development plans (LDP).  In Ireland LDPs are changed every 6 
years and must fit in with the National development plan.  Public participation in drawing up 
the plan is encouraged and draft copies of the plan are given to various statutory and 
voluntary bodies to give specialist advice. 
5.9.2 Consultation 
In some countries, consultation is very limited.  In Italy, consultation tends to be with various 
organisations rather than directly with members of the public.  Consultation is only required 
in Greece in planning applications requiring an Environmental Impact Assessment.  In the UK 
consultation tends to be passive, the public have to find advertisements on planning proposals 
in newspapers or on posters at the proposed site.  Those with objections then have to initiate 
complaint.  This leads to a planning system that is heavily weighted in favour of the 
developer.  In other countries, consultation is proactive with letters being delivered to the 
homes of those directly affected, public surveys, presentations/ hearings and direct 
involvement of NGOs (Austria, Sweden, Belgium, Germany).  Such more proactive planning 
systems mean that the voice of the public is taken far more into consideration. 
5.9.3 Appeals Procedures 
The type of consultation procedure in each country has an effect on the appeals procedure.  
Those with a comprehensive planning procedure aimed at getting the decision right the first 
time round have little need for a comprehensive appeals procedure (Austria, Denmark, 
Germany, Netherlands).  The inclusive consultation process in Belgium, together with many 
levels of appeal (albeit time limited), mean that developers are very receptive to address the 
concerns of the public, so reducing the need for appeal.  Whereas those countries with a more 
perfunctory planning procedure have much more comprehensive appeals procedure as a safety 
net against disadvantageous planning decisions (UK, Greece). 
5.9.4 Compensation 
Countries with better consultation processes, also place less emphasis on their compensation 
provisions.  In some countries (Austria, UK, Poland, Italy) there is no explicit right for 
compensation for third parties, except in the case of government infrastructure projects where 
there may be compulsory compensation or purchase.  In any other circumstance compensation 
must be pursued through the courts where success is unlikely unless negligence on the part of 
the developers can be proved.  In other countries (Denmark, Belgium) compensation is 
available to those directly affected by the development, or in some cases (Greece), any group 
is eligible where a development has had an unfavourable effect.  In Germany, compensation is 
available where protection of the public from negative effects of the project is not possible.  
In Ireland both developer and the public can claim compensation from the planning board if a 
decision reduces the value of an asset. 
5.9.5 The Precautionary Principle 
In Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and the UK, the precautionary principle is 
explicitly meant to guide the planning  process.  In Demark and the Netherlands it has never 
been officially adopted into legislation, although both have signed up to international 
conventions that incorporate the principle.  It is also part of Dutch and Swedish environmental 
policy.  However all EU countries are bound by the EU directives that incorporate the 
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principle.  One of the key EU directives that incorporates the precautionary principle is 
85/33/EEC (amended 97/11/EC) which assesses the impact of large private and public 
projects on the environment.  The implementation of this directive varies widely between 
countries, but it is mandatory throughout the EU. 
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5.10 The artificial fluoridation of public water supplies 
 
Fluoridation, the process of increasing trace levels of fluoride in water supplies to an optimum 
level, usually of one part per million (1ppm), is a contentious public health issue.  Intended to 
be a preventive measure against dental caries (tooth decay), particularly among children, the 
issue raises ethical questions and practical concerns about the potential harmful effects of 
consuming excessive amounts of fluoride. 
 
Surprisingly the evidence on the efficacy and safety of Water Fluoridation is not conclusive.  
Lobby groups that oppose water fluoridation have made various claims about the safety of 
water fluoridation, although the only disease where there is significant evidence for an 
adverse effect is fluorosis.  The evidence that artificially adding fluoride to the water supply 
should be an effective way of reducing dental caries, especially among socially disadvantaged 
children, is stronger.  However, despite the fact that water fluoridation is probably effective 
and probably safe, very few countries in Europe have legislation that permit artificial 
fluoridation of water.  Of those that do, actual fluoridation may be limited to certain regions.  
Some other countries have previously permitted water fluoridation, but have reversed the 
policy.  Why then has a relatively cost effective public health policy not been more widely 
adopted? The extensive use of fluoride toothpastes has meant that population health across 
Europe has been generally improving over recent years, although health inequalities exist.  
The anti-fluoridation lobby have been very vocal and politicians have been reluctant to 
challenge their arguments.  While the majority of claims of side-effects from water 
fluoridation have been disproved, the public seem unwilling to bear the small risk of 
morbidity and the aesthetic effects of fluorosis.  The public no longer seem receptive to 
requests for accepting risks (even if theoretical and/or small) so that vulnerable groups such as 
children may benefit.  Instead, the precautionary principle seems to be increasingly prevalent 
within Europe with public and politicians alike preferring not to take on any risk within public 
health policy. 
5.10.1 Countries where fluoridation is currently permitted 
Water fluoridation is currently permitted in Greece, Ireland, Spain and the UK, however the 
extent of such fluoridation varies.  For example, while approximately 70% of the population 
in Ireland drink fluoridated water, this figure falls to just 10% in Spain and the UK.  Although 
Greece has been able to fluoridate its water since 1974, concerns over the technical, 
administrative and financial complexities and over health and safety issues has meant that the 
law has never been implemented.  The UK is the only country which requires local 
populations to be consulted prior to fluoridation occurring.   
5.10.2 Countries where fluoridation was previously permitted 
Finland, the Netherlands and Poland have experimented with fluoridation and ultimately 
decided not to fluoridate their water supplies.  Reasons for ceasing fluoridation programmes 
include debates around efficacy (Finland, Poland), and concerns around mass-medication and 
the infringement of civil liberties (the Netherlands, Poland). 
5.10.3 Opposition to fluoridation 
The issue of artificial fluoridation does not arise in countries where water supplies are 
naturally high in fluoride (Denmark, Italy).  In other countries, water supplies may not be 
fluoridated where alternatives are preferred (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
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Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden); where there are ethical concerns over fluoridating 
water supplies (Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden); or where there are concerns over the 
safety of fluoridation (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Sweden).  Opponents of artificial 
fluoridation question the scientific evidence upon which claims of benefits from fluoridation 
are based.  Much of the evidence is of poor quality and concerns over associated increases in 
dental fluorosis are not discounted.  Fears of links between fluoridation and a range of more 
serious conditions and diseases are unproven and remain contested.  Even where trace 
fluoride levels of 1ppm are considered safe, concerns remain over the potential effects of 
cumulative fluoride consumption.   
5.10.4 Alternatives to the artificial fluoridation of public water supplies 
Fluoridation has also been critiqued for treating the symptoms rather than tackling the causes 
of poor oral hygiene and dental caries in children.  Thus, in countries that focus upon 
improving education, diet, and access to dental health services, artificial fluoridation may not 
even be a consideration.  Alternatives to fluoridation provide individuals with choice over 
what they consume.  This helps to define the individual as best judge and does not encroach 
on civil liberties or bodily integrity.  Alternative measures include better dental health 
education in schools (Austria, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland); the provision of 
fluoridated gels, pastes, tablets and rinses (Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Sweden); 
fluoridated salt (Germany, Greece); and bottled water high in fluoride (Italy).   
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6 Commentary on Comparison of Public Health Structures 
and Policies 
 
The overall aim of EuroPHEN was to develop a normative framework of ethics for use within 
public health policy at a European level and within Member States.  Normative frameworks 
should be derived from a moral understanding of how public health professionals should 
behave and how policy should be developed and implemented, rather than derived from 
current practice.  This strand of EuroPHEN examining similarities and differences between 
public health structures, is useful therefore in examining how Member States currently 
balance private versus public interest, and provide an indication as to the possible 
acceptability of various ethical approaches to deriving a normative framework.  However, the 
normative framework itself must be based on other moral considerations.   
 
There is considerable variation between EuroPHEN countries in terms of the funding and 
organisation of health services and public health, for a combination of historical and political 
reasons.  In some countries, public health is a branch of medicine, in others it does not exist as 
a medical specialty, in others it is a multi-disciplinary specialty, and in yet others it is not 
recognised as a profession in its own right.  These factors also impact on the breadth of public 
health practice, ranging from biomedical interventions to policies to address inequalities.  
There is also a wide variation within and between the countries examined in terms of to the 
various public policies examined. 
 
It may be tempting to argue that a Member State places more relative value on public over 
private interest compared with another country, if it has a stronger Public Health regulatory 
framework.  Similarly, pointing to specific policies which restrict civil liberties should not 
necessarily be taken as conclusive evidence about value placed on collective benefit. 
 
The EU has sought to legislate in a number of these areas of public policy in order to bring a 
degree of uniformity of approach in Member States.  These include tobacco legislation, 
protection of research subjects, use of genetic testing in employment, and urban planning 
issues.  Although countries vary in the degree to which they have adopted these in theory and 
practice.  These variations may be due to: 
• the relative importance of an issue as a public health problem within each Member 
State; 
• historical trends in the epidemiology of a disease or behavioural patterns. 
• previous policy direction;  
• the date of accession to the EU; 
• the ability to update and amend legislation in the face of scientific developments and 
the rise of new issues requiring legislation;  
• the resources to support such policy changes; 
• the degree of politicisation of an issue;  
• concerns from Member States to ensure maximum protection or accordance with 
existing laws and policies prior to adoption rather than a disagreement with the 
regulation per se.   
 
Thus, for example, a Member State with a strict regulatory and enforcement framework may 
be expected to have a higher prevalence of a disease or its risk factors, or when the trend is 
worsening, compared to a country where a disease or risky behaviour is rare, or the trend 
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seems to be improving without the need to be intrusive on private lives and autonomous 
decision making.  Exploring underlying epidemiology as an explanation for differences 
between countries was not within the remit of EuroPHEN. 
 
During the work of EuroPHEN, historical events were noted that may also explain differences 
between policies in Member States, and between attitudes of citizens in different countries.  
However, once again, a detailed analysis of these was not part of the remit of EuroPHEN.  
The impact of historical events on public policy is illustrated by two examples, public policies 
to control dangerous dogs and gun control.   
 
In the UK, The Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 (c.  65) was a policy response to rise in the 
newspaper coverage of attacks by American Pit Bull Terriers, particularly towards young 
children.  This policy outlawed owning and breeding of four dog types which were seen as 
particularly aggressive; the Pit Bull Terrier, the Japanese tosa, the Dogo Argentino and the 
Fila Brasileiro133.  In 1997 it was amended following lobbying by the Dog’s trust (then known 
as NCDL) to allow owners to register dogs which exhibited behaviour and physicality similar 
to the four breeds134.   
 
Gun control policy in the UK was initiated in response to Michael Ryan’s actions which later 
became known as the Hungerford Massacre in 1987.  In response the Conservative Home 
Secretary Douglas Hurd banned semi-automatic weapons (Firearms (Amendment) Act 
1988)135.  In 1996 Thomas Hamilton killed 16 school children and one adult at Dunblane 
Primary School which lead to the government setting up public inquiry and the Parliamentary 
Home Affairs Committee to begin its own investigation into Handgun Ownership136.  The 
public inquiry recommended some changes about licensing and using handguns, but didn’t 
recommend a ban.  However two petitions were started, one of which was lead by the Scottish 
Mail, to ban all handguns.  In February 1997 the government passed the Firearms 
(Amendment) (No.  2) Act 1997 which restricted ownership, however with a Labour win in 
May 1997 there was a further amendment which means that handguns have been almost 
completely banned for private ownership136.   
 
Thus public policies respond to historical events as well as being directed by public concern 
and demands for action.  Sometimes, such incidents can have a cumulative effect on policy 
frameworks and perhaps of even greater influence on attitudes of citizens.  Thus, for example, 
media reports of various public health concerns or scandals, even if subsequently 
demonstrated to be unfounded, have had widespread impact on public trust in politicians and 
public health officials, and hence willingness to accept restrictions on collective measures 
advocated by governments and agencies. 
 
With these caveats, this chapter draws some conclusions about differences in moral value 
placed on private and public interest in the Member States studies. 
 
Most countries are paternalistic with regards to smoking and communicable disease control, 
and the general trend is to increase the degree of paternalism with regards these two areas of 
policy.  With regard to smoking, the EU has led the way for increasing state control over 
smoking in public places, advertisement, sponsorship, and health warnings on packaging, and 
all countries have followed this guidance although Germany is slower than others, due to 
influential tobacco lobbyists and an emphasis on personal freedom in lifestyles.  With regard 
to communicable disease control, the increased profile of this area of public health following 
real or threatened international outbreaks and incidents (the rise of TB, SARS, avian and 
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pandemic flu, bioterrorism) has led to the development of new legislation in some countries 
which increase the state’s power to contain and control, within limits. 
 
All countries except France and Belgium have laws prohibiting the corporal punishment of 
children in academic institutional settings and are thus paternalistic within state run facilities 
in order to protect children.  However, generally, corporal punishment is not prohibited within 
the home in the majority of European Member States.  The exceptions are the Scandinavian 
countries of Finland, Sweden and Denmark have banned smacking in the home, as have 
Germany and Austria.   
 
The Scandinavian countries, together with Poland, also tend to be more paternalistic within 
drugs policy compared to other western European countries.  However many of the previously 
more liberal countries are now moving towards a more paternalistic goal of abstention rather 
than harm reduction, perhaps as a consequence of a previously more liberal approach which is 
perceived to have failed. 
 
Immunisation policy is perhaps surprisingly more liberal in Scandinavia but this may be due 
to a historical high level of trust in the authorities thereby requiring less legislation to ensure 
adequate levels of vaccination coverage.   
 
There are explicit laws to regulate genetic testing in employment and prohibit discrimination 
in many Member States.  Although in many countries there are exemptions from the 
protection of individual rights if testing would protect self and/or others.  Most countries are 
non-specific with regards to discrimination on the grounds of genetic tests.  Because of the 
complexity of this issue and the continuous advances of this branch of science, these issues 
are under review in many countries and most seek to protect the individual worker.  The 
overall direction is to be more paternalistic in terms of laws and punishments for non-
compliance in order to protect the individual’s rights, with exemptions in certain situations, in 
keeping with EU regulations. 
 
There is increasing protection of children and vulnerable adults in clinical research across 
most countries in order to protect the individual rather than undertake research for the public 
good in line with EU Directives and the Declaration of Helsinki.  There is variation in the 
degree to which these are implemented and worded and questions remain as to whether they 
provide the level of protection envisaged in practice.  Austria, Spain, the UK and Ireland have 
only partial or no formal restrictions on payments to adults with capacity, a more liberal 
approach than the other countries which restrict this Austria, Germany, Italy and Sweden 
require the appointment of a proxy for the purposes of consent in incapacitated adults to be 
made through the courts, in other countries it is more liberal.  Germany has the greatest 
restriction on research in children, and also has the greatest protection for women in research.  
This more paternalistic approach to protect the individual may be related to historical factors 
relating to the Nazi era. 
 
Understanding how historical events and underlying moral values have shaped contemporary 
public policy is important to the development of international public health policy.  Although 
all EU countries are subject to various Directives, these are translated into practice in different 
ways and to different degrees depending on the fit with existing policies and practices.  The 
Scandinavian countries have a stronger history of paternalism with regards public policy and 
this is evident in the sections above.  Childhood immunisation is a notable exception, 
although this may be due to a strong historical trust in authority as noted above which has not 
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necessitated state intervention.  Another notable exception is Germany which has public 
policy which differs from the European norm in two main areas, that of tobacco control where 
it is more liberal, and that of the protection of research subjects where it is more paternalistic.  
It has been speculated that this may be related to activities of the Nazi era, with contemporary 
governments keen to not repeat events of the past.  However, in addition to historical reasons, 
the situation in Germany (and indeed other countries) may reflect to a large degree the 
influence of the tobacco industry.  Thus despite a gradual change in German public opinion, 
political resistance remains quite high.  Poland stands out in a number of areas of public 
policy as being more paternalistic than some other countries, in particular immunisation, 
communicable disease control, and drugs policy, these may be related to its communist past.  
Ireland generally is congruous with other member states except in the field of water 
fluoridation where it is the most paternalistic of all countries as the only country to mandatory 
fluoridate water supplies.  Southern and Western European countries are generally more 
liberal, for example in terms of drugs policy, although France and Belgium are unusual in not 
banning corporal punishment in educational settings to protect children.   
 
In summary, with the caveats noted at the start of this chapter, some countries tend to adopt 
relatively consistent patterns of the degree of liberalism versus paternalism whatever the 
public health issue studied (for example, Scandinavian countries tend to be more paternalistic, 
Western and southern European are more liberal).  In addition, there is a degree of 
consistency between which public health policies are more liberal versus paternalistic 
depending on the issue, irrespective of the individual country (tobacco control and 
communicable disease control tend to have more paternalistic policies). 
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7 Attitudes of European Citizens to Public Health Policies 
 
As with the comparison of structures and policies within Member States, any empirical data 
on the attitudes of European Citizens, should not be used to develop a normative ethical 
framework for public health policy.  However, this strand of EuroPHEN, examining citizen 
attitudes, provides an indication of the acceptability of restrictions on individual freedom for 
collective benefit. 
 
7.1 Methodology 
 
A total of 96 focus groups were held in September and October 2003 within 16 European 
countries of these: Austria (Linz, Vienna), Belgium (Antwerp, Liege), Denmark 
(Copenhagen, Veju), Finland (Helsinki, Jyväskylä), France (Paris, Tours), Germany 
(Hamburg, Leipzig), Greece (Athens, Salonica), Republic of Ireland (Cork, Dublin), Italy 
(Milan, Rome), Luxembourg, Netherlands (Amsterdam, Eindhoven), Poland (Krakow, 
Warsaw), Portugal (Lisbon, Oporto), Spain (Barcelona, Madrid), Sweden (Örebro, 
Stockholm), and the UK (London, Glasgow).  Additional pilot groups were previously held in 
the UK and France to test the question topic guide. 
 
Focus group participants (with an average of 8 people per group) were recruited by Market 
Research companies in each country via a range of techniques: telephone directories, recruiter 
database of contacts, door-to-door or on-street recruitment.  In order to obtain as 
representative sample as possible a screening questionnaire was used.  For example, potential 
recruits were excluded if they were “very active in working for political issues” or who had 
absolutely “no interest in current political and social issues”, or who worked for the 
government, in marketing or the health industry.  Thus efforts were made to reduce the 
chance that focus groups discussions would be biased by people with strong views in favour 
or against the policy issues discussed.  The groups were segregated according to gender; age 
(20-30 or 45-60 years); marital status; parental status, educational status; and smoking status. 
 
The focus groups each lasted approximately 2 hours and were conducted! in the appropriate 
local language.  The same topic guide was used for all groups (see Appendix 1).  However, 
because of time constraints, not all groups were able to cover all policy areas.  For example, 
72 focus groups discussed smacking of children; 68 discussed water fluoridation; 94 
discussed smoking policy; 89 discussed drugs policy; 66 discussed immunisation and 72 
discussed smacking of children.  The focus groups were tape-recorded, transcribed, and 
translated into English.  These transcripts were then analysed and coded manually by the first 
author using techniques drawn from grounded theory.137  Finally the types of arguments and 
general mood of the groups was compared and contrasted between demographics.  Quotations 
in the results are used to illustrate the key emergent themes and arguments used.  Focus-group 
quotes are identified by the location of the group, gender, age range (20-35 or 45-60), marital 
status, parental status, higher or lower education and smokers or non-smokers. 
 
While focus groups do not measure strength of options held, they are particularly effective in 
highlighting both arguments used and the social and cultural context for individual believes138 
as well as raising questions and perspectives that may not naturally occur during other 
qualitative methodologies.139  The focus group methodology enabled participants to discuss 
issues that they may not have previously considered and to form or challenge their opinions 
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through discussions with other people.  140 141 142  Focus groups are a particularly useful 
methodology for establishing shared frames of reference and meaning in relation to how 
cannabis and the legalisation of cannabis which were used to produce and defend individual 
options and experiences.  The number of focus groups conducted was large by qualitative 
standards, but the number of groups in each country or involving specific demographic 
categories was proportionately less.  Care must also be taken in when making comparisons 
between countries and demographic groups to take into account historical and legislative 
differences as well as linguistic issues.   
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7.2 Prohibition of smacking of children 
 
7.2.1 Opinions on smacking 
This issue was highly polarising across demographic types and countries.  There were 
distinctly different views on whether smacking was harmful.  The discussions were often 
emotive and there were sometimes angry exchanges from those who passionately disapproved 
of smacking at any level with those who did not.  Participants with children were equally 
divided against smacking or for smacking, though they thought there were better ways to 
discipline children.  Older participants appeared more against smacking than younger 
participants and in general, females were more against smacking than males. 
 
In countries where all forms of smacking is already illegal e.g.  Sweden, Finland and 
Denmark, it appeared that anti-smacking beliefs were more entrenched than other countries.  
They felt that society could and should manage without smacking, and that ultimately parents 
did not have the right to smack their child. 
 
“It is a disgrace to take advantage of the helplessness of children.  I don’t see how it 
could be necessary in any situation”. 
Finland/female/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
Several people stated that they had been smacked as children and had suffered no ill effects, 
this was seen across age groups, countries, gender and whether they had children or not but 
was more prevalent among older respondents.   
 
“A clip around the ears hasn't done us any harm either” 
Germany/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
Others thought it a good form of discipline which even though not ideal was necessary and 
possibly unavoidable.   
 
“I think people even have the right to make that a part of their upbringing” 
Netherlands/female/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
Some respondents suggested that some children are uncontrollable any other way and that 
children should be spanked more.   
 
“There are children who do not react to anything else anymore” 
Austria/female/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
One person stated that it was part of their tradition.   
 
“I think that smacking a child as punishment is part of our tradition.  However, there are 
limits to it and it shouldn’t get out of hand.” 
Spain/male/45-60/married/children/standard education 
 
A number of respondents mentioned that they thought discipline among young people was 
better when corporal punishment was allowed and that children were now uncontrollable.   
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“Nowadays our society suffers from the lack of spanking” 
Italy/female/45-60/single/no children/standard education 
 
Some felt children should be treated in the same way as adults and given the same respect and 
that there were better ways to discipline them for instance, denying treats, discussion, 
grounding etc. 
 
“-Can you give me one justification why I can slap a child? I am not slapping you as an 
adult, either, do I? I really find that unbelievable.   
-But I also think it is important to show children where the limits are! 
-But you can do that in a discussion!” 
Germany/female/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
Some believed that smacking made children more aggressive and that violence can breed 
violence.  They thought that teaching children that hitting is an appropriate way of resolving 
conflict could contribute towards a more violent society. 
 
“This aggression cumulates and in the future he’ll beat his parent” 
Poland/female/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
Some were worried that smacks can get harder, sometimes involving implements, can then 
escalate to beating, on to abuse and that it leads to further violence.  They thought that 
smacking could get out of control.   
 
“That one smack, then a child doesn’t do it the next time, then he gets two smacks” 
Netherlands/female/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
7.2.2 Opinions on smacking bans  
No consensus was reached either across demographics or across countries on the benefits of 
having a law against smacking children in place.  However in countries where smacking has 
been banned for some time, respondents were much more in favour of legislation than 
elsewhere.   
 
The primary reason for rejecting the government’s right to legislate in this area was an 
infringement of civil liberties and parental rights.  This was not seen as a problem in 
Scandinavian countries but in other countries, it was felt that perceived government 
interference and invasion of privacy would lead to an unacceptable loss of parental rights.   
 
“Yes, but you do have the right to raise your child, if you think that’s the best way to raise 
it.” 
Belgium/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
Some thought that a law would protect the minority - those who were being abused. 
 
“I think it should be a law, this way we can save children who are really beaten and have 
bruises” 
Finland/female/45-60/married/children/further education 
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However, the majority felt that the rationale of protecting vulnerable children from abuse was 
not sufficiently compelling.  Very few felt that banning smacking would protect an individual 
child from abuse. 
 
“The ones who are really mistreating their kids will do it anyway.  So the people who are 
actually affected are the parents who want to spank their kids” 
Denmark/male/45-60/married/children/standard education 
 
This was because they felt that crimes occur despite laws. 
 
“Sexual abuse of children is forbidden, too, but evidently it happens nevertheless.” 
Austria/female/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
Others stated that although it may not be effective in protecting the minority, legislation was 
felt to raise awareness of the abuse issue in society and send an unequivocal message about it 
being harmful and parents may think twice before smacking. 
 
“No, it doesn't protect them, but maybe it would make the public more aware.  People 
hitting their children are well aware of the fact that they are not allowed to do that.  So if 
it is made illegal, this doesn't really protect the child.  But these people know they will be 
punished if it comes out in the open.” 
Austria/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
One Swedish group, where a law against smacking has been in place for some years, felt that 
even though smacking still occurred in Sweden, the law had resulted in a reduction in the 
incidence of slapping.   
 
“But, you know, kids get slapped even in Sweden, or get their bottom spanked, or, but it’s 
less than it would be without this law.” 
Sweden/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
Some groups mentioned that a law would give observers the right and the power to make a 
report to the authorities. 
 
“But at least in that case, if the neighbours hear what is going on, they can do something 
about it.  If the appropriate laws do not exist then you can't do anything about it at all”  
Germany/female/20-30/maried/children/further education 
 
However, some groups were worried that a law could result in the false reporting of 
neighbours, if for instance there was some animosity between them.   
 
“-I've got something against my neighbour …- I'll report that he hits his kid.”   
Belgium/female/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
A few groups worried that the law could result in inappropriately strong punishment for 
parents, or punishment that was too extreme for the crime.   
 
“Parents will be punishable if they ill-treat their children, if they beat them up.  But it will 
be absurd only for a smack.” 
Italy/female/45-60/single/no children/standard education 
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Concern was voiced about children rebelling against their parents and being able to threaten 
their parents with the police which would lead to an undermining of parental authority. 
 
“In that case we would soon have children reporting their parents to the police, because 
they slapped them.” 
Austria/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
A critical problem for many is that it appears unworkable as a law – it was an intrusion of the 
State, smacking was essentially a personal choice and banning this is the thin end of the 
wedge, a slippery slope for further government interference, and that there would be non-
compliance. 
 
“There are certain areas where the state just can’t go any further, can the law go into the 
bedroom, into the house, how far can the law go, how can the state monitor that.” 
Ireland/male/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
“I would continue to raise my children in the way I think is right.” 
Austria/male/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
7.2.3 Discussion 
A 2001 UNICEF opinion survey of 15,200 young people, aged 9-17 years across 35 countries 
in Europe and Central Asia, found six out of ten children reporting violent or aggressive 
behaviour within their families.143 
 
Seventy two percent of children in Finland144 and 91% in Ireland145 had been slapped or 
smacked in childhood.  In the UK a study found that although three quarters of respondents 
agreed that smacking is not an appropriate way to handle the unsafe behaviour of a three year 
old child, almost two thirds of the sample had smacked their pre-school child in the past 
week.146 
 
Legislation against smacking in schools and in the home currently varies across Europe.  In 
the countries in this study, all except France already have a law in place that bans corporal 
punishment in schools.  Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Sweden currently have 
laws explicitly prohibiting the physical punishment of children in the home.147 Italy and 
Portugal are in the process of having a law confirmed in legislation.  Certain countries such as 
the UK have tried to distinguish between disciplining children and abuse by allowing mild 
smacking that does not cause visible bruising, grazes etc under a reasonable chastisement 
defence against common assault.   
 
The focus group analysis did not observe strong demographic variations between the 
perceptions and arguments of the focus groups however older participants and females 
appeared more against smacking than younger or male participants. 
 
Both professional and lay opinion is divided on the use of smacking as a form of discipline of 
young children.148 Some believe that smacking is an important component of discipline and 
essential for normal social development.149 Others believe that smacking is at best ineffective 
and at worse leads to an escalation of unwanted behaviour or abuse.150 151 This range of 
opinions was observed in the focus groups of this study. 
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Limited research has been published on public opinion to smacking.  A 2004 survey of 1,007 
adults in the UK, found that 85% agreed that “parents should sometimes be allowed to smack 
their children”.  Only 12 per cent agreed that, “smacking of children by their parents should 
be illegal in all circumstances”.152  A survey done in the USA found that 51% of the parents 
supported the use of corporal punishment in schools.153 Another USA survey found that 19% 
of mothers believed that there are times when it is appropriate to spank a child less than 1 year 
old, and 74% believed this about children 1 to 3 years old.154 A 1998 UK survey of 2,000 
adults showed that 88% agreed that “it is sometimes necessary to smack naughty children”, 
with only 8% disagreeing.155  A Scottish survey found that 83% of respondents thought it 
should be lawful for a parent to smack a 9 year old.156 These surveys stand in marked contrast 
to the results of a MORI poll conducted in the UK on behalf of the Children are Unbeatable 
Alliance157, which suggest that the majority of the general public supports a change in the law 
on smacking.  The explanation for this discrepancy may be due to the language used in the 
MORI poll questions, which referred to “hitting family members” without allowing 
respondents to make a distinction between moderate physical correction and violent attacks.  
In the focus groups in this study, it was made clear that the discussion was about mild 
physical punishment.   
 
Making decisions about the upbringing of a child is usually within the rights of the parents but 
it is their responsibility to do this within socially acceptable norms.  Children may be taken 
into the care of the social services if certain boundaries are crossed, for instance if children are 
seriously harmed or abused.  Most member states of the United Nations have ratified the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child which obliges States to “… take all appropriate 
legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all 
forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, 
maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal 
guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child”.158  
 
Professional opinion is divided on the ability of legislation to bring about change in social 
attitudes and behaviour.  A review of the effects of Sweden’s ban on smacking found little 
change after the ban159 finding that in a 1994 Swedish survey that corporal punishment was 
just as prevalent after the ban as it was before.160  Another study found that public support for 
corporal punishment had declined and that the ban had been highly successful.161  
 
However, the UNICEF report143 showed that death rates due to maltreatment are virtually 
identical in countries with smacking bans compared to those without them.  In fact, none of 
the four countries with the lowest child maltreatment death rates (Spain, Greece, Italy and 
Ireland) has a ban on smacking. 
 
The debate on smacking remains polarised.  The right of a parent to choose whether to smack 
a child appears strongly defended in all countries in our study except Sweden and Finland, 
where legislation has been in place for some time.  The primary reason is a curtailment of 
their parental rights rather than a belief in the rationale that was offered to them in discussion 
– namely that legislation restricts the freedom of the many to protect the few.  Moreover 
perceived problems with defining and enforcing such legislation undermines its credibility.  It 
is clear that public opinion is crucial to the effectiveness of a ban on smacking and an 
individual’s moral commitment to a law is linked to whether or not they will obey the law. 
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7.3 Wearing of car seat belts 
 
Support was expressed for the use of car seat belts in most focus groups.  Support was 
particularly strong in The Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.  Wearing seat belts was seen as 
being in everyone’s best interests and justified paternalistic legislation. 
 
“I don’t wear my belt because of the law; I wear it for safety”. 
Denmark/male/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
“I think sometimes people have to be forced to do something and that makes obvious 
sense to wear a seat belt.  There's no reason why anybody shouldn't wear a seat belt”. 
UK/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
Some participants gave personal examples of why wearing seat belts is important: 
 
“Because I don’t want to be thrown…because one of my colleagues was thrown through 
the windscreen and he lost his sight.” 
France/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
The majority also supported seat belts in Poland, Luxemburg and Spain although reluctant 
and opposing views were more strongly presented.  Some individuals held strong views 
against any form of legislation and refused to wear a seat belt at all. 
 
“I don't fasten my seatbelts and I will never do it because I simply don't like it.  Even if I 
pay a fine I will still drive without fastening seatbelts”. 
Poland/male/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
7.3.1 Infringement of Personal Freedom 
An argument used by those opposing seat belt legislation was that it should be an individual’s 
own choice to wear a seat belt, as not wearing one posed little or no threat to anyone but the 
individual in question. 
 
“I consider the inside of a car to be free space, like the inside of a house.” 
France/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
Civil liberty arguments were frequently criticised within the groups and it was pointed out 
that even if the direct costs by an individual not wearing his or her seat belt are slight, indirect 
costs do exist, and have a potentially critical impact of justifying necessity. 
 
“But if you have an accident and end up in a hospital, and you’re handicapped for the 
rest of your life, then the community pays for all that.” 
Belgium/female/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
The opinion that each individual should think beyond restrictions in personal liberty and more 
towards community advantages was common.  Some group members took the topic further. 
 
“At the danger of sounding extreme again, in my opinion there are certain basic laws that 
have to be observed.  Otherwise life in a community does not function.” 
Germany/male/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
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7.3.2 Risk of Accidents 
Some participants did not believe that the risk of serious injury was great enough to warrant 
frequent belt use.  Even those individuals who generally supported seat belt use admitted non 
compliance in some circumstances.  There was an association between perceived risk of 
having an accident and journey length.   
 
“I think being truthful it depends what journey I am going on, if it is a long journey I put 
my seat belt on, if it is a short journey I am being lazy, I sometimes don’t …But if I was 
going on a long journey, yes, I would put a seat belt on …I know it sounds stupid, you 
have got more chance of something happening.” 
UK/male/20-30/married/children/further education 
 
However, others recognised that any length of car journey was associated with risk. 
 
“You can sit in the car for five hours and nothing happens, you can be in the car for five 
minutes and can be totally, totally collided and dead” 
Netherlands/female/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
The risk associated with seat belt compliance differed from that of other traffic regulations.  
This was often used to promote seat belt necessity.   
 
“Being a responsible driver I wear a seat belt and am protected.  However things like red 
lights are a different issue.  According to the law I am not allowed to cross red lights.  I 
don’t do it, and I especially don’t do it if there is other traffic around.  If the lights are red 
however, and no car is to be seen or even heard anywhere, of course I go through the 
lights.” 
Germany/male/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
7.3.3 Law Enforcement 
The separate issue of being caught by the police for non-compliance was perceived as a 
powerful factor in legislation enforcement.   
 
“I’m talking about the authorities, the cops and everybody else, given the fact that they 
don’t fine people for [not wearing seat belts] then it must mean they’re not entirely 
convinced by it either.” 
France/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
If those enforcing the law do not do so adequately the public may assume reasoning behind 
legislation to be weak.  Some participants were also of the opinion that a good example 
should be set by law enforcement authorities.   
 
“I have seen policemen in the car in front of me not wearing a seatbelt.  That’s not exactly 
serving as a good example”. 
Germany/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
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7.3.4 Habit 
Habit was frequently used to reinforce both compliance and non compliance arguments. 
 
“I’ve been damaged by work, I guess.  Because I jump into different vehicles all the time, 
so it’s impossible, that is, it’s too much hassle.  And then, unfortunately, you take that with 
you home”. 
Sweden/male/20-30/married/children/further education 
 
“I have been told to wear a safety belt since I was a child, so it is instinctive”. 
Finland/female/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
7.3.5 Setting an example for children 
In focus groups where participants were parents, a large majority made their children wear 
seat belts in both the front and rear seats for safety.  It was also expressed that educating 
children in this way had the capacity to change a parent’s behaviour. 
 
“I used to be careless in driving.  But when I had my child, from then I always wear a seat 
belt because I think, if something happens to me what will happen to my child, and I 
always but the child in the safety seat because I think, if something happens to my child, 
what will happen to me?” 
Greece/female/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
7.3.6 Discussion 
Traffic volume within the European Union has tripled over the last 30 years, though the 
number of road deaths have fallen by half.  Despite these reductions the EU has stated that the 
figures are still too high and have set new targets.162 Over 41,000 people were killed across 
Europe in road traffic accidents in the year 2000, and it has become the primary cause of 
death in 14-25 year olds.163 The European Commission plans to halve this number by 2010, as 
set out in the White Paper on European Transport Policy.  However, the European Transport 
Safety Council (ETSC) reported only a 17.5% reduction in road traffic fatalities in 2005, well 
below that projected, and needed 25% at this stage for the European Union to hit its target.164  
 
With non seat belt use being one of the three major aggravating factors for fatal accidents, 
alongside speeding and driving under the influence of alcohol165, increasing seat belt 
compliance would be hugely beneficial in achieving the 50% reduction.  It has been estimated 
that universal seat belt use, to the best international rate, could prevent more than 6,000 deaths 
and 380,000 injuries a year within the original 15 European Union Member States.166 
 
In 1991, the European Commission passed a Directive (91/671/EEC) requiring that a seat belt 
must be worn in both front and rear seats in all vehicles less than 3.5 tonnes.167 This was 
revised in 2003 (Directive 2003/20/EC) extending the obligatory use of seat belts to 
occupants of all motor vehicles, including trucks and coaches.168 As of 9 May 2006 the latest 
Directive had to be transposed into national law in all Member States.  It is the duty of the 
individual Member States to enforce such legislation and improve seat belt usage and road 
safety. 
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Incorporating seat belt legislation into national law is only one step to improving widespread 
seat belt use.  In order to benefit public health, the legislation must be publicised, explained 
and, if necessary, enforced.  Factors influencing public understanding and attitudes to seat belt 
legislation include socio-economic differences, population density, age, fatalistic attitudes and 
law enforcement.  169 170 171 
 
Most focus group participants were convinced of the benefits of seat belt use and hence 
restrictions in personal freedom may be perceived as less severe if one wears a seat belt 
habitually.   
 
Classically a north-south divide exists across the European Union, with northern countries 
having a higher overall rate of seat belt use than other Member States.172 The differences are 
so stark that whilst the Southern and Eastern Member States represent only 34% of the 
European Union's population, 54% of all road deaths occur in these countries.173 The 
European Transport Safety Council (ETSC) stated in April 2006 that seat belt wearing rates in 
the EU vary between 59% (Hungary) and 97% (France) for the front seat and 21% (Estonia) 
and 90% (Germany) for the rear seat.172 This is despite all countries requiring use of seat 
belts.  Differences in belt use can be largely attributed to effective planning and 
implementation of legislation.   
 
Only 1% of non seat belt users are totally against seat belts.174 They generally do not 
acknowledge the benefits of seat belts and are opposed to their use.  Many hard core non-
users object to being forced to buckle up, believing that belt use should be a matter of 
personal choice.175 People within the focus groups who refused to wear seat belts were rare, 
but those that did cited civil liberty arguments as justification. 
 
Habitual behaviour has been recognised as one of the most influential factors in improving 
overall compliance rates170 and its importance is reflected in the focus group data, being used 
to reinforce reasoning for both regular and irregular use of seatbelts.  The focus groups 
highlighted the inconsistencies in seat belt use dependent on the journey taken and the 
perceived risk of having an accident, despite a widespread agreement on the safety benefits of 
seat belts.  People who do not always use seat belts understood the importance of wearing a 
seat belt, but did so inconsistently due to the predominant effects of habit.  SARTRE 3164 also 
found that people were less likely to wear seat belts in built up areas compared to motorways 
or other main roads.   
 
People who do more driving each year (more than 10,000 km) were less likely to always wear 
seat belts.170 These frequent drivers may need to use vehicles as part of their work.  Some of 
the focus group participants described how occupational work patterns could reinforce bad 
habits for seat belt use. 
 
SARTRE 3164 found that drivers who use seat belts less frequently tended to underestimate 
the benefits of wearing belts if one drives carefully and overestimated the risks of being 
trapped by the belt in case of emergency.  The report also recommended that education and 
information campaigns were necessary to improve understanding of the benefits of seat belt 
wearing. 
 
Although no significant demographic differences were apparent from the focus group 
analysis, those participants who had children were more likely to recognise the safety benefits 
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of wearing a belt.  SARTRE 3170 found that those drivers who always made children wear a 
seat belt or restraint was a significant predictor for the driver wearing a seatbelt themselves. 
 
The problems identified in the focus group data regarding law enforcement are a cause for 
concern.  In order to effectively promote seat belt use it is necessary for the police to adhere 
to, as well as enforce the law, especially with such strong majority support for seat belts.  
There are two main ways in which law enforcement is most effective.  Either more fines are 
issued by the police or an increased perception of being fined is created with effective use of 
the media.  Maximum benefit is most likely through a combination of the two.176 A USA 
study observed a clear relationship between belt use and the perceived risk of being 
ticketed.177 It is important to note that individual risk perceptions of being ticketed appeared 
to be irrespective of the actual chance of receiving a ticket.   
 
SARTRE 3170 found that the percentages of drivers who were fined or punished in some way 
for not wearing seat belts in the last 3 years was between 10% and 20% in Estonia, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Croatia and just over 20% in Cyprus.  The percentages in other EU States were less 
than 10% and many were less than 5% (lowest in UK).  The proportion of drivers who were 
fined or punished for not wearing a seat belt was low for countries where the wearing rate was 
highest.  However, comparison of wearing and punishment rates suggested that non-users are 
punished relatively infrequently in many countries.   
 
ETSC recommend that the best way to enforce seat belt use is through intensive and highly 
visible specific seat belt actions.  Such blitz enforcement should last only one to four weeks 
and be repeated several times a year.  These could be combined with other enforcement 
actions, for example on drink driving to be a more cost-effective use of police resources.176 
 
If seat belt compliance rates can be improved in drivers who use them some but not all of the 
time, the likelihood of the EU reaching its 2010 target may be significantly increased.  The 
ETSC has endorsed the use of seat belt reminders in new cars as a cost effective intervention 
aimed predominantly at this group and suggested that reminders can increase compliance 
rates to 99%.174 
 
It is doubtful that seat belt reminders alone will be enough to promote vast attitudinal change.  
However, combined with education and other interventions, it may be possible to not only 
improve immediate compliance rates but also long term adherence to legislation.  In order to 
achieve such long term effects, focus groups recognised that paternalistic legislation, provided 
it is appropriately enforced, can be an important motivation factor to encourage people to do 
what they recognised is in their own best interests.   
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7.4 Decriminalisation of cannabis use 
 
The cannabis discussion was focused upon the perception of cannabis as a soft drug, its use 
by youngsters, advantages and disadvantages for society, potential limitations of use and 
purchase. 
 
In two countries, Belgium and Denmark, there was extensive discussion of the cannabis 
question, which is likely to be related to the recent public debates regarding cannabis 
legalisation.  In the other countries there were still mixed responses, but less discussion which 
is likely to reflect a difference between knowledge and experience of drugs, rather than being 
directly related to gender, education level, or national boundaries.  Only in the Dutch and 
Danish groups was cannabis raised by respondents themselves as a person’s own choice, 
which is likely to be related to the policy of tolerating personal possession in those countries.  
Overall the groups consisting of younger men were more positive in tone regarding cannabis 
and its de-legalisation.  The focus groups with older participants remarked more often that 
cannabis was a hard drug (dissimilar to alcohol and tobacco) and were against legalisation.  
There was also confusion as to why the government would legalise a drug such as cannabis 
while at the same time restricting life style choices such as smoking.   
 
Nearly all individuals expressed agreement that cannabis should be legalised for medical 
treatment by prescription if their doctor felt it would benefit a patient.   
 
“On medical grounds yes but then it’s prescribed by a doctor” 
UK/female/45-60/married/children/standard education/non-smoker 
 
7.4.1 View of cannabis as a soft or hard drug 
The main difference in options between group participants was how they conceived of 
cannabis as a drug.  The view of cannabis as a hard drug seemed to be central to arguments 
against legalisation of cannabis.  Many of these respondents disagreed with the distinction the 
moderator made between the idea of soft and hard drugs: 
 
“Except that there aren’t any soft drugs, and marijuana is a drug, and there are no softer 
drugs.”  
Sweden/female/20-30/married/children/standard education/smoker 
 
“A drug is a drug and there should be no differentiation between soft and hard, however 
you put it.  That has to be drummed, it has to be drummed into every head so to speak, 
drugs are rubbish, drugs do not belong…” 
Germany/male/40-60/married/children/standard education/non-smoker 
 
For those that supported the legalisation of cannabis, as a soft/light drug, they drew upon its 
significance as a natural drug.   
 
“Yes, because cannabis is a natural product after all”  
Netherlands/female/45-60/married/children/further education/non-smoker 
 
Respondents who voiced options supportive of cannabis legalisation saw cannabis as a soft or 
light drug similar to socially accepted drugs such as cigarettes, coffee and alcohol.  Thus 
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some respondents drew on tobacco to argue that cannabis should be legalised in a similar 
way. 
 
“It’s not a drug; it is rather comparable to cigarettes.” 
Austria/females/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
However the view of cannabis as being similar to alcohol was also used by some anti 
respondents to argue that it had similarities for misuse.   
 
“We have seen how it is with alcohol.  Many people start with beer or cider, and move on 
to spirits.”  
Finland/female/45-60 /children/standard education/no smoking 
 
Overall alcohol was considered to cause more anti-social problems and violence.  The view 
that cannabis was a soft drug led respondents to believe that it, like alcohol could be used in 
moderation.   
 
While creating new users was not a concern for those who viewed cannabis as a soft drug, it 
was a concern for those respondents who saw cannabis negatively and some feared that 
legalisation would attract new users.   
 
“I’m against it because all the weak people will find it much easier to get hold of and then 
they’ll start using it.  That group...  the weak group, who are easily influenced...”  
Denmark/male/45-60/single/no children/further education/smoking mix 
 
Thus in some cases respondents thought the line should be drawn at chemical drugs because 
they saw these as being more harmful. 
 
“And that’s where the line is.  And then you stop there when that’s where the line is.  
Chemically.  And that’s more clear than what we have in Belgium right now I think.  I 
know people who are convinced that their E’s aren’t harmful at all.” 
Belgium/male/20-30/married/children/further education/smoker 
 
A second concern expressed by respondents was the potential effects of cannabis on physical 
and mental health.  Respondents viewed the governments’ control of tobacco as justified 
because it caused physical dependency, whereas cannabis did not.   
There was some debate between respondents as to the impact of drugs upon a person’s 
capacity to make decisions:  
 
“You don’t lose your judgement after a cigarette, but your judgement goes after … 
No, but you lose it after a bottle of spirits, I’d say.” 
Sweden/female/20-30/married/children/standard education/smoker 
 
Some respondents believed that cannabis had a long term impact in this regard. 
 
“I believe that when used as a narcotic it will affect your brains and your thinking.  It will 
make your attitude somewhat impassive and apathetic.  It stultifies you”  
Finland/female/45-60/married/children/further education/smoker 
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For some respondents this would mean cannabis users were likely to use public resources in 
the form of drug rehabilitation centres. 
 
7.4.2 Gateway drugs 
Some respondents who were against the legalisation of cannabis voiced concern that the 
legalisation of cannabis would not only create new users but also act as a gateway drug. 
 
“I'm shaking my head because I know people who have started off with cannabis amongst 
friends, children, and they're now on the next levels and it's horrendous” 
UK/female/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
This was an added concern as people were thought to become involved in harder drugs 
through buying cannabis from dealers who offered harder drugs.   
 
“If you are involved in that circle they will try and sell you something else.” 
UK/female/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
7.4.3 Crime  
Respondents thought that legalisation may impact on crime if more people would become 
addicted and as a result crime would increase.   
 
“And the assaults and thefts would increase and everything.  They just must get that 
cannabis, and they would not get it from shops, would they?”  
Finland/female/45-60/married/children/further education/smoker 
 
Other respondents argued that legalising cannabis would not close down dealers, but rather 
move the dealers onto selling harder drugs. 
 
“All those cannabis dealers aren’t going to go and find themselves another job if 
cannabis becomes legal.  What they’ll do is probably start selling something else.  If you 
look at places like Spain, when they can’t deal in cannabis anymore, they just start 
dealing in (…) heroin or cocaine.”  
UK/male/45-60/married/children/further education/non-Smoker 
 
For those who held the option that cannabis was a soft drug, its use also did not directly 
involve crime, rather it was the current law which led to a tacit support of organised crime. 
 
“Thus, people who use cannabis are actually supporting organised crime, prostitution, 
illegal weapons trade and things like that….  So I would like the legislation to concentrate 
on keeping organised crime, prostitution and drug sales under control.  I would suggest 
changing the practice of the law in stead of legalising cannabis.”   
Finland/male/20-30/married/children/standard education/smoking  
 
In most cases the groups’ discussions regarding cannabis legalisation concluded that it should 
remain illegal but that personal possession should not be prosecuted.  In those countries with a 
history of alcohol prohibition (notably Finland) respondents argued that the illegality of the 
drug caused many associated problems and thus the government should punish dealers.   
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“Punish dealers, but not consumers, given that there is an increasing mentality which 
says that drugs which are addictive…victims more than culprits…” 
Luxembourg/male/20-30/single/no children/standard education/non-smoker 
 
Some respondents supported a similar move on pragmatic grounds.   
 
“This is about not wasting effort on things that will happen anyway.” 
Netherlands/female/45-60/married/children/further education/non-smokers 
 
7.4.4 Personal right 
In nearly all the Danish and Dutch groups (countries which both have areas where cannabis is 
perceived as ‘semi-legal’) many participants referred to civil liberty and personal freedom.   
 
“Actually everyone should have the right to decide for themselves.”  
Netherlands/female/20-30/married/children/standard education/smoker 
 
In some other countries, such as Austria and Sweden, a few respondents also expressed this 
view.   
 
“If somebody thinks he has to do it, he will find out where he will end up.  You have to 
give human beings the freedom to find out where it will take them.” 
Austria/male/20-30/married/children/standard education/smoker 
 
In similarity with the options expressed by some respondents regarding smoking tobacco, 
cannabis use was seen as personal and acceptable as long as people’s actions did not hurt 
anyone else. 
  
“That we have a right to choose if we want to smoke or not smoke [cigarettes], as long as 
it doesn’t hurt anyone else, then I think, in that case, that we have the right to choose if we 
want to smoke cannabis or not”.   
Sweden/male/45-60/married/children/further education/non-smoker 
 
This was made explicit as any ‘harm’ was only inflicted upon themselves.   
 
“I smoke cannabis.  Ok, that’s my choice because I feel I harm nobody around me.  And 
personally I think it’s ok, I mean, I don’t think it makes me antisocial.”  
Belgium/male/20-30/married/children/further education/smoker 
 
7.4.5 Government control 
The focus group question was used to prompt a discussion to the role of the government in 
legalisation of cannabis and the potential benefits.  In those groups where the predominant 
feeling was that legalisation was positive, respondents also supported the increased 
involvement of the government as potentially improving the quality of the product.  This was 
seen as important as respondents believed that good quality drugs were not so harmful. 
 
“But it seems that good quality drugs are not so harmful (…)  So there should be controls 
on the quality of the drugs.”  
Spaiin/male/45-60/married/children/standard education/non-smoker 
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Some respondents felt that market forces and government control would create a better 
product, while they had been unable to do so with cigarettes because of the power of tobacco 
companies.  Some respondents envisioned cannabis being cleaner under government control.   
 
“Hash will be clean.(…) I mean you can put all sorts of stuff in hash nowadays.  You can 
go down to Dannebrogsgade street and Vesterbro area and there may be some deodorant 
or other random stuff they stick in it, you know?” 
Denmark/male/45-60/single/no children/further education/smoking mix 
 
In contrast to the view that government involvement was a positive step, some anti- 
legalisation respondents believed government involvement and regulation would be seen as 
condoning drug use.  These respondents expressed confusion as to how the government could 
be trying to encourage people to give up smoking while legalising cannabis.   
 
Certain respondents also were of the option that the regulation of cannabis by governments 
could bring benefits to society as a whole i.e.  via taxation.  Thus some Dutch groups 
remarked that their current system could be seen as beneficial as it brought tourists.  Taxation 
was seen, even by some non-cannabis users, as a pragmatic reason for government 
involvement in the cannabis trade.   
 
“Because in Denmark, there is – no matter how you look at it – there is a trade in 
cannabis.  And so we might as well try to get some money out of that so as to do 
something about the other narcotics”  
Denmark/female/20-30/single/no children/further education/smoker 
 
7.4.6 Education 
Many of the respondents felt that the government’s role was to inform its citizens rather than 
directly regulate their actions and choices, and thus they suggested that education regarding 
the consequences of drug use was the most important thing. 
 
“Then I think that hash should be legalised.  And then there should be information 
campaign.”  
Denmark/male/45-60/married/children/standard education/non-smoker 
 
In some cases respondents who were against legalising cannabis expressed the view that if it 
were to be legalised, it should follow the Dutch system with similar restrictions.  These 
respondents voiced the option that this would allow greater education and information, while 
also tightening certain restrictions (i.e.  age restrictions).  Thus the legalisation of cannabis 
was also seen by some respondents as allowing an open discussion and greater information 
could be given to cannabis users.   
 
“At least when I look in France (…) it’s completely hidden under the carpet and yeah, I 
don’t think that’s a solution either.  In any case, what I see happening in the Netherlands 
slowly, is that an open discussion is now slowly possible, where a couple of experts try to 
do research, to get a clearer picture of what the effects are.”   
Netherlands/male/40-65/married/ children/further education/smoker.   
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7.4.7 Discussion  
Cannabis is by far the most commonly used illegal substance in Europe.  In Belgium, Estonia, 
Hungary and Portugal between 5–10 % of the population has used cannabis, and this rises to 
24–31 % in Denmark, Spain, France and the UK.178  In recent years there has been increasing 
public debates as to the advantages and liabilities of the legalisation or decriminalisation of 
cannabis.  Cannabis is progressively viewed as a lifestyle drug which is harmless in 
moderation, however, there is growing evidence that heavy and abusive use of cannabis may 
have multiple adverse consequences for personal function and health.179 180   
 
While national drug polices across the European Union seek to create a drug-free society their 
precise mechanism for achieving this varies.  Some are based on limiting consumption 
behaviour while others focus on reducing the negative consequences of drugs for both the 
individual and society.181  With regard to cannabis, the major negative consequence is 
considered it’s potential to act as a gateway drug particularly in reference to misuses of other 
illicit drugs.182  While the actual causal mechanisms underlying such a gateway are unclear183, 
some countries, such as the Netherlands, have sought to separate soft and hard drug markets.  
In theory, by tolerating the sale of cannabis young people who experiment with cannabis are 
kept away from other illegal hard drugs.181  Indeed there is a growing movement within 
Europe to decriminalising personal purchase, possession and consumption of cannabis to 
focus on harm reduction.   
 
It is often argued by pro-cannabis lobby groups that public opinion supports changes in 
legislation for cannabis use in the general population.184 185 186  Public attitudes towards 
legalisation of cannabis has been explored in Australia187, the United States188, Norway189, 
and in Europe through the 2004 Eurobarometer.190  National drug agencies collate drug 
related statistics but these are not focused on public attitudes.191 192 General attitudes towards 
legalisation between socio-economic demographics have been explored; however the majority 
of research has been based upon youngsters and risk groups.  179 193 
 
Due to the variations between national drug legalisation the topic of decriminalisation of 
cannabis was raised in general terms, without specific reference to how the law could be 
changed.  This is a concern as it has been shown that respondents can vary their support 
depending on the extent of legalisation.187  It should also be noted that cannabis possession 
and use is not only illegal but also socially taboo in many countries and this was a concern 
when moderators sought to establish the experiences and attitudes of the respondents. 
 
The legalisation of cannabis for use in the general population was met with mixed responses.  
Respondents were typically either in favour or against it depending on their view of cannabis 
as a drug.  Those against legalisation generally saw cannabis as a hard drug and were 
concerned with the major mental health impacts and addiction.  By contrast, those 
respondents who saw cannabis as a soft drug argued that when used in moderation it had few 
health effects and other licit drugs caused comparable harm (i.e.  alcohol and tobacco).  
Research carried out for the popular media in the UK indicates this is a well supported view; 
48% agree that using cannabis is no worse than drinking or smoking, while 34% disagreed, 
and 17% did not know.194  The research reported here indicates that in similarity with alcohol 
and tobacco, cannabis use is seen by some as a personal choice which can be consumed in 
moderation as long as it does not harm others. 
 
The increased normalisation of recreational drug use, including cannabis,195 is likely to be 
linked to greater exposure of populations to recreational drugs.  Throughout the European 
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Union cannabis use is concentrated among young adults; highest in 15 to 34 year olds 
(between 11-44% depending on country), predominantly male and more common in urban 
areas.196  This study did not observe any strong socio-economic or gender variations between 
the perceptions and arguments of the focus groups.  One possible reason for this is that 
cannabis as a licit drug is normalised not only in users but also in non-users.   
 
The question of legalisation of cannabis was introduced to the focus groups in general terms, 
and in many cases respondents themselves argued that cannabis should remain illegal but that 
policing priorities should be changed.  This is supported by the research carried out for the 
popular media in the UK which found that 66% of those surveyed supported legalisation of 
cannabis or that it should remain illegal but for the police to not prioritise prosecutions.197  
Thus 65% felt cannabis possession should be the lowest priority for the police, compared to 
other crimes such as street robbery, burglary, heroin use and car theft.198  This is consistent 
with regard to the changes in several EU countries which have recently ratified laws 
liberalising the personal possession and use of cannabis.199  In this study we found slight 
variations between age groups, with older groups expressing stronger opposition to 
legalisation.  A similar age variation has been seen in the UK were 45% of 25 to 34 year olds 
agree with the legalisation of cannabis while only 27% of over 65’s support this.200 
 
This research also suggested that there was widespread support, by both those in favour of 
legalisation and those against, for greater drug information campaigns.  Respondents called 
for these to include both information concerning health risks of cannabis and current laws 
related to possession and consumption.  While the legalisation of cannabis or the toleration of 
personal cannabis use by police would be a step towards separation of hard and soft drug 
consumption, information campaigns would necessarily have an important role to play.  This 
is especially true within the social environments which exposes youngsters to drugs and 
where licit and illegal drug use is normalised.   
 
The normalisation of licit and illegal drugs is a growing problem throughout Europe which is 
unlikely to be successfully tackled through increased regulation and policing.182,183 The 
EuroPHEN data suggests that some respondents saw moderate recreational use of cannabis as 
comparable to the use of licit drugs such as alcohol, both in terms of health problems and anti-
social behaviour.  Respondents supported efforts to separate and regulate soft and hard drug 
markets to combat cannabis acting as a gateway to the unhealthy use of drugs (either 
excessive use of soft drugs or progression to hard drugs).  While some people rejected the 
suggestion that cannabis was a hard drug, these tended to be within groups of older people in 
countries where exposure to cannabis is lower.  It is possible that those who see cannabis as a 
harder drug may be less well informed or have less personal experience of usage themselves 
or among friends.   
 
The research presented here raises the possibility that individuals are not primarily concerned 
with the safety of cannabis use itself, but rather with which policy is more effective in 
preventing progression onto drugs such as heroin or crack cocaine where there are clearer 
risks to individual and public health.  Due to constraints in this project it remains to be 
explored whether pro-legalisation supporters see legalisation as the best way of stopping 
people progressing onto harder drugs or if opponents believe that for some, any softer drug 
use may inevitably place them on the slippery slope to destruction, and therefore all drug use 
(including alcohol) may be dangerous in this respect.  If this is correct then opponents may 
argue the interests of adults who make autonomous choices, and are able to use cannabis 
responsibly without impact on their social obligations, but be outweighed in order to protect 
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vulnerable groups such as children, or those with more addictive personalities.  However, this 
hypothesis is speculative and the focus groups did not discuss this specifically. 
 
While it is possible to de-normalise drugs, as illustrated by the current change in social views 
of tobacco and smoking201, such a policy would require massive resources and relies on a 
clear evidence basis that smoking moderate amounts of cannabis causes considerable harm.  
This research indicates that to counter cannabis acting as a gateway, it may be more effective 
to exploit the existing view that cannabis is a soft drug in contrast to other highly addictive 
and damaging hard drugs. 
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7.5 Water Fluoridation 
 
Most participants in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK were opposed to water fluoridation.  In 
comparison, most participants in Greece, Ireland, Poland and Sweden were supportive.  In 
part, this pattern reflects current or past experience of water fluoridation in these countries.  
However, it should be noted that in some countries only 1 or 2 groups discussed fluoridation. 
 
7.5.1 Physical Harms 
Many people were concerned about the health risks of fluoridation or fluoride overdose, 
particularly for children or others who may be more susceptible to harm.  Some were aware of 
fluorosis or made links with other diseases e.g. bone cancer, arthritis, and mental retardation.  
However, the majority of participants did not specify what side-effects concerned them.  
People worried that supplementary fluoride in toothpastes, rinses etc. could combine 
dangerously with the levels proposed in fluoridated drinking water. 
 
“I am taking fluoride supplements, tooth paste enriched with fluoride.  And on top 
of that, drinking water! I will be totally fluoridated.” 
Germany/male/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
“I drink three litres of water a day – am I supposed to tell a child that they can only have 
one glass of water a day and that’s it? … Because I’m an adult and I can cope with 
anything but some children might be harmed” 
Spain/female/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
“It is the same as with the vaccinations, some can take it, others not.” 
Austria/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
Some participants noted fluoride is classified as a poison in their country or were concerned 
about fluoride getting into their bloodstream. 
 
“But then you can also say that there’s fluoride in toothpaste, and there’s fluoride in that 
fluoride rinse.  We always had to spit that out, and we spit out the toothpaste too.  So why 
should we suddenly have something like that in our stomachs?” 
Denmark/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
7.5.2 The Purity of Water 
People within the focus groups placed a great deal of value on their water being ‘pure’. 
 
“I just love clean, pure water and I think it is polluting to add fluoride in it.” 
Finland/female/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
“I don't think you should tamper with things like that ...  I think you should keep things as 
natural as possible … I don’t think it’s good for society.” 
UK/female/45-60/single/no children/further education 
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Participants were suspicious of additions made by the authorities, although they recognised 
that chlorination is necessary to make water clean enough to drink. 
 
“In Italy water was so good, but now we hold a record in selling mineral water.  Because 
there is chlorine, there is atrazine.  The State, in my opinion, should sanitize water we 
have and not adding anything.” 
Spain/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
Various participants were convinced that adding fluoride would change the taste or smell of 
water. 
 
7.5.3 Rights, responsibilities and trust 
Many saw fluoridation as an imposition on their freedom of choice, with the State making 
decisions for them rather than individuals taking responsibility for their own health. 
 
“Things are being imposed ….It seems like they’ve got us on a leash.  That’s it.  - We’ve 
actually take no responsibility for ourselves, for our children.  We’ve got no choice.  
They’re putting us in a mould.  Take your vitamins morning, noon and night.  They’re not 
telling us why it’s good.  … they want to make us rely more and more on their help … we 
don’t have to think about anything any more.” 
France/male/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
“I just think that it’s a problem, doing this instead of getting involved at the root of the 
problem.  There are some people who don’t teach their children the dangers of drugs or 
why you should brush your teeth, so we intervene.  I mean we go along and say: ‘OK.  
We’ll take care of that for you.  You don’t need to worry about that.  … You’re making a 
whole society of grown adults into people who can’t sort things out for themselves.” 
Denmark/female/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
Many participants wondered what would else would be added to their water? 
 
“Tomorrow we put fluoride in it, the day after we put something else in it, where does it 
stop?” 
Luxembourg/female/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
“The Chinese for example would put some contraceptive or something like that into their 
drinking water simply because they have too many people.” 
Germany/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
“They'll find that the population is over excited, they'll put downers in the water also!” 
Belgium/male/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
It was clear that many in the groups did not trust their politicians or the experts they employ 
to act in the public’s best interests.  There was also concern that harms may emerge in the 
future when it was too late. 
 
“Do you know that the person that gave the expert evidence in Australia, the first thing he 
did when they put fluoride in the water was invest in some kind of gadget to take the 
fluoride out of the water going into his house … Who the hell do you believe?” 
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UK/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
“I think that a lot of stuff they add to our food now, they don’t have a clue what effect it 
actually has on us.  Then twenty years later you get some study or other and they say oh 
right, it’s actually that E759 thing that has an influence on people getting cancer or losing 
brain cells.” 
Denmark/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
Many felt dental health was an issue to be dealt with at the level of the individual, rather than 
a solution to be imposed en masse. 
 
“It is like shooting at sparrows with canons.” 
Austria/male/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
It was pointed out that the policy would be ineffective as many do not drink tap water. 
 
“I don't think that we drink that much water, we use it for the laundry.  I don't like tap 
water … I rather have mineral water or a coke.  Whether this is healthy is another 
question, but I don't drink tap water.” 
Austria/female/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
Some participants did not see why they or their children (who had good teeth) needed to be 
subjected to (undefined) risks such that a minority may benefit.   
 
“Well this is kind of “just” teeth, that’s my feeling.  I mean that the entire population of 
Denmark could get, could end up with too much fluoride, an accumulation and so on.  I 
mean you can sort that out in some other way.  You know perfectly well how to sort out 
problems with your teeth.” 
Denmark/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
People expected either parents to take responsibility for their children’s dental health or the 
State to ensure that they do.  Many people who advocated these alternatives did so with the 
attitude that other children’s dental health was not their problem and that the issue should be 
dealt with in a way that least interferes with their lives. 
 
“- Toothpastes are becoming cheaper and cheaper and all of them are with fluorine  
- But there are some people who can’t afford toothpastes. 
- I don’t agree.  It would be better if the social care gave them money for toothpastes.”  
Poland/male/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
“Instead of adding fluoride they could subsidise dentists more, couldn't they? “ 
Spain/male/45-60/married/children/standard education 
 
Some people suggested as an alternative, tablets or rinses could be used to supplement 
fluoride levels so that those in need are individually targeted. 
 
“You can give a fluoride tablet to your children daily.  They like them, they enjoy having a 
little pill.” 
Finland/female/45-60/married/children/further education 
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Groups in some countries suggested that schools should take responsibility, either by 
providing toothpaste, brushes, and supervision, or administering tablets or rinses. 
 
“At school they brush their teeth two times a day and they should do it more frequently” 
Poland/female/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
Some felt that if parents behaved irresponsibly and did not enforce tooth brushing and healthy 
diets then, social services should intervene. 
 
“I think that in such a case the youth welfare department has to become active.  These 
families are known to them.” 
Germany/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
7.5.4 Reasons Given For Fluoridation 
Some people felt responsible for the wellbeing of other members of the community who were 
not as fortunate as themselves.  As such they felt it was their duty to support measures by the 
government to help the socially disadvantaged. 
 
“If there has to be fluoride in water and this will benefit the whole population, of course 
they have the right … to protect poor people who don’t have the income to take vitamins” 
Greece/female/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
“- Should the state have the right to make these choices for us? 
- If it is for our health, yes - this is why we vote, we vote people to make these choices for 
us” 
Greece/female/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
“- When they take note of the health, public health, I think it’s ok 
- Yeah, then they do have the right, not the duty, but a right”  
Netherlands/female/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
Some participants, mostly in Poland saw the addition of fluoride as another good initiative to 
add on to the success of chlorination. 
 
“Yes, if it's not harmful.  We already have chlorine in our tap water, so fluorine wouldn't 
make a difference.  … We were drinking chlorine for so many years so fluorine is not a 
problem.” 
Poland/male/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
In countries where there had been fluoridation, many felt that they suffered no ill effects and 
therefore were supportive or at least did not oppose fluoridation. 
 
“When I was a child I drank water enriched with fluoride.  In the GDR this was 
common….I had white teeth”.   
Germany/male/20-30/single/no-children/standard education 
 
“Well I’ve drunk the water all my life and brush my teeth and hasn’t done me any harm, 
so I go with what I know”.   
Ireland/female/20-30/single/no children/further education 
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7.5.5 Conditional Acceptance 
Where there was acceptance of fluoridation, it was often conditional upon one or more 
provisos being met.  For example: the measure could not harm anyone, even if it benefited 
many people; there could be no change in water taste or smell; no increase water costs; an 
independent review to prove effectiveness and safety; public consultation or referendum. 
 
“If we’re really sure that it’s safe, with no colour and taste, then it’s ok.” 
Poland/male/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
“There should be a petition to ask people whether they want that… they could hold a 
referendum”. 
Luxembourg/female/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
7.5.6 Discussion  
A systematic review of the effectiveness and safety of water fluoridation concluded that “the 
best available evidence …suggests that fluoridation does reduce caries prevalence, both as 
measured by the proportion of children who are caries-free and by the mean dmft/DMFT 
score”.202  The report adds the caveat that “the degree to which caries is reduced, however, is 
not clear from the data available”.  It also stated that the reduction in dental caries prevalence 
“should be considered together with the increased prevalence of dental fluorosis” but that 
“overall, the studies examining other possible negative effects provide insufficient evidence on 
any particular outcome to permit confident conclusions”.  The report also noted that “given 
the level of interest surrounding the issue of public water fluoridation, it is surprising to find 
that little high quality research has been undertaken”.  The scope of the review was therefore 
not broad enough to answer the question “should fluoridation be undertaken on a broad scale 
in the UK?”  Instead the report recommended that “research into the safety and efficacy of 
water fluoridation should be carried out with appropriate methodology to improve the quality 
of the existing evidence base”.  A full economic evaluation was also required as well as 
consideration of the ethical, environmental, ecological, costs and legal issues.   
Despite the lack of clear evidence of cost effectiveness, water fluoridation has strong 
advocates and even more vociferous opponents.203 204 205 206 207 208  Indeed in October 2003 
the authors of the York systematic review issued a statement saying that they were 
“concerned about the continuing misinterpretations of the evidence and think it is important 
that decision makers are aware of what the review really found”.209 They reiterated that the 
evidence of benefits and adverse effects were and that since their report was published in 
October 2000 “there has been no other scientifically defensible review that would alter the 
findings of the York review”.   
 
There has been limited recent research on public opinions on fluoridation across Europe.  
Previous research was mainly in UK, and Scandinavia.  210 211 212 213 214 215 216 
 
There seemed to be a majority among our focus groups across Europe against water 
fluoridation, apart from those countries where people have experienced fluoridation without 
adverse effects.  Significant differences between the various demographic groups represented 
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were not detected, although the number of focus groups was large the number of citizens in 
each country was still relatively small. 
 
The public generally perceive risks to be more worrying (and less acceptable) if they consider 
them 217: 
1.  To be involuntary (e.g.  exposure to pollution) rather than voluntary (e.g.  dangerous sports 
or smoking) 
2.  As inequitably distributed (some benefit while others suffer the consequences) 
3.  As inescapable by taking personal precautions 
4.  To arise from an unfamiliar or novel source 
5.  To result from man-made, rather than natural sources 
6.  To cause hidden and irreversible damage, e.g.  through onset of illness many years after 
exposure 
7.  To pose some particular danger to small children or pregnant women or more generally to 
future generations 
8.  To threaten a form of death (or illness/injury) arousing particular dread 
9.  To damage identifiable rather than anonymous victims 
10.  To be poorly understood by science 
11.  As subject to contradictory statements from responsible sources (or, even worse, from the 
same source). 
 
Public concerns around water fluoridation may be explained by many of these elements. 
 
The participants were very familiar with the concept of adding substances to the water e.g.  
chlorine to make it wholesome, and with other food additives for health reasons e.g.  vitamins 
or iodine.  However, many had a poor understanding of the benefits and costs associated with 
fluoridation.  They seemed unaware that water could naturally contain fluoride or that some 
bottled mineral waters actually have very high fluoride content. 
 
Studies in the USA and South Africa have shown that many people did not know water 
fluoridation was intended to prevent tooth decay, although that knowledge was better in 
higher educated groups and among older people.  218 219 220  Other studies have also found that 
the public are aware that fluoride can strengthen teeth, because they know that it is added to 
toothpaste.210 221  However, no demographic differences in knowledge or attitude were 
observed between our focus groups.  The main concerns about water fluoridation for focus 
group participants were imposition on choice and responsibility, water purity, taste and the 
non specific risk of harm.  Similar concerns have been found in studies in the USA and UK.  
210 211 221 
 
The main reasons given by people opposing water fluoridation in South Africa  were: “water 
should stay as it is” (26%), concerns about it staying in the body (16%), and (negative) affect 
on health (12%).222  Follow-up surveys in Norway (conducted in 1973 and 1983 ) and 
Denmark (1969 and 1975) found that public opinion had become more negative over time.214 
215 216  Rise and Kraft thought that the public may not see water fluoridation as being 
necessary as dental health had improved through use of fluoride toothpaste.216  They also 
noted the influence of the media and an increase in public’s ability to participate in political 
decision making. 
 
While the UK public wished to be informed of plans for water fluoridation, they did not want 
to be involved in decision making about fluoridating their water, preferring such policy to be 
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left to experts.212  However in our research there seemed to be doubts about the veracity of 
experts.  Schwartz and Hansen described how the announcement by a prominent dentist that 
he disagreed with the Danish Dental Association about water fluoridation led to public 
concern about conflict between experts and mistrust of the professional body.215 
 
Newspapers were the predominant source of information about fluoridation in the US.221  
Lowry noted that the majority of UK media coverage was anti-fluoridation reflecting what he 
believed was a general anti-establishment bias against health promotion messages amongst 
journalists and the success of the anti-fluoridation lobby in influencing the media.223  He also 
noted that with concerted effort it was possible for the pro-fluoridation lobby to reverse this 
bias. 
 
Hastings et al.  found that dental public health was not seen as great priority for the UK public 
and most people may not feel strongly about water fluoridation one way or another.210  Their 
concern about dental health tended to be limited to the impact of appearance of poor teeth.  
Studies in Australia and the UK both found that the public found fluorosis aesthetically 
objectionable, and even considered that childhood fluorosis was an indicator of parental 
neglect.224 225  Hastings suggested that the public “will not rise up and demand fluoridation 
and do not feel sufficiently skilled to make final judgements on its efficacy”.226  Instead, anti-
fluoridation lobbyists may be much more vocal.  Dixon and Shackley showed that although 
the majority (62%) of UK respondents were in favour of fluoridation, the intensity of 
opposition of the 31% who were against was greater than the intensity of support of those in 
favour of the measure.211 
 
Dixon and Shackley’s211 finding of a majority of their UK sample being in favour of 
fluoridation seems at odds with the response of our UK focus groups.  But this may be due to 
the majority of people not holding strong views about dental public health, or an artefact of 
the way questions are asked, and the ability of people to develop and explain their opinions 
within qualitative research, compared with the Yes/No option originally presented by Dixon 
and Shackley. 
 
The debate around fluoride has lasted for over 50 years.227  There remains uncertainty around 
the benefits and risks of fluoridation.202  The debate remains polarised, although the apparent 
vehemence in the debate may reflect arguments between a relatively small number of 
lobbyists on either side.  Holloway commented in 1977 that because the general public does 
not have a particular view on fluoridation “decision makers would have little guidance except 
for the activities of the pressure groups involved”.228  He suggested that both pro- and anti-
fluoridation groups “adopt similar strategies in that they communicate with those members of 
the community who are likely to influence decisions on water fluoridation”, but that anti-
fluoridation groups were more likely to use the media to influence the public directly. 
 
Lobbying strategies do not seem to have changed significantly over time.  Anti-fluoridation 
websites propose various claims about diseases caused by fluoride, although with the 
exception of fluorosis these have not been proven.202  However, despite these relatively one 
sided messages, the European citizens within our focus groups have not reflected back the 
anti-fluoride rhetoric about morbidity, instead they been more concerned about the impact on 
civil liberties and water taste.  Where they have raised concerns about harm, they tended to be 
non-specific and follow a precautionary principle.229  They preferred not to take any risks 
when benefits were ill-defined and, perhaps more importantly, where they recognised that 
better dental health could be achieved by the individual action of using fluoride 
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toothpaste/rinses/tablets.  In such a climate, and with improving dental health in developed 
countries, it is unlikely that politicians will wish to tackle the opponents of fluoridation, even 
if they only represent a minority of the public, and require water fluoridation, despite its 
potential impact on health inequalities.230 Alternatively, governments, e.g.  in the UK, have 
preferred to give responsibility for decisions about water fluoridation policy to others.  
Indeed, the tendency in Europe has been for artificial water fluoridation schemes to be 
removed rather than introduced.   
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7.6 Immunisation 
 
This research found no clear correlations between attitudes to immunisation and gender, age, 
marital status or educational level.  Focus group participants with children were slightly more 
likely to discuss immunisation and to hold stronger views on immunisation.  This is likely to 
reflect their direct experience of thinking about vaccinating their children.  The main 
differences in attitudes expressed in the focus groups were found at country level.  
Participants in countries where immunisation is compulsory were more supportive of State 
compulsion than those where immunisation is voluntary, and participants were more likely to 
discuss issues around vaccine safety in those countries where the intensity of vaccine scares 
had been greatest. 
 
7.6.1 The concept of risk 
The question on childhood immunisation was intended to be broad and to lead participants to 
debate whether parents should be free to decide the immunisation status of their children or 
whether the State should intervene and make childhood immunisation compulsory.  The 
central theme emerging from the focus groups in numerous countries was the concept of risk 
phrased in terms of the pros and cons of immunisation.  The question of parental choice 
versus State compulsion was often a secondary concern.  The concept of risk was discussed in 
terms of both private interest – “could immunisation harm my child?”– and public interest – 
“could non-immunisation harm other people?” 
 
7.6.2 Risk to the individual 
A significant number of participants questioned the safety of immunisation and expressed 
concerns over the potential side-effects of vaccines, particularly the MMR.  Where the risk of 
side-effects was perceived to be high, participants argued against immunisation and were 
generally opposed to compulsion.  Where the risks of vaccination were deemed to be low, or 
were not even discussed, participants were more supportive of immunisation.  Some believed 
that with adequate information and openness, parents would voluntarily choose to have their 
children immunised and thus compulsion would be both unnecessary and would undermine 
parental freedom to choose.  Others believed that compulsion would be necessary to ensure 
that children were immunised, either because parents may otherwise forget, or because they 
may not believe that immunisation is necessary against certain diseases.  Some participants 
argued in favour of immunisation on the grounds that they had been immunised against a 
range of diseases and had not been adversely affected.  In contrast, other participants 
countered that they had been infected by various diseases in childhood and had not suffered 
any adverse consequences, thus immunisation against diseases such as measles, mumps and 
rubella were perceived to be unnecessary: 
 
“MMR wasn’t about when we was kids, we all had measles, we all had mumps and 
German measles.” 
UK/male/20-30/married/children/further education 
 
Others recognised the continuing importance of immunisation, both to protect their own child 
against disease and to help protect other people. 
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7.6.3 Risk to other people 
At the societal level there was broad agreement that immunisation programmes are beneficial 
to the public health.  Participants praised the eradication of particular diseases (e.g.  
smallpox), and raised concerns that falling rates of immunisation could lead to epidemics of 
disease and the potential emergence of new strains of disease.  On a number of occasions, 
public health was posited above the health of individual children.  The majority of people who 
argued in favour of compulsory immunisation used public interest arguments as their 
justification.  Although they may not be in favour of State intervention in other areas, they 
believed that compulsion may be necessary in order for herd immunity to be achieved and 
maintained and for the public health to be protected. 
 
“- Well, we are not crazy, but sometimes other people are crazy.  You also have to 
contemplate other people who are not responsible enough for this. 
- I think there are certain vaccines that should be compulsory, because some diseases 
could imply disease for others as well ...  So not having this vaccine might affect third 
parties ...” 
Portugal/male/45-60/married/children/standard education 
 
A number of participants demonstrated an awareness of the potential conflict between private 
and public interest in the sphere of immunisation.  Individuals may not have wanted to have 
their own children immunised but they realised that if enough other people thought the same 
then the risk of epidemics would threaten the public health and this in turn would threaten the 
individual health of their children.  This circular argument was picked up by a number of the 
participants who recognised the (potential) interplay of public and private health and interests. 
 
“One mother is trying to save her child because she knows that there are unique features 
with regard to the vaccination.  And the other mothers want the vaccination because they 
know that it’s a good thing overall, that it’s good for the general majority.  So actually 
everyone’s going along the same lines”. 
France/female/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
7.6.4 Differences in countries where compulsory immunisation already 
exists 
In countries where certain childhood immunisations are already compulsory (Belgium, 
Greece, Italy and Poland), focus group participants tended to support the status quo, at least 
for those diseases which they perceived to be more serious.  This obligation informed the 
debates, with some participants in the Polish focus groups querying why they were asked to 
comment on a law that already exists.  On the whole, focus group participants (in each of 
those countries) supported compulsory immunisation, and hence the over-riding of parental 
choice.   
 
“- it is imposed by the doctor 
- it is also imposed by the state because in order for a child to be enrolled at school 
vaccination is an essential condition 
- there is legislation on this 
- and it is good that it exists 
- … we have vaccinated our children through this system.  The State has imposed this.  So 
I can’t give any other answers.  I say that we should do them.” 
Greece/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
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In countries where childhood immunisations are voluntary, focus group participants opposed 
compulsion and instead advocated their rights, as parents, to decide their child’s immunisation 
status: 
 
“Parents should have the power to decide, and parents have the responsibility as well” 
Finland/male/20-30/married/children/further education 
 
The most notable exception to this pattern occurred in the German focus groups.  Although all 
vaccinations are voluntary in Germany, compulsory immunisation was advocated by a 
significant number of the participants.  Their arguments echoed those from other countries: 
that health authorities and the state have better access to experts and information, that 
immunisation is generally in the best (private) interests of children, and that the achievement 
of herd immunity benefits public health and the public interest.   
 
7.6.5 The foreign threat 
Immigration was raised as an issue in a number of the topics discussed in the focus groups.  In 
relation to immunisation, a small number of participants in Austria, Finland, France, Greece 
and Italy implied that certain vaccinations are or remain necessary because of the risk of 
disease entering the country through foreigners.  Such participants tended to argue that 
immunisation would not be necessary in their respective countries if it wasn’t for this foreign 
threat.   
 
“The State has to promote it, because our State is becoming a multi-ethnic state.  A lot of 
diseases totally unidentified are coming here in Italy and they are serious.  There are 
tuberculosis and malaria in Milan.  There are diseases that are kept hidden.  That’s why 
the State has to monitor, to make sure and, in these cases, to issue some regulations, 
issued by Regions.  This is because unidentified diseases are arriving. 
Italy/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
In some countries there was an underlying element of blame, while in other countries 
participants expressed empathy for those who were not fortunate enough to have had access to 
immunisation in their native countries.   
 
“There are some things which are coming back.  And why?  Because there are things 
brought in by these groups of people who unfortunately didn’t have access to these 
vaccinations, to that kind of healthcare”. 
France/female/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
7.6.6 Trust  
Whether directly or indirectly, issues of trust were raised in all countries.  In Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Sweden focus group 
participants expressed their trust in the immunisation advice of family doctors, paediatricians 
or state health agencies.  The most common argument posited that doctors, health authorities 
or the State have better access to expert knowledge and the information with which to make 
immunisation decisions: 
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“It is outside of the decision-making competence of most parents.  Sure, the situation is 
different if the parents are medical doctors, but this is probably a small percentage.  This 
decision has to be taken away from parents, because they are simply not competent 
enough to decide.” 
Germany/male/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
Participants in one Swedish group developed their argument into a discussion of act versus 
omission – in this instance the potential harm caused to one’s child through the act of 
immunisation, versus the potential harm caused to one’s child if the parent omits to immunise 
and the child later contracts the disease.  This led the majority of participants to advocate 
compulsory immunisation on the grounds that the decision should be taken by experts, not 
parents.   
 
Where participants lacked confidence in the advice of their doctors, politicians or State health 
agencies, then they expressed greater concern over the safety of vaccines and were less 
inclined to have their own children immunised.  This message was particularly strong with 
regard to MMR.  For example, in two UK focus groups, the older and younger fathers 
referred to the fact that British Prime Minister Tony Blair had not disclosed whether or not his 
own young son had been given the MMR vaccine.  This fuelled participants’ safety fears and 
jeopardised their faith in the vaccine: 
 
“If the prime minister won’t let his own son have it then why should we put our faith in it 
with our kids?” 
UK/male/20-30/married/children/further education 
 
Some participants stated that they would like more access to information about the risks and 
benefits of immunisation versus non-immunisation so that they may make more informed 
decisions: 
 
“I am taking the vaccination, but I don’t understand …  I have read a lot about these 
things and thought about them.  I choose to take them, but I don’t think they give you any 
options, really.  This is a good example of a situation where an independent party, 
whatever it might be, should inform people more”. 
Finland/male/20-30/married/children/further education 
 
However, participants in most countries seemed happy to rely on the advice of their family 
doctors. 
 
7.6.7 Fears over vaccine-safety 
Fears over the safety of vaccines were raised in a number of focus groups in Ireland, Italy and 
the UK.  Participants made reference to cases and media reports where they believed that 
children had suffered from serious, and in some cases fatal, side-effects of the vaccination, 
and others stated their opposition to having their own children immunised: 
  
“ Right, see, I was, I was for it, I let my son have the first one and then when it all came 
out and it was all basically, it came out it could cause this, it causes this, and my son is a 
very bright child.  I absolutely flatly refused to let him have the booster, simply because if 
he’s come out like that I don’t want to spoil his intelligence by giving him something.” 
UK/male/20-30/married/children/further education 
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Participants were divided in how they weighed the perceived risks.  Some argued that the link 
with autism had not been proven and even if it existed the risk of developing autism from the 
vaccine would be less than the risks associated with contracting a vaccine-preventable 
disease.  Others argued that, partly owing to the risk of side-effects, immunisation should be a 
matter of parental choice.   
 
Focus group participants in Ireland and the UK expressed concern over the concept of 
immune-overload, both by questioning the safety of multiple vaccines, in particular the MMR 
triple-vaccine, and by discussing their perceptions of the relative merits of single antigen 
vaccines for measles, mumps and rubella: 
 
“- It is 3 completely different injections and they are trying to put, trying to make it into 
one thing and that one chemical, whatever it is that they are using, and it’s wrong, it’s 
totally wrong. 
- It should be available in 3 separate vaccines. 
- I think there should be a choice. 
- You should have the choice, I mean why do you have to pay for separate injections … 
why should you have to pay for it when you, if one is free and one is not they are forcing 
some people into it. 
- Right.  So you are saying that single vaccines should be available?...  That’s a 
compromise position? 
- Yeah.” 
UK/male/20-30/married/children/further education 
 
In countries where the safety of the MMR vaccine was not debated (Germany, Finland), 
participants may have been unaware of the high-profile scare surrounding the vaccine or they 
had been successfully reassured by the State or relevant health agencies.   
 
7.6.8 Discussion 
Childhood immunisation is an effective means of eradicating or significantly reducing the 
prevalence of particular infectious diseases.  However, in recent years rates of immunisation 
coverage have fallen, in some cases below the level required for herd immunity, thus raising 
the threat of outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases.  One factor in this decline is the 
immunisation paradox, a phenomenon where the success of previous public health measures, 
mass immunisation and consequent herd immunity have reduced the prevalence of particular 
diseases leading parents to believe that the current threat of infection from such diseases is 
minimal.  Some parents refuse to have their children immunised on the grounds that the risks 
associated with immunisation, though small, are perceived to outweigh the benefits.231  
Paradoxically, the success of immunisation programmes may ultimately reduce take-up rates 
with the potential for future epidemics of preventable diseases.  232 233 234  A second factor in 
the decline of immunisation rates has been a number of recent vaccine scares.  235  One of the 
most high profile scares, linking the measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) triple-vaccine with 
autism and bowel disease236 has an ongoing impact on immunisation uptake rates despite 
being shown to be groundless.237 238 239 240 241 
 
The State has an interest in encouraging immunisation, both to provide protection for 
individuals and to protect the public health via herd immunity.  The regulation of 
immunisation varies across Europe.  In the countries in this study, certain immunisations are 
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compulsory in Belgium, Greece, Italy and Poland, with non-compliance theoretically 
punishable by fines or temporary imprisonment for the parents and refusal of school 
enrolment for children.  In other countries financial and non-financial incentives may exist to 
encourage parents to have their children immunised and/or to encourage health professionals 
to increase immunisation coverage. 
 
A systematic review of qualitative studies looking at parental attitudes and beliefs toward 
immunisation found that in more than half of all the studies reviewed barriers to childhood 
immunisation included concerns over the risk of adverse side-effects, distrust of those 
advocating the vaccines, poor communication with health-care staff and a lack of awareness 
of the immunisation schedule.242  Fears of side-effects and concerns over the safety of 
particular vaccines have been reported as factors associated with low immunisation coverage 
in numerous other studies 243 244 245 and were common themes in the focus group discussions.  
Such fears need to be addressed by health professionals giving good quality information to 
parents and giving parents the opportunity to discuss their concerns around (particular) 
immunisations.  Studies also suggest that parents fear overloading the child’s immune system 
with multiple vaccines.246, 247  Discussions about immune overload within the focus groups 
were more prominent in countries where the MMR scare received a lot of negative media 
coverage and where immunisation rates have fallen, most notably in Ireland and the UK. 
 
However, not all studies support the notion of a correlation between the health beliefs of 
parents and the immunisation status of their children.248  Instead, some studies report that 
immunisation status is more closely related to socio-demographic characteristics.249  A study 
from the Netherlands found that parents with the most negative attitudes to further expansion 
of the Dutch vaccination programme were more likely to be highly educated, health care 
workers, non religious, and to perceive vaccinations to be at best ineffective and at worst the 
cause of asthma and allergies.250  A study from the USA found that the parents of under-
immunised children were more likely to be low earners, not have a consistent health care 
provider, to have four or more children, and to see vaccines as relatively unsafe.251  This 
suggests that interventions may need to target particular socio-demographic groups.  
However, the only discernable socio-demographic difference in attitudes toward 
immunisation noted in the current study was that focus group participants who were also 
parents tended to have stronger views on immunisation.  Whether this was an opinion for or 
against immunisation depended more upon the intensity of recent vaccine scares and trust in 
the reassurances of family doctors and State public health authorities.  The other main pattern 
apparent in the focus groups was the correlation between support for State compulsion and the 
over-riding of parental choice amongst those countries where certain immunisations are 
already compulsory.  This could suggest a degree of normalisation where laws on compulsory 
immunisation gradually become part of a cultural norm.   
 
In some countries, a small number of participants spoke of the foreign threat whereby 
immunisation was deemed necessary to combat diseases being brought in from abroad.  
Where this foreign threat was raised as an issue, participants tended to refer to neighbouring 
countries.  The Austrians and Finns spoke of the threat of disease entering from Russia, while 
the Greeks blamed the Albanians.  However, this was very much a minority voice, with 
generally only one or two participants from each listed country making reference to a foreign 
threat.  It is worth noting that the timing of the focus groups coincided with the global panic 
over Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), a disease spread between countries largely 
through foreign travel.   
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Access to information regarding immunisation was also raised in the focus groups.  A number 
of participants commented that they would like to have more information, particularly around 
the MMR vaccine, in order to make an informed decision.  This reflects findings from other 
studies, where parents who felt they did not have enough information were less confident in 
the safety of vaccines and had more negative attitudes toward their health care providers.252  
Such findings suggest that parental confidence in immunisation could be increased if trusted 
healthcare providers provide more information about the relative risks and benefits of 
immunisation versus non-immunisation. 
 
A key finding in this study is the positive relationship between parental trust in health 
professionals and their decision to immunise.  This finding has been supported by a German 
internet survey on parental attitudes to immunisation which found that 95.0% of respondents 
(5722 respondents) perceived their paediatrician as “the most important source of information 
regarding immunization”.246 253 254  This has significant implications for the role of physicians 
in increasing immunisation coverage.  Studies from across Europe and the United States have 
shown that physicians who were concerned about the safety of particular vaccines were less 
likely to vaccinate or recommend certain vaccinations and this correlated with low levels of 
childhood immunisation.255 256 257  Similarly, parents within the focus groups who did not trust 
the advice of health professionals were less likely to consent to their children being 
immunised, particularly with the MMR vaccination.  A UK study found that parents who 
were aware of the financial incentives offered to family doctors for reaching immunisation 
targets had less confidence in the recommendations of their health care providers 258, however 
this issue of incentives was not raised in the focus groups.   
 
In countries where the potential risks or side-effects, however small, of immunisation were 
not debated, one may assume that participants had no significant fears over the safety of 
vaccines and thus they trusted the advice of the State and any reassurances they had received 
following vaccine scares.  By contrast, where participants spent most of their time debating 
the relative risks of immunisation versus non-immunisation or where they opposed 
immunisation on the grounds of safety concerns, then one may assume that participants 
lacked trust in the advice and reassurances of their governments and public health agencies. 
 
In addition to a lack of parental trust in the efficacy of vaccines and/or in the health advice of 
governments or family doctors, other factors associated with low rates of immunisation may 
include the perception that building natural immunity to infectious diseases is preferable to 
immunisation and/or that vaccine-preventable diseases are not particularly serious.259 260  Each 
of these perceptions was raised in the focus group discussions.  Ways of increasing 
immunisation coverage may therefore include improving physicians’ attitudes, beliefs and 
commitment toward immunisation 261 262 and increasing parental confidence in the vaccines 
and in the assurances given by family doctors and the State. 
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7.7 Banning smoking in public places 
 
All groups agreed that the government should encourage the public not to smoke.  
Additionally all groups were against a total ban as it was seen as attacking personal freedom 
and choice.  There were mixed responses as to whether tax on tobacco products should be 
increased as respondents were aware the government benefit in terms of revenue.  Most 
respondents supported banning advertisements and increasing health promotion, although 
they were concerned that these may be ineffective.   
 
7.7.1 Smoking ban in public places 
Focus group participants from all countries whether smokers or non-smokers, generally 
supported a ban on smoking in public places.  Groups made mostly positive references to such 
bans in countries such as the USA, Ireland and Australia, although Singapore was used as an 
example of excessive regulation. 
 
The main argument used to support a ban was that smoking bothered non-smokers. 
 
“The problem with smoking is that you bother other people.  That’s not fair.” 
France/male/45-60/married/children/further education/non-smoker 
 
Even most smokers agreed to some restrictions; however both smokers and non-smokers 
argued that smokers should be given a space in which they could smoke. 
 
“You can’t force someone to tolerate your smoke, you should go so a special place to 
enjoy your cigarette” 
Greece/male/20-30/single/no children/further education/non-smoker 
 
Many smokers had mixed responses to whether laws should be used to restrict smoking as 
they were aware that this would restrict their own personal actions and choices. 
 
“I mean I can definitely see the point of banning smoking in public places for the few.  
But with regard to society.  No I don’t think that’s the sort of society we need to have.  
It’d be a society of restrictions.” 
Denmark/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education/smoker 
 
However, many smokers were supportive of regulation of their habit because they viewed 
smoking negatively and believed it would help them give up or at least reduce the amount of 
tobacco they consume. 
 
“Society is trying to restrict me in some way but I'm allowing those restrictions to take 
place because I don't think it's a nice habit.” 
UK/female/45-60/single/no children/further education/smoker 
 
Smokers recognised the importance of respecting the private space of non-smokers. 
 
“I’ve got my cousin there who’s strictly non-smoking, I don’t smoke in his house because 
it’s a matter of personal respect up to a point, I go outside to smoke my cigarette.” 
Belgium/male/20-30/single/no children/standard education/smoker 
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However, many respondents expressed the view that people smoked in public places because 
of lack of education and respect, and regulation was required to enforce the social norms of 
respect and consideration. 
 
“It’s because people no longer respect others that they have to legislate.  Politics is 
nothing to do with cigarettes, it’s really stupid.  It’s respect for the individual, for 
yourself and for others, we can discuss it all you like, but especially respect for others.” 
Belgium/male/45-60/single/no children/further education/smoker 
 
However it is clear that many of the non-smokers in the focus groups found it difficult to ask 
smokers not to smoke. 
 
“ -Yes but people don’t say anything.  I don’t. 
- No me neither.  I mean I don’t know why actually.  I mean you should really.  But 
people just feel like...  well no, they don’t want to.   
- Why not? 
- I don’t know, I guess people feel like they’re trespassing on someone’s property in a 
sense.”  
Denmark/male/20-30/married/children/standard education/non-smoker 
 
It is possible that non-smokers supported regulations as a ban would remove the need for 
individuals to personally request people to stop smoking.  It was observed by a few 
respondents that they had never been asked whether smoke bothered them, and as one noted: 
 
“I am a non-smoker and I have to admit I have always regretted never having been asked 
by a smoker in public whether I tolerate he is smoking there now.” 
Germany/male/45-60/married/children/further education/non-smoker 
 
In many of the groups there was a feeling that smoking regulations should be enforced with 
greater penalties.  This was seen especially in countries such as Italy and Greece.   
 
7.7.2 Stigmatisation of smokers 
Many of the groups spent time discussing how social attitudes and views of smoking 
impacted upon those who smoked in public places.  In Ireland, most groups made reference to 
smoking being ‘socially unacceptable’.  One man went as far as to describe it as an:  
 
“Unsociable, dirty, filthy habit” 
Ireland/male/45-60/married/children/standard education/non-smoker 
 
In a British group there was mention of a social leper.  A few smokers, particularly in 
Belgium saw the ban on smoking in public places in negative terms of victimization and 
sanitation. 
 
“But let me come back to this issue of cigarettes.  There’s fundamentalism involved, the 
word is not too strong.  I’m a smoker; I can assure you I have been subjected to crypto-
racist acts.  And the law agrees.  The law has done away with the three remaining seats 
in the train carriage where we could stop from time to time to have a smoke.” 
Belgium/male/45-60/single/no children/further education/smoker 
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Some respondents saw this fundamentalism as mainly coming from ex-smokers.  It has been 
noted that the smoking debate is highly moralistic, however the respondents indicate that this 
is also seen in public places where smokers are confronted by non-smokers. 
 
“I think that this is part of that idea that you have the goodies on the one hand who don’t 
smoke and the baddies on the other that do smoke.  (…) I can say that from personal 
experience as well as indirect experience, the more time goes by the more I see extremely 
harsh behaviour and comments towards smokers.  It really is aggressive behaviour”. 
Belgium/male/45-60/single/no children/further education/smoker 
 
7.7.3 Defining a public space 
One of the main concerns expressed in nearly all groups was the definition of a public space, 
which may mirror the problematic process policy encountered at the time in drawing up 
smoking regulation.  Most respondents were aware in generality of where smoking was 
currently prohibited.  For example they may know whether smoking was banned on trains in 
their country, but some were uncertain whether it was permitted at the train station.   
 
All groups generally accepted non-smoking regulations in public areas such as schools, 
hospitals and public transport, which in many of the countries had already been established, 
even if not widely enforced.  Some respondents saw pubs/bars, restaurants and clubs as 
different from public places as entering them was voluntary and one was not required to 
attend as a member of the public.  Even most non-smoking groups seemed to hold or 
sympathise with this view (especially those in Ireland, the Netherlands, Finland and the UK).  
Thus, most of these groups concluded that non-smoking bans should be applied to those areas 
where individuals were required to attend (i.e.  government buildings, schools). 
 
In the case of restaurants even most smokers preferred non-smoking through out or a separate 
area for smokers.  Some saw tobacco smoke as destroying the atmosphere connected with 
food. 
 
“I mean, I go to have lunch, I go to a restaurant, I go there to spend a lot of money and 
then I find that bad ambience! I don’t smoke”  
Italy/male/45-60/married/children/further education/non-smoker 
 
However while most respondents preferred non-smoking restaurants they felt that the decision 
to ban smoking was up to the restaurant owner rather than the government. 
 
Respondents saw a social connection between smoking and alcohol.  Both smoking and non-
smoking respondents argued that smoking had always been accepted in pubs/bars and thus 
should still be allowed. 
 
“I don’t think it is necessary to overdo these things – and what is a public space anyway? 
A pub? People have always smoked in pubs” 
Germany/female/45-60/single/no children/further education/non-smoker 
 
Following on from the argument that smoking was an established practise in pubs/bars, some 
respondents expressed the view that someone in a pub/bar was already doing something 
unhealthy (drinking alcohol) and so should be allowed to smoke.   
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Generally it was felt that a ban would hurt the owners of social establishments rather than the 
smokers, and so pubs and cafés should use various technical solutions to accommodate non-
smokers and smokers.  Many of the groups expressed the view that the ‘bother' smoke caused 
could be over come by such technical solutions. 
 
“But then it’s the duty of that establishment to have a very good suction and really just 
taking good care that other people are really not bothered by it.  That’s really an 
obligation of that pub.” 
Netherlands/female/20-30/married/children/standard education/smoker 
 
In some cases respondents suggested that the city planning should insure that there were a 
selection of non-smoking and smoking places. 
 
There were some discussions as to the status of parks and (covered) bus stops.  In these spaces 
there was an emphasis on being basically outside.  Respondents generally felt that it should be 
down to a person’s own common sense rather than laws to modifying behaviour in these 
places.  In many of the smoking groups there was concern that a ban on smoking in public 
places would stop them being able to smoke outside, and this was expressly discussed in a 
Spanish group where the streets were seen as being owned by everyone and thus smokers 
should have the right to smoke there. 
 
7.7.4 Discussion 
Smoking is the leading cause of preventable death in the European Union, killing over 
650,000 people each year.263  The EU and national governments are discouraging smoking 
through a range of policies, aimed at both encouraging people to stop smoking and 
discouraging people from starting.264 265  One of the most successful policies is the regulation 
of smoking in public places, which both increases the effort required to smoke and de-
normalises smoking.266 In 2002 the EU Commission adopted a non-binding Council 
Recommendation on the “Prevention of Smoking and on Initiatives to Improve Tobacco 
Control”267 although nearly all European Union Member States had some smoking 
restrictions regarding public transport and public buildings before that date.  Restricting 
smoking in public places has already shown results in Europe.  In Italy, for example, cigarette 
sales decreased by 8.9% after their ban.268   
 
Public attitudes towards regulation of smoking in public spaces have been well documented in 
South Africa269, North America 270, Australia271, New Zealand272 and Europe.273 274 275 276 277 
278 279  Differences between socio-economic demographics and between smokers and non-
smokers have also been explored.280 281 282  However the majority of research has been based 
upon set interview questions and surveys.  Little qualitative work has been done at the level of 
the general population in Europe to explore attitudes and beliefs in regard to smoking and the 
regulation of smoking in public places.  It is critical for policies to be based, not only on 
benefits to public health, but also upon the attitudes and perceptions of whole populations 
especially when formulating acceptable, effective and enforceable regulations.   
 
The analysis of the focus groups did not observe strong demographic variations between the 
perceptions and arguments of the focus group participants.  Similarly non-smokers and 
smokers shared many values and views of smoking regulation in public places.  This is 
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supported by a study in Australia which showed that over 70%, including almost half of 
smokers supported the establishment of some smoking restrictions in hotels.283 
 
One reason for this may be the strong belief in personal choice expressed in nearly all the 
focus groups.  Across all groups it was felt that it was a person’s own choice to smoke, with 
references to freedom of choice and personal choice.  This indicates the strength of the 
individualisation of health and responsibility for one's life and lifestyle choices.284  Personal 
choice was also at the heart of a non-smokers right to a non-smoking environment.  However, 
the right of the non-smoker to clean air seemed to trump the rights of smokers.  It is likely this 
connects with the image of the considerate smoker constructed by the pro-smoking lobby and 
now widely incorporated into smoking norms.285  
 
The main argument used by the EU to support a smoking ban in public places has been the 
rights of workers to a non-smoking environment.286 While in principle regulating smoking in 
public places is supported by the general populations, the definition of a public space may 
influence attitudes.  For example, while a UK survey found that 93% of the UK public 
supported smoking restrictions in public places, people differentiated between types of public 
spaces, with 88% of people supporting restrictions at work, 91%  supporting restrictions in 
restaurants, but only 65% supporting restriction smoking in pubs.287 Similarly research 
conducted in New Zealand found that 85% of the general public supported a total workplace 
ban but only 56% did so when pubs were included as workplaces.288 In this study respondents 
only drew upon the right of a worker to a non-smoking environment in reference to their own 
personal workspace and did not apply it to restaurants, bars and clubs.  In fact passive 
smoking and other health consequences of second-hand smoke were rarely referred to.  This 
is unlikely to be due to lack of knowledge as an EU report found that 71% of Europeans 
believed that second-hand smoke can cause problems such as respiratory ailments or long-
term illness.277 
 
Social conventions were clearly important in drawing boundaries concerning where smoking 
should be tolerated.  In the case of public spaces which were historically smoking areas 
(pubs/bars etc) smoking respondents seemed less willing to support restrictions and non-
smokers were more willing for them to remain smoking.  This is one of the few aspects of the 
focus group discussion where cultural specificity was seen, with references to smoking after 
dinner parties in Denmark and in Belgium’s Cafés.  A study in Australia has indicated that 
restaurant owners favour a ban on smoking in restaurants; however it is likely this will be 
influenced by the particular economic geography of the business.289   Similarly support for 
smoking bans in restaurants were associated with seeing smoking as unacceptable 
behaviour.290 
 
In this study many of the non-smoking participants were reluctant to request a person to stop 
smoking.  A 1992 European survey which asked people to rank on a scale of 1 (never) to 4 
(often) how frequently a person would ask a smoker not to smoke, found that only 9% would 
often ask a smoker to stop.  However, by 2002 this figure had increased to 13%.277  
 
Overall adherences to smoking regulations in the EU have increased since 1995277.  There are 
cultural differences in the respect for smoking regulation, with southern Europeans showing 
the least regard.  277  It is clear that public opinion is crucial to the effectiveness of laws and 
regulations291, in addition to this an individual’s moral commitment to a law is tightly linked 
to whether they will obey the law.292  Smoking restrictions have been widely accepted in 
those European countries that have already enforced bans, and this paper indicates strong 
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support throughout Europe.  Concerns about victimization and fundamentalism expressed in 
these focus groups indicate the fine balance which needs to be struck when creating anti-
smoking regulation to insure a minimal negative backlash.  Governments need to create the 
environment to facilitate reductions in smoking in the population, to protect vulnerable 
groups, and to improve health and safety.  However, attention also needs to be given to 
encourage continued dialogue between smokers and non-smokers, as non-smokers seem to be 
winning the argument based on the unpleasant nature of cigarette smoke rather than its effect 
on health. 
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7.8 Not-in-My-Back-Yard: living near people with mental illness 
 
The phrase home for people with mental illness was variously interpreted by both moderators 
and participants to encompass the whole spectrum of mental illness, mental handicap and 
learning disability.  In English, this variation means that at one end of the spectrum are 
psychopaths who need care in secure units and at the other end are dyslexics who need 
support in the academic environment.  However, in some groups the term mental illness was 
used to encompass criminals such as sex offenders and paedophiles.   
 
Understandably, the risks associated with different types of institutions for this huge range of 
potential patients varied greatly in the eyes of the participants – dyslexics or children with 
Down’s syndrome were considered safer than sex offenders.  Broadly speaking, the hierarchy 
of risk went as follows: secure units for child killers/sex offenders/paedophiles were the least 
desirable mental institutions, then secure units/psychiatric for other seriously mentally ill 
people (often described as schizophrenics), then open units/sheltered housing for people with 
mild mental illness, then homes for people with mental or learning disabilities with the 
physically disabled being viewed as the least risky.  Overall, with the exception of the sex 
offenders, there was quite strong agreement that these people had to go somewhere, and they 
had a right to live in decent surroundings.  In order to include the widest possible range of 
treatment centres, homes or secure units, in the analysis the overarching term mental 
institution has been employed here.   
 
The discussions in the focus groups would be useful for exploring themes of prejudice and 
social stereotyping of the disabled or mentally ill, as so much of the debate focuses on what 
mental illness really means and how a mental institution patient / client really would behave.  
The debates and clarification needed by respondents were clear examples of strong 
particularism in this area.  The particularism related to the different types of patients which 
would be treated in the institution, but also to the regime type, whether it was open/closed or 
inpatient/out patient or hospital/home.   
 
“- They're going to put a centre for mentally disabled people that may pose a threat to the 
community.  How would you react?  
- Well, rather badly.   
- Why might they pose a threat?  
- Well because not everybody is fully in control of their faculties.   
- It depends whether they've ever caused problems in the neighbourhood before” 
Belgium/male/45-60/single/no children/further education/smokers  
 
Consequently, while the question(s) asked in the groups provide a fascinating insight into 
different prejudices about mental illness or mental disability, as the respondents spent so 
much of the discussion establishing all the particulars and exploring hierarchies of risk, it is 
much less useful for exploring how people weigh up public and private interests. 
 
Another significant issue in the groups was the strength of feelings the issue aroused.  
Participants often argued from a very personal perspective, and much of the discussion time 
in longer debates was one or two participants trying to fight the prejudices of other group 
members.  Participants were often offended by the inclusion of mental disability under the 
banner of mental illness and by the stereotyped caricature of schizophrenia presented by the 
moderator or their peers.  Where the “home for people with mental illness” was actually 
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presented as being a high security unit for criminal psychopaths and sex offenders this 
provoked much more emotive NIMBY-ist arguments than a home for disabled children.  
Indeed, in one group it provoked participants to criticise a group member as being egotistic 
because he was willing to accept such a high security unit in his neighbourhood: 
 
“- Well, it wouldn't bother me any more now, but when my children were born and I was 
young, back then it would have bothered me.   
- Why?  
- The concern for my children.   
- But that would be a bit egoistic to say, now that my children have moved away, no 
problem.  And the others, my neighbour's children, they don't matter as much, isn't it?  
- No.  I was asked whether it would bother me.  I wasn't asked whether that would bother 
me on someone else's behalf, because I personally would not be bothered by it any more.” 
Germany/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
The mental institutions scenario was not discussed in great depth in the focus groups, but 
given the limitations of the data set this is of less significance than it would be elsewhere in 
the analysis.  The limitations also mean that only the key themes to emerge across countries 
have been summarised, country-by-country analysis not being possible due to the various 
ways in which the question was presented and understood by participants both within and 
between different country groups.   
 
7.8.1 Historical Context 
In some countries participants looked at how the mentally ill or mentally disabled had been 
treated over the centuries in terms of exclusion rather than integration.  However, the question 
had uncomfortable resonance for countries where in living memory the mentally disabled had 
not merely been excluded, but had been systematically murdered on eugenic grounds.  Given 
this background, it is not surprising that some participants felt the entire line of questioning to 
be uncomfortable: 
 
“I am finding it problematic that we have to talk about this.”  
Germany/female/45-60/single/further education 
 
7.8.2 Conflating Illness and Disability 
In some groups, participants sought clarification about the question, i.e.  whether the patients 
in the proposed mental institution would have mental health problems or mental/learning 
disabilities.  Most often it was the participants themselves who conflated the two and 
understood mental health problems to include mental disability, but where the moderator 
conflated the two issues, they ran the risk of offending the participants:   
 
“- I mean it's good for the sick to be taken care of, someone has to take care of them, 
right? But so it could be both sick people suffering from Downs syndrome or violent 
schizophrenics, or…  
- They're not sick, I don't like you saying that.  The mentally disabled aren't sick.”  
Denmark/female/45-60/married/children/further education 
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7.8.3 Mental Institutions as Risk-Free 
For many participants, particularly in Austrian, Italian and Polish groups, the mental 
institution and its patients – either mentally disabled or mentally ill – were framed as risk free, 
so NIMBY issues were an irrelevance.  Indeed, for some participants, where the question put 
to them related to a home for the disabled, not only was it viewed as risk-free, it was actually 
viewed as something very positive for the community as children should be exposed to a 
range of different people.  Other respondents recalled their experience of working with 
handicapped people and the negative reactions of members of the public to these people.  
These narratives were employed in order to argue for a mental institution to be built in 
consultation with local communities and not simply imposed on them.  However, with the 
mental institutions for people with mental illnesses, participants were more likely to view 
them as a bad influence on children.   
 
Some respondents, particularly in the Netherlands, also joked that there were plenty of 
strange people in the city already, so it made little difference having a mental institution in 
their neighbourhood: 
 
“Amsterdam is an open-air facility for the mentally disturbed (laughter).  What are we 
talking about.”  
Netherlands/male/45-60/single/no children/standard education 
 
7.8.4 It Could Be Worse! 
Where the mental institution was not deemed risk-free, it was often viewed as preferable to 
other institutions which could have been used.  These institutions were considered less 
appealing because the people they would be dealing with would be in some way riskier than 
people with mental illness / disability.  Sometimes these fears were not articulated, the 
comparisons were just presented in terms of preference: 
 
“If you’d have said ‘for drug addicts’, then it would have been a different story.” 
Netherlands/male/45-60/single/no children/standard education 
 
“We have planning permission put in, in our road, somebody bought a big house and they 
wanted to convert it into a, it was going to be a hostel for asylum seekers.”  
UK/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
“I might have had a problem if there was a hospital for people with HIV” 
Greece/female/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
7.8.5 It Could Be Me! 
In many groups, a strong motivation for tolerance towards having a mental institution in the 
neighbourhood, was the feeling that mental illness or disability could affect anyone at any 
time.  Other participants disclosed that people close to them were either mentally disabled or 
had mental health problems.  Many participants, particularly in Belgium, Germany and the 
UK, argued that clients or patients at mental institutions were people who had rights and a 
place in society like anyone else.   
 
The mental institution was most definitely seen as different to the man made risks from 
mobile phone masts or chemical factories, because there was a real human need for such 
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institutions, so the patients / clients really did have to have a home somewhere and people 
were more important than profit.  However, there was one participant who argued that having 
a chemical factory next door was preferable to having the mental institution, as it would help 
fewer people and not just those living locally who have taken on the risk: 
 
“Well, you can’t completely compare it now can you, those two things, because with the, 
with that factory you help your environment … because a whole lot of people can go work 
there … with the madhouse, (laughter) you help, you help a lot less people.  You help, you 
help, crazy people who aren’t necessarily also in your own immediate environment.”   
Netherlands/female/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
Participants in most focus groups also often had personal experience of living near mental or 
similar institutions, and had no negative experiences, although some had more frightening 
experiences of living near people with mental health issues.   
 
7.8.6 Appropriate Treatment 
Some actively welcomed the closure of large mental hospitals and trying to reintegrate 
mentally ill people into society.   
 
“- let’s suppose that, all at once, they build a home for people with mental illness in the 
area close to your house  
- It wouldn’t bother me  
- Neither would I … On condition that they aren’t any concentration camps, as they were 
before.  Let them be real nursing homes” 
Italy/female/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
However, ‘concern’ for the wellbeing of patients was also used as a smokescreen to argue 
against having a mental institution in the neighbourhood, where respondents, particularly in 
Greece, asserted that for the wellbeing of patients such homes should be built in the country 
side rather than city centres. 
 
“I think that they can build a clinic not in an inhabited area that would also harm the 
patients but in a place where they would have quietness, their comfort, not be bothered 
from us the sane.” 
Greece/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
“Well, I also wouldn't like to have them somewhere in my backyard but I understand that 
they aren't totally degenerated but maybe they got some kind of depression and than they 
got mentally ill...  anyway I think that it's better for them to be somewhere close to nature 
than in a loud part of the city.”  
Poland/male/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
7.8.7 Reflecting Social Stereotypes 
While mental institutions for disabled people were broadly viewed as risk-free, some 
participants were concerned about other issues, such as the patients making strange noises or 
looking funny.  For those institutions which were understood as being for mentally ill people, 
the main concern was also with potentially noisy patients, except in Poland, where concerns 
about noise were strongly liked to fears about personal security if the patients were to escape.   
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Although many respondents actively rejected stereotypes about people with mental illness 
being a significant risk to local individuals, and many responded with indignation when 
moderators insinuated that people with mental health problems were a risk, others in many 
groups and particularly in Poland, did accept these stereotypes wholeheartedly and felt the 
key problem was that mentally ill patients at liberty would be a real danger to people living 
locally, even if this was expressed in a jocular fashion: 
 
“It is more favourable, because, however, a mental patient could kill one or two, but a 
factory would kill many more, wouldn’t it?” 
Italy/male/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
In the Greek and Swedish focus groups many participants expressed very strong concerns 
about having a mental institution next door, largely because they simply did not trust their 
authorities to run such institutions according to the rules, so there were bound to be escapes 
and other risks to the local community from violent mental patients.  It was therefore 
unsurprising that real NIMBY sentiments were most openly expressed in the Greek focus 
groups.  With the Swedish participants it was clear that they had been strongly influenced by 
two murders in Sweden which happened two weeks before the focus groups were conducted, 
because these murders had been committed by people known to mental health services.  A 
leading Swedish minister (Anna Lindh) was stabbed while shopping in a department store and 
then, hours later, in a separate incident a five-year-old child was stabbed to death at her 
playgroup, which was in the vicinity of a mental hospital.xviii   Participants themselves argued 
that these incidents had shaken their faith in the system: 
 
“You have a fairly reduced faith right now in the psychiatric healthcare sector because it 
seems as if there are not many resources” 
Sweden/male/20-30/married/children/further education 
 
The lack of trust or faith in the system in Greece and Sweden stands in stark contrast to the 
Dutch focus groups where participants trusted the authorities not to put them at risk by 
choosing to site a mental institution in their neighbourhood.  A similar sense of trust could 
also be detected in some of the UK focus groups, despite frequent references to media stories 
about schizophrenics refusing medication and knifing strangers.   
 
7.8.8 Political Correctness 
Reflecting social stereotypes was commonplace in the focus groups, which would indicate 
that participants were expressing themselves freely without fear of ‘looking bad’ among their 
peers.  However, discriminating against mentally disabled children was something that did 
cause further discussion among participants, and those participants brave enough to actually 
share their fears or reflected social stereotypes faced strong censure from others in the group.   
 
“- does it have to be near our house? I don’t know what to say, it will be difficult to 
decide  
                                                 
xviii Story details available at: http://www.landbou.com/News24/World/News/0,,2-10-1462_1415098,00.html, the 
Swedish focus groups were conducted on the 29th and the 30th of September 2003, the murders described here 
occurred on 11th September 2003.  For a description of the impact such cases have had in Sweden see Lars 
Bevanger (2004) “Swedish Psychiatry in the Dock” BBC News (19 January 2004)  [online] 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3408957.stm 
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- it is racist to say that you don’t want it?  
- these people don’t belong to the margin of society, it is wrong to feel like that”  
Greece/male/20-30/single/no Children/standard education 
 
7.8.9 Discussion 
The questions about how focus group participants felt about plans to build a home for people 
with mental illness in their neighbourhood formed part of a larger discussion about Not-In-
My-Back-Yard NIMBY issues, and trust in information provided by government and public 
agencies.  In addition to asking about how the focus groups felt about building a home for 
people with mental illness in their neighbourhood, they were also asked similar questions 
about plans to build a mobile phone mast and a chemical plant making everyday items, like 
plastic or pharmaceuticals. 
 
In a survey published in 1997, over two-thirds of the mental healthcare providers in England 
and Wales experienced local opposition to community mental health facilities in the previous 
5 years.293 Most of the organisations also reported that the extent of opposition had increased 
over time.  The Scottish Association for Mental Health, a voluntary sector organisation, 
recorded incidents of local opposition to community mental health projects in Scotland, which 
indicated a similar degree of resistance in Scotland.294 
 
The differences in the way the term “home for people with mental illness” was understood 
between groups means that care must be taken when interpreting the analysis, and in 
particular when attempting to deduce any differences between countries.   
 
Angermeyer et al.295 examined public’s preference for social distance from people with 
schizophrenia.  Social distance was assessed using a 5-point Likert scale for the extent 
someone was willing to have a social relationship with a person with a mentally ill person as a 
landlord, co-worker, neighbour, member of the same social circle, personal job broker, in-law 
or child care provider.  Gender and educational status were not predictive of desire for social 
distance.  There was an association with age: the older the respondent, the stronger the 
tendency to shun a person with mental illness.  Beliefs about the aetiology of the mental 
illness and poor prognosis were also predictive.  However the most important determinants of 
desire for social distance were perceptions of unpredictability of behaviour and 
dangerousness.   
 
Angermeyer et al.296 also examined the association between desire of social distance and pity 
and with perceived need for help for people with mental illness.  There was a positive 
association between perceived dependency and pity.  However, there was also a positive 
correlation between perceived dependency and fear.  Thus Angermeyer et al.  concluded that 
the effect of perceived dependency on other emotional reactions was contradictory and 
evoked mixed feelings, and could positively as well as negatively affect people’s desire for 
social distance. 
 
As part of a survey conducted in Germany on knowledge and attitudes about schizophrenia297, 
7,246 people were as asked during a telephone interview about their acceptance of a group 
home for 6-8 schizophrenia patients in their neighbourhood.  7.6% of interviewees would be 
supportive, 57.1% were indifferent, 30.7% would be worried and 4.6% would oppose the 
proposal.  Of those 4.6% who opposed the plans, 53.8% said that they would try to prevent 
people from schizophrenia from moving into their neighbourhood.  Anxiety and opposition 
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was highest among women and older age groups.  Indeed women and older people also 
tended to display more anxiety about schizophrenia in other personal relationship and work 
contexts. 
 
A survey conducted in Canada298 using similar methodology and questions also found that a 
majority (67.1%) of the 1653 respondents claimed to be indifferent about having a group 
home for 6-8 people with schizophrenia in their neighbourhood.  However a larger minority 
of Canadian respondents were in favour (25.3%), with 7.6% opposed.  Women were less 
likely to be indifferent than men (27.5% of women were in favour and 9.2% opposed).  
Logistic regression found that the oldest age group were almost three times more likely to 
express high social distance compared to their youngest counterparts.  Those with the highest 
knowledge of schizophrenia were 10 times more likely to express highly tolerant attitudes, 
compared with those with the least amount of knowledge. 
 
In both Germany297 and Canadia298, a majority believed that people with schizophrenia could 
be successfully treated outside of hospital in the community (68.1% in Germany, 65.4% in 
Canada).  Similarly only a minority thought that people with schizophrenia are dangerous to 
the public because of violent behaviour (18.2%, Germany; 14.4%, Canada) or are a public 
nuisance due to begging or odd behaviour (12.9%, Germany; 18.4% Canada).  Both sets of 
authors speculated whether their findings may be subject to a social desirability bias, with 
respondents giving answers that they though would be more politically correct, and hence 
concerns may be higher if there were actually plans for locating a home for people with 
schizophrenia within a respondent’s neighbourhood. 
 
However as Cowan has noted, there is a marked discrepancy between research studies on 
public attitudes to location of homes for people with mental illness and the experiences of 
organisations involved in consultation on, planning for and delivering community care.294 She 
suggested that this may be due to methodological limitations of such attitudinal studies such 
as the survey methods and attitude measurement scales used with hypothetical situations.  
Thus such studies fail to take into account the interactional complexity of attitudes expressed 
in real-life community care contexts and the way protagonists structure their arguments and 
rebuttals.  Our European focus groups will also be limited by some of these methodological 
problems.  Most notably, the scenario was hypothetical: the focus group participants were not 
being faced with a planning proposal for their own neighbourhood.  However, the focus group 
methodology does allow debate and interchange of opinions between group members who 
hold different views.299 It also provides an opportunity for people to develop and explain their 
responses compared to a tick box or Likert type scale approach within quantitative research.  
Focus group participants may however feel reluctant to express views significantly different 
from the norm due to perceived group pressure. 
 
Cowan294 attempted to explore more real public attitudes to locating homes for people with 
mental illness in, by studying public responses to such a proposal in a town in Scotland.  She 
examined public documents such as correspondence in the local newspaper, and also 
conducted focus groups and interviews with people who supported and opposed the proposal.  
Opponents of the scheme raised the following objections: lack of prior consultation with local 
people and secrecy; unsuitability of the project’s location; and the type of residents who 
would live within the home.  Opponents claimed that consultation would have provided more 
information about the scheme and hence allay public fears.  However, the proposers of the 
scheme believed that calls for more consultation were really a means for attempting to veto 
the proposals.  Opponents suggested that without the input of local residents, a location had 
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been selected in an area of “vandalism and high volume pedestrian traffic” that was not 
suitable for patients and other residents.  This line of argument was also seen within our focus 
groups, when some group participants suggested that people with mental illness would be 
more suitably located in more rural areas. 
 
Angermeyer et al.300 examined the relationship between familiarity with mental illness and 
attitudes towards people with schizophrenia and depression.  Familiarity was categorised 
according to whether the respondent themselves; a member of their family; or a friend/co-
worker/acquaintance has undergone psychiatric treatment; or whether they had no personal 
experience of mental illness.  Familiarity with mental illness inversely predicted the 
perception of dangerousness of people with schizophrenia and to a lesser extent also inversely 
associated with fear and social distance.  Familiarity also was also inversely associated with 
perceived dangerousness of and desire for social distance from people with major depression.  
On the whole participants within our focus groups who had some degree of familiarity with 
mental illness tended to be more positive about locating a home for people with mental illness 
in their neighbourhood. 
 
Lauber et al.301 also constructed a regression model examining factors influencing desire for 
social distance from mental illness using data collected in Switzerland.  Four groups of 
predictor variables were found: the illness depicted (i.e.  schizophrenia compared to 
depression); attitudes to general aspects of mental health; emotions towards those affected; 
and attitude toward consequences of mental illness.  However, the regression model also 
found that survey respondents from the Italian-speaking part of Switzerland wanted greater 
social distance from the mentally ill. 
 
Lauber et al.302 examined associations between linguistic areas in Switzerland with public 
attitudes on restriction on mentally ill people (withdrawal of the driver’s licence, withdrawal 
of the right to vote and requirement to have an abortion).  They found that living in the Italian 
or French part of Switzerland was a significant predictor of the acceptance of restrictions.  
Italian-speaking Swiss had stronger opinions than the French speaking but this was not 
significant. 
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7.9 Obeying Rules and Social Norms 
 
In order to explore European Citizens attitudes to obeying rules and social norms, they were 
presented with a relatively trivial case asking them what they would do if came across a “DO 
NOT WALK ON THE GRASS” sign in a park.   
 
 The majority of participants expressed their behaviour as conforming to social conventions: 
 
“I’m fairly law-abiding.” 
France/female /45-60/single/no children/further education  
 
Only a few individuals in Ireland expressed any desire to break rules on principle.   
 
“You have to walk on the grass (laughter) Even if you go and put one foot on it” 
Ireland/female/20-30/single/no children/further education  
 
“- There’s obviously a reason for it like but….. 
- But sometimes we don’t care do we? A lot of the times we don’t care.  Just do it for the 
hell of it really”  
Ireland/male/20-30/married/children/standard education  
 
For the other participants their decision to walk or not across the grass was based on the likely 
consequence of breaking the rule,  
 
“It’s actually the weight of the consequences of breaking that rule governing whether you 
break it or not”   
Ireland/male/20-30/married/children/standard education  
 
7.9.1 Judgment based on likely harm of action 
In most focus groups the initial question was met with arguments concerning the perceived 
harm of walking across the grass, which on an individual level was seen as causing no or 
minimal harm: 
  
“-The worms perhaps? 
-Yeah, I was just gonna say…the little blades of grass” 
Belgium/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education  
 
As the discussion progressed participants argued that routine non-compliance by individuals 
could cause damage. 
 
“Well, because if I were to walk over that grass, not once, but if I keep walking over it, the 
grass will be destroyed.”  
Netherlands/male/45-60/single/no children/standard education 
 
Participants were also aware that while individual action in itself caused little harm, the 
collective walking of a large number of people would cause destruction.   
 
“If everybody thinks like that the grass will be destroyed…[there] won’t be any park left” 
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Austria/female/45-60/single/no children/further education   
 
“You see a nice park right, and there’s a sign that says do not walk on the grass so if a 
fellow ignores that right, and starts to go across the grass right, another fellow follows 
suit right and in 6 weeks there’s a worn path across that’s why people don’t do it and 
that’s why people are asked not to do it.  99% of people I think follow that.” 
Ireland/Male/45-60/married/children/standard education  
 
Many of the respondents felt that there must be a reason for such a sign, and often gave the 
example of a newly seeded area as a situation in which the sign would be required to 
minimise damage.   
 
“Look, if I see a field that’s only just been seeded, then I can imagine that you can’t walk 
on it”.   
Netherlands/female/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
7.9.2 Judgement based on function of grass 
 
Participants also discussed the idea of harm in terms of the function of grass and the park.  
The grass in the part was seen as having a functional use; to walk on, play football etc.   
 
“Grass is to walk on it.  They should care for the grass to make it nice to walk on.”  
Poland/female/45-60/single/no children/standard education  
 
Parks were seen as public spaces which served an important role in people’s lives, and as such 
should be accessible,  
 
“Is a park a green lung, or not? What is it for? For ‘pasturing’.  So we can ‘pasture’ 
there without hesitation.”   
Italy/male/20-30/married/children/standard education  
 
Respondents who did not have a garden voiced the idea of the park as a space where they 
could enjoy grass, and argued that restrictions of accessing the grass were unreasonable. 
  
“I felt like going on the grass.  I haven’t got a garden.  It’s a bit risky.  We were beneath 
the trees.  We felt good and also we weren’t the only ones, and when the park attendant 
came, we were thrown off, but I didn’t think this was reasonable, because I haven’t got a 
garden or a patio.”  
France/female/45-60/married/children/standard education  
 
Respondents who were parents argued that parks were there for their children to play in, 
 
“- You know, if one of my kids wants to go to the park, I can hardly say “you can’t go on 
the grass”, that’s ridiculous  
- Why is that ridiculous?  
- Because, then they have to, then they have to put fences don’t they.  I mean, a park is 
there to play in, final stop.”  
Belgium/male/20-30/married/children/further education  
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Other respondents viewed parks as more formal spaces and argued for the preservation of the 
grass for aesthetic reasons and to attract tourists.   
 
“One has to listen to the common sense, to see what is the smart thing to do and what is 
not.  If there is a sign there will be a reason for it.  The lawns are part of Vienna's beauty; 
the lawns are meant to be beautiful, not trampled down, as this attracts tourists who will 
say, it looks so beautiful.” 
Austria/male/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
Some respondents observed that grass in the park was artificially laid out, and argued that 
their actions in the park would be different from in natural forest,   
 
“Grass in the park, that is something that has been artificially laid out, but in the forest I 
behave differently” 
Luxembourg/female/45-60/single/no children/further education  
 
The artificial nature of the park was referred to by other respondents in terms of it being 
someone’s work.   
 
“Yes, grass that’s only been seeded, then I also think, when they’ve been working on that, 
that I’ll just, destroy someone’s work or something.”  
Netherlands/male/40-65/married/children/further education  
 
The judgment of the grass as well maintained or not was used by some respondents to argue 
that they would obey the sign depending on the state of the grass,  
 
“If there's someone who looks after it it's to respect his work, at least if it's a beautiful 
lawn anyhow.  If it's a pretty lawn you're not going to walk on it, on the other hand if you 
see a half-bald lawn and everyone's walking over it then it's very easy to say I'm not going 
to take any notice either.” 
France/male/20-30/single/no children/further education  
 
The artificial nature of the park was also referred to in terms of respondents arguing that the 
designers of the park should have laid a path to ensure that if there was a reason to walk in a 
certain route it would not be across the grass.  In this case respondents agreed that such signs 
were beneficial and that if there was need people could use the paths in the park. 
 
“Yeah, that’s good, that’s good, yeah, it’s good to have a sign cos, cos it’s made, to make 
our life nicer, isn’t it? If there was a reason to go through the park, they should just have 
a little road through it, a little path.”  
Luxembourg/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
Similarly there was the belief that if the grass was not to be walked on people should be given 
alternative spaces,  
 
“It is good to have rules but you must also have an alternative solution, to have an 
alternative place for the dog to go and do his need for example - to have a proper park 
with a sign not to step on the grass, if the park is not a proper one.” 
Greece/male/20-30/single/no children/standard education  
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7.9.3 Judgement based on being seen   
 
Some respondents referred to the idea that there would be no consequence if you weren’t 
seen.   
 
“It won’t hurt, not if you’re by yourself and no-one knows about it.”  
Ireland/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education  
 
Another respondent expanded on this by referring to pretending to be a good citizen, 
 
“I wouldn’t do it if someone was there or if someone was looking at me.  No Jesus no I’d 
let on that I was a good citizen and take the long way round”  
Ireland/female/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
One respondent referred to being seen in terms of setting an example. 
 
“My job in life, I have to set an example”. 
Netherlands/male/ 40-65/married/children/further education  
 
The importance of context and location was emphases in another group which argued that 
their compliance depended upon the location.  One Amsterdam participant argued that if they 
were in a quite area of the city then they would be more likely to obey the sign.   
 
“I think you know, where is the lawn.  Are you putting this lawn in the middle of 
Amsterdam centre or … say where it’s quiet.  There I wouldn’t walk on the grass.  Point 
one: everyone would see me.  Point two: it’s just quieter, you can go around it there, there 
are other facilities.  In Amsterdam centre you’re in a hurry, everyone’s in a hurry…”  
Netherlands/male/20-30/single/no children/standard education  
 
7.9.4 Judgment based on punishment or fine  
In comparison to the references to social norms and harm few respondents mentioned the 
issue of punishment or fines as a reason for not walking across the grass.  One of the reasons 
for this may be that within the cultural context such signs are not taken as rules: 
 
“Last summer, during the concerts, there were signs like that in Kaivopuisto, but I think 
they were only recommendations…”  
Finland/male/20-30/single/no children/standard education  
 
Generally people felt that such rule breaking went unpunished. 
 
“You don’t get strictly punished for disobeying that sign, and if you can save five minutes 
by stepping on the lawn, you do it.”  
Finland/male/20-30/single/no children/standard education  
 
One respondent specifically referred to whether the sign was legally sanctioned,  
 
“And that notice “don’t go”, that all depends if it’s got “article this and that” 
underneath, so then you can get fined.”  
Netherlands/male/45-60/single/no children/standard education  
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In similarity with the idea of being seen, another respondent referred to the presence of the 
police as a reason why they may or may not walk overt the grass, 
 
“If I don’t see the police, I walk over it”  
Netherlands/male/45-60/single/no children/standard education  
 
However another Amsterdam respondent argued that the police in the city did not care about 
rules.   
 
“In Amsterdam it doesn’t really matter all that much, you, you,you wave at the police 
whilst driving through a red light” 
Netherlands/female/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
For many of the respondents the question of whether or not to walk across the grass was 
dependent on a number of different changeable factors (their mood, whether they were busy 
or late) rather than whether the rule was connected to a fine: 
 
“I see my bus coming, I have to get there quickly, then I’ll think “oh fuck it, I’m just going 
over that grass”.  And if I get caught and fined, well then I shouldn’t nag, then I’ll just 
pay it.  And the moment that I’m not in a hurry or something like that, or I’m just thinking 
‘it’s nice and easy’, then I won’t do it.  Then I don’t think I’d do it”  
Netherlands/male/20-30/single/no children/standard education  
 
7.9.5 Judgement based on others behaviour  
 
Respondents often argued that if others were walking across the grass they would also walk 
across it.  Some also compared the harm caused by walking across the grass to others types of 
actions in the park which were seen as more harmful to the grass –and as a result their own 
rule breaking was not such a big deal.   
  
“Young people do it.  They play football.  They play ball sports, although it’s not 
allowed.” 
France/female/45-60/married/children/standard education 
  
In this case respondents argued that more damage was caused by people making a mess on the 
grass and not cleaning up afterwards, 
 
“It’s to avoid the grass getting wrecked.  (…) it’s more to do with making a mess.”  
France/male/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
Respondents also raised the issue of people sunbathing as causing more harm. 
 
“No, but for me that’s the deciding factor.  I’ve seen lawns that people have lain 
sunbathing on.  They’re totally destroyed”  
Sweden/male/20-30/married/children/further education  
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7.9.6 Judgment based living in society 
Based on the idea that the park and its grass was maintained by someone, some respondents 
argued that those in charge would have placed the sign for a reason and that it was beneficial 
to the group/community to adhere to it.   
 
“I think we have to live together in society, and that means that if there is a sign saying 
‘Keep off the Grass’, there must be a reason for it, so I don’t walk over it.”  
Luxemburg/female/20-30/married/children/further education  
 
In other of the discussion there was a strong use of the idea of respect, and regulations were 
seen as part insuring they were maintained for the good of the community, 
 
“Don't walk on the grass, well I think that's normal, after all are we not just respecting 
something that has been done for the good of the community?” 
Belgium/male/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
Similarly a respondent noted that the rule stemmed from a government department having 
taken the responsibly to care for the grass  
 
“I feel that when you pay taxes there’s some government department, some kind of 
organization that takes care of this.  If they choose to put up a sign there’s generally some 
valid reason.  Because, it’s once again, we want a functioning society and we don’t want 
to do it ourselves here, but we want someone else to it for us.”  
Sweden/male/20-30/married/children/further education  
 
It was also clear that for some participants the authority’s motivation for placing the sign on 
the grass was to saving money on cleaning up after people. 
 
“- I think it’s a question of good manners.   
- That somebody doesn’t throw litter on the pavement for example.   
- So what is it for?  
- To save money.   
- Yes.”  
Poland/female/45-60/single/standard education  
 
7.9.7 Discussion 
Social norms are one of the most central theoretical constructs in the social scientists.303 304  
Norms are typically defined in terms of an obligation or social expectation which is backed by 
a non-legal sanction and are often the basis of more formal rules and regulations.305   
 
Norms have been central to descriptions of how social order is maintained306 307 offering a 
basis for explaining cooperation between individuals and groups.  Research within social 
psychology has shown that to explain individual and group behaviour one must take into 
account regulations and rules as well as social norms.  The context of the situation is also 
important in the resulting behaviour, as the activation or priming of social norms by stimulus 
(such as an anti-littering signs) increase the likelihood of individuals complying with the 
norm (not littering).308 
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Carl Kallgren, Raymond Reno and Robert Cialdini have argued that a division should be 
drawn between descriptive norms (what is commonly done) and injunctive norms (what ought 
to be done).309  This section of the focus group discussion explored how individuals report 
both what they would do, and what ought to be done in regard to a sign in a park which says 
“do not walk on the grass”.  There is likely to have been a wide variation in the acceptance of 
a sign stating “do not walk on the grass” as representing a social norm, a recommendation or 
a legally sanctioned regulation by the park’s authority.  With this in mind the discussions 
raised a number of interesting items related to social norms.  Rather the focus groups explored 
the deliberations surrounding its acceptance as a social norm, whether participants considered 
that the sign was correctly applied in the given situation as well how they justify their own 
reported behaviour within a group environment.   
 
The major justification for the respondent’s behaviour was based on the likely consequence of 
disregarding the sign.  Anti-littering research has indicated that the activation or priming of 
social norms has a clear impact upon behaviour.  The results reported here indicate that not 
only were the respondents primed by the sign as to the state/health of the grass, but also to the 
grass as the outcome of  the park keepers’ work and hence the impact of their action on others 
work and efforts.  In this regard they were also highly conscious that it was not the 
consequence of their single action but the collective impact of many people walking on the 
same route which was likely to cause harm.   
 
There has been much work concerning social norms and rule obeying is based on the idea that 
the individual involved rationally calculates the costs and benefits of breaking the law.310  
There are suggestions that an acceptance of a mild law (with only low cost) induces an 
expectation of cooperation, and that people tend to comply with the law if they expect many 
others to do.311  In this research we found that while a few respondents did mention the 
possibly of being fined, the possibly of being told off (or to move) and being seen to be 
breaking a social norm was more important.  In addition respondents were aware that their 
own actions would be used by others to justify breaking the rule and lead greater harm to the 
grass and were willing to not break it to set an example. 
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7.10 Parental rights 
 
A number of the questions asked within the focus groups explored views on parental rights; 
who is the best judge, and the role of the State, in particular discussion on issues such as 
immunisation, smacking, water fluoridation, religious refusal of blood transfusions and vegan 
diets. 
 
7.10.1 Parental rights and best judge 
In general, participants expressed the opinion that parents are the best judge of their children’s 
best interests and that the State should only interfere in extreme cases where the child is 
potentially in danger.  This belief was balanced against an acknowledgement of the 
responsibilities that parents have to their children.  In certain situations, the state can be 
paternalistic and position itself as best judge.  In the focus groups, such potential paternalism 
was often seen as an infringement of parental rights: 
 
“- ….  One of the pleasures of having made a baby is that, you’ve made a baby, and 
now you can bring him up into an adult, a citizen, to ensure they are well brought up.  
It’s not about making a clone for the State and the State telling me what I should and 
shouldn’t do.” 
France/male/45-60/married/children/further education  
 
In all the issues discussed, the majority of participants asserted that in most cases parents 
should be free to make decisions about their children.  For example, parental choice was often 
advocated above State compulsion in relation to immunisation: 
 
“- I think you should choose for yourself whether you want your children vaccinated” 
Denmark/female/45-60/married/children/further education/non-smokers 
 
In discussions around raising a child on a vegan diet, many participants thought that State 
involvement was an infringement of parental rights.  A number of participants expressed the 
view that vegan parents were probably better informed about their specific diet and nutrition 
than the government and hence were best judge, but some respondents felt that the State 
should intervene if the child’s growth falls outside normal ranges:  
 
“- Parents can decide what their children eat at home.   
- In the child care centre they will see that the child grows and develops normally.  
They care for the child, at least, and if their growth does not develop along normal 
lines, they interfere.” 
Finland/female/45-60/married/children/further education/smokers 
 
In situations where parents have refused to consent to life-saving treatment for their children 
on religious grounds, for example Jehovah’s Witnesses refusal of a blood transfusion, the 
majority of respondents argued that, in such extreme cases, the parents’ rights should be 
secondary to the child’s rights, and the child’s rights are advocated by the State in their 
concern over the best interests of the child: 
 
 “- I think that if it was dangerous for a child’s life the court should decide that there 
should be a transfusion...” 
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Poland/male/20-30/married/children/standard education/smokers 
 
7.10.2 State influence over parents 
In many countries, the State attempts to influence good parenting by providing subsidies or 
incentives to encourage what it perceives as positive behaviours, and by punishing behaviours 
that it views as harmful.  Focus group participants generally approved of State incentives to 
encourage good behaviour, preferring incentives to compulsion.  For example, in discussions 
around the fluoridation of public water supplies, participants preferred that States provide 
subsidised fluoride pastes, tablets, and school dental health campaigns targeted at vulnerable 
children rather than introduce compulsory fluoridation and consequent blanket coverage for 
all.  In many cases, they felt that mass water fluoridation was an infringement of their rights 
and not acceptable, even if it prevented dental problems in susceptible children: 
 
“...  Sure, fluoride would be good for the children, but it can be added to toothpaste 
and does not need to be tipped into our water.”  
Germany/male/20-30/single/standard education/non-smoker 
 
Similarly, in relation to immunisation, the majority of participants from countries where 
immunisation is voluntary argued in favour of parental choice rather than State compulsion.  
However, in countries where immunisation is already compulsory, participants (on the whole) 
tended to support compulsion and hence the over-riding of parental choice:   
 
“- it is also imposed by the state because in order for a child to be enrolled at school, 
vaccination is an essential condition 
- there is legislation on this 
- and it is good that it exists.” 
Greece/male/45-60/married/children/further education/non-smoker 
 
7.10.3 The role of the State in a child’s upbringing 
Taking a slippery slope view, a number of focus group participants expressed their concern 
that State involvement in one area could be carried over into other areas, potentially leading to 
complete State control: 
 
“- The State wants to monitor everything.  I don’t necessarily agree.   
- All that remains will be to make people wear a microchip” 
France/male/20-30/single/no children/standard education/smokers 
 
For example, in relation to a ban on smacking children: 
 
“- Today we forbid beating children and tomorrow we forbid cooking tomato soup...” 
Poland/male/20-30/married/children/standard education/smokers 
 
7.10.4 Role models  
One of the arguments raised in favour of parental rights was that parents and other members 
of society have a responsibility to act as role models to children:  
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“- ....I think we’ve got a lot of responsibilities towards children and youngsters in our 
society… 
“-  …I think you can have a role model function towards youngsters…” 
Belgium/female/45-60/married/children/further education/smokers 
 
State laws also set guidelines for what is socially acceptable and help to set a good example to 
parents and, in turn, to their children.  For example, a prohibition on smacking children was 
seen by some participants as setting a good example to parents and, as a result, in helping to 
instil the belief that violence towards children should not be used: 
 
“ - ...  maybe it would make the public more aware.  People hitting their children are well 
aware of the fact that they are not allowed to do that.  So if it is made illegal, this doesn't 
really protect the child.  But these people know they will be punished if it comes out in the 
open.” 
Austria/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education/non-smokers 
 
7.10.5 The greater good  
Some respondents were aware that public health measures are about the greater good of the 
community rather than the individual and stated that they would be prepared to accept 
measures that would be beneficial for other members of society, even if they would not 
personally benefit.  Similarly a number of participants argued that they were willing to give 
up some of their choices in order to protect the vulnerable.  Such arguments were made in 
relation to water fluoridation, immunisation, and a ban on smacking children: 
 
“- Isn’t it an interference in parents rights?  
- No.   
- It’s important for the whole society” 
Poland/male/20-30/single/no children/further education/smokers 
 
“-I think it should be a law, this way we can save children who are really beaten” 
Finland/female/45-60/married/children/further education/smokers 
 
7.10.6 Trust 
Issues of trust were raised around compulsory immunisation and the fluoridation of public 
water supplies.  For instance some participants referred to fluoridation as mass-medication 
and questioned its safety and the potential side-effects of over-consumption.  They did not 
completely trust the information they had been given by their politicians or experts employed 
by the government: 
 
“- ...  the person that gave the expert evidence in Australia, the first thing he did when 
they put fluoride in the water was invest in some kind of gadget to take the fluoride out 
of the water going into his house … Who the hell do you believe?” 
 UK/male/45-60/married/children/further education/non-smokers 
 
Participants were more likely to trust information if it came from a qualified source: 
 
“- If a paediatrician tells me ‘Look, buy water with fluoride because it does [my child] 
good’ I will buy it for him” 
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Italy/male/20-30/married/children/standard education/smokers  
 
With regard to immunisation, some respondents stated that they would be happy to accept the 
decision of State and relinquish their parental rights because they did not have the expertise to 
make the decision themselves: 
 
“-The state should decide 
- The parent but with the agreement of scientists  
 -What do parents know, what are they, doctors? ...” 
Greece/male/45-60/married/children/further education/non-smokers  
 
7.10.7 Enforcement 
Participants expressed concern about the potential difficulties in enforcing some laws, for 
example a ban on smacking in the home:  
 
“- and how are they going to check that? They will put a camera in the house?” 
Greece/male/45-60/married/children/further education/non-smokers  
 
Similar concerns were raised in relation to the difficulty of ensuring that a child of vegan 
parents has a balanced diet: 
 
“-....They will have to introduce an obligatory check-up every other month in order to 
make sure that the child has not been given vegan food in the meantime...   
- Such a law cannot be implemented.” 
Germany/male/20-30/single/standard education/non-smokers  
 
7.10.8 Discussion 
This paper reports research involving a large number of focus groups over a range of public 
health policy areas.  Parental rights were part of many policy issues discussed.  In a 
democratic society, parents are in principle free to raise their children as they see fit.  This 
makes practical as well as ideological sense in that it would be too expensive and time-
consuming for the State to make all decisions relating to children.  Having parental 
responsibility means that you have the right to make important decisions about your child's 
upbringing.  It also means you have an obligation to care for the child, to act in their best 
interests and bring them up to become good citizens.  However, the State has a role to play in 
ensuring that children are raised within the boundaries of social norms.  It has an obligation to 
protect the interests of all its’ citizens and to act via public policy to ensure that vulnerable 
groups are protected.   
 
There are differences between countries as to the extent of such state intervention in 
parenthood.  According to Millar and Warman312, European countries can be divided into 
three groups in this respect: intervention in only extreme circumstances; support for parents 
experiencing difficulties, and support for parenting with some recognition of the autonomy of 
children.  Family policies, the state, the public sector, non governmental organisations, child 
welfare organisations and social work, have an important role to play in providing support 
and services.  The state can intervene by offering incentives to encourage particular decisions 
by parents.  For instance in some European countries, financial incentives (cash rewards, 
subsidised products) or non-financial (social or professional pressure) encourage child 
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immunisation.313 Where parents do not make what the State believes is the right decision for 
their children it can compel parents to make particular decisions and punish them for non-
compliance (with fines or imprisonment, etc).313 314  In other cases, the introduction of a law 
removes the autonomy of parents to make choices about child rearing, for example banning 
smacking, but the State also has a duty to intervene if children are put at risk of harm,315 and 
can on some occasions override parents’ wishes, for instance when parents refuse to consent 
to life saving blood transfusions for their child on religious grounds.316 
 
There was some concern that certain laws would be difficult to enforce, for example a ban on 
smacking, and could thus lose their credibility.  However, the fact that the law exists sends 
out a normative message of what is deemed to be socially acceptable, and over time this could 
change attitudes and behaviour.317   
 
Trust in public health policy involves a variety of factors.  The 2003 Eurobarometer,318 
undertaken by the European Commission, showed that only 10.7% of Europeans trust 
political parties as a source of information about health..  In the focus groups, there was 
evidence of public mistrust in the State, or the Public Health agencies acting on its behalf, 
particularly in countries where there are concerns over corruption or where there have been 
previous health scares for example mistrust of the measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) triple-
vaccine following unfounded claims of an alleged link with autism and bowel disease.319  
 
Focus group participants felt that parents have rights in the upbringing of their children and 
that these should be respected.  For instance they believed in principle that parents should 
retain the right to decide whether to immunise their children, or feed them a vegan diet, 
except in exceptional circumstances.  Participants accepted State guidance over these issues 
although they did not completely trust it and expressed a desire to maintain a degree of 
independence in how they lived their lives and raised their children.  Although in principle 
participants tended to believe that the State was generally acting in the public interest, some 
participants rejected such State interventions on the grounds that these interfered with 
individual choice and private interest.   
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7.11 Incentives and Enforcement 
7.11.1 Preference for targeted incentives over enforcement 
In most situations, a majority of focus group participants expressed a preference for incentives 
targeted at the relevant population rather than enforcement and blanket coverage for all.  For 
example, when groups were asked whether they agreed that States should fluoridate the public 
water supply in order to improve the dental health of disadvantaged children, many 
participants suggested alternative, individual measures to help vulnerable groups while 
avoiding blanket coverage.  Participants generally did not see an incentive for them to agree 
to have their water fluoridated and instead thought that dental health should be tackled in 
other ways that did not impact upon themselves.  For example, they advocated targeted 
incentives in the form of State provision of subsidised fluoride toothpastes, rinses, tablets and 
so on, such that interventions were directed at people who needed them and the rest of the 
population would not be forced to drink fluoridated water: 
 
“Instead of adding fluoride they could subsidise dentists more, couldn't they?” 
Spain/male/45-60/married/children/standard education 
 
Similarly, when groups were asked if they thought that smoking should be banned outright or 
banned in public places, most participants agreed that the government should encourage 
people to stop smoking but there was also clear support for respecting individual choice: 
 
“If a law were passed, which would ban that I would feel patronised and that is against the 
democratic principles of our society.” 
Germany/female/20-30/married/children/further education/smokers 
 
There was concern that overly harsh restrictions would lead to a rebellion from smokers, 
while less extreme measures would receive greater support, help to set the framework for 
achieving the desired result, and could lead to cultural change and the denormalisation of 
smoking (particularly in public spaces).  Thus participants spoke of providing incentives such 
as subsidised nicotine replacement products to help people quit smoking rather than removing 
individual choice completely: 
 
“Bans always promote.  They promote the desire, because you want to try the things 
you’re not allowed to.” 
Denmark/male/20-30/married/children/standard education/non-smokers 
 
Where participants discussed immunisation in the context of parental choice versus State 
compulsion, the majority opinion was that immunisation should be a matter of parental 
choice.  Some participants commented that if parents were given good, clear information then 
they would voluntarily choose to have their children immunised, thus compulsion would be 
unnecessary.  Further, there was a belief that compelling parents to immunise could prove 
counter-productive as people do not like to have their freedom of choice removed: 
 
“Here I’d say that I don’t think they should legislate about things like vaccinations, I 
think they should give information.  You can get a lot further.  If you had received really 
good information then there probably wouldn’t have been any doubt as to whether you’d 
let them go and be vaccinated.  But if there’s a penalty imposed – then you immediately 
get the other … resistance towards it.” 
A Normative Ethics Framework for Public Health   EuroPHEN 
  193 
Denmark/female/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
In some groups and some situations, participants seemed amazed that either incentives or 
enforcement were necessary to make the public act in certain ways.  For example, when the 
cash reward offered to parents in Austria who partook in a child health programme that 
included having their children fully immunised was reduced from €1200 to €200 (in 1995) 
immunisation coverage began to fall.  This led a participant in one Austrian focus group to 
exclaim: 
 
“We are discussing a matter of principle here.  But what really scares me is the fact that 
… there are health checks offered for children and some mothers did go when they were 
paid for…  And as they might not get (paid) for it anymore today, they are just not going!  
And I do not understand that.  I mean, does the State really have to pay me to make sure 
that my child is healthy?” 
Austria/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
The question of whether immunisation should be made compulsory also raised issues of trust 
as participants focused on their perceptions of vaccine safety and the risks of immunisation 
versus non-immunisation.  Participants who trusted assurances from health professionals and 
the State that vaccines were safe were either happier to accept compulsory immunisation or 
believed that compulsion would not be necessary as parents would recognise that 
immunisation is in the best interests of the child.  Those who did not trust public reassurances 
over vaccine safety were generally more concerned about immunisation and expressed a 
preference to make their own decisions about immunising their (hypothetical) children. 
 
7.11.2 Social and professional pressure 
Social and professional pressure can also influence attitudes, behaviour and adherence to 
public health policies.  The incentives and enforcements associated with various public health 
policies make a statement about the social acceptability of certain choices and behaviours.  In 
discussions over the pressure to have one’s children immunised or to not smoke in public 
places, some participants commented upon the influence of social/peer pressure and pressure 
from health professionals or public health campaigns: 
 
“And it is a common conversation topic to ask if your kid has already been vaccinated, it 
is a rule almost, an agreed deal.” 
Finland/male/20-30/married/children/further education 
 
7.11.3 The greater good 
A number of focus group participants argued in favour of the greater good, stating that they 
would be prepared to accept compulsory immunisation, the fluoridation of public water 
supplies and/or a total ban on smoking for the greater good of society, and in particular for the 
greater good of disadvantaged populations and vulnerable groups, notably children.  
However, such sentiment was only expressed by a minority of participants; the majority spoke 
instead in favour of individual choice and of individual solutions (for example, the provision 
of better dental health services instead of mass fluoridation). 
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7.11.4 Preference for enforcement in certain areas 
There were, however, some situations in which a majority of focus group participants who 
expressed a preference advocated legislation and enforcement.  The issue of enforcement was 
particularly pressing when respondents spoke of vulnerable groups, for example in relation to 
prohibition of the sale of tobacco products to children and young people.  In general, the 
health consequences to children and youth were seen as a valid reason for greater restrictions 
of freedom. 
 
7.11.5 Enforcing the enforcements 
In discussions around smacking and a total ban on smoking, focus group participants spoke of 
difficulties in the enforcement of certain laws.  For example, irrespective of whether 
participants were in favour of a ban on smacking children, many expressed concern about the 
difficulty of enforcing such a ban in private spaces such as the home, and the concern that 
children, neighbours, or anybody with a grudge against the parents could accuse the parent of 
smacking the child out of spite: 
 
“I've got something against my neighbour.  Yeah exactly.  I'll report that he hits his kid”. 
Belgium/female/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
“There are certain areas where the state just can’t go any further, can the law go into the 
bedroom, into the house, how far can the law go, how can the state monitor that.” 
Ireland/male/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
Thus, while participants may have viewed the end goal as desirable (for example, a reduction 
in the physical abuse of children, or fewer people smoking), there was some scepticism about 
the means of achieving those goals while trying to maintain a balance between public and 
private interest, responsibility and action. 
7.11.6 Discussion  
Public health policies are intended to promote and/or protect the health of (sections of) the 
population through encouraging socially positive behaviour and collective responsibility and 
discouraging or punishing negative behaviours.  As such, they may involve incentives or 
punishments for acting or failing to act in certain, specified ways.  Incentives may be financial 
(cash rewards, subsidised products) or non-financial (provision of food vouchers, social or 
professional pressure).  They can be targeted at the individual patient/subject or towards the 
health care professional (for example, bonus payments for reaching particular targets).  
Incentives are used to encourage positive, healthy behaviours: for example, the provision of 
free or subsidised nicotine patches aims to help people quit smoking, free or subsidised 
fluoride tablets aim to improve dental health, and vaccinations free at the point of use aim to 
encourage immunisation and maintain herd immunity.  By contrast, disincentives and 
punishments are used to discourage negative choices or unhealthy behaviours: for example, 
taxation on tobacco products aims to reduce tobacco consumption, and fines for failure to 
have one’s child fully immunised aim to encourage high levels of immunisation.  However, 
providing financial rewards or incentives to individuals or to health care professionals is 
ethically problematic.  Incentives have a disproportionate impact on lower socio-economic 
groups for whom the reward or incentive is relatively greater than for those in higher socio-
economic groups; and the public perception that financial incentives to health care 
professionals may impact upon their professional judgment may affect public trust and the 
doctor-patient relationship.   
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Examples of State use of incentives and enforcements can be found in relation to policies on 
immunisation, smoking, fluoridation, smacking, and many others.  The use of incentives and 
enforcements varies widely between policy areas and European countries, and raises a number 
of issues.  Firstly, such measures may be ethically contentious in that they may infringe upon 
civil liberties or freedom of choice and they imply that the State (via the public health 
agencies acting on its behalf) is the best judge of what is in the public’s interest.  Although the 
State may have superior access to scientific and expert knowledge, issues around vested 
interests, individual choice and private interest must also be addressed.  Secondly, particular 
laws and policies may be difficult to enforce.  For example, while child health and 
immunisation records may mean that compulsory immunisation can be monitored, a ban on 
smacking children is difficult to enforce in private spaces, notably in the home.  Thirdly, 
striking the balance between incentive and punishment can be problematic.  For example, 
while an outright ban on smoking would be impossible to enforce and would likely lead to a 
rebellion, the banning of smoking in public places affects the normalisation and cultural 
acceptability of smoking and helps to reduce tobacco consumption.  Public policy makers 
therefore need to produce policies that can be gradually accepted by the public whose health 
they are intended to promote and protect. 
 
There has been limited recent research on public opinion relating to the use of incentives and 
enforcement in public health policy across Europe.  This paper forms part of a study on the 
ethics of public health practice; it considers public opinion on tensions between private and 
public interest on a range of public health policy issues.  One of the study’s objectives was to 
provide information to give policy makers across Europe a better understanding of public 
opinion to population approaches to improving health, in particular in relation to reasons for 
supporting specific public health policies and their enforcement.  This paper reports the 
findings in relation to public attitudes toward the use of incentives, enforcements, and 
concepts of the greater good and best judge in relation to policies on immunisation, smoking, 
fluoridation and smacking.   
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7.12 Trust 
7.12.1 Who do the participants trust? 
Participants did not totally trust the information they were given unless it came from health 
professionals or family doctors who they believed to have either their best interests or the 
interests of their community at heart.  Some participants viewed the State (or agencies acting 
on its behalf) as having access to the experts and therefore better informed to make decisions.  
Regarding the safety of drinking artificially fluoridated water, some trusted advice from 
doctors: 
 
“ -If a paediatrician tells me ‘Look, buy water with fluoride because it does [my child] 
good’ I will buy it for him” 
Italy/male/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
When asked who they would trust, others said they would only trust someone they knew 
personally: 
 
“-  A researcher who is my friend… 
-: … and I just wanted to say, a scientist who knows all about radiation…, an 
independent scientist”  
Austria/male/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
“- (….), Institutes, scientists. 
- the institutes are also influenced by politics and money mainly” 
 Austria/male/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
Overall, participants tended to believe sources which were closer to home i.e. local over 
national, national over EU (this could also be because they are more familiar with them, not 
just because they are closer) 
: 
 “-  Local ones.   
- Local ones, why’s that?  
- Because we trust them the most” 
Denmark/male/45-60/married/children/standard education 
 
7.12.2 Reasons expressed for trust in state or society or political system 
Some participants expressed the belief that the state had their best interested at heart, and 
therefore could be trusted to do the best for them: (is this only in Sweden?) 
 
“- The experts would have recommended it to us. 
- They would have adopted a stance on the matter. 
- Exactly 
- And they wouldn’t go ahead if they weren’t sure it was for our own good.” 
Sweden/male/45-60/married/children/standard education 
 
“- … A State run immunisation campaign can’t ever be wrong can it?” 
Sweden/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
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With regard to resistance to risky developments in their neighbourhood (NIMBY), such as the 
sitting of a mobile phone mast, a mental institution or a chemical factory, participants in 
Finland, Netherlands and Poland appear to have much more trust in the state to protect the 
population from unnecessary risk: 
 
“- If it were dangerous, they would not build it there.   
- They would have found out already…  
- I trust the Finnish society, no problem at all.” 
Finland/male/20-30/no children/standard education 
 
7.12.3 Who did the participants distrust? 
In the focus groups, there was evidence of public mistrust in the State or the Public Health 
agencies acting on its behalf, particularly in countries where there are concerns over 
corruption or where there have been previous health scares and scandals.  In some countries 
the lack of trust appeared absolute and attitudes towards the state were often overtly cynical: 
 
“- I wouldn't believe a politician, not at all!”  
Austria/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
“- So what if state institutions said it is safe, would that be trustworthy? 
- That definitely not at all. 
- Why not? 
- Because somehow at the moment trust in any state institutions is as low as ever.” 
Germany/female/20-30/children/further education 
 
In general, participants did not trust the media: 
 
“- …but journalists, you can’t rely on them, they write this the one day, and that the 
other and… 
- …and they can be manipulated” 
 Netherlands/male/45-60/single/no children/standard education 
 
“- …Well if you don’t trust the government, then you shouldn’t trust TV either…” 
Netherlands/male/45-60/single/no children/standard education 
 
Other participants did not trust the information because they were aware that the experts 
advice could be contraction by their actions: 
 
“- Do you know that the person that gave the expert evidence in Australia, the first 
thing he did when they put fluoride in the water was invest in some kind of gadget to 
take the fluoride out of the water going into his house … Who the hell do you 
believe?” 
UK/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
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7.12.4 Reasons for distrust 
Apart from a blanket distrust of politicians and media, caused by past events, a number of 
participants believed that due to conflicting interests, information given could not always be 
trusted: 
 
“- I wouldn’t trust a public institution because I know that they would have other 
interests from that.” 
Greece/female/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
“- It depends on who is conducting the investigation.  If it is the industry itself, I am 
not sure I would believe it, because they want to sell their stuff.”  
Germany/male/20-30/single/standard education 
 
7.12.5 What type of information do the participants want? 
Participants were asked if the thought it was acceptable for the government to withhold some 
information from the public in order to prevent panic and confusion.  Some felt that all the 
information should be given uncensored: 
 
“- …we are over-age, we want to know the truth. 
-…we need that.” 
Austria/female/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
 
Others felt that there were situations where some information could be withheld if it could 
cause panic or not be understood: 
 
“- You should not scare people for no reason. 
- They should give information up to a certain point.  If there is a warning, ‘This might 
cause the growth of a sixth arm to your baby’… Not many people would want that 
product, even though there were ten good things listed there and only one ‘might’ at 
the end.  It would scare people so badly they would not want to use the product. 
- They should give us the facts”. 
Finland/female/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
“- Not all the information can be given, some might cause alarm or terrorism, or 
things like that.  They can’t go around and say what really happens, in my opinion.  
They must keep some information”. 
Italy/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
7.12.6 Discussion 
Confidence in science and technology has eroded over recent years.  Various health and food 
scares have impacted on the public’s general trust in government departments and raised new 
issues relating to trust in the science and technologies of food provision.320 The public’s 
reaction to scares such as Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)321, the combined 
measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccination322 and the scandal of contaminated blood 
products in France323 have been taken as indications that the level of trust in national 
European institutions is critically low.  In the case of BSE, European consumers have also lost 
faith in public health policies and in the scientists who sided with the government to dispel 
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public concerns about infected beef for purely economic reasons.324 Similarly there is a 
mistrust of the government handling of the MMR triple-vaccine in the UK following claims 
of an alleged link with autism and bowel disease325 which has since been disproved.326 327 
This mistrust now extends to other areas and has already affected some technologies such as 
stem cell research and gene therapy.328 Cross-national comparisons of focus groups in several 
European countries reveal that distrust of scientists and regulatory authorities is a source of 
disquiet about GM food across Europe.329 
 
Trust is by definition, particularly difficult to gauge, as it is a “level of the subjective 
probability with which an agent will perform a particular action” which occurs before the 
action can be monitored and affected by our own action.330  Trust in government policy and 
agencies is affected by a number of factors including the form of media coverage; a decrease 
in perceptions of impartiality of government agencies and experts; a perception that 
information has been hidden and that public safety is balanced against economic concerns.   
 
As the focus group participants indicated greater weight is given to the opinions of people we 
know.  331  Trust in information sources are influenced by a number of factors, including 
where the information comes from, availability of alternative information and the perception 
of risks.  While medical health professionals tend to be rated highly trusted, public health 
polices tend to be published by national government institutions.  Trust in experts depends on 
an expectation that the experts will be technically competent and that they will hold other 
people’s interests above their own.  Some level of trust ideally exists between individuals and 
experts (or institutions and organizations acting as experts).  In a 2006 MORI poll in the UK, 
92% of the public trusted doctors to tell the truth, only one in five adults trusted politicians 
and government ministers to do the same.332 This agrees with results from the 2003 
Eurobarometer, run by the European Commission which showed that on average only 23.4% 
of people had trust in their national government.333 In the focus groups, there was evidence of 
public mistrust in the State or the Public Health agencies acting on its behalf, particularly in 
countries where there are concerns over corruption or where there have been previous health 
scares and scandals.  With regard to resistance to risky developments in their neighbourhood, 
such as the setting of a mobile phone mast or a mental institution, participants in Finland, 
Netherlands and Poland appear to have much more trust in the state to protect the population 
from unnecessary risk.  In some other countries the lack of trust appeared absolute and 
attitudes towards the state were often overtly cynical. 
 
The decrease in trust is a major concern for public health, particularly where it plays a critical 
role in the effectiveness and adherence to public health policies as well as enabling prevention 
programs (i.e. immunisations).  In these focus groups most participants wished to have access 
to all the information so that they could make their own decisions and thought that this 
information should be provided by experts who were independent from economic interests.  
However they were also aware that such openness carried the potential that information may 
be misunderstood, cause unnecessary worry/panic and harm national security interests.  
Overall the participants accepted some censorship of information which they characterised as 
different from the State actively publicising misleading information.   
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7.13 Citizenship 
 
The opening questions within the focus groups were in relation to participants understanding 
of community, and society and their rights and responsibilities. 
 
7.13.1 What is community? 
 
Most participants were able to easily identify with a notion of community – whether defining 
it as a geographical community (staircase, neighbourhood, district) or community of interest 
(work, hobby, religious) whereas society was more often viewed as an abstract – less tangible, 
concept.   
 
Within the groups, questions on community and society were the first ones asked after 
introductions – participants were clearly feeling their way in many of the groups, with several 
groups simply coming up with lists of words to describe community, that were remarkably 
similar across different places and countries: Family; Work; Parish; Voluntary work; Sports; 
Friends, and somewhat more surprisingly: small animals (pets).  One of the Irish focus groups 
included “prisoners” in a concept of community, reflecting political history in that country.  
In some of the groups, the notion of community encompassed a broader notion of the 
municipality, whole country, and the European community itself.  This latter may have arisen 
as a consequence of the focus of the project as had just been described by the moderator.  
More rarely, and mostly in the younger age groups, the notion of “global community” was 
raised.   
 
“All people – all on the planet”  
Sweden/female/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
A range of views were expressed that people belong to different communities simultaneously 
and at different times of their lives, exemplified by this quote: 
 
“Let’s just say that life is a bit like a Russian doll.  You have a really small community 
which generally speaking is the family unit, a really tangible community and then you 
have a community based around your life so a professional community or another type of 
community and then you get to the more artificial (layers), the most abstract community, 
and yet on a daily basis I feel like I’m from Liege, but the Walloons, the francophone…” 
Belgium/male/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
Some respondents, particularly in the Nordic countries were even willing to include strangers 
into their notion of community with the example of people you may meet on the daily 
commute: who in some sense are sharing a communal activity.  Others were less sympathetic 
to a notion of all-encompassing community, expressing the view that there are some 
communities in which you have limited choice about whether to belong such as the family, 
but in others –work colleagues, fellow commuters, it is possible to choose not to regard 
oneself as a member.  The notion of choice – some element of self-determination, is valued 
across the groups and countries.  However the generally held view is that whilst individuals 
would like to be autonomous, most people recognise that mutual co-operation and negotiation 
is important too:  
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“We need each other – from prehistoric times “And that means that there are some rules 
and some of them are written down and some of them are unwritten.  And it’s a case of 
getting the best possible conditions together”  
Denmark/female/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
Nevertheless, participants also recognise that not all communities are benign: 
 
“Groups as well as individuals can be unhealthy – e.g. school communities: I can 
imagine that for some people, that it’s the group spirit that, for instance can have its 
effect at a very young age.  I know people for instance who don’t feel good at school for 
instance”  
Belgium/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
Across the countries the idea that some communities are closed and do not mix outside was 
raised at various points and in various ways.  Some views are expressed more tolerantly than 
others: 
 
“It’s them and us.  We say hi to them and the children play but there’s no… there just 
isn’t.  And so whose fault is it?” 
Denmark/male/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
In other groups anger is expressed at the notion that outsiders, including migrants from within 
the EU, but particularly asylum seekers and refugees, may receive preferential treatment in 
terms of housing or services – this belief is expressed in several countries, notably in England, 
and most particularly in one of the Italian groups: 
 
“We pay 50 Euros a day for that riff-raff.” 
Rome/female 45-60/married/children/further education 
 
In this particular focus group, caution must be exercised when interpreting the results – part 
way though a pejorative exchange a participant reports that her husband was murdered by an 
immigrant, instantly closing down the expression of any alternative point of view.  Thus the 
importance of local context needs to be emphasised – a specific experience in one case, and 
the heightened awareness of extremist groups and issues around asylum and refugee status as 
portrayed in the media in the other. 
 
7.13.2 What is society? 
Society, on the other hand is seen as an abstract concept, and in some groups, only in ideal 
terms. 
 
“Well society is getting things done I think.  The public - the public authorities, the 
municipalities, the state, and county – what I belong to.”  
Denmark/male/45-60/married/children/standard education 
 
And in more obviously ideological terms: 
 
“France stands for individualism”  
Male/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
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Which gave rise to this riposte, from an opposing political perspective:  
 
“Actually no, there are loads of communities.  Community spirit is extremely resistant – 
increasingly so (…) With immigration communities everywhere.  So there are load of 
communities in France either from a cultural or a social point of view”  
France/male/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
Of particular interest is the Polish groups, which were unlike virtually all the other groups in 
holding extremely negative views about the society they lived in: a poor society; corrupted; a 
rat race; narrow minded; unequal; greedy; individuals but no society; malicious.  Because of 
the strength and similarity of views expressed that are not mirrored by any other country, it 
would be more useful to regard the Polish social and political context post-communism as a 
special case, worthy of further analysis.   
 
7.13.3 Comparison of community in past and present 
Respondents varied in response, but most, if not all, seemed to view the past as a rosier place, 
in which people were able to care for one another more than they are able to at present.  Many 
respondents put this down to the faster pace of life in modern times – mobile phones, the 
Internet, hectic working lives.  However, some people are ambivalent about newer 
technologies and their role in community 
 
“Nowadays everybody is in a hectic rush and it’s not going to change because 
technology is developing more and more varieties.  So you have the possibility to 
preserve community by email, telephone or whatever.  Therefore I can keep community 
alive but meeting up is important too” 
Austria/male/20-30/married/no children/further education 
 
Fear was expressed that with a work-life balance that is tipped towards work, children are out 
of control, and both family and communities suffer as a consequence.   
 
“- Like kids now, they’d curse at you in the street, kids of 12 years old cursing at you 
Jeez, I’d never have cursed when I was that age I wouldn’t have dared, I’d be terrified” 
“- but they’re not getting social skills, they’re just getting presents.  Nice food, nice 
clothes” 
Ireland/ female/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
Some groups raised the issue that with more women in the workforce than in the past 
(whether this is an accurate perception or not) a fragmentation of communities has occurred – 
women being perceived as a kind of social glue. 
 
Not all groups felt that communities were better in the past, even if they were closer knit: 
 
“That’s going back community.  The word community is very small, we’re a global 
society and the world is becoming very small” 
Ireland/male/45-60/married/children/standard education 
 
In contrast, for this group without close family links– notions of community cohesion become 
increasingly important as we age: 
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“As a society we no longer look after the elderly, as we become the older generation who 
is going to look after us because in times gone past it was always that you were looked 
after by the family but now I would think the majority of us would go into a home” 
UK/female/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
7.13.4 Collective versus individual model of Society 
One of the key research objectives was to evaluate preference for a collective versus 
individual model of society.  In order to focus respondents, they were asked to respond to two 
descriptions of countries in which they could live: 
 
Country 1: The government provides a high level of public services – education, health, 
pension and social care – but taxes are high to pay for them, and because the government 
makes decisions, there are some limitations on choice about education, health and social care.  
If someone had a high wage they would pay more and poorer people would pay less, but all 
would have the same provision. 
 
Country 2: Taxes are low but people are expected to pay for insurance in case they become 
unemployed or ill and to make provision and social care when they are older.  However 
because taxes are low they can make own choices about what sort of insurance/ pensions to 
buy etc.  All would pay the same for a particular package but people could choose to pay 
more or less to tailor their package to their needs. 
 
In all focus groups respondents immediately associated Country 1 and Country 2 with models 
that exist currently – namely the USA (and the UK for some, e.g. France) and Sweden, 
respectively.  Association of Country 2 with the USA entailed considerable negatives and 
antipathy – this was particularly focussed on perceived harshness and injustice of healthcare 
provision.   
 
7.13.5 Advantages of country 1 
Despite differing preferences for one country compared to the other, perceptions of the 
advantages and disadvantages of each system were remarkably consistent across countries 
and across demographic groups.  The main advantages of Country 1 were that everyone is 
taken care of and has the same opportunities and a more philosophical position that it suggests 
a more mature and caring society: The only difference that stands out is the marked likelihood 
of young people to cite less hassle as an advantage of Country 1. 
 
“The government is present at all levels regarding family needs and everyone has the 
same opportunities.” 
France/female/45-60/married/no children/further education 
 
“More equality, human dignity.  Everyone is entitled, even if not in a job. 
That’s important”. 
Finland/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
7.13.6 Disadvantages of Country 1 
A lack of choice was commented on by all groups, but there was some suggestion that this 
was a greater affront to only a minority.  Although lip-service was paid to this loss of choice 
(which was suggested in the moderator’s description of country 2) the more emotive 
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disadvantage hinged on a loss of motivation in the wider society to strive and the knock on 
effects of lack of vibrancy.  This extended in most cases to the whole economic landscape, not 
just public provision.  Young people across countries were more likely to express concern that 
choices would be made by government that were not in their own best interests.  However, in 
most countries these younger groups were prepared to subsume their own interests for the 
greater good – although much less true in the UK and Ireland. 
 
The majority were very concerned about abuse of the system, but the majority of those who 
favoured this model were able to rationalise that this had to be expected and accepted for the 
model to function.  However concern over spongers, scroungers and abusers was very acute 
and a culture of dependency and endemic laziness were mentioned in all countries as very real 
dangers of this system.  Again, countries who were most unequivocal about this model felt 
that abuse would be minimal as individuals can be trusted to play the system fairly – indeed in 
some countries, namely Denmark and Sweden, it was very hard to countenance that abuse of 
the system would actually take place. 
 
“If you can prove it is their own fault, they would still get help, but less help (than the 
others) – but I wouldn’t allow them to starve.” 
Austria/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
While not articulated immediately, after some discussion the idea of a monopoly provider 
opened up issues of sub-optimal provision through complacency of the provider.  A lack or 
loss of efficiency was anticipated with implications for quality of services provided, 
particularly by those who were more accepting of Country 2. 
 
The experience of government as the provider in Spain, Portugal and Greece highlighted the 
risks of relying on a sole provider as the state has been seen to fail in providing such services.  
In countries just starting to grapple with issues such as future pensions provision and the 
inability of the state to maintain current levels of provision (e.g. Germany, France, Finland) 
the idea that the state might fail or even go bankrupt was not anticipated but the start of 
anxiety about the state as provider was evident. 
 
“It depends on how the country is run.  It may be run badly, like Spain where we have a 
problem with pensions.” 
Spain/male/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
7.13.7 Advantages of country 2 
In evaluating Country 2 there was some initial confusion over the description in some groups.  
Many assumed that some form of safety net was implicit (perhaps suggesting that complete 
self-reliance is an anathema to many) and responded accordingly.   
 
The advantages of an individual model of society were principally the recognition of effort 
and reward for effort made.  The knock-on effects in society at large were mentioned by all 
groups – promoting enterprise, entrepreneurship, activity, creativity, enthusiasm, hard work, 
and so on.  In terms of public provision the advantage of this system was felt to be efficiency 
and competition leading to greater choice and ultimately improved standards of public 
provision (although some could see that a monopoly provider may well become more of an 
expert than disparate, independent providers might). 
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At a more societal level many, but not all, groups could recognise that the need for individuals 
to make provision for themselves might foster a more pro-active attitude towards society 
within the population as a whole – the need to evaluate choices and involve yourself in the 
system could actually be to the good and other avenues like involvement in charity work 
would grow (mentioned particularly in the UK). 
 
The minority who lean towards this system were all confident in their ability to prosper and 
play the system to maximum advantage to them (e.g. not paying for insurance in the certainty 
that they won’t need to call on the services – particularly the young). 
7.13.8 Disadvantages of country 2 
The disadvantages attached to Country 2 were significantly harsher than those attached to 
Country 1 – and for people repelled by this system these disadvantages were completely 
untenable.  The greatest disadvantage of a Country 2 system was the perpetuation of 
inequality.  It was felt that the richer and more able groups in society would prosper at the 
expense of the poorer and less able groups, accessing more and better services.  For many the 
effects on society would be profound – it places a value on wealth generation rather than 
intellectual or caring jobs and favours a particular set of (commercial) talents over others.  
The cycles of relative advantage and disadvantage set up through this would impact very 
quickly on life opportunities.  The ultimate result of this kind of society was felt to be social 
unease, crime, anxiety and worry – one that few within the groups would wish to live in.   
 
It was acknowledged that the system would be burdened by those who do not pay – either by 
design or by inability to take on this kind of responsibility.  The needs of those who are not up 
to the challenge of managing their own affairs or understanding the system (through illness, 
learning difficulties, lack of aptitude, the elderly, etc.) would need to be taken care of and 
under this system many would fall through the cracks in the system and suffer.  Allowing this 
perceived injustice was felt to signify a very uncaring society – going as far as being 
uncivilised for those countries and groups who supported a collective system most 
unequivocally.   
 
“It is not acceptable that the foolish live in poverty.  Not giving someone water in a desert 
is a crime”. 
Finland/male/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
“This is quite dangerous as there are lots of people out there who can’t manage their 
money at all.” 
Luxembourg/female/45-60/no children/further education, 
 
“I quite like the idea of Country 1, I don’t really mind paying taxes, if you’re getting 
something back in return – I think it’s the mark of a civilized government as well that we 
care for the weak and elderly and the poor and they definitely exist, there might be some 
people that are skivers and that is true but I do think we have to have something in place 
to look after the weaker ones of society.” 
UK/female/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
“We should help everyone who needs help irrespective of whether they are deserving or 
blaggers.”  
Denmark/male/45-60/children/standard education 
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“There’ll always be minorities like that in any country, and they may not all be foolish but 
just unlucky to lose their job or get a long-term illness, but whatever the reason, it is the 
government’s duty to help its fellow people.  After all some might be in such situations 
because the state failed to educate them to save so it’s partly to blame!” 
Greece/female/45-60/married/children/standard education 
 
These views extend to people who may have brought harm on themselves (over-eating, 
drinking, smoking) as very few individuals wanted to judge or condemn   
 
“We can’t draw the line like that, not if you are part of a community!” 
Finland/male/45-60./single/no children/further education 
 
Generally the majority felt that the foolish should be taken care of as well – based largely on 
the fear that it could happen to me.  However, those who have not made provision for 
themselves (i.e. are experiencing hardship through their own fault) or whose lifestyles have 
contributed to the hardship should receive a more basic level of support.  This is particularly 
true of opinion in Austria, Poland, Netherlands, Portugal and the UK. 
 
7.13.9 Preference for country 1 or country 2 
Overall the majority of the respondents involved in the study would prefer to live in country 
1.  Few, however, reason in black and white and for all but a few countries a mid-point 
appears most desirable and realistic.  Even groups that expressed a preference for country 1 
demonstrated a certain malaise or dissatisfaction with a nanny state – across many of the 
policy areas discussed.   
 
Clear differences emerged across countries in terms of the nature of the response to these two 
models – country differences appeared stronger than differences between demographics 
within any one country.  The key differences here hinge not only on the feeling that a 
collective model is morally right but in the belief in the viability and sustainability of this type 
of system.  These countries are those that are already felt to provide higher levels of social 
provision and which appear to have least disparity in terms of wealth, education, opportunity, 
etc – namely Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Netherlands and 
Belgium.  In these countries probably no more than 1 individual in any group leaned towards 
a Country 2 model, in terms of having more choice. 
 
“I can see that I would probably do better under Country 2, but other people in the 
population would struggle and so I would automatically choose to live in a country like 
country 1, not every one is going to cope.” 
Netherlands/female/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
“If my personal freedom means there will be poor people who don’t think they can afford 
to pay out for cover, that isn’t right either.” 
Austria/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
Respondents appeared able, however, to countenance the idea of living in a Country 2 type 
system (with appropriate safety nets in place) and acknowledged that, although unattractive, 
this type of system is inevitable in the future of all developed countries (moving towards an 
American model).  Countries in this group were Poland, Germany (with differences between 
old East and West), Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece – all countries facing up to a future of 
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pensions crises and overstretched social services, i.e. a general need for greater self-reliance.  
The failing state provision of services in countries like Portugal and Greece meant that group 
participants felt pragmatically pushed away from Country 1 by this situation although from a 
purely moral and ideal point of Country 1 would be preferred. 
 
A stronger leaning to Country 2 emerged among men and younger respondents.  One 
similarity of these groups is that many were quite financially secure (or said they were) and 
felt that they would be able to take care of themselves under this system and they would not 
be paying for other people in society.  These people were parents as well as non-parents.  
Many could identify that this is an attitude likely to be espoused by the young, and many 
older respondents felt that if they were young they would choose this path, but given their age 
and their needs in terms of provision of healthcare and pensions, etc, they could see that this 
system was no longer a real option for them.  (This view was not only pragmatic, there were 
many examples of these older people also saying that the wisdom of age and understanding 
what mattered in life also contributed to them actually favouring a collective system at this 
point.) 
 
“If I was younger I’d choose Country 2.  I was born in Country 1, I can’t 
change to Country 2 now, I’m 60.  You have to be realistic.” 
Germany/male/45-60/married/children/standard education 
 
“It’s great when you’re young but when the rust sets in and you start boiling oil that’s 
when the American system starts to hurt” 
Ireland/male/45-60/single/no children/further education, 
 
The UK and Ireland were countries in which the greatest number of individuals would choose 
the Country 2 model as a solution for me and mine above the future security of a collective 
model.   
 
“I don’t have a private pension, that’s because that’s not important to me right now.  I 
need to get money together to get a flat, that’s my main priority right now, so I can’t 
afford to put away.  Now when I’m 80 I may be kicking myself…” 
UK/female/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
It appears, from these groups, that the fact that the UK and Ireland are felt to be further down 
the path of self-reliance in this domain tends to make it a more acceptable reality – 
exacerbated by the perception in both countries that social provision (especially healthcare) 
through a taxation system is far from adequate. 
 
7.13.10 Altruism versus self interest 
In debating these questions there seemed to be a difference in approach, be it ever so nuanced.  
In the UK there appeared to be a correlation with right and left wing political views (which 
was more difficult to discern in other countries), and extremes of altruism and self-interest 
were evident in each of the groups.  However, the majority of people ended up in the same 
place – i.e.  wanting the greater good – but some appeared to get there through self-interest, in 
other words understanding my interest is best served by a collective position, and fortuitously 
so is society’s. 
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There was strong evidence that the majority across countries accept that they should pay for 
others.  Respondents were asked about paying for the education and healthcare of others, even 
if they do not use these services themselves. 
 
“I see the benefit for all – me paying for the education of others’ kids means 
when my mum gets sick, they will be paying for her.”  
Austria/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
“Maybe I won’t benefit from everything, but I’ll get some benefits...” 
Poland/female/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
Accepting that an individual should pay towards others’ education appears to have a strong 
moral element, in other words education is very broadly perceived as an inalienable right for 
all, creating equal opportunity and contributing to [a better] society – particularly in Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden, Luxembourg, Austria and France. 
 
The majority articulate that educating the younger generation is ultimately for the good and 
the prosperity of the country.  Some go further in identifying that an educated population 
affects them by impacting on society and with improved lifestyle due to reduced crime rates.   
 
In terms of healthcare, the majority were more emotive and tended to agree that it is right to 
pay for others’ healthcare more from a self-interest point of view – ‘it could happen to 
me/mine’. 
 
“Not everyone studies, but everyone becomes sick, it is a question of solidarity.” 
Portugal/male/45-60/married/children/standard education 
 
“It’s only fair to pay for those who have kids, as we might in turn contribute to other 
services we may not use/ need – imagine if they’re ill and I never am, I pay for them in a 
way, but that’s how it works!”  
Greece/female/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
7.13.11 Rights and Responsibilities 
Respondents were asked to spontaneously list rights/responsibilities.  Similar rights and 
responsibilities were commonly mentioned across countries and demographic groups.  A large 
number of other rights were listed.  The most frequently mentioned rights (in order of 
frequency) were: 
• Right to an education 
• Right to healthcare 
• Freedom of speech / thought 
• Freedom of choice 
• Right to vote/democracy 
• Right to basic level of income/ pension / social benefits 
• Justice/ civil rights/ right to protest 
• Right to work/not work 
• Personal safety/security 
• Housing 
• Freedom to practice religion 
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• Respect / dignity 
• Enough food and basic life needs 
• Right to free movement and travel 
• Equality 
• Right to life/die 
• Freedom of association/ membership of trade union or political party 
 
Many found it relatively easy to give examples of their rights but much more difficult to think 
of responsibilities: 
 
“There are loads of duties, even though I could not think of any now.” 
Finland/female/45-60/Children/standard education 
 
“When we talked about duties we rather came up with rights.” 
Austria/female/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
However, some groups in the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany and Poland found it easier to 
list responsibilities: 
 
“Well, we’re responsible for our own lives, we have a responsibility towards society and 
toward our families.  And then we have a responsibility to obey the law.  And towards our 
fellow humans.  And the responsibility is moral too, like keeping your promises and not 
demanding all the time”.   
Denmark/male/45-60/married/children/standard education 
 
In order of frequency, the duties spontaneously mentioned were:  
• To have public spirit, civil courage, show solidarity and contribute to society 
• To obey the law 
• Pay tax 
• Respect others 
• To look after your family especially children (and insure that they are educated) and 
the elderly 
• Behave responsibly 
• Respect environment 
• Look after your self 
• To vote 
• To work 
• Military service 
 
When challenged why they had produced a longer list of rights than responsibilities some 
groups suggested that this was just an artefact because the terms used for responsibilities were 
much more general: 
 
“Maybe if it was written in a different way it will be the same … because we wrote down 
respect .  For example, I wrote them in a different way: observance of laws, respect for 
people.” 
Italy/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
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Or actually if they spent time listing every law then the groups could have come up with far 
more responsibilities than rights: 
 
“If we are talking about the duties of the Austrian or of any person who is here- we have 
an incredible amount of duties because we have a huge amount of regulations, you only 
have to take a look at the law, but we are not going to name all these now.” 
Austria/male/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
A view was also expressed that you just get used to your responsibilities so you forget about 
them when asked to produce a list: 
 
“There are loads of duties, even though I could not think of any now.  I try to be a good 
citizen and do things according to the norms and laws.” 
Finland/female/45-60/standard education/children 
 
“We have a lot of responsibilities, but on the other hand we’re not always aware of them.  
I think that we have a bit of a tendency to sidestep responsibilities a bit, to maybe put the 
emphasis on our rights, ‘I have a right to this’ and so on.” 
France/female/45-60/single/noo children/further education 
 
7.13.12 Role of the Media 
Some blamed the media for the greater attention paid to rights rather than responsibilities: 
 
“I think duties and responsibilities are completely sidelined and now through education 
and the media we’re only hearing about our rights.” 
France/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
“I think the media focus on [rights] all the time.  You know if we think about what we read 
in the newspaper.  People are, oh ‘I’m fighting for this, I’m fighting for that’.” 
Ireland/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education  
 
“The rights as opposed to the responsibilities are a sexy story.”  
Ireland/male/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
7.13.13 Taxation in lieu of responsibility 
In almost all countries, especially focus groups of young men, the idea of paying tax off-set 
the majority of responsibilities.  In countries like Netherlands and Republic of Ireland there 
was much greater discussion around the idea of making a contribution to society by personal 
effort not just taxation.  Germany, Austria, Spain, France and the UK were most likely to talk 
of paying taxes as fulfilling any obligation towards society.  In Italy this was even stronger as 
paying taxes in a climate of evasion heightens their sense of entitlement. 
 
One Italian man did not believe that he had any responsibilities at all: 
 
“-  what are your rights? 
-  Education, health and national insurance, because I pay taxes.  I have no 
responsibilities.  I’ll explain to you why.  I live in a country where I pay taxes, expensive, 
don’t I? Therefore I already pay for having education, health and national insurance”. 
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Italy/male/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
Other members of his focus group pointed out to him that he has a duty to pay taxes.  
However, he drew a distinction between services that he had to pay for and those that he did 
not.  In the latter case, he conceded that there may be duties: 
 
“I pay for services I have, they aren’t free.  In that case, if they were free, I would have 
some responsibility.  If you give me a free service, I will have some responsibility.” 
Italy/male/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
Some group participants believed that the prevalent view that people discharged their social 
responsibilities through paying taxes could have negative consequences, if people no longer 
saw that they could make a personal difference: 
 
“You pass the responsibility on to someone else in many things, like the environment issue 
for example.  You think that you could not possibly make a difference because it is out of 
your hands.”  
Finland/female/20-30/ no children/Further education 
 
“I think that we don’t have enough responsibilities in a certain amount of situations … I 
only have to throw a piece of paper on the street and there comes a garbage van to pick it 
up.  I also don’t have to take any responsibility for my fellow citizens, because someone 
else will take care of them.  I don’t think that’s right either ...  I really miss personal 
responsibilities.” 
Netherlands/female/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
“We don’t emphasise the responsibilities that we have.  We tend to get caught up on “the 
government says this” and then we wait.  The citizen becomes like a child, waiting for the 
government to act.  Each citizen should take themselves in hand and start contributing 
ideas, but for that to happen we need creativity to be something which is recognised in the 
debates.  At the moment creativity is completely wasting away, we don’t use it, we’re not 
aware of it.  We clip children’s wings when they go to school and then when they leave 
school we tell them ‘right, now you can go and be creative’.  There’s a big gap.” 
France/female/45-60/single/no children/further education 
 
7.13.14 Responsibilities between generations 
A number of younger groups talked of not having many responsibilities as they have not fully 
entered society yet – these were individuals and often students, specifically in Luxembourg 
and Ireland.   
 
Young men with families, particularly in the UK, felt that their responsibilities extended to 
themselves and their families only. 
 
“I think that your only responsibility is as a person is to look after yourself and 
your family.” 
UK/male/20-30/married/children/further education 
 
However, responsibilities to young and older generations was also a theme in other countries: 
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“It’s also about our children.  Because children are our future.  We hear about our 
responsibilities towards the elderly.  Because they were sort of responsible for putting us 
where we are today.  And elderly people also have responsibilities… towards young 
people.  They have to look after us when we get old.  Where old people actually looked 
after us when we were kids, you know.” 
Denmark/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
7.13.15 Enforcing rights and responsibilities 
In France, most respondents (except women with children and no higher education) stressed 
the importance of the defence and fulfilment of their rights and showed themselves to be less 
aware of their responsibilities.  Similarly in Ireland, younger women talked about defending 
your rights as a responsibility.   
 
Polish groups also believed that it was difficult for them to enforce what rights that they had: 
 
“We have a lot of rights but they aren’t respected.” 
Poland/female/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
People may have responsibilities, but this does not always mean that they fulfil these duties.  
This view was particularly common in Italy: 
 
“- Italian people are moaners 
- And do you think, as citizens, that actually all these duties are fulfilled? 
-  No!” 
Italy/female 45-60/single/no children/standard education 
 
It was suggested that the perceived breakdown in society was in part because responsibilities 
were not enforced: 
 
“That’s why we’re in the state that we are today because too many people walk away 
from their responsibilities, there’s nothing to hold them to it.” 
UK/female/45-60/married/children/standard education 
 
People felt that there was a power imbalance with the State enforcing citizen responsibilities 
but not their rights. 
 
“- Do you feel that we have strict punishments when breaking the law, here in Greece? 
- If they concern the state yes, if they concern our rights no.  If someone hurts me he won’t 
be punished, but if I hurt the State I will have very strict fines.” 
Greece/female/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
“The question should be posed differently: ‘do you feel that they trample on your rights 
and that they put more responsibilities?’ I believe this would be a better question.  We live 
in a state that obliges you to do things” 
Greece/male/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
“I feel that I can not always make use of my rights, however I have to fully fulfil all 
duties”  
Germany/female/45-60/single/no children/further education. 
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Partly it was an issue of clarity, in that obligations were more clearly specified, e.g.  in law, 
compared to rights: 
 
“- I think that there are some rights, that we don’t know at all and they tell us about them 
only in some extreme situations for example advice of a lawyer in the social care. 
- And I wanted to say that knowing our rights is our duty, for example if you don’t know 
them in our country, then they take advantage of you. 
-  OK, so you complain all the time that you don’t know your rights and do you accept 
your duties? 
-  We don’t have choice, generally…” 
Poland/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
A young man in one of the Belgium groups said that he was prepared to take on 
responsibilities provided that they were discussable.  However, in general focus group 
participants felt that they were not consulted. 
 
7.13.16 The appropriate balance between rights and responsibilities 
An imbalance in favour of rights did not seem disconcerting to the groups, particularly in 
Austria, as they thought that having rights than responsibilities should be the norm in a liberal 
society: 
 
“In my opinion our rights are appropriate.  Probably we have more rights because we are 
a very liberal country.  This is why we have fewer duties, but still quite a lot of rights.” 
Germany/male/20-30/single/standard education 
 
“Imagine if you had a whole lot more duties than rights, then you’d quickly end up in the 
direction of dictatorship” 
Netherlands/male/45-60/single/no children/standard education 
 
Most groups recognised that it was human nature to want rights rather than responsibilities: 
 
“We want too much, but we give less” 
Italy/female 45-60/married/children/further education 
 
“We prefer to talk about the rights and not about that what we have to give to third 
persons.” 
Poland/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
“You like it more when you get something than when you have to give.” 
Belgium/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
In Poland in particular, there was also a view that citizens had too many duties compared to 
rights.  Although, with the transition from a Communist the balance was shifting: 
 
“We are changing our system to have more rights than obligations”. 
Poland/male/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
Some thought that it was appropriate to have more responsibilities than rights: 
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“That is how it always is in a solidarity community.  Fewer rights but more duties” 
Germany/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
In France it was felt that this state of affaires existed because people had abused their rights so 
much in the past 
 
“I think that this framework exists because people have abused their rights too, and that 
out of necessity, responsibilities are there to limit everyone, because in the past, rights 
weighed heavier in the balance.” 
France/male/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
In Belgium and Scandinavia, an ideal society was felt to constantly re-evaluate the role of 
state and society. 
 
There is some feeling that responsibilities are more oriented towards the personal or 
individual rather than society, with a loss of what is termed civic courage in Luxembourg, 
Netherlands and the rise of me or selfishness in Republic of Ireland. 
 
Responsibilities were not always seen as being bad: 
 
“There are pleasant and unpleasant duties.  Paying taxes is certainly not a pleasant thing 
but being a patriot is a very pleasant thing and nobody should be ashamed of that.” 
Poland/male/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
Indeed, some wanted more responsibilities: 
 
“Maybe there are too few duties and responsibilities.  They are not in balance in Finland.  
I am not convinced that it works if there are only a few responsibilities and a lot of 
rights.” 
Finland/male/20-30/children/standard education 
 
There was also a recognition that citizens should have responsibilities in order for society to 
function: 
 
“I think that every country or society needs a certain amount of duties in order to make 
sure that everything works out...” 
Austria/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
“- And if we didn’t have those limitations? If we were totally free? 
- I think it would be worse than the Wild West” 
Poland/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
7.13.17 The relationship between rights and responsibilities 
There was a realisation in many groups that rights come with responsibilities: 
 
“I think that to have rights you have to also take the responsibilities.” 
Luxembourg/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
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“I am afraid that people only think of their rights nowadays, and forget about the duties 
and responsibilities.  Rights and responsibilities go hand in hand, that is what I’ve been 
taught”.   
Finland/female/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
“But also they interact - what’s my right is his responsibility.  Or what’s my responsibility 
could be his right.”  
Ireland/male/45-60/married/children/standard education 
 
It was noted that it was important to act in the way that you would want others to behave 
towards you: 
 
“Once you’ve agreed on some rights and then you stick to them… well then it’s also your 
responsibility to apply them, both for you and for others.  And that means you’re 
responsible for making sure those rights are respected and that involves responsibility for 
particular things.”  
Denmark/female/20-30/single/no children/further education 
 
It was also recognised that when living in a community, personal freedoms may have to be 
constrained if there were consequences for others: 
 
“Everyone would like to have got freedom, but freedom will end when someone 
encroaches on other’s freedom” 
Italy/male/45-60/married/children/further education 
 
“We’re responsible that our freedoms don’t interfere with other people’s” 
Ireland/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education 
 
Some participants criticised those who wanted to isolate themselves from society and the 
associated duties as a citizen: 
 
“We have a duty to do something ourselves… I mean to help society along so that it can 
help us in return you know.  So you don’t just sit in a cave somewhere and say -‘I’ll look 
after myself thanks and I don’t want anyone else helping me’ - because people might want 
to do that sometimes.  So even if you don’t actually like other people, help them anyway.  
Making sure it all hangs together so you can get something back out of it yourself.”  
Denmark/male/20-30/married/children/standard education 
 
However, rather than fulfil responsibilities out of a sense of solidarity, it seemed as though 
many participants discussed rights and responsibilities in terms of a social contract.  If rights 
were not protected by the State and citizens did not get anything in return for upholding 
responsibilities, many people did not feel an obligation towards social duties. 
 
“- It may be a vicious circle, because he says ‘Why must I give anything if they offer me 
nothing?’ 
- You don’t give and they don’t offer, if you don’t give they won’t offer you.” 
Italy/female/20-30/single/no children/standard education/non-smokers 
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7.13.18 Discussion 
 
In a 1998 survey of adults in the UK334, aged 15 years and over, 50% of people surveyed said 
that they felt that they knew at least a fair amount about their rights as a citizen, compared to 
65% who said knew their responsibilities as citizens (Table 2).  Perceived knowledge about 
rights and responsibilities were lower among younger respondents to the survey (15-24 years 
old).335 Only 34% said that they knew at least a fair amount about their rights and 48% knew 
about their responsibilities as a citizen. 
 
Table 2: How much if anything do you feel you know about your rights and 
responsibilities as a citizen? 334 
 Your rights as a citizen Your responsibilities as a citizen 
 % % 
Great deal 6 14 
Fair amount 44 50 
Just a little 37 28 
Hardly anything at all 12 7 
Don’t know 1  
 
Virtually all people in the UK consider themselves to be a good citizen.334 On the whole they 
also consider other people living in Great Britain to be good citizens too (Table 3). 
Table 3: Do you consider yourself and Britons as a whole to be good or bad citizens? 334 
 Yourself Britons 
 % % 
Good citizen(s) 95 67 
Bad citizen(s)  7 
Both good and bad 4 24 
Don’t know/ no opinion 1 2 
 
UK Citizens in the MORI survey334 were also asked which out of a list of traits were most 
important to being classed as a good citizen (Table 4). 
 
The younger age group in the survey335 (15-24) felt the most important aspects of being a 
good citizen were respecting others (51%), looking after the environment (41%), obeying the 
law (40%), being a good parent (26%) setting a good example to others (23%), being a good 
neighbour (22%). 
 
A more recent MORI survey335 conducted among schoolchildren (aged 11-16) in England and 
Wales, found that children were even more likely to say that respecting others (87%) and 
obeying the law (72%) were characteristics of a god citizen.  The 11-16 year old children did 
not see the importance of good citizens voting at elections 6%), volunteering to do things 
(17%) and having a say it what goes on (19%). 
 
In the 1998 MORI survey, the 15-24 year olds seemed to want to interact with society on an 
individualist level.  They thought of citizenship in terms of how they should treat others and 
what they are entitled to.  When asked about their rights, treatment by the NHS came first 
(69%) followed by access to higher and further education (64%) and unemployment benefit 
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(60%).  Fewer put a premium on the right to vote or free assembly for peaceful meetings and 
demonstrations. 
 
Table 4: Which two or three of these do you feel are most important to being a good 
citizen? 334 
 % 
Respecting others 41 
Being a good parent 40 
Obeying the law 39 
Looking after the environment you live in 30 
Being a good neighbour 30 
Setting a good example to others 20 
Helping to reduce/preventing crime 15 
Knowing your responsibilities as a citizen 11 
Giving something back to your community/society 10 
Paying taxes 9 
Voting at elections 9 
Having a say in what goes on 8 
Improving your local area / community 6 
Challenging the law when you think it is wrong 6 
Being active in the community 4 
Knowing your rights as a citizen 4 
Volunteering to do things 4 
 
A considerable minority of 11-16 year olds335 (20%) felt it was not always wrong to burgle a 
house or steal from your family.  Only 64% felt it was always wrong to carry a knife and only 
50% felt that fare dodging was unacceptable. 
 
In the 1998 MORI survey335, only 65% of 18-24 year olds felt that they “belong strongly” to 
their local community, compared to 74% of people surveyed aged 25 and over. 
 
In another survey335 conducted in the UK by MORI in 2002 for the Commission for Racial 
Equality, only 1% of 16-24 year olds said that they felt a “great deal” involved in the local 
community, and 15% a “fair amount”,  compared to 5% and 26% respectively for all adults.  
Young people were also less likely to feel that there was a great deal or a fair amount of 
community spirit in their area, compared with older people surveyed. 
 
Many Focus Group participants paying tax in lieu of other social responsibilities.  While 
arguably the burden of moral responsibilities is similar on all citizens across Europe, the tax 
burden on an average citizen varies considerably between Member States (Table 5). 
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Table 5: Income Tax and Social Security contributions (2006) within EuroPHEN 
Member States336  
Country  
Income tax as % 
average wage for 
single person without 
children 
Employee social security 
contributions as % average 
wage for single person 
without children Total 
Austria  11.5 14 25.5 
Belgium  21.3 19.7 41 
Denmark  30.1 10.6 40.7 
Finland  19.3 5.5 24.8 
France  10.9 9.5 20.4 
Germany  17.5 18 35.5 
Greece  6.8 12.5 19.3 
Ireland  8.8 4.6 13.4 
Italy  13.9 7.0 20.9 
Luxembourg  12.3 12.3 24.6 
Netherlands  11.7 19.7 31.4 
Poland  5.3 21.4 26.7 
Portugal  8.2 8.9 17.1 
Spain  10.8 4.9 15.7 
Sweden  18.2 5.3 23.5 
United Kingdom  15.9 8.3 24.2 
 
 
A Eurobarometer survey conducted in autumn of 2003337 looked at EU citizen’s attitudes 
regarding citizenship and belonging.  Out of a possible 14 options EU citizens were asked to 
choose 3 that were the most important to them in terms of their lives.  On average across 
Europe, the most important aspect chosen was “the family” (82%).  This was especially the 
case in Portugal, Greece, Denmark and Spain.  Even in countries where this was a lower 
priority, it was still relatively high on the agenda, for example in the Netherlands (73%).  
Overall, health was the next highest chosen, followed by; “work, friendship, a partner, 
money, education, spare time”, and “religion”. 
 
Eurobarometer participants were also asked to list three values of most importance out of a 
possible list of 14 (Table 6).   
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Table 6: How EU citizens rank values from a personal perspective 
Rank Value High EU15 
average 
Low 
1 Peace 66% Germany,  
64% Italy 
60% 51% Netherlands,  
53% France 
2 Respect for 
human life 
55% Italy,  
54% Ireland 
46% 36% Sweden,  
38% Austria 
3 Human rights 57% Sweden,  
46% Luxembourg 
37% 26% Portugal,  
27% Denmark 
4 Individual 
freedom 
51% Austria, 
 44% Germany 
30% 19% Greece,  
20% Sweden 
5 Democracy 46% Sweden,  
43% Denmark 
25% 14% Finland,  
19% UK 
6 Tolerance 31% Netherlands, 
28% France 
19% 0% Greece,  
9% Italy 
7 Equality 26% Portugal,  
24% Spain 
16% 8% Germany,  
14% Luxembourg 
8 Rule of law 33% Finland,  
28% UK 
15% 7% France, 8% 
Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands 
9 Self-fulfilment 21% Ireland,  
19% France 
14% 1% Denmark,  
7% Italy 
10 Solidarity, 
support for 
others 
24% Portugal,  
23% France 
13% 5% Ireland,  
6% UK 
11 Respect for 
other cultures 
24% 
Luxembourg, 
10% Italy 
8% 4% Finland, Austria 
12 Religion 30% Greece,  
13% Portugal 
7% 3% France, Sweden, 
Luxembourg 
13 Don’t know 4% Luxembourg, 
3% Austria 
1% 0% Netherlands, 
Greece 
14 None of these 2% Austria,  
1% Germany 
0% 0% Finland, Greece 
 
The European Social Survey338 (the ESS) is a social survey designed to chart and explain the 
interaction between Europe's changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour 
patterns of its diverse populations.  The survey covers 25 European countries, and is a data 
resource for researchers to conduct further analysis.  As part of EuroPHEN (see appendix 3) 
the ESS dataset was analysed (using SPSS 12.0.2 for windows) to examine questions within 
the questionnaire relating to various attitudes and behaviour relating to rights and 
responsibilities of a citizen.   
 
Most respondents thought that citizens should spend some free time helping others.  However, 
there were significant differences between countries.  For example, respondents in Portugal 
(88.4%), Ireland (88.4%), Spain (84.9%) and Greece (84.1%) were significantly more likely 
to strongly agree or agree with the statement than people surveyed in Netherlands (53.6%), 
Denmark (61.2%), Finland (63.6%) and Belgium (64.7%). 
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Conversely when ESS respondents were asked if “society would be better off if everyone 
looked after themselves” the French and the Belgians were most likely to agree 
strongly/agree.  The Swedes were most likely to strongly disagree with that statement. 
 
On the whole, ESS respondents thought that many people try to be fair, but only a few 
thought that most people in society try to be fair.  In fact a minority of respondents said that 
most people tried to take advantage of them.  Belief that most people tried to be fair was 
significantly higher in Denmark compared to other European countries.  Within the 
EuroPHEN countries, a belief that people try to take advantage of each other was highest in 
Greece and Poland. 
 
Similarly when asked about whether people could be trusted, The Danes were far more likely 
to say that most people could be trusted.  The Poles and the Greeks were most likely to say 
that “you can’t be too careful”. 
 
ESS respondents in Poland and Greece were also most likely to think that “people mostly look 
out for themselves”.  The Irish were most likely to say that “people mostly try to be helpful”.  
As with other question about trust, respondents were most likely to choose answers which 
indicated that most of the time citizens tend to neither try to be helpful nor just look out for 
themselves. 
 
Within the EuroPHEN countries, when asked “if you want to make money, you can’t always 
act honestly” the Greeks were most likely to agree and condone dishonesty.  Belief in the 
reward of honesty was highest in Portugal, Denmark and Netherlands. 
 
The French, Finns, Greeks and Portuguese were most likely to say that “you should always 
obey the law even if it mean missing good opportunities”.  The Belgians and the Dutch were 
most likely to think that it was not always necessary to obey the law in order to get a good 
opportunity.  Similarly when asked if it was “occasionally alright to ignore law and do what 
you want” the Belgians and the Dutch were most likely to agree strongly/agree. 
 
Not cheating on taxes was seen as most important in Finland, Denmark and France.  Once 
again, the Belgians were most likely to think it acceptable for citizens to cheat on taxes. 
 
Women and older people were more likely to think that fellow citizens could be trusted, and 
that most people try to be fair and helpful.  Women and older people were also more likely to 
think it important to obey the law, not cheat on taxes and to spend time helping others.   
 
Throughout the countries surveyed there was usual a juxtaposition of both right and left wing 
political conceptions of citizenship and rights and responsibilities.   
 
The right-wing interpretation suggests that there are fundamentally two types of citizens.  
Firstly, there are those who are willing to take responsibility for their lives, by working hard 
or gaining high qualifications and getting good job, paying taxes and being a burden to no-
one.  These are called “active citizens” by Keith Faulks.339 Secondly, there are “passive 
citizens” who (it is assumed) deliberately do not take responsibility by working hard and 
contributing to society through taxes and instead take advantage of state welfare systems, thus 
being a burden on other citizens.  Usually those who argue this line of thought usually 
consider themselves to be the active citizens as well as other people that they know and that 
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others (usually outside their circle of acquaintances because they do not know any specific 
examples) are the passive citizens that cause all the problems in society by not taking 
responsibility but demanding their social rights.  This is consistent, as Faulks says, with the 
logic of liberalism, which refuses to accept structural explanations for social problems and 
therefore condemns individuals for their own failings.   
 
However people are not consistent in their stance and will change their tack, usually 
depending on their personal understanding/ prejudices of a particular situation.  For example 
any sort of help for the elderly or children by the State is usually applauded, whereas helping 
people out of poverty who have got there by their own fault is not seen as morally justifiable.  
It is possible that politics on a national and international level also informs and influences 
citizen’s understanding and opinions.   
 
In the UK over the last 25 years of the Thatcher and Blair governments there has been a 
profound change in social attitudes and the perceptions of what a citizen is and their rights 
and responsibilities in relation to the State.   
 
The Thatcherite governments tired to change the meaning of citizenship by defining the 
relationship between the state as guarantor of rights and the citizen as a recipient of those 
rights.  Thus in the MORI survey conducted in the UK, but also in many of the EuroPHEN 
focus groups in other countries too, people talked about rights as something you get from the 
government as a consequence of paying taxes not something you get as just being a citizen.  
Within this right wing conception of rights and responsibilities, you had to be an active 
citizen, that is responsible for your own actions, yet at the same time be possessed of a sense 
of civic virtue, thereby the rigours of the market economy would be civilised by one’s 
concern for local community and the country in general.  It was felt that active citizens shared 
the same values and understood the need for reciprocal obligations and loyalties with very 
little need for the state.  This allowed the State to be thinned-down, as it was seen by Thatcher 
and other neo-liberalists as intrusive, inefficient, and a break on the market economy that 
would bring prosperity to all.  By bringing in service and market elements into public 
services, right wing governments across Europe during the 1980s succeeded in de-politicizing 
the government-citizen relationship: “if your grandmother could not get a hip operation it 
was the hospital’s fault, not the politician you had elected to office”. 
 
As Faulks339 summarises: “The Thatcherite years were marked by an approach to citizenship 
which attempted to reduce the universality of social rights, while at the same time expecting a 
universal sense of obligations.” 
 
From the right wing perspective, the problems of society were summarised as: 
• Individual moral failure because of the overbearing nanny state 
• The permissive society allowing people to rescind all personal responsibility and place it 
back with the state. 
These perspectives were commonly presented within the EuroPHEN dataset. 
 
The neo-liberalism of the Conservative and Christian Democrat years is of course not 
classical liberalism because it negates the egalitarian nature of the liberal ideal.  The centre-
left politics of Social Democrat parties of Europe that have dominated since the 1990s could 
be said to be more egalitarian, but still have market forces as a priority over the collectivist 
state. 
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There are many pressures in modern western society that are undermining the effectiveness of 
democracy and weakening traditional concepts of citizenship, a decline in the sense of 
community and solidarity among the public340, growing cynicism with politics and 
disaffection with political institutions341 342 a decline in institutions which underpin civil 
society and democracy such as political parties343 long term decline in electoral turnout in 
most mature democracies.344 
 
State welfare systems are under unprecedented stress in all EU Member States.  This is 
because of growing ageing populations and shrinking working populations paying into the 
pot, as well as growing demand for support from various groups.  This has been described as 
a “Fiscal crisis of the state”345; that is increasing demands for spending on health, transport, 
education and pensions against declining ability of the state to deliver in the face of an 
increasing tax burden and therefore a tax-resistant electorate. 
 
At the heart of welfare policy is a social contract binding citizens to each other both 
contemporaneously and across the generations.  This contract involves a willingness of 
some individuals and groups to make sacrifices in order to support others.  If citizenship 
is weak then this social contract will also be weak and governments will not be able to 
deliver on their promises.  346 
 
The growing burden of taxation limits the extension or creation of social rights.  In fact it 
could be argued that there has been a deterioration of social rights within Europe as well as 
welfare rights.  Pattie346 makes reference to Fraser and Gordon’s347commentary on social 
citizenship in the Untied States where there is a strong tradition of civil rights.  An emphasis 
on individual rights and sanctity of contracts has inhibited the development of social rights, so 
that even low wage earners have an anti-welfare mentality. 
 
The widespread fear that ‘welfare’ recipients are ‘getting something for nothing’ is an 
understandably embittered response from those who work hard and get little; their own 
paltry remuneration becomes their norm and they see themselves cheated by welfare 
clients rather than by their employers.347 
 
However, Pattie argues that rights are only part of the story as rights cannot be divorced form 
responsibilities and obligations, because as he points out, referring to the ancient Greek 
conception of citizenship: To a significant extent one person’s rights are another person’s 
obligations. 
 
Pattie goes onto suggest a modern definition of citizenship: A set of norms, values, and 
practices designed to solve collective action problems which involve the recognition by 
individuals that they have rights and obligations to each other if they wish to solve their 
problems. 
 
Pattie argues that the main goal of citizenship and therefore the State is common security.  
The goal of common security point out the fundamental dilemma of democratic citizenship; 
common security is defined by jointness of supply and impossibility of exclusion, as such 
there is always temptation not to contribute as your goal will always be met whether you 
contribute or not.  Of course if everyone free-rides then there will be no security.  This refers 
to game theory as portrayed in the prisoner’s dilemma. 
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Pattie quotes Axelrods348 349 solution to the problem: 
 
1. Individuals should not be short-sighted in their desire for payoffs.  If people want 
instant gratification and are not prepared to wait for benefits to emerge then they are 
unlikely to cooperate and once again security will not be provided. 
2. The game should be a repeat game, that is played many times over, illustrating the 
point that cooperation needs to be based on frequent interaction between actors.  It 
may be rational to rob a stranger whom you will never meet again, but not to rob your 
neighbour whom you will expect to meet again quite often. 
3. Individuals should be uncertain when the game will end – if they are not then the 
incentives to cooperate collapse. 
4. Individuals should be able to sanction non-cooperative behaviour by punishing those 
who attempt to free-ride. 
 
Although, Pattie points out that the solution in the real world is often that cooperation is often 
enforced by state action, but then this assumes that the state will always provide the collective 
good. 
 
Growth in Immigration and multiculturalism also has an impact on citizenship as populations 
in the industrialised world become less and less homogenous.  In recent history the majority 
of people within a nation shared a common cultural identity and those that did not were 
generally ignored.  Now as culturally distinct immigrant populations are asserting themselves 
and being taken notice of in terms of policy to varying degrees it is arguably much harder to 
engineer a social contract, when the nation no longer consists of a heterogeneous cultural 
majority. 
 
The ability of  a nation state to implement a social contract is also undermined by power 
being taken away from the state the increasing influence of global corporations, the 
consolidation of legislative power in supra-national bodies such as the EU.  Also movements 
towards regional government, e.g.  devolution in the UK, Flemish autonomy in Belgium, 
Catalan autonomy in Spain, Basque autonomy in France and Spain or Northern regional 
autonomy in Italy undermine the social cohesion that makes it easier to effect a social contract 
between citizen and the state. 
 
The current poor state of the relationship between government and citizen has profound 
implications for those involved in public health and public health policy.  In order for public 
health policy to be effective there has to be a dialogue with the public affected by it.  The 
ability to have this discourse is limited by two main issues.  Firstly the distancing by many 
governments from their political responsibility for services provided by state institutions by 
turning them into agencies, has radically changed the public’s perception of these services.  
As politicians are seen as increasingly irrelevant, it is impossible for them to implement 
public health policy when they are seen as so distant from the very services they are trying to 
change/improve.  Secondly appeals to people’s civic duty to engage with government health 
promotion strategies, may have little impact when the very notion of citizenship is in such 
flux.  Growth in multiculturalism and immigration, increasing influence of multinational 
corporations and supra-national organisations such as the European Union, movements 
towards devolution within the regions and therefore traditional citizenship, which relies on a 
sense of belonging to a nation, is undermined. 
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8 Understanding public attitudes to private interest / 
public interest tradeoffs –commentary on the Focus 
Group findings 
8.1 Paying taxes - safety nets for the unlucky, the foolish, and the 
selfish 
 
The most heated discussions between those devoted to the liberal tradition in some of its 
forms have always centred on to what extent the state can limit our freedom in order to avoid 
harm to others either by action or omission.  In the Lockean spirit many are willing to argue 
that civil government should be based on the rights of individual human beings to protect 
their life, liberty and private property, the only inviolable moral law being that individuals are 
not allowed to interfere with the liberty of others if the liberty in question can be enjoyed by 
all.   
 
Unfortunately those who stress the value of economic liberty and who speak for hands off 
policies often fail to see that the protection of so-called negative rights which they consider to 
be clear and simple is far from being so.  It has been asked350 what these negative rights are, 
how can we recognize and define them and whether they possibly consist of only one such 
right, namely the right to liberty.  And if negative rights should be reduced to a single right to 
liberty, are we able to define that liberty? The question arises when different liberties collide.  
A Nozickian kind of minimal state theory is particularly vulnerable to this criticism since he 
emphasizes, much more than his predecessors, the value of non-economic liberties.351 
 
But is it really possible that personal freedom finds its finest forms and expressions in a 
society where you can rely only on yourself in the provision of necessary means for life? 
What about the personal freedom and autonomy of those who, unlucky already at birth, are 
provided only with the barest means of survival? Economic liberty, if fiercely protected by 
the state, may create conditions where the only freedom left to some is to become 
marginalized and to choose between undesirable options.  Lack of education guarantees in 
most cases a menial job, and lack of access to proper health care burdens life with 
unnecessary ailments and suffering.  Although we cannot mechanically provide people with 
love and friendship, we can try give them access to commodities most of us value as 
necessary means for a decent life.  Therefore,  the classical Ayn Randian question why should 
I suffer for the bad luck of others, could – and I think should – be replaced with the question 
why should the unlucky ones suffer if we can help them without suffering ourselves? The 
presumption is that paying taxes cannot be seen as suffering by any right-minded person  Or 
are we ready to say that having to contribute to the well-being of others – or at least to the 
alleviation of potential ills - harms us to the point that traditional welfare state ideals of 
equality in need satisfaction should be simply abandoned? Can we truly value liberty if, at the 
same time, we are not prepared to adopt a single positive duty towards others? It is not 
enough simply to smugly remind those who demand help from others that many character 
traits, including apparent lack of self-sufficiency and lack of initiative to improve one’s lot, 
are not necessarily self-chosen.   
 
During the past years this traditional dispute libertarians against welfare liberalists has 
reached new dimensions with the increasing popularity of conservative thinking.  The 
question isn’t merely whether to pay taxes to provide the less well-off with public services, 
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but rather whether publicly funded services should be restricted to cases where the needs are 
genuine in the sense that they are not self-inflicted, due to one’s choices in life-style.  The 
underlying (conservative) idea is that since some people seem to make wrong, irrational life-
style and other choices, which could have been avoided, they should bear the consequences 
themselves instead of demanding that others should shoulder the expenses when things go 
wrong.  These wrong choices may be wrong because they are seen as bad in the sense that 
they are made by bad, immoral people or they may supposedly be wrong choices made by not 
necessarily bad people as such, but ignorant and thoughtless egoists who burden the rest of 
the society through their lack on consideration.  Obviously and at least according to John 
Kekes, in case the of the afore-mentioned bad people, it wouldn’t even be necessary to bar 
them from the use scarce resources because the harm in question seems to be self-inflicted, 
but because in general they happen to be bad people.  As he puts it: “How could it be 
maintained that good and wicked people should be given the same amount of scarce 
resources? How could a system that is designed to ignore what people deserve be a system of 
justice?”352  
 
Kekes´s presupposition seems to be that fair distribution of public services means that needs 
cannot be taken to be the only criterion for equal access, but instead individual merits and 
deserts should be decisive.  What remains unclear is whether the “wicked” should be 
excluded because resources are scarce or because, in the case of abundance, bad people 
shouldn’t be rewarded by others.  If and when we choose the former interpretation, this kind 
of selection procedure is far from unproblematic.  Firstly, in a pluralist, democratic society it 
would be difficult to reach a consensus on where the boundaries of wickedness lie.  There 
might be some people most of us would with some ease call bad and some others good – at 
least till our knowing turns out to be sheer prejudice.  Secondly, is it totally incomprehensible 
to claim that at least certain needs are such that common decency commands us to satisfy 
them, simply because of our shared humanity.   
 
Most conservatives, including John Kekes, seem to think that all human needs and their 
satisfaction should be on one’s own responsibility, at least if and when the person in need is 
not one of the good people.  However, their way of seeing public services as rewards blinds 
them to the basic reasons and motives of those welfare liberalists who believe in need-based 
distributive justice.  This misconception is detectable in the following quotation: 
 
“The assumption is that people are naturally good, and if they are not subject to unjust 
social arrangements, then they will live good rather than evil lives.  The assumption is the 
liberal faith.  It is from it that it follows that those who are worst off must have been 
unjustly treated; …; that the distribution of resources should ignore moral merit because 
everybody would have moral merit if there were no injustice;…on a fundamental level 
everybody is equally deserving.”353  
 
Kekes fails to see that people’s moral worth shouldn’t enter the picture at all if and when the 
original idea and decisive factor for helping others is their need for help and our ability to 
provide it.  Most people want to live good lives and that is what a more or less ideal welfare 
state aims at, namely to provide its citizens with basic components for what they conceive to 
be a good life.   
 
In what follows, the intention is to show that even though many people find demands for 
personal responsibility and moral worthiness intuitively appealing, they would lead to serious 
inequality among citizens.  This would be the case not only in monetary terms but also in the 
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kind of life-style choices people are able to make because of their luck or misfortune since 
social background, genetic inheritance and the growth environment undeniably affect not only 
one’s health but one’s choices as well.  Additionally, if the distinction self-inflicted / not self-
inflicted or good versus bad behaviour were to be applied as criteria for distributive justice, 
we would end up with costly and bizarre practices.  What would be the financial cost of all 
the detective work needed in order to discover  whether somebody’s need for help is self-
inflicted by foolish behaviour or  whether the allegedly foolish behaviour was voluntarily and 
autonomously chosen instead of being due to inherited and therefore not self-chosen stupidity.  
Or should we just leave it to the doctors who then decide according to their own impressions, 
prejudices and values?  
 
We should keep in mind that if we are not ready to renounce our democratic ideals, a 
pluralistic and basically egalitarian society would be in difficulties deciding exactly whose 
views on foolish behaviour, unfounded and silly metaphysical beliefs or lack of understanding 
should form a basis strong enough to justify totalitarian strategies for distinguishing  innocent, 
responsible citizens from  reckless ones.  Curiously enough, public debates clearly show that 
most of those people who want to draw a line between guilty and innocent behaviour, tend to 
focus only on certain types of self-inflicted harms, such as smoking, drinking and having sex 
– all activities traditionally associated with sinning, which even  believers are usually willing 
to leave to the judgement of heaven. 
 
8.1.1 Foolish behaviour – according to whom? 
Should we be allowed to act foolishly? If foolish is given its lexical definition, then foolish 
behaviour means the person in question lacks a good sense of judgement, is silly and unwise.  
Therefore we might say that in many cases acting foolishly might also mean not acting 
prudentially, engaging in activities that may cause even serious harm - depending on the 
circumstances and whether a person is lucky or not.  Foolish behaviour doesn’t necessarily 
lead to any serious harm.  It may have no consequences whatsoever.  Walking against red 
lights may be sheer lunacy in heavy traffic but when there are absolutely no cars in sight and 
therefore little risk of being hit by one, it may feel a bit silly in waiting for the lights to 
change.  And happily indulging oneself in seafood and other cholesterol-rich food may be 
foolish or even seriously harmful for those at high risk, while others do not even have to think 
about such matters. 
 
In the Western tradition it would be difficult to show why acting foolishly could or should be 
forbidden if individual autonomy, in the Millean sense,  is taken seriously and if we are not 
ready to adopt perfectionist policies where either some individuals or the majority vote are 
given authority over others’ self-regarding choices and values.  In fact, most of those who 
prefer one or other form of liberalism to strong paternalism and moralism354, are actually not 
saying they would want to legally ban all potentially self-harming behaviour.  Rather, what 
they have in mind is that if people make foolish choices they should suffer the consequences 
and realise that the possible loss of life or limb simply just serves them right.  Because of their 
foolishness, even recklessness, they do not deserve to have their suffering alleviated by 
measures financed by taxpayers’ money. 
 
This line of thought, however, is far from unproblematic.  Why would it be of any importance 
how people have got their illnesses or injuries? If the basic principle behind welfare state 
policies is need satisfaction (avoidable death, curable illness or injury), it shouldn’t matter 
how it came about, unless we want to reformulate this policy by saying that the idea behind 
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the welfare state should indeed be need satisfaction but only in cases where the need hasn’t 
been self-inflicted.  But were this reformulation adopted, it should be logistically and 
consistently applied to all services provided by the state no matter what the activities in 
question are, without making suspect ad hoc distinctions between acceptable and 
unacceptable risky behaviour.  For some reason many people seem to be more than happy to 
classify certain choices as morally suspect and to include them among self-inflicted cases 
while considering some equally risky choices as perfectly valid.  Division into morally 
suspect self-inflicted habit or practices and morally acceptable ones runs into the same 
difficulties as John Kekes’s dichotomy “good people vs.  bad, wicked people”. 
 
8.1.2 Not only foolish but bad as well 
If all potentially self-harming activities were given equal weight so that people would be held 
responsible for their choices we would be living in a society where, for instance, the 
following scenarios could take place in cases were agents couldn’t afford private services: 
 
1. A is working hard to make ends meet.  His doctor has warned him about endangering 
his health.  A gets an ulcer.  Since he didn’t listen to his doctor, he will not be treated.   
2. B went skiing and broke her leg.  Since she knew this might happen, she will not be 
treated. 
3. C and D were foolhardy and went sailing even though they were warned about stormy 
winds.  Now they are missing and costly rescue teams are not sent to find them. 
4. Against her doctors warnings E is pregnant again and knows that if there are serious 
complications, she will not be treated and she may well die.   
5. F suffers from cerebral malaria.  He will not be treated since he explicitly refused the 
use of prophylactics. 
 
In all these cases people know that they run a risk of harming themselves but nonetheless they 
proceed with their original choices and plans.  Now, someone might argue that even though 
what happens to these people is in a sense self-inflicted, these cases should be cared for since 
the activities in themselves are neutral or good innocent activities as such.  Working hard is a 
Western virtue, skiing and sports are good for you, weather forecasts are known to be wrong, 
some religions do not approve of contraception, and people’s fears about modern 
pharmacology should be respected.  The advocate could continue by saying that people 
should be held responsible if the self-inflicted harms are caused by dangerous life-styles or 
reckless behaviour, which should be seen as morally suspect as such.  Usually the hidden 
reason seems to be that such actions or life-styles are chosen in order to pursue of hedonistic 
pleasures.  And, traditionally of course, hedonism is condemnable. 
 
Now, would it be possible to find justifications for these additional distinctions? People 
shouldn’t be assisted in their needs if the need in question is self-inflicted and foolish in the 
sense that either the activity in question is morally wrong as such, or it is wrong because it 
allegedly causes hedonistic pleasure.  Would this distinction make it easy to justify helping 
the needy in these examples?  
 
In example 1, A has been warned about the health risk he is taking with overwork.  Working 
hard in order to make ends meet is not usually considered to be foolish or immoral.  We might 
even say that financial hardship forces A to endanger his health, and therefore the ulcer he 
gets should in fact not be seen as a self-inflicted illness.  But what if his financial hardship is 
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due to heavy gambling or an extravagant appetite for caviar and champagne beyond A’s 
means? Would and should this information change the ruling? 
 
Skiing is considered to be a healthy activity and especially suitable for women.  As a 
physically demanding exercise it decreases the risk of frail bones caused by osteoporosis – 
nothing strange or foolish about that.  But what if the injured skier B rejected the health value 
of cross-country skiing and instead opted for downhill and chose a slope meant for 
professionals, just in order to feel the thrill? For C and D going sailing in rough weather was a 
risky decision and luckily – in this example at least – we know that they knew about the risks 
and a lot of tax money was saved as because no rescue team was needed.  Or then again, 
should they be saved after all since sailing is considered to be a civilised activity? But what if 
instead of C and D we had C2 and D2, who were rescued and we find out that not only did 
they know about the risk, but they also decided to sail while drunk, both of them bragging to 
their sailing pals that they are not cowards to be frightened off by a little storm?  Should they 
reimburse the costs? 
 
What about case E then? Most people would willingly admit that children give pleasure and 
most people do want to procreate.  Does this make treatment acceptable? What if the woman 
in question didn’t necessarily want any more children but couldn’t avoid it since in her belief, 
God disapproves of contraception.  Should we trust her life to her Saviour?  
 
In order to make additional distinctions justifiable, one would have to show why some 
activities are morally suspect as such (not because they might be harmful to other people), 
have harmful consequences for oneself, why people shouldn’t be helped if the harm they 
suffer may be self-inflicted and why hedonistic risky activities are worse than other risky 
behaviour.  This might be a bit tricky because things are not always what they seem to be.   
 
What if the hardworking man actually enjoys working hard? How do we know that the 
scientist who risks his health in the tropics isn’t really enjoying himself hugely studying 
snakes, collecting butterflies and admiring the local ladies? Is the obsessive runner just 
keeping herself fit or actually doing it for endorphins? Is there really some meaningful 
difference between sports, drinking, smoking or stuffing oneself with cholesterol-rich and 
fattening food? If we are ready to say that people shouldn’t be treated or saved or helped if 
they have knowingly endangered their lives then we cannot apply it just to smoking or 
drinking or other hedonistic pleasures unless we can somehow show that these practices are 
immoral and therefore should be both morally and legally banned altogether.  At least people 
who indulge in them shouldn’t be cared for if they get ill whether they go private or not. 
 
The introduction of a Devlinian kind of a view on “immorality as such” into health care has 
at least two major flaws.  Firstly, if people shouldn’t be treated because of the immorality of 
their behaviour, because of the moral wrongness of it, then they should never be treated, not 
even when they could pay for it themselves.  (Private hospitals might have difficulties in 
accepting this policy.) If it were to be applied only to those who need public health care then 
the general message would be that we have nothing against immorality if people can afford 
the consequences, moral acceptability being relative to one’s financial status.  To a proponent 
of the welfare state and equity this would be an absurd idea.  On the other hand, for a 
conservative like John Kekes, this is exactly how things should be.  In his book Against 
Liberalism he writes the following: 
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“The liberal intuition is that justice requires the recognition of the equal rights of human 
beings to the resources they need for living autonomously.  The contrary intuition is that 
justice makes the right to such resources contingent on what their recipients deserve.  The 
liberal intuition is motivated by the egalitarian belief that at a fundamental level all 
human beings have equal worth.  The contrary intuition is motivated by the anti-
egalitarian belief that the worth of human beings varies with their moral merits.”355 
 
A year later, in his book A Case for Conservatism, he rephrases his anti-liberal views:  
 
“Why should one think that when such basic benefits as security, health care, decent jobs 
or pleasant housing are scarce, then all people, regardless of their moral merits and 
demerits should get the same share of them? And why should malefactors, criminals and 
wicked people be as undeserving of the harms that they have merited by their way of life 
as those who have lived and acted decently?”356 
 
But how does one create a ranking list? Who is to judge who is wicked enough not to deserve 
help? Is proper health care really to be seen as a reward for decent behaviour? Are doctors and 
nurses to become judges of wickedness? Unfortunately Kekes doesn’t give us any criteria for 
telling the good and bad apart. 
 
If the state’s role were to be confined to taking care of the innocent, it would lead to rather 
extraordinary situations.  In order to get public defence, the poor defendant should first go to 
court where it would be decided whether she is guilty or not guilty in order to know whether 
she deserves legal aid for her trial where it would be established whether she is guilty or not 
guilty. 
 
If these innocent – guilty distinctions were to be applied to all possibly self-inflicted cases 
where we have reason to believe that one’s distress may be self-inflicted, at least something 
resembling truth commissions should be immediately organised in order to find out whether 
people knew what they were doing.  Since people are known to be less than honest when they 
have their own good at stake, this might turn out to be a long and difficult process.  And of 
course, as in life in general, there would always be those individuals lucky enough not to need 
any public services no matter how foolishly they conducted their lives. 
 
8.1.3 Selfishness – in what? 
In this context selfishness cannot refer to one’s reluctance to depart from one’s money but 
instead the reasonable interpretation would be that the selfish ones are those who endanger 
their health without thinking about the other poor taxpayers.  The underlying idea being that 
we have a duty not to cause expense to others.  Up to a point it is a reasonable demand not to 
burden others in vain, but foolish behaviour is not a sufficient excuse for non-treatment.  If 
this duty or command were to be taken seriously then it might also be our duty to avoid an 
extensive retirement period, not to mention the other costly risks involved in longevity.  The 
model citizen would wish to have a heart attack the day he retires, thus maximizing his 
productiveness and minimizing the costs to society. 
 
Is it reasonable to demand that people should avoid all risky behaviour because it could be 
seen as a form of unacceptable selfishness? Should we not be allowed to travel in exotic 
countries for fun because we might catch a costly disease? Should we instead reward those 
individuals who stay at home, away from harm’s way and who claim to sacrifice their 
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eagerness to travel for the common good? Are they in reality just too lazy or frightened to 
leave their sofas and TVs? As long as we are willing to think that society should serve us and 
not vice versa, it would be difficult to convince people that one of their major duties is to live 
as cost efficiently as possible, avoiding pleasures some members of society might disapprove 
of. 
 
If the concept and existence of public health care is accepted in general, then the only possible 
criterion for being treated is the patient’s expected benefit from the treatment.  All-
encompassing access to health care can guarantee that even the selfish who are foolish enough 
to mistakenly believe in their eternal good luck get treated. 
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8.2 Self interested altruism 
 
Increasingly autonomy is the dominant concept underpinning the codes of conduct for health 
professionals.  Autonomy (self rule) is the capacity to think, decide, and act on the basis of 
such thought and decision freely and independently without hindrance.  Autonomy is a more 
complex concept than purely respect for an individual’s desires.  For example Dworkin357 has 
suggested that autonomy is conceived of as a second-order capacity of persons to reflect upon 
their first-order preferences.  Thus an individual may have a first order preference to smoke 
cigarettes but have be higher-order preferences to remain healthy with a long life expectancy 
and hence have a second order preference for policies that assist smoking cessation. 
 
Onora O’Neill358 has suggested that a plausible reason for the triumph of autonomy is that 
there is “one presently prize domain of life in which informed consent requirements are often 
seen not only as necessary but also as sufficient  for ethics justification” namely consumer 
choice.  The shift towards describing patients as consumers of health care has meant that are 
attributes of the market have also been adopted.  However, in addition to more cost-effective 
practices for the provision of health care, the market philosophy has also led to other 
consumerist thinking, with health care being seen as a transaction covered by a contract, 
rather than a social good aimed at improving health to facilitate social flourishing.   
 
The balancing of rights and duties has been enshrined in the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (article 29) which indicated that the exercise of a person's rights 
and freedoms may be restricted for the purpose of meeting the “just requirements of morality, 
public order and general welfare in a democratic society.” Similarly, article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights states that a public authority may interfere with the 
exercise of personal autonomy right if it is in “the interests of national security, public safety 
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health and morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.  
Thus, social control over an individual's reproductive autonomy may be legitimate if it is 
necessary to prevent harm to other individuals.  As John Stuart Mill argued in his essay “On 
Liberty,” freedom means “doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: 
without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them" 
nor "attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.”359   
 
Beauchamp and Childress recognised that as with all moral principles, the principle of 
autonomy “has only prima facie standing" and that if choices endanger the public health "it 
may be justifiable to restrict exercises of autonomy severely”.360 The justification being 
competing moral principles such as beneficence or justice.  However, this approach to 
bioethics analysis based on principles advocated by Beauchamp and Childress, among many 
others, has become an unequal battle, was an almost unrivalled pre-eminence of autonomy, 
despite attempts by Beauchamp and Childress to stress that this should not be the case.   
 
Of course an individual could act altruistically in the interests of a third party, even though it 
is counter to their own interests.  Alternatively, individuals may be motivated to act in the 
interests of others out of a sense of solidarity.   
 
However, a consumerist approach to bioethics, and public health ethics in particular, cannot 
depend on making appeals to altruism or solidarity.  A consumer is unlikely to be receptive to 
arguments that personal sacrifice in the public interest is just the right thing to do, or even to 
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go further and to accept that the distinction between private and public interest is artificial as 
they are one and the same.  Instead a consumer is likely to ask what is in it for me?  
 
Someone who owns property where a new hospital or road is to be built, which is subject to a 
compulsory purchase order to allow the project to go ahead, could reasonable ask for 
compensation at the market value of that land.  Similarly, a person suffering from diarrhoea 
and vomiting who normally works in a restaurant, may be prepared to stay off work until they 
have been cleared as an infection risk, provided they continue to receive their wage paid by 
their employer or an agency acting under public health law.  Even altruism could be viewed 
within such a compensation framework, albeit in a non financial sense.  The utility that 
someone gives up by being prevented from exercising their autonomous choice is instead 
compensated by a greater sum of utility for knowing that someone else, usually to whom they 
have a connection if only though common community membership, is better off. 
 
People may be willing, albeit grudgingly, to pay taxes as part of a contract to receive services 
from the state.  They may perceive their taxes as contributions towards a fund for healthy, 
pensions and other social goods that they can draw on in the future, in the same way that they 
would if they were paying towards a personal pension, or health insurance plan.  In reality 
they are only paying for current users of health care or elderly people.  Their own social 
benefits are dependent on an expectation that the next generation will make the same 
altruistic sacrifice.   
 
People who pay taxes towards public services or make charitable donations that they believe 
that they may never benefit from, or at least not to the extent of their contributions, may not 
be motivated by our altruism, but rather by a form of self-interested altruism.  This of course 
may appear to be an oxymoron as the two concepts of altruism and self interests should not be 
compatible with one another.   
 
For example, a person may be happy for their money to provide shelters for the homeless, 
therapy for people with drug addiction, or even the education of other people’s children if 
they themselves are childless.  These may be considered to be worthy causes in their own 
right.  A roof of your head may be considered a basic human right.  Drug addiction is 
associated with significant reductions in quality of life and threats to health.  Education 
permits widening of the mind, exposure to the arts etc.  However, a self-interested altruist 
may consciously or unconsciously see more direct personal benefits from helping others.  
They may be spared having to see people begging or sleeping on the street, which perhaps 
makes them feel guilty, or impairs the aesthetics of their environment.  Drug addicts commit 
crime in order to purchase drugs.  Self-interested altruists may be the victim of this crime.  A 
better educated society is also likely to be associated with lower crime rates, as well as being 
economically more prosperous and hence a better place for the self-interested altruists to live.  
Thus while an individual may have a first order preference to pay low taxes, he or she may be 
willing to pay for others to benefit, providing it fulfils their second order preferences to live in 
a society that is compatible with their personal interests and goals.  These interests and goals 
could be purely altruistic, but are usually connected in some way with their own personal 
interest.  This is perfectly acceptable, and citizens should not be criticised in acting in this 
way.  It merely reflects the difficulty in separating private from public interest. 
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8.2.1 Implications of self-interested altruism for Public health 
 
In our modern consumerist society, appeals to individuals to acquiesce to public policy that 
may not appear to be compatible with their direct or immediate private, interest, may not be 
effective.  Of course, individuals may feel good by acting out of what appears to be altruism, 
but when designing messages for the public, policy makers need to ensure that citizens 
implicitly understand what they will be getting out of the policy in terms of their second order 
preferences.  For example, that it will save them having to pay tax in the long run, or they 
would be similarly supported of it were to happen to them in the future, or it means that they 
may live in a society compatible with their goals.  Thus policy makers need to be much more 
sophisticated in their campaign messages and hence need to research public attitudes, 
concerns and motivations more carefully.  While the principle of autonomy is not a good basis 
for deriving an ethical framework for public health practice, political realities mean that if 
policy is to bring about improvements to the public health in a consumerist society, it will be 
necessary to work in partnership with the self-interested altruist. 
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8.3 It Could Be Me: On the Hazy Border between Self-interest and 
Solidarity 
 
Debates on health policies are often polarised to oppose self-interest with solidarity.  This 
polarisation manifests itself in many different ways, that all have the common denominator of 
pointing towards the desirability (solidarity) or undesirability (self-interest) of collective 
solutions to health problems, which makes it particularly interesting from a public health 
perspective.  In some cases, claims that people are basically self-interested/solidaric are used 
to this end; sometimes the very content of arguments are held out as being based on norms 
prescribing satisfaction of people’s self-interest/solidarity with all people.  In any case, the 
polarisation assumes that self-interested and solidaric opinions can be clearly distinguished on 
a methodological level.  In this chapter, this basic assumption will be questioned on the basis 
of some particular results of the EuroPHEN focus groups.  Especially, these results indicate 
that just asking people where they position themselves with regard to the self-interest – 
solidarity dichotomy is a poor predictor of their basic moral stance, and, in particular, that 
people holding out themselves as basically self-interested may well appear to be much less so 
when interpreted in a richer context of expressed patterns of reasoning. 
 
8.3.1 The It Could be Me Phenomenon 
Within the EuroPHEN focus groups, the respondents were asked to take a stand on two 
opposing ideas on how to organise health policy in terms of two imaginary countries, 1 and 2.  
Country 1, (C1) was described as providing publicly financed health services to all citizens 
while in country 2 (C2), health services were described as accessible almost only through 
private means.  As a consequence, taxes where described to be significantly higher in C1, 
while the number of alternative health service forms and providers where significantly lower 
than in C2.  Almost every respondent ended up expressing a clear preference for C1, and most 
of these motivated their stand in ways pointing towards a stance that can be broadly described 
as solidaric.  However, one particular minority reasoned in a more complex way.  They 
started out with an initial preference for C2, motivating this stand with the claim that they 
would fare well within this type of policy, while recognising that several others would not, 
and therefore benefit more by it (due to lower taxes and access to a larger range of alternative 
health service providers).  However, having made this initial declaration, they then added that 
although they indeed believed themselves not to belong to the losers in C2, it could be me 
(ICBM), and on this basis they concluded that, all in all, C1 was after all the more desirable 
option. 
 
Psychologically and sociologically, it may of course always be asked what happens in 
people’s minds when they express their opinions, especially in a group.  Are they really being 
true about their views, or are they adapting to the expectations of others, for example? Or do 
they lack any clear opinion, thus constructing one on the spot? However, since this type of 
doubts is applicable to any opinion, it does not seem to cast its shadow on the ICBM 
phenomenon in particular.  Of more basic interest is the question how the content of ICBM 
could and should be interpreted.  Should it be seen as describing a shift of moral stance, 
where an initial commitment to self-interest is exchanged for a more solidaric view, for 
instance? Or does it signify something else? In any case, the mapping of people’s moral 
values obviously is a more complicated task than just asking them to declare their views.  In 
the ICBM case, people’s views are rather uncovered by letting them perform a complicated 
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line of reasoning.  And, as will be briefly sketched, such lines of reasoning are as a rule open 
to many different interpretations.   
 
8.3.2 The Content of ICBM: Three Interpretative Categories 
ICBM might simply expresses a more careful analysis of what is of benefit for oneself.  While 
indeed believing that one would fare better in C2, on second thoughts one realises that 
conditions may change or that one may have an exaggerated picture of one’s abilities.  Here, 
the initially expressed commitment to a self-interested outlook stands untouched – all that 
ICBM signifies is a more careful application of this outlook to the issue at hand.  An 
advanced version is to interpret ICBM as the expression of a rational bargain, where the wider 
consequences of having or not having losers in society is taken into consideration, but still 
from a purely self-interested perspective.361 This type of interpretation analyses ICBM as a 
type of rational reasoning pattern that does not require a shift away from self-interest as a 
basic moral stance.   
 
However, other suggestions for such patterns that might fit ICBM rather indicate a (rationally 
required) shift of basic moral stance.  Two of these could be described as Kantian:362 either in 
the form of a generalisation of the original self-interested view (what if everyone reasoned 
like this, what would then become of me should I not fare as well as I believe, and is that 
acceptable?), or as a universalisation (what if I had been in the loser’s shoes, would I then 
have preferred C2?).  If the answer in either case is negative, rationality is assumed to require 
abandonment of the view that thereby cannot be generalised/universalised – in this case, self-
interest.  Very close to the universalisation idea is the Rawlsian contractualist pattern;363 
ICBM then indicates the position that a valid view has to be the one reached when one is 
unaware of one’s actual position in society, and that therefore pure self-interest is inapplicable 
– one’s appraisal has to be performed at a collective level.xix Similarly, one versions of 
communitarianism would suggest interpretations of ICBM where pure self-interest is ruled 
out as incoherent, due to the alleged fact that the border between oneself, others and the 
community is much less clear-cut than what is assumed by the self-interested argument for C2 
(my interests are partly made up of the interests of others and the common good).364 
 
Other versions of communitarianism would instead disqualify the intial self-interested 
argument for C2 because everyone are required by their role as members of society not to 
reason purely self-interested in  the sphere of health,365 or because individual interests are 
simply not what is of most importance – even if self-interested, we should rather care for the 
common good as socially defined.366 ICBM could be interpreted as expressions of both these 
types of positions. Close to this is the interpretation according to which ICBM expresses a 
recognition of what a truly moral piece of reasoning requires: it cannot be purely self-
interested, since one would then fail to take ”the moral point of view”.367 This brings us closer 
to the last interpretation, according to which ICBM indicates an initial confusion about the 
issue: the respondent first thinks that she should express a personal preference, but then 
realises that what is asked of her is an overall evaluation of which society would be the better 
one (not which one she personally would prefer to live in). The difference between these two 
question is that the latter may be asked and answered without considering oneself as a 
                                                 
xix It is, admittedly, possible to read Rawls so that he is rather putting forward the idea of a self-interested 
rational bargain. However, our reading of Rawls contractualism is that it is more constructivist: the initially 
assumed self-interest is a methodological assumption made in order to make the justification of the basic values 
of society constructed through the contractarian reasoning stronger. 
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member of the societies one is asked to evaluate. In all these cases, what ICBM expresses is 
the fact that the respondent’s basic moral outlook is in fact not self-interested at all. 
 
The variety of possible interpretations that may fit ICBM is in itself of interest from a 
methodological point of view, since it calls into question the two most commonly used 
methods for investigating people’s values: simply asking people to position themselves 
among a number of basic positions (the polling method so often used in the surveying of 
public opinion), or deriving basic ethical stances from hypothetical choices among competing 
courses of action (revealed preference, nowadays often applied in form of the willingness to 
pay method). The weakness in both cases is that, if given an opportunity to reason, people’s 
values may indeed shift, or they perception of the issue at hand may shift. Most important, 
though, reasoned opinions may reveal that initially expressed views are open to a number of 
competing interpretations. From this perspective, the focus group study of basic social 
evaluations may be seen as having revealed a sort of process deliberation methodology that 
seems to be particularly suitable for the study of evaluative and normative opinions and 
stances. However, both of the other methods also have virtuous features, and these may be 
possible to import into the process deliberation approach, for example, so as to have people 
conduct complex patterns of reasoning about their prioritisation within a willingness to pay 
scheme interpreted in different ways. 
 
Are there any reasons to prefer any of the basic lines of interpretation sketched above? Many 
economists would probably prefer the first line of interpretation, since it would fit standard 
theoretical models better.  However, that is a poor reason, since it means begging the question 
at hand: are people basically self-interested or not? To avoid that, a wider methodological rule 
could be applied: in social and behavioural science, other things being equal, we should prefer 
interpretations that picture people’s opinions and pieces of reasoning as making sense and 
being roughly plausible.  Applying that rule, it seems that the first two interpretative 
categories share a weakness, they both claim that ICBM expresses an allegedly rational 
pattern of reasoning.  However, it may turn out that the reasoning is not so rational after all – 
especially since within and between the categories are expressed competing views on what 
rationality requires.  In addition, it is not evident that any of the suggested patterns of 
reasoning in these categories would indeed support endorsement of C1 rather than C2.  This 
weakness is avoided by the third type of interpretation, according to which the totality of the 
ICBM pattern should be seen as expressing a denial of self-interest as the respondent’s basic 
moral stance. 
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9 Implications for a Normative Ethics Framework for 
Public Health 
 
Within both the EuroPHEN strands examining differences between approaches to public 
health policy and attitudes of citizens, it was stressed that such evidence was not collected in 
order to derive a normative framework for public health.  Such a framework must be derived 
from the EuroPHEN strand dealing with philosophical analysis.  However, these other strands 
will have relevance to how any such a normative framework is developed into guidance 
documents for use within European institutions and Member States, e.g.  in producing code of 
conduct by Public Health professional bodies.  The legal and policy implications of 
EuroPHEN in terms of the critique of ethical issues within public health practice, must 
therefore be considered in conjunction with the future research needs that EuroPHEN has also 
identified. 
 
9.1 The Goals of Public Health 
The societal practice of Public Health is driven by goals that are expressed explicitly by 
various policy documents and regulations and/or implicitly by the way in which Public Health 
is organised, structured and motivated by professionals. Such goals express ideas about what 
values should be pursued by Public Health from an ethical point of view, and these in turn 
influence what is seen as desirable and defensible Public Health practice. Even if we disregard 
obvious ambiguities built into the very notion of Public Health, there is a significant variation 
between European countries, as well as between different temporal eras of one and the same 
European country, with regard to what these goals are taken to be.368 From the point of view 
of a harmonisation of Public Health policy across Europe, this fact is a serious challenge, 
since it necessitates a choice of what the goals of European Public Health should be.  
 
In this concluding chapter, this question is addressed as a purely ethical issue about the proper 
content of the political ideology that should shape an envisioned European approach to Public 
Health. Five main types of goals will be sketched, connected to underlying ethical positions 
and compared, with some tentative conclusions to the benefit of the last suggestion. It is 
argued that this suggestion supports the idea of a complex and dynamic goal structure for 
European Public Health, and that such a suggestion also seems practical as well as desirable 
from the point of view of the realities of European politics. 
 
A note should be made of the fact that the goals may be conceived of on different levels from 
a theoretical point of view. They may be taken to express rather directly some basic ethical 
claim about what is in itself desirable. However, they may just as well be seen as claims about 
what is sometimes referred to as contributory values, i.e. features that together with various 
other features make up states that are desirable in themselves. Finally, the goals may be seen 
as purely instrumental – based on empirical hypotheses they express the belief that attaining 
the goals will in turn lead to the actualisation of states that are desirable in themselves. A 
complete analysis of the goals of Public Health would have to systematically work through 
these different possibilities. In the present case, however, I will leave it open on what 
theoretical level they should be placed, and merely make some scattered hints at how the goal 
I will argue in favour of may be justified. The point argued is simply that seemingly 
conflicting goals may be combined into a coherent, complex structure that should be able to 
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satisfy most of those requirements that have been proposed with regard to the nature and 
ethics of Public Health. 
 
9.1.1 Five Goals 
It is a common idea of Public Health that its goals are population- rather than individual-
based. This is seen clearly in the traditional goal of Public Health to promote the health of the 
population,369 where the latter is some kind of aggregate of the health states of individual 
members of the population in question.370 This feature sets Public Health apart from health 
care or medicine, where the traditional goal is to promote the health of the individual patient.xx 
This difference is also seen in traditional ethical restrictions, where the primary one within 
Public Health is cost-effectiveness in terms of population health, while medical ethics focus 
on respecting the patient (her needs, fragility, and autonomy).  
 
In recent years, requests for Public Health to incorporate concerns of medical ethics have 
increased, and in some cases new goals have been suggested that add new values to the 
traditional goal. The first of these is equality, made manifest by an increasing focus on health 
inequalities in Public Health monitoring, and measures aiming at empowering allegedly weak 
groups. The rather imprecise idea seems to hold out an egalitarian ideal that concentrates on 
the improvement of the health of those worse off in this respect, and that focus on unequal 
opportunities to be healthy rather than actual health states. The second suggested addition is 
to hold out autonomy as a value to be promoted by Public Health. Also here, an increased 
interest in the promotion of people’s opportunities to choose to be healthy (if they want to) 
bears witness; showing itself in measures aimed at securing access to health promoting 
choices, empowering people to make such choices, and informing them about what choices 
are health promoting. There is also strong trend to underline people’s responsibility for taking 
care of their health, implicitly implying that choices made should be respected by society 
even if they are not to the benefit of the individual. Both these ideas differ from and 
potentially conflict with the traditional goal. Promoting health opportunities may be very 
difficult and therefore cost-inefficient, and even if successful, people may still make 
unhealthy choices. The autonomy goal also actualises the conflict between concerns for 
individual freedom and the common good, as well as the individualist and the population 
approach already mentioned.  
 
One central discussion within the EuroPHEN project has been about the suggestion that 
considerations of autonomy should be emphasised in Public Health. Two main reasons have 
been suggested for doubting this idea. First, it has been observed that holding out autonomy 
as central without recognising its intimate practical connection to a basic level of population 
health will make it into a thin concept of formal market freedom that is of doubtful ethical 
importance in itself. That is, autonomy has to assume that the basic material conditions of 
society are such that the formal freedom of people to choose is a real and practical 
opportunity for people to significantly improve their lives, compared to how they would have 
fared in other material circumstances. If this is not taken into account, having autonomy as a 
goal of Public Health may have the effect of conserving or further deteriorating social and 
material conditions that block beneficial opportunities for most people. Second, just holding 
out autonomy as desirable in an unqualified sense seems to imply that it should be the 
                                                 
xx While promoting the health of the population must plausibly imply that the health of some 
individual is promoted, this individual need not be a patient in the medical or health care 
sense, and vice versa. 
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business of Public Health to boost the opportunities of people to make unhealthy choices. The 
perception that this is obviously wrong connects to the former complaint, but also to the third 
and final one. This argument makes the case that the idea of autonomy as a value to be strived 
for and promoted goes against the very nature of Public Health, since autonomy is essentially 
an individualist conception, while Public Health pursues values on a population level. 
 
These conflicts could be weakened if, first, the traditional goal is given appropriate space and, 
second, the autonomy goal is made population rather than individual oriented.xxi Some of this 
is secured in a fourth suggestion for the goals of Public Health, which combines the concern 
for equality and autonomy against a background of a general societal interest in good 
population health. According to this idea, the goal of Public Health should be to secure the 
equal opportunities of members of the population to choose better health.371 While implying 
some amount of respect for individual choices not to use such opportunities, the idea implies 
that Public Health should only concern itself with providing health opportunities, and that the 
freedom to make unhealthy choices may be restricted if it impedes the opportunities of others 
to make healthy choices. However, this goal still does not acknowledge the traditional goal, 
and the arguments about the connection between autonomy and a decent level of population 
health mentioned above may therefore still apply. Suppose, for instance, that a very dangerous 
pandemic seriously threatens Europe – in that case it may be very difficult to uphold the ideal 
of equal health opportunities for everyone, and also difficult to claim that individuals refusing 
to comply with measures taken by authorities to prevent catastrophic scenarios in terms of 
health and, in effect, secure basic social and economic stability are impeding anyone’s equal 
opportunities to choose better health (especially since these measures may counteract such 
equality). But, surely, society should apply such measures, so there must be something wrong 
also with this way of constructing the goals of Public Health. 
 
This consideration seems to support a further addition to the fourth goal; namely that it holds 
under the provision that the health of the population resides on or above a sufficient level (i.e. 
the level at which the importance of individual control becomes strong enough to trump the 
importance of attaining an even better level of population health). That is, should the health of 
the population slide below that level, the traditional goal again becomes the primary objective 
of Public Health. This may also be applied in a preventive manner of reasoning: if it can be 
predicted with reasonable certainty that if the traditional goal is not taken as paramount, the 
level of population health will deteriorate below that point where the combination of equality 
and autonomy concerns formulated in the fourth suggestion trump the concern for population 
health, the traditional goal should be applied. This fifth idea of the goals of Public Health may 
be motivated by rather different ethical outlooks,xxii all of which support the ideas that (i) 
improving the situation of the worse off is more important than improving the situation of the 
better off as long as a basic level of wellbeing is upheld on the population level, and (ii) the 
more wellbeing people enjoy, the more important it is that they are able to control how much 
wellbeing they enjoy. 
 
                                                 
xxi Population orientation here means merely that a goal to promote autonomy is formulated in 
terms of certain features of a population, not necessarily that populations as such are ascribed 
varying degrees of autonomy. The latter would imply a strong communitarian idea. 
xxii Rawlsian egalitarianism, different brands of prioritarian consequentialism, as well as 
suitably constructed brands of communitarianism (where the proper concern for the common 
good is adjusted according to the just mentioned idea). 
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This idea will not appear acceptable to everyone.xxiii However, besides the fact that it appears 
to be supportable on the basis of a broad range of different basic ethical positions, it seems to 
harmonise well with common sense opinions on the relative importance of social utility, 
individual freedom and equality. In addition, it does seem to accommodate the requests for 
incorporating medical ethical ideas into Public Health, as well as the insistence that the goals 
of Public Health should be exclusively population oriented and make suitable room for a 
direct concern for population health. 
 
9.1.2 Application to European Public Health 
Applied to the prospect of convergence of European Public Health, the above suggests a 
complex goal structure that is flexible with respect to different subject areas and 
regions/countries. Common to all aspects of European Public Health, is the shared interest of 
European Union to provide its population with opportunities for better health. If people want 
to remain or become more unhealthy, they will have to create the opportunities for this 
privately. What is more, it supports the idea that focusing on the traditional goal at the 
expense of equality and autonomy is appropriate in a particular region/subject area when the 
health of the population of this region/with respect to this area is sufficiently poor. If 
measures are successful, these conditions will improve, however, and in that case shifting 
focus from health levels to (equal) health opportunities is required. Should this, in turn, effect 
too much of unhealthy choices so that the health of the population deteriorates too much, 
shifting back to the traditional goal becomes justified (as mentioned, if such processes can be 
predicted, taking preventive measures that apply the traditional goal of promoting population 
health alone may be justified). However, as remarked, since opportunities to be unhealthy 
must not impede the equal opportunities of others to choose better health, such a development 
is not very probable, except in very special circumstances, where there are great health threats 
that directly affects the whole of society and creates real risks of socio-economic unrest or 
collapse (such as a pandemic of a very dangerous communicable disease that cannot be 
effectively treated). 
 
Besides appearing to have good prospects for being well supported at a theoretical level, a 
goal structure of this complex type would also serve to facilitate the creation of European 
Public Health. This since it makes room for different countries/regions to make very different 
priorities within their own Public Health work, at the same time as they will all be 
contributing to promoting the goals of European Public Health. Another side of this is that, 
from the perspective of the European Union taken as a whole, this goal provides reasons for 
allocating Public Health resources for boosting population health in regions/countries that are 
worse off with regard to population health and be cautious in spending these resources on the 
further advancement of health-related equality and autonomy in countries that already score 
very well in terms of population health. So, at the same time, this goal seems to provide 
support for the idea of autonomy of member states to conduct their own Public Health 
policies, and the idea of an overarching European solidarity within the area of Public Health. 
Both of these ideas appear to be important for the long-term socio-economic stability of the 
                                                 
xxiii Supporters of strong communitarianism, rely on an organic rather than a population 
conception of society (i.e. society as such is ascribed desires, strivings, needs etc. that are 
independent of the situation of the members of society), and radical libertarians, who discard 
any legitimate societal concern for the common good beyond that needed for securing formal 
liberty, are two examples. 
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European Union, and also to make the prospect of harmonisation and integration in the area of 
Public Health particularly appealing. 
9.1.3 Further Issues to Consider in relation to goals 
As indicated  above, the suggestion regarding the prospect of actually justifying the fifth goal 
of Public Health on the basis of different ethical outlooks will have to be integrated with an 
analysis of on what theoretical level this goal may be placed. Considerable work remains 
before this has actually been undertaken. Here are a few issues of importance: (i) What is the 
range of variation with regard to the structuring of this goal with regard to theoretical level?, 
(ii) How should key concepts employed in the formulation of the goal be analysed in more 
detail and in relation to practice – in particular, the notion of equal opportunities to choose 
good health? Such an investigation would have to involve closer analysis of the concepts of 
equality and autonomy, as well as how these are applied in different ethical outlooks and 
political ideals. (iii) How can various ethical theories and political ideals be related to various 
ways of understanding the fifth goal theoretically? (iv) What (if any) practical difference will 
it make if the goal is justified on the basis of one set of basic values and norms rather than 
another? 
 
9.1.4 Power and Authority 
None of the philosophical theoretical frameworks above solve the so-called demos problem 
(i.e. the problem of who should be included among those that are given the opportunity to 
influence policy through democratic means and on what basis that is to be decided), although 
they may provide tools for approaching it. The importance of this problem relates to the 
perspective of European harmonisation of Public Health and the requirements that should face 
new member states. There is a delicate balancing in the intersection of these two processes 
between the perspective that new members have to adapt their policies to official European 
Union ideology, and the perspective that, as new members, they have the opportunity to 
change European Union ideology. This balancing is especially sensitive in areas where the 
harmonisation process is in the beginning, and where conflicts of basic values reside. The 
Public Health area is an example of both 
 
Rather than the inclusion of people into the democratic domain, this problem concerns the 
inclusion of views/issues in that public arena where democratic deliberation is taking place. 
There is an intense discussion of this problem within liberal democratic theory (Rawls, Audi, 
Nussbaum, including deliberative democratic thinkers) that addresses the problem of how to 
handle issues/views that seem to be at odds with the shared basis of values (however thin it is) 
on which liberal democracy is founded. With regard to Public Health, this problem is 
particularly pressing regarding the issue of how to handle differing views on who (or what 
institution) should be given the authority to decide/teach/proclaim matters of fact. This theme 
can be connected to general issues about secular European society, and certain pressing value 
conflicts with regard to Public Health may be related to that 
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9.2 The Ethical Challenge to Public Health 
Public health programmes promoting health lifestyles may be driven by the impetus to do 
good in society, but frequently they do so by enacting moral prescriptions as to how to live 
lives individually and collectively.  Public health policy makers and practitioners traditionally 
act upon their own interpretations of what is in the public interest, although these 
interpretations diverge throughout the European Community depending on the political and 
public health traditions in the various member states.  Despite this variation between Member 
States, the underlying structure of the new European public health  is to do good: benevolence 
is the impetus of public health programmes, for what else is public health than to protect and 
improve the health of the public? 
 
On this view liberty, freedom and autonomy are considered as stumbling blocks and barriers 
for any public health program.  So many autonomous agents in modern Western societies 
exert their agency by drinking, smoking, not exercising, and many other unhealthy activities.  
All these irrational agents show that autonomy and freedom are virtual capacities and provide 
the legitimization to curtail civil liberties.  The appeal for banning, mandatory and restrictive 
policies in public health is growing.  Public health is developing more and more towards a 
paradigm of a disease-modelled, risk-oriented and individualistic directed activity of 
preventing bad things, designing effective and efficient methods and techniques to achieve the 
ends and goals set – not to smoke, not to drink, not to stress, not to live a life without exercise 
– without discussion on the goals themselves.  Why should these ends be discussed anyway? 
Science has shown that these irrational activities lead to disease and disability, hence they 
should be subject to criticism, sanction and attack. 
 
A paradigmatic shift in public health is required.  Instead of pursuing a disease-oriented, 
protective and restrictive approach towards freedom and liberty, public health needs to 
reorient itself towards a strategy of building up relationships and enabling opportunities, 
social capacities and environmental conditions.  In this respect the public health community 
should not consider autonomy as a bulwark against their programs of doing good, but instead 
as a personal and social condition of vitality, creativity and sociality.   
 
Many of the ends set by the public health seem to be fixed and indisputable: stop smoking, 
avoid eating fat, exercise more, eat healthy food.  The only remaining issue for the public 
health community would seem to be how to design better policies and methods for 
implementing these ends, the ends themselves need not to be discussed. 
 
Although public health professionals tend to see themselves as being at the service of the 
public, any attempt to do good is inherently operating power and control.  Justifying policies 
and methods in terms of benevolence does not mitigate this. 
 
Power has to be legitimized.  Doing good should be framed as doing right and the notion of 
public should encompass the power position of those, including public health professionals, 
who claim to do good on behalf of society.  Not only is how ends are set relevant, but also 
how ends are imposed.  Whether the ends are set by the public health experts or the public, in 
executing these ends the public health community should not engage in a practice of making 
people do what one wants them to do through more or less persuasive or even compulsive 
measures.   
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The tenet of public health is to strive for the public good.  Underneath lays the view of some 
way of aggregating the good (or the reduction of the bad).  Utilitarian reasoning says 
something like to do good is to produce the most happiness and communitarian reasoning that 
which produces the most good to the community.  Kant opposes this grand tradition in ethics 
and moral philosophy because it (a) presupposes that the consequences of one’s action are 
central and (b) the consequences can be somehow calculated. 
 
It is not sufficient to claim that doing good is by itself the legitimate ground for enacting 
public policies.  If this were true, it would lead to claims that all kinds of behaviour 
considered by sections of society as bad, that is bad by itself and bad for others could be 
banned under the label of doing good to society.  The judgment bad implies that people are 
annoyed and disgusted by it and that it provokes, if not physical, then certainly psychological 
and emotional harm.  Conversely, this implies that all kinds of behaviour considered virtuous 
by the majority of the population can be the legitimate ground of public policies.  This leads 
to the moralizing of politics. 
 
One might argue that many public health programs and policies do not aim at promoting good 
behaviour only, but instead attempt at proposing health and related conditions in terms of 
equity and fairness, say by promoting equal opportunities and defining health as a resource 
for social participation.  If so, then such programmes and policies cannot frame the issue in 
terms of benevolence.  The benevolent policy should be a just policy, a policy that performs 
the right thing. 
 
There is an increasing trend towards arguing that people should be responsible for their 
choices.  The assumption is that people understand autonomy as a matter of choosing 
important aspects of their lives from a variety of options and opportunities.   
 
Most of these affairs should be the affair of citizens and not of the state, that is, that the 
regulation of the interplay between subject and object responsibility should have the judge of 
the public sphere and not government or any other public institution such as the public health 
community proposing top down mandatory measures.  The additional point Kant makes is that 
one should instead start bottom up, promoting the capacity and vitality of the civil society. 
 
Individuals have to be considered as the best judges of their own preferences, values and life 
plans.  If citizens see it worth pursuing their ends, it is not legitimate to intervene for any 
reason other than what the individual aspires and permits.   
 
All our collective measures to reinforce people’s sense of responsibility by making explicit 
public announcements on the various issues of responsibility – do not smoke, do not eat fat, 
do exercise, refrain from stress, and so on – are supposed to strengthen our identification with 
the appropriate sources of subject and object responsibility.  However, while trying to 
reinforce our notions of responsibility, public health measures as representative of other 
collective, coercive measures, may in fact weaken it.  If we learn that coercive measures apply 
to the operations of our free will, we may respond progressively contracting the latter’s 
domain.  The paradoxical effect here is that in many instances behaviour has to be moralized 
and blamed for: the person is an addict, the person has no control over his or her body and 
mind, the person has to be corrected.  Increasingly we have to describe actions in a 
deterministic vocabulary designed to place our free will, our selves, and our communal life at 
the periphery of self and communal life that is outside the boundaries of social life.  This in 
fact leads to minimalist forms of constitution of selves and communities.  In some cases, we 
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really need to restrict behaviour and to enforce legal sanctions as in the case of being attacked 
by murderers or terrorists.  However, in most cases, similar approaches may be unintended 
and unwelcome.  If the mishaps associated with driving, smoking, eating fat, exercising too 
little, living too ambitious lives and other kinds of behaviours considered to be unresponsive 
to society’s needs and goals, carry with them severe social and legal repercussions, we may 
decide to give up all sorts of social behaviour which are vital and creative to individuals and 
communities.  By cutting down responsibilities, individuals and communities may draw the 
boundaries of their selves and their identities more narrowly than they otherwise would have 
done. 
 
Instead of making explicit public announcements of mandatory measures the public health 
community would be better off taking an interactive approach with the public, viewing 
autonomy and freedom as allies to promote the capacity, creativity and vitality of citizens 
living their lives as members of social networks and society. 
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10 Policy Implications 
 
The EuroPHEN partners do not wish to make specific recommendations with regards to a 
code of professional ethics for Public Health.  The normative framework that should underpin 
public health and issues in its implementation are laid out within the entire report.   
 
Of particular importance are the sections of the report relating to the values of public health, 
and the challenge posed to public health professionals to reconsider their relationship with the 
public and the goals underpinning policy.   
 
There are differences in approach to policy between Member States, which reflect local 
circumstances in terms of epidemiology and history, as well as variation in moral weight 
given to public versus private interest.  However, these differences do not represent 
insurmountable challenges to developing professional codes for Public Health to be used 
within Member States or European Union institutions, nor for developing policy and 
European Directives. 
 
The empirical research demonstrates current thinking among citizens towards public health 
and public policy more generally.  The research also provides an indication of more effective 
ways of developing and implementing policy that attracts greater public support. 
 
In summary, the following points should be considered: 
 
1 Public health should strive to create an environment and structures that facilitate 
individual health, wellbeing and flourishing, and facilitate the interdependency between 
individuals necessary to achieve individual flourishing. 
 
2 Public health should achieve population health in a way that respects the rights of 
individuals and the interests and interdependencies of communities.  For some 
communities individual-focus bioethics is likely to be unsuitable and policy makers must 
be sensitive to the different needs and moral values of different communities.   
 
3 Public health policies must take heed of the pre-eminence of autonomy in European 
society.  However, the ability of citizens to make autonomous choices, sometimes for 
what may appear to be irrational behaviours that put them at increased risk of morbidity or 
mortality, should not be seen as an impediment to making improvements in the health of 
the public.  Indeed, central to the normative framework proposed by EuroPHEN is the 
need to strengthen the autonomy of the public to promote the capacity, creativity and 
vitality of citizens living their lives as members of social networks and society. 
 
4 Citizens consider themselves as consumers of healthcare who see health services as their 
right as tax payers.  However rights have reciprocal responsibilities, and the public must 
be reminded of these.  The method of informing the public about their rights and 
responsibilities as a citizen is a process that is lifelong, starting with school education.   
 
5 Public health has a strong role to play in ensuring that people feel part of a society so that 
they can make a contribution to society.  Identifying disenfranchised members of society 
is difficult because by definition they tend to be invisible and inaudible.  They may not 
want to be identified because they think society is not relevant to them. 
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6 The public are unlikely to support policies which they do not understand or which they 
see as unconnected to their lives. 
 
7 Public health policy should be implemented in a transparent manner that facilitates 
accountability, including the provision of all information and evidence used to inform the 
decision making process.  Policies which are seen as un-enforceable will not only 
decrease support but also weaken support for public health policies in general.   
 
8 There is a need to actively build trust in public health policy and for public health 
structures to be seen as independent from lobby groups, political, commercial and 
monetary influence.   
 
9 A balanced approach is required between incentives and restrictions.  The public generally 
prefer incentives to change behaviour etc, rather than more explicit, direct restrictions on 
what may be considered to be civil liberties.  However, public health polices must be 
cautious regarding the use of inducements as these can create distrust.  Inducements 
directed towards the medical suppliers of public health services can be seen as creating 
commercial interests which may biased what is best for the individual.  Inducements 
directed at the general public can raise conspiracy type worries, especially in those cases 
where public information is lacking or where there is conflicting information given from 
alternative sources.   
 
10 Public health institutions should respect the confidentiality of information that can bring 
harm to an individual or community if made public.  In cases where there is high 
likelihood of significant harm to the individual or others, suitable mechanisms should be 
in place to retain a level of confidentially that minimises the breach in privacy.   
 
11 Where there are risks to health, public health institutions should act in a timely manner on 
the information available, taking into account the reliability of the data and other 
priorities. 
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11  Future Research needs  
 
11.1 Further qualitative research 
It would be beneficial to conduct further qualitative research focusing on the meaning of 
community and solidarity.  The research could explore to what extent they are important within 
a 21st concept of citizenship and community.  EuroPHEN conducted focus groups in 16 
countries, but in further research it may be more effective to reduce the countries, but increase 
the demographics groups studied, and to have similar group profiles in all countries researched.  
It would be beneficial to explore these concepts in specific groups e.g. ethnic/religious groups, 
gay community etc.  EuroPHEN included Poland, but with the further expansion of the EU, 
additional perspectives should be included by conducting the research in other central and 
eastern European countries and Turkey. 
 
It seems to be a valuable prospect to conduct such research on the basis of developed versions 
of the initial focus group methodology. Among other things, adapted elements from other 
methodologies (for example, willingness to pay approaches), may be brought into the focus 
group set-up to facilitate more close investigations of attitudes to conflicts of interest, 
community concepts, etc 
 
11.2 Quantitative research 
The findings of EuroPHEN should be used to develop questionnaire surveys.  Health economics 
techniques could be used to assess strength of support/opposition to Public Health policy e.g. 
willingness to pay, or compensation required.  
 
Of particular interest is to survey, first, attitudes to particular types of policies/policy areas, 
and, second, particular types of value sets that may conflict in the public health context – such 
as, equality, economic and social efficiency, community autonomy, and individual liberty. It 
is moreover of interest to correlate the results of such surveys to economic features (such as 
growth) of the nations of the respondents, religious confession etc. 
 
In light of the results of EuroPHEN, one other factor which is of considerable interest to 
survey quantitatively is citizens’ trust in various social institutions with regard to issues 
related to public health and health policy. Comparisons between different countries and 
connections to other issues, such as the development of ethical guidelines for the public health 
profession, and the value sets mentioned above. 
 
11.3 Research with the Public Health Community 
It was originally the intention of the EuroPHEN Partners to develop an ethics normative 
framework that could be used by public health professionals.  The partners decided that further 
work would be needed to do this involving a consultation process, similar to that used by the 
Public Health Leadership Society in the USA.  Although the EuroPHEN Partners do not feel 
that a list of principles would not be helpful, as it could address the complexity of public health 
practice in its various settings.  This consultation should also include a discussion of goals and 
methods of Public Health and examine the impact of private sector, lobby groups. 
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There are three basic models for how this may be done: 
 
1 a top-down approach, where public health agencies and organisations (e.g. the European 
Public Health Association [EUPHA] and the professional bodies in Member States)  are 
brought together to create a shared outlook.   
2 a bottom-up approach, where the ideas of individual Public Health-professionals are 
surveyed in various ways (using quantitative and/or qualitative methodologies).   
3 a combination of these.   
 
Of these, the third option looks like the most promising, but it is also methodologically 
challenging when it comes to bringing the top and the bottom together.  In the first instance, 
an international conference could be organised to initiate this process. 
 
11.4 Conceptual projects 
Perhaps the most important issue arising from the EuroPHEN report is the need to further 
consider the goals of Public Health.  This is an important conceptual task for Public Health 
Professionals, public, politicians and other stakeholders. 
 
Further philosophical research is required to explore concepts such as solidarity, equality and 
attitudes to risk.  Such research should attempt to describe what specific public health policies 
would look like if based on a particular normative framework, to examine the differences 
between liberal, Kantian, communitarian, utilitarian approaches.  It would also be beneficial to 
consider how to communicate/promote public values in private societies. 
 
With special consideration to European harmonisation in the area of public health, it is of 
interest to relate these investigations to broader considerations about the forms and ideologies 
of European secularised societies, since these approach issues about the various points of 
conflicts between general society, sub-community- and individual interests mentioned above. 
In also connects to the issue of the importance of trust, and the related and crucial issue of 
who or what should be given the power/authority to represent the basis of knowledge that 
needs to underpin any activity within the public health area. 
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Appendix 1: Codes of Conduct 
 
United Kingdom 
General Medical Council 
The duties of a doctor registered with the General Medical Council 
http://www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/good_medical_practice/duties_of_a_doctor.asp 
 
Patients must be able to trust doctors with their lives and well-being.  To justify that trust, we 
as a profession have a duty to maintain a good standard of practice and care to show respect 
for human life.  In particular as a doctor you must: 
• make the care of your patient your first concern 
• treat every patient politely and considerately 
• respect patients’ dignity and privacy; 
• listen to patients and respect their views 
• give patients information in a way they can understand 
• respect and protect confidential information 
• make sure that you personal beliefs do not prejudice your patients’ care 
• act quickly to protect patients from risk if you have good reason to believe that you or 
a colleague may not be fit to practise 
• avoid abusing your position as a doctor; 
• and work with colleagues in the ways that best serve patients’ interests. 
In all these matters you must never discriminate unfairly against your patients or colleagues.  
And you must be prepared to justify your actions to them 
 
 
 
United Kingdom 
Nursing and Midwifery Council 
The NMC code of professional conduct: standards for conduct, performance and ethics 
http://www.nmc-uk.org/aDisplayDocument.aspx?DocumentID=201 
 
As a registered nurse, midwife or health visitor, you are personally accountable for your 
practice.  In caring for patients and clients, you must: 
• respect the patient or client as an individual 
• obtain consent before you give any treatment or care 
• protect confidential information 
• co-operate with others in the team 
• maintain your professional knowledge and competence 
• be trustworthy  
• act to identify and minimise risk to patients and clients 
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Germany 
Code of Conduct for the Medical Profession in Germany 
 
The "Code of Conduct" printed here is in its essence the (prototype) code of conduct 
resolved upon in the 100th German Medical Congress and amended in the 105th German 
Medical Congress, the 106th German Medical Congress, and the 107th German Medical 
Congress.  The Code of Conduct becomes effective when constituted by the Medical 
Associations in their assemblies, and approved by the regulating authority. 
 
Vow 
The following professional vow applies to every physician: 
• On entering the medical profession I solemnly vow to dedicate my life in service to 
humanity. 
• I will exercise my profession scrupulously and with dignity. 
• The preservation and restoration of my patients' health shall be my paramount 
obligation. 
• I will observe all confidential information, even beyond the patient's death. 
• I will preserve the honour and noble tradition of the medical profession to the best of my 
ability, and I will not make a difference between religion, nationality, race, political 
affiliation, or social position in the conduct of my obligations as a physician. 
• I will respect all human life beginning with conception with reverence, and I will not 
use my medical skills in contradiction to the laws of humanity, not even when under 
threat. 
• I will pay due respect to all my teachers and colleagues.  All this I vow on my own 
honour. 
 
A.  Preamble 
The code of conduct, resolved on the basis of laws by the associations and healing 
professions, reflects the medical profession's determination as to the conduct of physicians 
towards their patients, their colleagues, other partners in health care, as well as their 
appearance in the public.  To facilitate this, the German physicians have given themselves the 
following professional code of conduct.  At the same time, the code of conduct with its 
determination of professional obligations serves the objective of: 
• maintaining and enhancing confidence between physicians and patients; 
• assuring the quality of the medical performance in the interest of public health; 
• preserving the freedom and reputation of the medical profession; 
• encouraging conduct worthy of the profession and to anticipate any conduct not worthy 
of it. 
 
B.  Professional Rules of Conduct 
I.  Policy 
 
§ 1 Tasks of the medical profession 
(1) Physicians serve the health of individuals and the public. 
 The medical profession is not a trade.  By its nature, it is a free profession. 
(2) It is the physicians' task to preserve life, to protect and restore health, to alleviate 
suffering, support the dying, and to collaborate in maintaining the natural foundations of 
life in respect of their importance to human health. 
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§ 2 General professional duties for physicians 
(1) Physicians carry out their profession according to their conscience, the obligations of 
medical ethics, and humanity.  They may not accept any policy or observe any rules and 
directives not consistent with their tasks, or the abidance of which they cannot take 
responsibility for. 
(2) Physicians must execute their profession diligently and live up to the trust they 
encounter in the course of their professional practice. 
(3) The principles of correct professional medical conduct in Chapter C are part of this 
diligent professional execution. 
(4) Physicians may not take any orders from non-physicians in the execution of their 
medical decisions. 
(5) Physicians are obliged to keep informed about the regulations guiding their profession. 
(6)  Irrespective of their special duties of notification and information specified in the 
following regulations, physicians are required to respond to any enquiries in reasonable 
time that the medical association may address to them in compliance with its legal duty 
of supervision. 
 
§ 3 Contradictory terms 
(1) Apart from practising their vocation, physicians are not allowed to engage in any other 
occupation which may contradict the ethical principles of the medical profession.  
Physicians are also prohibited from using their name in connexion with a medical 
occupational title in an unfair fashion for commercial purposes.  Nor may they allow 
their name or the professional reputation of physicians to be used in such a manner. 
(2) Physicians are prohibited from distributing products and other items or have them 
distributed with their assistance in the course of their medical practice, and they are not 
allowed to render trade services or have them rendered with their assistance unless the 
distribution of the product or service is a necessary part of medical therapy due to their 
special properties. 
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Poland 
Medical Code of Ethics passed at 3rd General Assembly of Physicians and Dentists on 
12th-14th December 1993, Warsaw 
 http://www.nil.org.pl/xml/nil/wladze/nil_eng/med_code 
 
• The physician's vocation is the protection of human life and health, the prevention of 
disease, the treatment of patients and the relief of suffering.  The physician shall not use 
his/her medical knowledge and skills for any purpose being in contradiction with that 
vocation.   
• The physician's ethical imperative is the good of the patient.   
• The physician shall perform all diagnostic, therapeutic and preventive procedures with 
due exactitude and appropriate allocation of time.   
• The physician should treat his/her patients with consideration and courtesy and show due 
respect for their personal dignity and privacy.   
• The physician is bound to observe medical confidentiality.  Information acquired by the 
physician in the course of his/her professional duties, concerning the patient and his/her 
background is confidential.  The death of the patient does not release the physician from 
the duty of confidentiality.   
• It comes within duties of each physician to constantly supplement and improve his/her 
professional knowledge and skills as well as to share own experience and skills with other 
fellow-physicians.   
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Finland 
Finnish Medical Association 
http://www.laakariliitto.fi/e/ethics/code_of_ethics.html 
 
A person working as a physician has undertaken a great and demanding task, which cannot be 
fulfilled unless there is, in addition to proper knowledge, a serious desire to meet the ethical 
responsibilities acknowledged by the medical profession for thousands of years.  A physician 
gains trust on the basis of personality, knowledge and proficiency.  In accordance with these 
principles, the Delegate Committee of the Finnish Medical Association has adopted the 
following code to be observed by physicians in their profession.   
I It is a physician's duty to protect human life and alleviate suffering, with the promotion and 
establishment of health as the principal aim.   
II A physician shall serve his fellowmen charitably and show himself by his behaviour and 
actions to be worthy of the trust and respect that his task requires.  He shall never participate 
in torture, the implementation of a death sentence or any other inhuman actions or preparation 
thereof.   
III A physician shall treat patients as equals and not allow race, religion, political views or 
social status to have any effect on his actions towards them.   
IV A physician shall not use his authority to undermine a patient's right to make decisions 
concerning himself.  Even where the patient cannot convey his own will, it is incumbent upon 
the physician to act in the patient's best interest. 
If a physician is compelled to make decisions concerning examinations or therapy irrespective 
of the patient's will, such decisions shall always be made on medical grounds.   
V A physician shall maintain and further his knowledge and skills, and shall recommend only 
those examinations and therapy that are considered effective and purposeful on the basis of 
medical knowledge and experience.   
VI Should a physician wish for his patient to participate in a clinical trial in which the 
examinations and therapy deviate from the normal procedure for the disease, he shall obtain 
the patient's freely-given consent without pressure, the patient being aware of the trial and of 
the additional strain and risks involved.  Generally accepted declarations and instructions 
issued by the authorities shall be observed during the trial.   
VII A physician shall maintain medical confidentiality and encourage his subordinates to do 
so.   
VIII A physician may not seek unfounded tangible interest.  He shall treat patients according 
to their need and collect a fee on the basis of the work carried out.   
IX When issuing certificates and statements a physician shall bear in mind that he is an 
impartial witness or expert whose statement must be based on the objective findings of a 
thorough examination, on their critical evaluation and on other facts observed.   
X A physician must observe strict consideration and avoid self emphasis when appearing in 
public.  When advertising, a physician shall observe instructions on the advertising of 
physicians and medical services.   
XI A physician shall nor become involved in medical care in which he does not have the 
freedom to act according to his duties and the principles of this code. 
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Norway 
The Norwegian Medical Association 
Ethical rules for doctors 
(passed by the landsstyret  in 1961 and amended in  2002 
http://www.legeforeningen.no/index.gan?id=485) 
 
1 Common conventions 
§ 1 A doctor shall cherish human health.  The doctor shall heal, ease and comfort.  The doctor 
shall help the ill to regain their health and the healthy to preserve theirs.   
The doctor shall base their actions on the respect for human rights and on truth and justice in 
relation to the patient and society. 
§ 2 The doctor shall look after the patient interests and integrity.  The patient should be 
treated with warmth, caring and respect.  Working with the patient should be based on mutual 
trust and shall, where it is possible, build on informed consent. 
§ 3 The patient has the right to information about their own health and treatment and the right 
to look at their own records.  The patient shall be given as much information as they wish.  
Information which is thought to be particularly distressing should be communicated carefully.   
§ 4 A doctor shall preserve confidentiality and show discretion regarding information she/he 
is given as a doctor.  The ethic for confidentiality and discretion can be more expansive than 
that which is provided for in law.  Releasing information must be based on the patients own 
agreement or that provided by law.   
§ 5 At the final stages of life the doctor must show respect for the patient own decisions.  
Active help to die, advice about how to die, and actions which could hasten the patient’s death 
should not be given.  A doctor must not help a patient to commit suicide.  To stop treatment 
or to not start a treatment is not seen as active death-help. 
§ 6 When a patient requires quick and emergency medical help, this shall be provided as 
swiftly as possible.  The duty to provide emergency help disappears if they are sure another 
doctor is available to help.  A doctor can refuse to take a patient under treatment, if they have 
the possibility of receiving treatment from another doctor. 
§ 7 A doctor must not exploit a patient, either sexually, economically, or religiously or in any 
other way.  The patient’s consent does not absolve the doctor of responsibility.  A doctor must 
not begin a sexual relationship with a patient.   
§ 8 A doctor should be aware of their patients’ economic situation and not seek unreasonable 
amounts.   
§ 9 A doctor shall, in examination and treatment, only use those methods which are 
recognised as acceptable.  Methods which put the patient in danger must not be used.  If the 
doctor can not provide a certain method they should make sure the patient gains this treatment 
through another doctor.  The doctor must not use or advice methods which they are 
unqualified to perform.  A doctor must not allow themselves to be pressurised into using 
methods which they find incorrect.  The care of the research person should be paramount 
when trying out new methods. 
§ 10 A doctor shall maintain and improve their knowledge.  Depending on their own 
competency a doctor should seek to educate and improve their medical knowledge.   
§ 11 Depending on qualifications a doctor should provide the authorities objective 
information concerning medical questions.  A doctor who speaks to the media about medical 
questions should secure the right to control how their comments are published. 
§ 12 A doctor shall in their actions take care regarding society’s economy.  Methods which 
are unnecessary or excessively expensive should not be used.  A doctor must not enter into 
alliance with the pharmaceutical industry and/or accept the supply of medical equipment 
which can lead to their professional independence being compromised.  The doctor is obliged 
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to insure that medical resources are shared according to general norms and ethics.  A doctor 
must not in any way seek to punish single patients or groups with economic burdens or in 
other ways prioritise patients.  If there is a lack of resources in the doctor’s own work area 
they should make these known. 
 
1 Rules for doctors in relation to co-workers and colleagues   
 
§ 1 A doctor should show colleagues and fellow workers respect, help, advice and counsel.   
§ 2 If a doctor detects signs of professional or ethic failing of their colleague or fellow 
worker, they should first take this up directly with the person.  Care should be especially with 
students and training doctors.  If this does not solve the matter, the doctor should take the 
matter up with the administrators superior or concern the health authority.  If the doctor 
detects signs of illness or misuse of drugs in a co-worker or colleague then they should offer 
help. 
§ 3 A doctor should take are of their own health and should seek help if it is needed. 
§ 4 A doctor must be careful when criticising colleagues in front of patients and others and 
must always have the patience’s best interests at heart.   
§ 5 During official debates between collages questions regarding medicine and health politics 
should be debated dispassionate.   
§ 6 The referral of patients between colleagues must build on medical and health policy 
questions and patients need for continued health cover. 
§ 7 Doctors must communicate open and confidently with each other.  Information between 
doctors about patients shall be quick and contain all necessary details. 
§ 8 Referrals must not be steered by personal economic interests. 
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Ethical Rules of the Swedish Medical Association (2002) 
http://www.lakarforbundet.se/templates/ArticleSLF.aspx?id=2830 
 
The person who has chosen the profession of a physician has accepted a difficult and 
responsible task that requires good knowledge and a willingness to comply with those ethical 
standards that physicians through millennia have recognised as valid.  The trust and freedom 
befalling a physician is based on his personal qualities, knowledge and skills. 
The person who is admitted into the Swedish Medical Association shall always let the 
following rules guide his action, and shall not participate in such activities where the freedom 
to act on such guidance is limited. 
1.  A physician shall have the health of the patient as a primary aim, and if possible cure, 
often aid, always comfort, thereby following what is commanded by the love of humanity and 
honour. 
2.  A physician shall act in accordance with science and tried experience, continuously strive 
to widen his own base of knowledge, and as far as he is able contribute to both scientific 
progress and the awareness of this progress among the general public.  As far as possible, a 
physician shall always be ready to assist others with his knowledge. 
3.  A physician shall seriously consider the importance of protecting and preserving human 
life, and as far as he is able assist people in situations of medical need.  A physician is never 
permitted to contribute to the active advancement of death. 
4.  A physician shall treat the patient with empathy, care and respect, and is not allowed to use 
his professional authority for restricting the patient’s right to decide with regard to himself. 
5.  A physician shall respect the patient’s right to information about his health status and 
available procedures for treatment, and as far as possible in this treatment proceed on the 
basis of informed consent, as well as abstain from communicating information about matters 
of which the patient does not wish to be informed. 
6.  A physician shall never relinquish the principle about the equal worth of every human 
being, and never subject a patient to discriminatory treatment. 
7.  A physician is not permitted to engage in a sexual relation with a patient in his care. 
8.  A physician shall when motivated consult other specialists, and welcome and assist a 
patient who wishes contact another physician. 
9.  A physician shall be secretive about all information about individual patients, unless this 
would jeopardise the patient’s health or other interests. 
10.  A physician shall not give council, advice or recommendation, unless he has investigated 
the patient or otherwise acquired su8fficient knowledge. 
11.  A physician is not allowed to be affected by illegitimate economic considerations, and 
shall never perform any other investigation or treatment than what is medically motivated.  
The fee shall be proportionate to the type and magnitude of the procedure performed. 
12.  Without failing to respect the interests of patients, a physician shall respect the work of 
colleagues. 
13.  A physician is never permitted to contribute in any way to the execution of death penalty, 
torture, or other cruel and inhuman practices. 
14.  A physician shall in his practice contribute to the use of medical resources in accordance 
with these rules, and never participate in illegitimate affirmative action with regard to 
individual patients or patient groups, whether in economic, medical or other respects. 
15.  A physician shall in certifications and assessments only confirm that which he after close 
consideration finds to be founded on facts and professional opinion, and distinguish this from 
other information, the truth of which cannot be assessed. 
16.  A physician shall not engage in obtrusive marketing of his services, and abstain from any 
other activity that improperly draws attention to his person or professional activities 
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United States of America 
American Medical Association’s Nine Principles of Medical Ethics 
American Medical Association.  Principles of Ethics.  Adopted by the AMA's House of 
Delegates June 17, 2001.  http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html  
 
1.  A physician shall be dedicated to providing competent medical care, with compassion and 
respect for human dignity and rights. 
2.  A physician shall uphold the standards of professionalism, be honest in all professional 
interactions, and strive to report physicians deficient in character or competence, or engaging 
in fraud or deception, to appropriate entities. 
3.  A physician shall respect the law and also recognize a responsibility to seek changes in 
those requirements which are contrary to the best interests of the patient. 
4.  A physician shall respect the rights of patients, colleagues, and other health professionals, 
and shall safeguard patient confidences and privacy within the constraints of the law. 
5.  A physician shall continue to study, apply, and advance scientific knowledge, maintain a 
commitment to medical education, make relevant information available to patients, 
colleagues, and the public, obtain consultation, and use the talents of other health 
professionals when indicated. 
6.  A physician shall, in the provision of appropriate patient care, except in emergencies, be 
free to choose whom to serve, with whom to associate, and the environment in which to 
provide medical care. 
7.  A physician shall recognize a responsibility to participate in activities contributing to the 
improvement of the community and the betterment of public health. 
8.  A physician shall, while caring for a patient, regard responsibility to the patient as 
paramount. 
9.  A physician shall support access to medical care for all people. 
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United States of America 
United States Public Health Leadership Society Principles of the Ethical Practice of 
Public Health 
http://209.9.235.208/CMSuploads/PHLSposter-40152.pdf 
http://209.9.235.208/CMSuploads/PHLSethicsbrochure-40103.pdf 
 
1.  Public health should address principally the fundamental causes of disease and 
requirements for health, aiming to prevent adverse health outcomes. 
2.  Public health should achieve community health in a way that respects the rights of 
individuals in the community. 
3.  Public health policies, programs, and priorities should be developed and evaluated through 
processes that ensure an opportunity for input from community members. 
4.  Public health should advocate and work for the empowerment of disenfranchised 
community members, aiming to ensure that the basic resources and conditions necessary for 
health are accessible to all. 
5.  Public health should seek the information needed to implement effective policies and 
programs that protect and promote health. 
6.  Public health institutions should provide communities with the information they have that 
is needed for decisions on policies or programs and should obtain the community’s consent 
for their implementation. 
7.  Public health institutions should act in a timely manner on the information they have 
within the resources and the mandate given to them by the public. 
8.  Public health programs and policies should incorporate a variety of approaches that 
anticipate and respect diverse values, beliefs, and cultures in the community. 
9.  Public health programs and policies should be implemented in a manner that most 
enhances the physical and social environment. 
10.  Public health institutions should protect the confidentiality of information that can bring 
harm to an individual or community if made public.  Exceptions must be justified on the basis 
of the high likelihood of significant harm to the individual or others. 
11.  Public health institutions should ensure the professional competence of their employees. 
12.  Public health institutions and their employees should engage in collaborations and 
affiliations in ways that build the public’s trust and the institution’s effectiveness. 
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Appendix 2: Topic Guide used for Focus Groups 
 
 
RECRUITMENT QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Good morning/afternoon.  I am an interviewer from ................  (AGENCY) and we are conducting 
some public opinion research.  Could you please spare a couple of minutes to answer a few 
questions? 
 
 
GENDER 
Male 1 RECRUIT 
Female 2 TO QUOTA 
 
EDUCATION (local definition) 
Further education 
achieved 1 RECRUIT 
Standard education  TO 
achieved 2 QUOTA 
 
WORKING STATUS 
Working full time 1 
Working part time 2 RECRUIT 
Full time student 3 A 
Housewife 4 MIX 
Retired 5 
Unemployed 6 CLOSE 
 
No more than 3 students or housewives in any 
one group, must have at least half of each 
group in some kind of work 
 
AGE 
Under 20 1 CLOSE 
20-30 2 RECRUIT TO QUOTA 
31-44 3 CLOSE 
45-60 4 RECRUIT TO QUOTA 
61+  5 CLOSE 
 
LIFESTAGE 
Single/ co-habiting,  RECRUIT 
Without children 1 TO QUOTA 
Married/ co-habiting/ live 
alone, with children (or 
have children who have  RECRUIT 
left home) 2 TO QUOTA 
 
 
NATIONALITY 
Are you a ‘national’ and been resident for 2 
years? 
Yes 1 CONTINUE 
No 2 CLOSE 
 
QA) First, can you tell me whether you or any of your close family or friends work (or have worked in 
the recent past) in any of these professions? 
Advertising/ PR 1 CLOSE 
Marketing/ Market research 2 CLOSE 
Journalism.  3  CLOSE 
Health industry (inc.  pharmaceutical company) 4  CLOSE 
Government*  5  CLOSE 
Other 6  CONTINUE 
*CONTINUE for civil servants e.g.  teachers, and any not involved in policy decision making, local 
council etc. 
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QB) Have you ever attended a group discussion/ focus group or interview for the purposes of 
market research? 
Yes 1 GO TO QC 
No 2 GO TO Q1 
 
QC) Have you been to a group discussion or market research interview in the last 6 months? 
Yes 1 CLOSE 
No 2 GO TO QD 
 
QD) How many group discussions or interviews have you attended in the last 2 years 
(i.e.  6 months – 2 years)? 
None 1 GO TO Q1 
1 or 2 2 GO TO QE 
3 3  GO TO QE 
More than 3 4 CLOSE 
 
QE) For each occasion, could you tell me what was the subject of the market research group 
discussion or interview you attended: 
................................................................................................................ 
................................................................................................................ 
(WRITE IN SUBJECT MATTER FOR EACH OCCASION) 
IF SUBJECT MATTER WAS RELATED TO HEALTH ISSUES, POLITICS OR 
GOVERNMENT POLICY, CLOSE 
 
Q1 Which of the following best describes your attitude towards current affairs and contemporary social 
issues? 
 
I am very active in working for ‘political’ issues and causes I believe in, I hold 
strong views on certain issues  CLOSE 
I am interested in current political and social issues, and try to get involved 
when I can  CONTINUE 
I have some interest in current political and social issues, and like to keep 
myself informed and up to date through discussion with friends, reading 
newspapers and magazines and watching news programmes on TV  CONTINUE 
I am aware of current political and social issues from discussion with friends, 
reading newspapers and magazines and watching news programmes on TV CONTINUE 
I have no interest in current political and social issues and tend not to follow them                               
in the news CLOSE 
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Q2 Do you smoke? 
No..................................................  1 GO TO Q3 
Yes.................................................  2 GO TO Q5 
 
Q3 Have you ever smoked? 
No, never  1  RECRUIT AS NON-SMOKER 
Yes  2  GO TO Q4 
 
Q4 When did you give up smoking? 
Less than a year ago 1  CLOSE 
More than a year ago  2  RECRUIT AS NON-SMOKER 
 
Q5 Which of the following best describes you? 
I am an occasional/ social smoker (less than 10 cigarettes per day) 1  CLOSE 
I smoke between 10 and 25 cigarettes every day  2  RECRUIT AS SMOKER 
I smoke more than 25 cigarettes every day 3  CLOSE 
 
Q6 Which of the following best describes your attitude towards talking about issues that affect you and 
your family, and the country as a whole? 
I am quite private about certain things and think that political issues should not be                   
discussed between friends and acquaintances  CLOSE 
I am happy to discuss my feelings on certain issues and enjoy hearing what                                   
others have to say  CONTINUE 
I always hesitate to discuss issues in politics or current affairs as I feel I may not                         
appear very informed  CLOSE 
I am happy to talk about my feelings on certain issues, even if I don’t have all the facts  CONTINUE 
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FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE 
 
ATTITUDES TOWARDS PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUES 
Explain that we are asking people's views on the balance between public and private interest.  We are 
looking at the interests of the individual vs another individual vs society and want to find out when it is 
better to put emphasis on private interest versus the public interest. 
Explain the need for open debate, honest revelation and respect for individual viewpoints – 
even if they are not politically correct. 
1.  COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY (15 mins) 
I would like to start by talking about ‘community’ – what kind of community you live in and what you 
understand by the term ‘community’? 
Prompt: What sort of local community do you live in? 
Prompt: How well do you know the people who live in your area or who you work with (e.g.  do 
you know their names, can you ask favours of them)? 
Prompt: Would you prefer to keep to yourself or to be close friends with those around you? Do 
you think that other people in your community feel the same way? 
Prompt: If your neighbours asked questions about you, would you think they were being nosey 
or caring (e.g.  if they see people they don’t recognise hanging around outside your 
home, or if something was left on your doorstep)? 
Prompt: How does this compare to when you were younger? 
Prompt: What concerns you about the neighbourhood you live in? 
Describe (in terms of words or images) the sort of society that you would like to live in? 
Listen for/: Freedom to get on with life and look after yourself        
prompt  Caring society where everyone is looked after 
2.  COUNTRY SCENARIOS (15 mins) 
Imagine two countries in which you could live.  Imagine you have an average wage so the net amount 
you would pay for a standard package of healthcare/education/pension provision would be similar. 
Country 1: The government provides a high level of public services - education, health, pension and 
social care - but taxes are high to pay for them, and because the government makes decisions, there 
are some limitations on choice about education, health and social care.  If someone had a high wage 
they would pay more and poorer people would pay less, but all would have the same provision. 
Country 2: Taxes are low, but people are expected to pay for insurance in case they become 
unemployed or ill and to make provision for a pension and social care when they are older.  However 
because taxes are low they can make own choices about what sort of insurance/pensions to buy etc.  
All would pay the same for a particular package but people could choose to pay more or less to tailor 
their package to their needs. 
Perceptions: What are the advantages/disadvantages of Country 1? And what are the 
advantages/disadvantages of Country 2?  
Which country do you feel is most efficient in producing services?  
On a scale between these two countries, where would you put our country?  
What about people in the Country 2 scenario who do not make provision for themselves 
Prompt: For instance some might choose to spend money on holidays rather than invest in the 
future, or are on low wages so find it hard to pay for insurance cover? What should 
happen to them if they need public services later on? Is it acceptable that these people 
should live in poverty/hardship/with no health services? How do you feel about this 
situation/these people?  
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Is it fair/right/acceptable that people with no children have to pay for the public education of others or 
people who are never ill should pay for the health care of others? 
Prompt: What you get out of paying for someone else's education or health care? Would you go for 
a high tax country because it is important that everyone has a good standard of education 
or health or because you believe that there will be benefits for yourself? What might the 
benefits be? 
Prompt: Does it make a difference whether they are unhealthy because they are unlucky or 
because they smoke, don’t take exercise, unhealthy diet etc? 
3.  TWO LISTS; RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (SPLIT GROUP, PAPER AND PENCIL) (10 
MINS) 
Rights as a citizen? Responsibilities as a citizen?  
Looking at the list - do you think that you have enough/about right/too many rights versus 
responsibilities?  
How do you feel about the responsibilities you have identified 
4.  PERSONAL FREEDOM VS SOCIETY’S RULES? (15 mins) 
Are there rules in other aspects of our lives that you think are intrusive? 
Prompt:  Sign in the park saying do not walk on the grass (WHY???) 
Prompt:  Road traffic e.g.  speed, parking where not allowed, wearing car seat belt, motorcycle 
helmets, alcohol limits whilst driving 
Why do you think we have these rules? 
Prompt: Are some necessary even if they restrict personal freedom? 
Prompt: What makes you respect a rule as opposed to ignoring or flouting it? 
Prompt: Is there a difference between rules that can affect others by your behaviour and those 
where only you would be harmed? e.g.  interfering with fire devices e.g.  car seat belt, 
motorcycle helmet? 
Why do you think these issues actually become laws, i.e.  why do you think the government needs to 
make laws on these issues when the evidence should be enough to make us do things voluntarily – 
e.g.  car seat belt, motorcycle helmets 
5.  EVALUATING SPECIFIC ISSUES – ‘ NOT IN MY BACK YARD’ (15 mins) 
Imagine there are plans to build: 
• !a mobile phone mast 
• !a home for people with mental illness? 
• !a chemical plant making everyday items, like plastic or pharmaceuticals 
in your neighbourhood.  How would you feel about this? 
Prompt: Effect on value of house, impact on health? 
Prompt: They are worthwhile, but just wouldn’t want them near your house? 
Some people may say ‘not in my backyard’ – is this fair? 
Should their protests be ignored or accepted? In what circumstances? 
Should people accept some risks so that others benefit (e.g.  mentally ill people cared for, jobs created 
in factories, mobile phone networks operate all over the country) 
Prompt: The risks would be quite low? 
Prompt: Or where risks are still not proven should we not proceed at all, e.g.  no-one allowed to 
use mobile phones because controversy surrounds the safety of masts and handsets ? 
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Briefly, who would you trust to reassure you that benefits are likely to outweigh the risks? 
Prompt: a civil servant, a public agency, someone with responsibility for public health, a politician? 
Independent or government? 
Do you think that government and/or public agencies provide the right amount of information about 
risks to our health? 
Prompt:  Should they give us all the information, which may confuse, or judge the type and amount 
of information we can handle? 
Prompt:  do they have the right to judge whether it is necessary to tell the public everything in all 
circumstances, or does controlling information suggest something else, e.g.  protecting 
groups or commercial interests etc? 
Prompt: examples may help – e.g.  pill scares, mad cow disease? 
6.  SMOKING POLICY (15 mins) 
Should we encourage people to stop smoking? (If so why? How?) 
Prompt:  Ban smoking completely (Why not, given well documented and accepted evidence of 
harm to health and number of deaths, etc) 
 Taxation on tobacco, banning advertising 
 Subsidised gum/patches, smoking cessation advice/support 
Do you think that people ought to be allowed to smoke in public areas? 
Prompt:  Advantages/ disadvantages? 
Prompt:  Workplace, Bars/ restaurants, Public transport 
Do you/ smokers always obey these restrictions on smoking? (Identify smokers, ex-smokers in the 
group) 
Prompt:  In what kinds of places do smokers tend to ignore these instructions? 
Prompt:  Why do you think smokers ignore these rules? 
Prompt:  Because not enforced 
Prompt:  Inadequate penalties 
7.  PARENTAL RIGHTS EXAMPLES 
Should government have the right to make laws that affect how all parents bring up their children in 
order to protect a small minority of children? In what circumstances? 
8.  SMACKING OF CHILDREN 
Research suggests that smacking a child could lead a child to believe that violence is acceptable.  
While a smack is not always harmful and can be a useful tool in teaching a child what is dangerous, a 
small minority of parents take this too extremes.  To protect this minority of children do you think that 
everyone including parents are stopped from smacking children by law.   
Does prohibiting smacking restrict the civil liberties of parents to bring up the child as they may feel 
best or protect the human rights of the child?  
Is it a sensible law, as it might not be respected by some parents who physically/mentally/sexually 
abuse their children anyway? 
8a.  CHILDHOOD IMMUNISATION 
There are scares from time to time about the safety of vaccines and while risks are low individual 
parents can become scared of the damage that the vaccine could cause to their own child. 
Should the decision as to whether to vaccinate their own child be left to the parents? Or should 
vaccinations be enforced by the government to keep the disease (such as measles) out of society as a 
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whole – a disease which can cause more deaths and damage to more children than the risks 
associated with the vaccine? 
9.  JEHOVAH’S WITNESS 
Should parents impose particular religious beliefs on their child? What about some beliefs such as 
being a Jehovah’s witness where parents could refuse consent for their child to have a life saving 
blood transfusion. 
10.  VEGANS 
Should parents be allowed to bring up a child as a vegan so potentially restricting the child’s dietary 
input of essential nutrients? (Research suggests that vegan diets are not sufficient for a growing child.) 
11.  DRUGS EXAMPLES 
Should government have the right to make laws that allow individuals to get involved in potentially 
harmful activities in an attempt to minimise harm to individuals and society overall?  
Some people claim that softer drugs such as ecstasy and cannabis are no more dangerous than 
tobacco and alcohol, thus the individual should be allowed to weigh up the risks for themselves and 
exercise their own civil liberties.  Many governments are considering legalising cannabis.   
The government is not actually condoning the use of this drug (in an ideal world people would not use 
alcohol or tobacco either) but they are accepting some evils in order to try and prevent greater harm to 
individuals and to society. 
11a.  LEGALISING CANNABIS 
Should cannabis be legalised -- use among young people is so common anyway, and they may be 
less likely to move on to harder drugs if they are not making contact with drug dealers? 
What would be the advantages and disadvantages for society of legalising its use? 
Should there be limitations – e.g.  medical use only, controlled use only - in specific areas only, at 
home only, bought from specific (even government run) shops or outlets etc 
12.  NEEDLE EXCHANGE 
What about providing clean needles for harder drugs such as heroin.  Drug users who inject their 
drugs sometimes use dirty needles, share needles with other people and pass on HIV or other 
infections such as hepatitis.  One way of reducing the transfer of these infections is to provide needle 
exchange schemes so drug users can at least use clean needles.  Some people are concerned that 
these schemes can appear to condone drug use.   
Should these people who are breaking the law be helped to stay healthier and reduce the spread of 
disease? What are the advantages and disadvantages for society of exchanging needles? 
13.  SUPPLEMENTATION OF FOOD EXAMPLES 
Does government have the right to alter basic foods/water of the whole population to benefit a minority 
of the population?  
In these examples, the supplementation targets vulnerable groups, especially children.  People could 
have vitamins they need by having fresh fruit and vegetables in their diet or using fluoride toothpaste.  
However many people, especially the poor, do not.  Thus it is easier for public health to add these 
things to food or water, as this ensures that everyone, especially vulnerable children, get them.  But 
some claim that this restricts civil liberties. 
14.  ADDING VITAMINS TO FOOD 
Some people do not have a balanced diet and do not eat as many vitamins as they need.  One way to 
get round this is to add extra vitamins and supplements to cereals, bread etc.   
Provided that these foods are properly labelled, people can chose to buy or avoid these as they wish.  
Do you tend to buy or avoid foods with such supplements, or don’t you make a conscious decision one 
way or the other?  (very complex – they may get sidetracked into discussing the benefits of artificial 
vitamin supplements vs.  natural healthy food?) 
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14a.  ADDING FLUORIDE TO WATER 
It is also possible to add fluoride to the water supply.  Fluoride is important for strong and healthy 
teeth.  Fluoride is not harmful unless it is taken in extremely large amounts (not likely).  Adding fluoride 
in this way is especially good for children who don’t brush their teeth as often as they should. 
Unlike adding vitamins to cereals, it is more difficult to avoid drinking water that has fluoride added.  
Do you think that some people would object to having to drink water with fluoride added? (Why should 
they unless there are bad side effects? Are there any?) 
15.  FOOD POISIONING EXAMPLE 
Should government have the right to pass on personal details or restrict an individual’s activities and 
rights in order to limit a wider risk to health? 
Imagine you have been to a restaurant or bought some food from a take-out restaurant and the 
following day you develop severe vomiting and diarrhoea.  You visit a doctor who feels that you have 
very bad food poisoning which could be a danger to others and needs investigating. 
Should the doctor pass on details of the case so that someone can investigate whether the illness is 
part of an outbreak, and perhaps withdraw the responsible food from sale or ensure that the person 
selling the food improves hygiene standards? 
Prompt:  What if the patient wants to maintain their confidentiality? Is looking into the source of the 
food poisoning to prevent other people developing food poisoning more important? 
Imagine your job is preparing food – it could be in a restaurant or a hospital or a school. 
Should the doctor or public health have the right to stop you going to work in order to protect the 
health of others/the children in the school/the people in the hospital? 
Prompt:  What if this meant you lost earnings/money? Would it be different if your wages were paid 
by the government while you had food poisoning (which is what happens in some 
countries like the UK)? 
Prompt:  What if laws like this made it more expensive to eat in a restaurant or to provide meals for 
hospitals or schools? 
What about other diseases e.g.  HIV or other sexually transmitted diseases? There is more stigma 
associated with these diseases and so a patient may be more concerned about confidentiality. 
What about duties not to pass on infection to other people? e.g.  sexual partners people you work with 
(e.g.  if you have a cold/influenza) 
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Appendix 3: Data from European Social Survey 
 
If you want to make money, you can't always act honestly Total 
 Agree strongly Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly   
Austria 7.0% 23.9% 21.5% 29.9% 17.6% 2147 
Belgium 12.6% 31.1% 15.4% 30.5% 10.4% 1761 
Switzerland 9.1% 36.0% 12.4% 31.6% 11.0% 2107 
Czech 
Republic 7.7% 24.0% 23.3% 25.2% 19.9% 2878 
Germany 5.9% 30.3% 20.6% 32.3% 10.8% 2814 
Denmark 3.1% 18.2% 15.4% 43.3% 20.1% 1456 
Estonia 5.2% 32.3% 23.2% 31.3% 8.0% 1855 
Spain 3.5% 26.1% 15.4% 38.3% 16.7% 1633 
Finland 9.4% 24.3% 18.8% 29.5% 17.9% 1990 
France 9.9% 26.1% 13.8% 22.2% 28.1% 1799 
United 
Kingdom 2.8% 27.3% 21.2% 39.7% 9.0% 1884 
Greece 15.4% 36.2% 22.1% 20.9% 5.5% 2336 
Hungary 10.6% 30.8% 24.1% 27.4% 7.1% 1466 
Ireland 5.9% 33.6% 12.4% 40.9% 7.1% 2253 
Iceland 4.3% 27.3% 12.8% 36.5% 19.1% 554 
Luxembourg 11.7% 33.3% 16.0% 28.2% 10.9% 1584 
Netherlands 2.4% 18.5% 14.3% 49.8% 15.1% 1869 
Norway 2.9% 17.7% 13.7% 45.5% 20.2% 1749 
Poland 7.2% 39.6% 17.9% 28.0% 7.4% 1663 
Portugal 4.2% 15.5% 13.7% 41.2% 25.4% 1997 
Sweden 3.0% 23.8% 16.8% 39.4% 17.1% 1911 
Slovenia 7.1% 33.1% 21.0% 31.2% 7.6% 1415 
Slovakia 5.0% 26.3% 26.9% 35.9% 5.9% 1452 
Turkey 23.7% 25.5% 9.1% 29.3% 12.4% 1804 
Ukraine 21.0% 30.2% 23.0% 18.8% 7.0% 1888 
Total 8.2% 27.7% 18.0% 32.7% 13.4% 46265 
 
If you want to make money, you can't always act honestly Total 
 Agree strongly Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly   
Male 9.5% 31.4% 17.9% 29.8% 11.4% 21383 
Female 7.0% 24.5% 18.1% 35.1% 15.2% 24813 
Total 8.2% 27.7% 18.0% 32.7% 13.5% 46196 
 
If you want to make money, you can't always act honestly Total 
 Agree strongly Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly   
24 and 
under 8.7% 32.3% 22.0% 28.0% 8.9% 6460 
25-34 8.8% 29.9% 19.6% 30.8% 10.9% 7426 
35-44 8.5% 28.4% 17.4% 32.7% 13.1% 8443 
45-54 8.7% 28.2% 17.1% 32.2% 13.7% 7844 
55-64 7.7% 26.1% 15.5% 35.3% 15.3% 6998 
65-74 6.9% 24.0% 16.9% 36.0% 16.2% 5485 
75 and over 6.4% 20.8% 16.9% 36.1% 19.7% 3364 
Total 8.1% 27.7% 18.0% 32.7% 13.5% 46020 
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Occasionally alright to ignore law and do what you want Total 
 Agree strongly Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly   
Austria 3.7% 25.0% 26.0% 29.7% 15.6% 2145 
Belgium 4.1% 31.6% 23.1% 29.7% 11.4% 1763 
Switzerland 1.8% 26.4% 18.5% 42.5% 10.9% 2124 
Czech 
Republic 3.5% 16.0% 27.3% 29.5% 23.7% 2877 
Germany 1.6% 18.4% 23.7% 45.7% 10.6% 2833 
Denmark 2.0% 21.4% 17.4% 42.5% 16.7% 1464 
Estonia 1.4% 19.8% 27.1% 42.1% 9.6% 1889 
Spain 1.7% 18.2% 19.0% 45.8% 15.4% 1628 
Finland 2.8% 16.4% 17.3% 42.6% 21.1% 2000 
France 3.4% 16.8% 16.1% 33.8% 29.9% 1803 
United 
Kingdom 1.1% 14.3% 17.6% 52.6% 14.5% 1887 
Greece 2.4% 12.4% 22.6% 46.1% 16.5% 2340 
Hungary 2.4% 16.3% 25.3% 42.4% 13.6% 1473 
Ireland 1.7% 15.3% 12.1% 60.7% 10.2% 2264 
Iceland .5% 15.5% 16.1% 54.1% 13.8% 560 
Luxembourg 3.9% 21.5% 20.6% 39.0% 14.9% 1598 
Netherlands 2.4% 31.6% 24.1% 36.2% 5.7% 1866 
Norway .9% 16.3% 17.7% 49.8% 15.3% 1756 
Poland 3.2% 23.5% 23.5% 40.4% 9.4% 1652 
Portugal 1.1% 10.8% 25.1% 42.7% 20.3% 1992 
Sweden 1.1% 18.2% 18.9% 45.2% 16.6% 1930 
Slovenia 3.3% 14.8% 27.8% 43.2% 10.9% 1395 
Slovakia 1.0% 15.2% 27.9% 48.2% 7.7% 1451 
Turkey 3.0% 8.9% 11.6% 55.7% 20.8% 1772 
Ukraine 3.9% 12.6% 24.2% 40.0% 19.2% 1907 
Total 2.4% 18.3% 21.4% 42.7% 15.2% 46369 
 
Occasionally alright to ignore law and do what you want Total 
 Agree strongly Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly   
Male 2.8% 20.9% 22.3% 40.2% 13.8% 21356 
Female 2.0% 16.1% 20.6% 44.9% 16.4% 24943 
Total 2.4% 18.3% 21.4% 42.7% 15.2% 46299 
 
Occasionally alright to ignore law and do what you want Total 
 Agree strongly Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly   
24 and 
under 2.7% 22.5% 26.7% 37.9% 10.3% 6443 
25-34 2.4% 19.0% 24.1% 42.0% 12.5% 7394 
35-44 2.3% 18.8% 22.3% 42.2% 14.4% 8439 
45-54 2.4% 18.7% 21.1% 42.9% 14.8% 7839 
55-64 2.4% 18.5% 18.0% 43.7% 17.3% 7026 
65-74 1.9% 14.4% 17.6% 46.5% 19.5% 5532 
75 and over 2.2% 13.1% 16.6% 46.5% 21.7% 3451 
Total 2.3% 18.3% 21.4% 42.8% 15.2% 46124 
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Citizens should spend some free time helping others Total 
 Agree strongly Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly   
Austria 17.5% 52.0% 22.3% 5.6% 2.5% 2185 
Belgium 16.5% 48.2% 23.5% 10.4% 1.4% 1775 
Switzerland 15.1% 63.8% 15.8% 4.9% .4% 2136 
Czech 
Republic 23.3% 52.2% 20.2% 3.7% .6% 2930 
Germany 11.2% 63.5% 20.1% 4.7% .5% 2826 
Denmark 10.3% 50.9% 26.8% 9.9% 2.1% 1460 
Estonia 9.5% 52.6% 29.9% 7.0% .9% 1907 
Spain 17.2% 67.7% 11.6% 2.5% 1.0% 1646 
Finland 12.2% 51.4% 28.6% 7.0% .8% 2012 
France 29.7% 49.2% 15.3% 4.1% 1.8% 1803 
United 
Kingdom 12.6% 58.4% 25.1% 3.7% .3% 1890 
Greece 24.1% 60.0% 11.8% 3.2% .9% 2396 
Hungary 18.7% 56.2% 17.1% 6.5% 1.6% 1483 
Ireland 21.2% 67.2% 8.3% 3.1% .3% 2263 
Iceland 13.1% 52.1% 27.6% 6.7% .5% 566 
Luxembourg 17.2% 63.5% 14.3% 4.4% .6% 1612 
Netherlands 7.8% 45.8% 25.6% 19.4% 1.4% 1874 
Norway 15.6% 63.0% 17.7% 3.6% .1% 1759 
Poland 13.1% 66.1% 17.1% 3.6% .2% 1689 
Portugal 27.9% 60.5% 10.4% .8% .3% 2026 
Sweden 7.4% 60.7% 27.6% 4.0% .3% 1923 
Slovenia 16.0% 66.9% 13.7% 3.1% .4% 1427 
Slovakia 12.6% 66.5% 18.0% 2.6% .2% 1474 
Turkey 46.3% 47.2% 4.0% 1.8% .8% 1828 
Ukraine 21.3% 47.1% 22.9% 7.6% 1.2% 1969 
Total 17.8% 57.3% 18.8% 5.2% .8% 46859 
 
Citizens should spend some free time helping others Total 
 Agree strongly Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly   
Male 16.8% 57.7% 19.1% 5.5% .9% 21514 
Female 18.7% 57.0% 18.5% 5.0% .8% 25275 
Total 17.8% 57.3% 18.8% 5.2% .8% 46789 
 
Citizens should spend some free time helping others Total 
 Agree strongly Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly   
24 and 
under 16.5% 57.8% 20.6% 4.3% .8% 6505 
25-34 15.9% 56.0% 21.7% 5.7% .8% 7449 
35-44 16.3% 55.3% 21.2% 6.3% .8% 8496 
45-54 16.2% 57.1% 19.9% 6.0% .9% 7888 
55-64 18.7% 58.6% 16.4% 5.3% 1.0% 7075 
65-74 21.0% 60.1% 14.1% 4.1% .8% 5637 
75 and over 24.6% 58.6% 12.7% 3.4% .8% 3555 
Total 17.8% 57.4% 18.7% 5.2% .8% 46605 
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Citizens should not cheat on taxes Total 
 Agree strongly Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly   
Austria 31.8% 39.5% 19.4% 6.4% 3.0% 2149 
Belgium 19.2% 41.1% 21.6% 14.3% 3.7% 1762 
Switzerland 28.4% 54.0% 10.3% 5.7% 1.6% 2121 
Czech 
Republic 46.8% 31.1% 12.2% 4.2% 5.7% 2901 
Germany 17.5% 56.2% 17.0% 7.6% 1.8% 2794 
Denmark 35.4% 47.3% 10.7% 4.9% 1.7% 1475 
Estonia 27.9% 61.8% 7.3% 2.1% .9% 1937 
Spain 20.8% 60.9% 10.1% 5.5% 2.7% 1640 
Finland 37.7% 44.0% 11.8% 4.8% 1.8% 2013 
France 39.6% 37.2% 13.8% 6.3% 3.2% 1800 
United 
Kingdom 22.5% 58.4% 11.8% 5.3% 1.9% 1891 
Greece 28.4% 47.6% 14.6% 7.2% 2.1% 2366 
Hungary 37.5% 48.7% 8.7% 3.6% 1.5% 1477 
Ireland 27.8% 59.5% 7.2% 4.5% 1.0% 2267 
Iceland 30.5% 54.7% 10.2% 3.4% 1.2% 567 
Luxembourg 31.1% 49.1% 10.1% 6.1% 3.5% 1554 
Netherlands 20.0% 61.8% 10.3% 6.7% 1.2% 1870 
Norway 21.9% 59.3% 10.9% 6.5% 1.4% 1756 
Poland 26.3% 59.9% 10.1% 3.1% .6% 1699 
Portugal 35.1% 50.3% 12.0% 1.7% .9% 2011 
Sweden 27.3% 51.1% 10.2% 7.4% 4.0% 1936 
Slovenia 31.6% 52.3% 10.1% 4.7% 1.3% 1416 
Slovakia 23.8% 57.8% 8.7% 6.9% 2.7% 1472 
Turkey 58.2% 36.0% 2.2% 1.6% 2.1% 1798 
Ukraine 34.3% 34.0% 22.0% 7.2% 2.5% 1899 
Total 30.5% 49.6% 12.0% 5.6% 2.3% 46571 
 
Citizens should not cheat on taxes Total 
 Agree strongly Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly   
Male 27.9% 49.7% 13.4% 6.5% 2.5% 21405 
Female 32.8% 49.5% 10.9% 4.8% 2.1% 25095 
Total 30.5% 49.6% 12.0% 5.6% 2.3% 46500 
 
Citizens should not cheat on taxes Total 
 Agree strongly Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly   
24 and 
under 25.6% 51.2% 14.8% 6.0% 2.3% 6392 
25-34 27.3% 50.1% 14.4% 6.2% 2.0% 7424 
35-44 27.2% 50.6% 13.4% 6.7% 2.1% 8486 
45-54 29.2% 50.4% 12.1% 5.8% 2.6% 7869 
55-64 33.9% 49.2% 9.9% 4.9% 2.1% 7050 
65-74 36.9% 48.4% 7.8% 4.4% 2.5% 5575 
75 and over 40.3% 44.8% 8.8% 3.7% 2.4% 3523 
Total 30.5% 49.6% 12.0% 5.6% 2.3% 46319 
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You should always obey law even if it means missing good opportunities Total 
 Agree strongly Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly   
Austria 13.9% 37.4% 31.0% 14.7% 3.0% 2147 
Belgium 11.1% 36.4% 27.6% 21.4% 3.5% 1765 
Switzerland 13.6% 50.8% 21.7% 12.7% 1.3% 2125 
Czech 
Republic 25.0% 39.8% 22.6% 9.1% 3.5% 2905 
Germany 11.5% 54.2% 24.7% 8.6% .9% 2837 
Denmark 20.9% 48.5% 18.4% 11.0% 1.2% 1463 
Estonia 11.8% 53.8% 23.3% 10.0% 1.2% 1909 
Spain 11.2% 53.9% 22.2% 10.2% 2.4% 1619 
Finland 26.1% 43.4% 19.5% 9.5% 1.4% 2005 
France 31.1% 39.0% 16.2% 11.1% 2.7% 1800 
United 
Kingdom 14.2% 53.7% 20.9% 10.2% 1.0% 1881 
Greece 20.0% 54.2% 18.4% 6.2% 1.1% 2342 
Hungary 18.8% 47.3% 24.0% 8.7% 1.1% 1475 
Ireland 12.1% 64.0% 13.0% 10.3% .7% 2262 
Iceland 14.0% 51.0% 21.8% 11.6% 1.6% 559 
Luxembourg 17.6% 50.5% 18.7% 10.8% 2.3% 1615 
Netherlands 5.5% 38.9% 31.9% 21.9% 1.9% 1861 
Norway 15.4% 59.4% 16.6% 7.4% 1.2% 1755 
Poland 15.9% 51.5% 22.6% 8.9% 1.1% 1681 
Portugal 20.7% 49.9% 20.9% 7.0% 1.5% 2005 
Sweden 14.2% 49.4% 25.0% 10.3% 1.1% 1920 
Slovenia 9.0% 43.3% 31.5% 14.3% 1.8% 1408 
Slovakia 8.6% 48.7% 29.1% 12.8% .8% 1452 
Turkey 38.7% 44.7% 9.9% 4.5% 2.2% 1789 
Ukraine 23.2% 36.5% 29.1% 9.5% 1.6% 1940 
Total 17.2% 48.0% 22.4% 10.7% 1.7% 46520 
 
You should always obey law even if it means missing good opportunities Total 
 Agree strongly Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly   
Male 15.8% 46.2% 23.9% 12.1% 2.0% 21405 
Female 18.4% 49.5% 21.0% 9.6% 1.5% 25047 
Total 17.2% 48.0% 22.4% 10.7% 1.7% 46452 
 
You should always obey law even if it means missing good opportunities Total 
 Agree strongly Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly   
24 and 
under 12.1% 42.3% 28.5% 15.2% 1.9% 6480 
25-34 13.2% 45.8% 26.3% 13.1% 1.6% 7413 
35-44 14.8% 47.0% 24.7% 11.7% 1.8% 8445 
45-54 16.6% 49.2% 22.4% 10.2% 1.6% 7855 
55-64 20.2% 50.4% 19.0% 8.8% 1.6% 7037 
65-74 23.1% 52.6% 15.6% 6.9% 1.8% 5556 
75 and over 26.8% 50.8% 14.1% 6.6% 1.7% 3486 
Total 17.2% 48.0% 22.3% 10.7% 1.7% 46272 
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Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair Total 
 
Most people 
try to take 
advantage of 
me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Most people 
try to be fair   
Austria 2.4% 2.0% 3.8% 7.2% 9.1% 21.7% 11.2% 17.5% 15.4% 5.2% 4.4% 2221 
Belgium 2.7% 1.4% 5.1% 7.6% 8.4% 22.6% 12.1% 22.2% 12.6% 2.9% 2.5% 1772 
Switzerland .9% 1.2% 2.4% 4.6% 5.8% 18.0% 10.6% 21.6% 24.1% 6.6% 4.3% 2134 
Czech 
Republic 4.3% 2.8% 5.8% 9.5% 11.8% 23.0% 12.0% 14.5% 11.4% 3.3% 1.6% 2965 
Germany 2.5% 1.3% 4.5% 7.4% 8.9% 21.6% 12.7% 18.4% 15.8% 4.0% 2.9% 2853 
Denmark .6% .5% 1.3% 2.2% 3.3% 12.8% 6.1% 16.5% 29.4% 16.1% 11.1% 1475 
Estonia 1.8% 2.3% 5.6% 10.6% 9.4% 24.1% 10.8% 16.7% 12.2% 3.6% 2.9% 1942 
Spain 3.4% 2.8% 7.4% 7.4% 8.6% 25.8% 14.1% 16.6% 10.0% 2.1% 1.8% 1656 
Finland .4% .7% 1.3% 3.2% 3.8% 12.3% 11.5% 25.0% 29.7% 9.1% 2.9% 2013 
France 3.3% 1.7% 4.2% 6.2% 8.5% 25.9% 12.6% 16.6% 14.5% 3.8% 2.8% 1804 
United 
Kingdom 1.4% 2.0% 4.5% 8.9% 9.8% 23.8% 12.7% 18.7% 13.1% 3.2% 1.7% 1883 
Greece 6.4% 12.1% 13.8% 15.4% 12.0% 20.3% 8.3% 6.6% 3.6% 1.1% .4% 2404 
Hungary 5.1% 5.7% 10.1% 12.3% 11.3% 23.6% 9.6% 10.7% 8.4% 1.3% 1.9% 1485 
Ireland 1.5% 3.9% 4.0% 6.1% 7.1% 16.9% 10.1% 18.5% 19.9% 7.9% 4.3% 2278 
Iceland .4% .2% 1.4% 3.3% 4.2% 14.3% 9.2% 22.0% 31.2% 8.3% 5.6% 568 
Luxembourg 4.1% 2.2% 5.3% 7.4% 7.4% 23.3% 9.1% 12.6% 16.6% 6.8% 5.3% 1619 
Netherlands .9% 1.2% 2.1% 3.8% 6.4% 15.5% 16.5% 30.7% 17.5% 4.3% 1.1% 1878 
Norway .3% .6% 1.5% 3.3% 3.2% 12.6% 10.2% 24.6% 28.5% 9.7% 5.4% 1759 
Poland 6.8% 5.9% 8.7% 12.8% 10.2% 25.3% 6.4% 9.4% 8.4% 3.1% 3.0% 1674 
Portugal 1.7% 2.5% 8.5% 14.9% 14.7% 23.6% 12.9% 11.3% 6.4% 2.2% 1.4% 2033 
Sweden .9% .9% 3.0% 4.4% 5.1% 16.3% 10.4% 20.8% 24.6% 9.9% 3.7% 1938 
Slovenia 5.9% 4.5% 9.2% 11.5% 8.7% 25.9% 7.6% 11.2% 10.9% 2.7% 2.0% 1432 
Slovakia 6.6% 4.2% 7.5% 12.4% 13.3% 30.0% 7.9% 8.3% 6.0% 1.5% 2.4% 1479 
Turkey 16.0% 14.2% 11.4% 10.6% 7.5% 15.5% 6.7% 5.5% 5.3% 2.5% 4.8% 1822 
Ukraine 5.2% 4.6% 8.2% 13.5% 10.0% 26.6% 8.9% 10.4% 5.8% 2.3% 4.5% 1970 
Total 3.4% 3.3% 5.7% 8.4% 8.6% 20.9% 10.6% 16.3% 14.8% 4.8% 3.2% 47057 
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Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair Total 
 
Most people 
try to take 
advantage of 
me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Most people 
try to be fair   
Male 3.6% 3.2% 5.8% 8.7% 8.4% 21.2% 11.0% 16.8% 14.3% 4.4% 2.7% 21634 
Female 3.3% 3.5% 5.6% 8.2% 8.7% 20.6% 10.3% 15.8% 15.2% 5.1% 3.6% 25347 
Total 3.4% 3.3% 5.7% 8.4% 8.6% 20.9% 10.6% 16.3% 14.8% 4.8% 3.2% 46981 
 
 
Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair Total 
 
Most people 
try to take 
advantage of 
me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Most people 
try to be fair   
24 and 
under 2.5% 3.0% 4.7% 8.3% 9.7% 22.2% 12.5% 17.0% 13.0% 4.5% 2.6% 6536 
25-34 3.9% 3.5% 6.1% 8.3% 9.2% 21.5% 11.6% 17.0% 13.0% 4.0% 1.9% 7478 
35-44 3.6% 3.4% 5.1% 8.1% 8.1% 20.9% 11.4% 17.7% 14.5% 4.5% 2.6% 8524 
45-54 3.6% 3.0% 5.6% 8.5% 8.0% 20.5% 10.1% 16.6% 16.2% 4.8% 3.0% 7920 
55-64 3.6% 3.4% 5.5% 7.8% 8.2% 21.2% 10.0% 15.2% 16.5% 5.1% 3.6% 7108 
65-74 3.3% 3.5% 7.3% 9.6% 8.6% 19.3% 8.8% 15.1% 14.6% 5.3% 4.6% 5642 
75 and over 2.9% 4.0% 6.3% 8.5% 7.6% 19.8% 8.3% 13.6% 16.6% 6.1% 6.3% 3586 
Total 3.4% 3.3% 5.7% 8.4% 8.5% 20.9% 10.6% 16.3% 14.8% 4.8% 3.2% 46794 
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Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful Total 
 
You can't be 
too careful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Most people 
can be trusted   
Austria 5.8% 3.4% 5.1% 9.1% 10.5% 23.0% 11.7% 16.2% 10.0% 2.8% 2.5% 2234 
Belgium 7.3% 3.3% 6.9% 11.1% 9.2% 22.5% 12.2% 17.5% 7.6% 1.4% 1.1% 1776 
Switzerland 2.5% 1.3% 4.3% 9.1% 7.7% 22.0% 11.1% 19.0% 17.4% 3.8% 1.9% 2141 
Czech 
Republic 8.4% 6.7% 11.0% 15.0% 11.8% 18.9% 9.1% 10.4% 5.9% 1.9% 1.0% 2994 
Germany 5.9% 2.7% 8.3% 13.0% 12.1% 21.6% 10.7% 14.3% 8.3% 2.0% 1.2% 2866 
Denmark 1.6% 1.3% 1.7% 4.2% 3.8% 15.4% 8.1% 18.7% 27.7% 10.9% 6.7% 1478 
Estonia 2.1% 3.5% 5.7% 9.9% 10.5% 25.7% 13.6% 16.1% 9.1% 2.1% 1.7% 1970 
Spain 5.4% 3.6% 6.9% 9.3% 9.6% 25.6% 14.4% 14.1% 8.8% .9% 1.3% 1661 
Finland .5% .4% 1.8% 4.6% 5.8% 15.0% 13.2% 23.5% 26.8% 5.7% 2.6% 2015 
France 6.7% 4.0% 8.2% 11.6% 12.9% 27.4% 8.8% 10.6% 7.1% 1.6% 1.0% 1805 
United 
Kingdom 3.5% 3.2% 5.0% 10.2% 12.3% 23.9% 12.0% 15.3% 11.1% 2.5% 1.1% 1893 
Greece 7.8% 10.8% 14.1% 14.2% 11.0% 17.9% 7.2% 8.1% 5.8% 2.4% .7% 2405 
Hungary 7.7% 7.1% 12.3% 15.0% 11.3% 24.2% 8.4% 7.2% 4.8% .6% 1.3% 1490 
Ireland 2.5% 2.6% 4.5% 7.4% 7.6% 18.1% 11.5% 16.8% 17.3% 7.1% 4.6% 2278 
Iceland 3.7% .7% 2.8% 4.9% 5.1% 14.0% 8.2% 26.5% 20.7% 8.6% 4.7% 570 
Luxembourg 7.0% 3.5% 4.7% 10.9% 8.5% 26.5% 9.3% 12.9% 10.7% 3.1% 2.9% 1629 
Netherlands 2.4% 1.6% 3.3% 7.3% 7.5% 15.9% 16.1% 27.7% 14.8% 2.7% .9% 1880 
Norway .8% .9% 1.9% 4.3% 4.5% 14.4% 11.0% 22.8% 28.2% 7.8% 3.4% 1758 
Poland 13.0% 9.3% 11.5% 14.7% 11.1% 22.2% 6.8% 5.7% 4.1% .8% .8% 1707 
Portugal 6.7% 6.5% 13.7% 19.0% 15.2% 17.6% 8.3% 7.9% 3.2% 1.1% .8% 2049 
Sweden 2.7% 1.4% 4.0% 6.7% 7.4% 16.7% 8.9% 21.3% 21.2% 7.2% 2.7% 1941 
Slovenia 9.6% 7.2% 11.2% 13.6% 9.6% 21.1% 7.7% 10.3% 7.4% 1.5% .9% 1437 
Slovakia 10.7% 5.9% 9.1% 12.5% 11.9% 30.2% 6.7% 7.1% 3.3% 1.1% 1.6% 1498 
Turkey 23.9% 16.6% 10.3% 9.8% 6.5% 16.2% 4.1% 5.1% 4.2% .6% 2.8% 1840 
Ukraine 10.1% 6.1% 9.4% 13.0% 10.6% 22.6% 8.0% 7.2% 5.9% 2.9% 4.2% 2013 
Total 6.3% 4.6% 7.3% 10.7% 9.6% 20.7% 10.0% 14.2% 11.3% 3.1% 2.0% 47328 
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Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful Total 
 
You can't be 
too careful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Most people 
can be trusted   
Male 6.0% 4.3% 7.0% 10.5% 9.3% 20.4% 10.5% 15.2% 11.7% 3.0% 1.9% 21721 
Female 6.6% 5.0% 7.6% 10.9% 9.9% 21.0% 9.6% 13.3% 10.9% 3.2% 2.2% 25529 
Total 6.3% 4.6% 7.3% 10.7% 9.6% 20.7% 10.0% 14.2% 11.3% 3.1% 2.0% 47250 
 
 
 
Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful Total 
 
You can't be 
too careful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Most people 
can be trusted   
24 and 
under 4.8% 3.6% 6.3% 10.3% 11.9% 22.0% 12.2% 15.8% 9.4% 2.3% 1.4% 6568 
25-34 5.9% 5.0% 7.3% 11.2% 10.0% 20.7% 10.6% 15.3% 10.1% 2.4% 1.6% 7515 
35-44 6.2% 4.4% 7.0% 10.4% 9.2% 20.0% 10.5% 15.3% 12.1% 3.1% 1.8% 8565 
45-54 6.5% 4.4% 7.1% 10.3% 9.6% 19.5% 9.4% 14.6% 13.0% 3.4% 2.3% 7952 
55-64 6.6% 4.7% 7.3% 10.3% 8.9% 21.3% 9.3% 13.6% 12.0% 3.6% 2.4% 7143 
65-74 7.4% 5.2% 8.7% 11.6% 8.8% 21.3% 8.7% 11.8% 10.5% 3.7% 2.4% 5689 
75 and over 7.2% 6.0% 8.0% 11.6% 8.5% 20.8% 8.3% 10.5% 11.6% 4.3% 3.2% 3626 
Total 6.3% 4.6% 7.3% 10.7% 9.6% 20.7% 10.0% 14.2% 11.3% 3.2% 2.1% 47058 
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Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves Total 
 
People mostly 
look out for 
themselves 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
People 
mostly try to 
be helpful   
Austria 2.6% 3.6% 5.7% 10.3% 11.8% 22.2% 13.3% 14.3% 9.8% 2.7% 3.7% 2233 
Belgium 5.4% 4.5% 10.7% 13.1% 13.2% 22.6% 11.4% 12.2% 4.8% 1.2% .8% 1774 
Switzerland 1.1% 1.7% 5.0% 10.6% 9.4% 25.0% 12.4% 17.2% 13.1% 2.8% 1.7% 2137 
Czech 
Republic 6.9% 8.3% 12.5% 14.8% 13.0% 18.5% 9.2% 8.1% 5.9% 1.6% 1.0% 2985 
Germany 3.7% 3.1% 7.4% 13.8% 14.3% 23.2% 12.3% 11.8% 7.5% 1.9% 1.1% 2862 
Denmark 1.1% 1.6% 3.0% 6.8% 7.1% 23.9% 11.5% 16.9% 17.9% 6.6% 3.6% 1483 
Estonia 2.8% 4.2% 7.9% 14.1% 11.8% 27.3% 10.4% 10.6% 7.2% 2.3% 1.1% 1968 
Spain 7.0% 6.1% 13.2% 13.6% 11.3% 19.6% 12.1% 9.4% 5.8% 1.2% .7% 1661 
Finland 0.7% 1.1% 3.1% 9.3% 11.8% 19.0% 16.0% 20.0% 13.6% 3.6% 1.5% 2015 
France 4.4% 4.1% 7.8% 15.5% 13.0% 24.8% 10.1% 10.9% 6.1% 1.4% 1.7% 1801 
United 
Kingdom 1.4% 1.6% 3.6% 8.4% 9.6% 23.4% 14.0% 18.7% 13.8% 3.4% 2.1% 1888 
Greece 8.9% 17.0% 17.0% 15.4% 11.1% 14.6% 6.9% 4.8% 3.3% .6% .4% 2396 
Hungary 6.1% 8.2% 12.6% 15.6% 11.7% 22.6% 8.7% 7.2% 5.0% 1.0% 1.3% 1489 
Ireland 1.6% 1.7% 2.9% 6.2% 5.8% 17.0% 10.8% 20.3% 20.3% 9.0% 4.4% 2270 
Iceland 0.4% 1.4% 2.1% 5.3% 6.7% 22.5% 14.2% 18.1% 19.6% 5.4% 4.4% 570 
Luxembourg 5.6% 3.8% 7.6% 12.7% 10.2% 26.2% 10.0% 11.1% 7.2% 2.8% 2.8% 1617 
Netherlands 1.2% 1.9% 5.6% 8.3% 11.7% 21.4% 19.1% 19.1% 8.8% 2.2% .6% 1881 
Norway 0.8% 0.8% 2.9% 6.9% 8.4% 21.0% 15.8% 20.1% 15.1% 4.7% 3.5% 1759 
Poland 15.7% 12.4% 13.8% 16.3% 9.8% 18.1% 4.4% 4.1% 3.2% .9% 1.2% 1706 
Portugal 4.6% 6.1% 15.9% 18.7% 17.1% 18.4% 7.7% 7.5% 3.0% .6% .4% 2031 
Sweden 0.9% 1.4% 4.0% 6.7% 8.9% 21.3% 13.5% 18.0% 17.3% 5.2% 2.7% 1941 
Slovenia 7.0% 5.8% 11.9% 13.1% 8.9% 24.2% 8.1% 10.5% 7.7% 1.6% 1.3% 1432 
Slovakia 11.6% 8.2% 11.4% 15.1% 13.8% 21.8% 6.1% 5.7% 3.5% .6% 2.2% 1496 
Turkey 19.1% 14.1% 12.1% 10.1% 7.6% 14.7% 5.0% 5.8% 4.9% 2.7% 3.9% 1836 
Ukraine 10.8% 9.1% 12.9% 15.2% 10.2% 19.7% 7.7% 6.3% 3.5% 1.5% 3.1% 1996 
Total 5.3% 5.4% 8.7% 12.1% 11.0% 21.1% 10.8% 12.2% 8.8% 2.6% 1.9% 47227 
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Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves Total 
 
People mostly 
look out for 
themselves 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
People 
mostly try to 
be helpful   
Male 5.4% 5.4% 8.9% 12.3% 11.0% 21.1% 11.1% 12.5% 8.4% 2.3% 1.5% 21684 
Female 5.1% 5.5% 8.5% 11.9% 10.9% 21.0% 10.6% 12.0% 9.2% 2.9% 2.3% 25467 
Total 5.3% 5.4% 8.7% 12.1% 11.0% 21.1% 10.8% 12.2% 8.8% 2.6% 1.9% 47151 
 
 
 
Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves Total 
 
People mostly 
look out for 
themselves 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
People 
mostly try to 
be helpful   
24 and 
under 4.7% 4.4% 8.2% 11.8% 13.3% 22.3% 11.7% 12.2% 7.2% 2.4% 1.8% 6566 
25-34 5.7% 6.0% 8.8% 12.7% 11.7% 21.7% 11.3% 11.7% 7.2% 1.7% 1.4% 7490 
35-44 5.1% 5.4% 7.9% 12.0% 10.9% 21.5% 11.9% 13.2% 8.7% 2.0% 1.4% 8559 
45-54 5.5% 5.5% 8.8% 12.3% 10.4% 20.7% 11.2% 12.6% 8.9% 2.6% 1.5% 7938 
55-64 5.4% 5.4% 8.7% 12.2% 10.7% 20.8% 10.1% 12.1% 9.3% 3.1% 2.1% 7126 
65-74 5.3% 5.6% 9.6% 12.1% 9.7% 20.1% 9.6% 11.6% 10.4% 3.4% 2.7% 5666 
75 and over 4.4% 5.8% 9.5% 10.7% 9.0% 19.6% 8.2% 11.6% 12.4% 4.6% 4.2% 3615 
Total 5.2% 5.4% 8.7% 12.1% 11.0% 21.1% 10.8% 12.2% 8.9% 2.6% 2.0% 46960 
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Appendix 4: Project related publications and relevant 
dissemination activities 
 
Publications in peer reviewed journals 
2004 
Greco D, Petrini C. “Alcuni aspetti di etica in sanità pubblica” Annali dell'Istituto 
Superiore di Sanità, 2004; 40 (3):363-371. 
Petrini C.  “Ricerca biomedica e ricerca in sanità pubblica: alcune analogie e 
differenze operative e nei criteri di valutazione etica. (Parte prima)” Biologi italiani 
2004; 34 (7):17-20. 
Petrini C.  “Ricerca biomedica e ricerca in sanità pubblica: alcune analogie e 
differenze operative e nei criteri di valutazione etica. (Parte seconda)” Biologi italiani 
2004; 34 (8):9-12. 
Scuderi G, Guidoni L, Rosmini F, Petrini C.  “La normativa sulla protezione dei 
soggetti partecipanti.  a studi clinici in Italia: dagli anni” (Italian regulation on the 
protection of human subjects participating to clinical studies, from the Nineties to 
2004) Ann Ist Super Sanità 2004; 40 (4):495-507. 
Verweij M, Dawson A. “Ethical principles for collective immunization programmes” 
Vaccine 2004; 22:3122-6.   
2005 
Ashcroft RE. “Standing Up for the Medical Rights of Asylum Seekers” J Med Ethics 
2005; 31:125-126. 
Ashcroft RE.  “Access to Essential Medicines: A Social Contract Approach” 
Developing World Bioethics 2005; 5(2):121-141. 
Ashcroft RE. “Ethics Committees in Transition Countries: A Figleaf for Structural 
Violence?” Br Med J 2005; 331:229-230. 
Ashcroft RE. “Making Sense of Dignity” (Essay review of Beyleveld D, Brownsword 
R Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
and Kass L Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity San Francisco: Encounter Books, 
2002) J Medical Ethics 2005; 31:679-682. 
Ashcroft RE, Newson AJ, Benn PMW. “Reforming Research Ethics Committees?” Br 
Med J 2005; 331:587-588. 
Häyry M.  “Precaution and solidarity” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 
2005; 14:199-206. 
Häyry M. “Can arguments address concerns?” J Med Ethics  2005; 31:598-600. 
Häyry M. “The tension between self-governance and absolute inner worth in Kant’s  
moral philosophy”  J Med Ethics 2005; 31:645-647. 
Majeed FA, Ashcroft RE. “Using children of asylum seekers and refugees as 
translators can create psychological problems for both parents and children” NWLJGP 
2005; 11(1):5-6.  
Petrini C.  “lcune considerazioni sui principi della bioetica applicati alla sanità 
pubblica” (Parte prima: aspetti generali)  Biologi italiani 2005; 35(10):41-48. 
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Petrini C.  “Alcune considerazioni sui principi della bioetica applicati alla sanità 
pubblica” (Parte seconda: principilismo, personalismo e sanità pubblica)  Biologi 
italiani 2005; 35 (11):13-19. 
Shickle D,  Piribauer F, Czabanowska K,  Loewy EH. “Europhen Public Health 
Ethics Network- Europhen” 13th Annual EUPHA meeting, Promoting the Public 
Health: Reorienting Health policies, Linking Health Promotion and Health Care 
European Journal of Public Health,; 2005; 15(1):180. 
Verweij M.  “Obligatory precautions against infection” Bioethics  2005;19(4):323-
335. 
2006 
Petrini C.  “Etica della sanità pubblica: spunti da alcune “checklist””.  Biologi italiani 
2006; 36 (9): 18-22. 
Häyry M. “Public health vs. human values” Journal of Medical Ethics 2006; 32: 519-
521. 
In Press 
Griffin M, Shickle D, Moran N.  “European Citizens Opinions on Water 
Fluoridation”.  Community Dentistry and Oral Epidemiology, In Press. 
Other publications in scientific journals or book chapters 
2004 
Petrini C.  “L'etica della sanità pubblica in Europa: l'European” (Public Health Ethics 
Network)  Notiziario dell'Istituto Superiore di Sanità 2004; 17 (3):8-11. 
2005 
Ashcroft RE. “Nothing to declare: UNESCO on ethics, human rights” 
http://www.scidev.net/opinions /index.cfm?fuseaction 
=readopinions&itemid=428&langauge=1 (9-9-2005). 
Ashcroft RE. (unsigned) “Legislating to prevent exposure to environmental tobacco 
smoke in public places and workplaces: ethical and civil liberties arguments” in 
Tobacco Advisory Group of the Royal College of Physicians Going Smoke-Free: The 
Medical Case for Clean Air in the Home, at Work and in Public Places London: Royal 
College of Physicians, 2005.  Ch.10, pp.115-128. 
Petrini C.  Le priorità di sanità pubblica in Europa tra etica e mercato.  Janus 2005; 5 
(17): 35-38. 
Schüklenk U, Ashcroft RE. “Affordable access to essential medication in developing 
countries: Conflicts between ethical and economic imperatives” in Von Niekerk AA, 
Kopelman LM (eds.) Ethics & AIDS in Africa: The Challenge to Our Thinking 
Claremont (South Africa): David Philip Books, 2005: 127-14. 
2006 
Moran NE, Shickle D, Munthe C, Dierickx K, Petrini C, Piribauer F. et al.  “Are 
Compulsory Immunisations and Incentives to Immunise Effective Ways to Achieve 
Herd Immunity in Europe?” In: Selgelid MJ, Battin MP, Smith CB (eds.).  Ethics and 
Infectious Disease.  Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006. 
2007 
Verweij M. “Ethics of public immunization programs” Kris Heggenhougen (ed.) 
Encyclopedia of Public Health Elsevier, 2007.   
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Juth, N, Munthe C. “Screening in Medicine: Ethical Aspects”, in Aschcroft, RE, 
Dawson, A, Draper, H & McMillan J (eds.) Principles of Health care Ethics, 2nd 
Edition, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2007. 
In Press 
Juth N, Munthe C. The Ethics of Screening in Health Care, Göteborg: Department of 
Philosophy, Göteborg University, In Press. 
Verweij M. “Tobacco discouragement and the values of public health” Dawson A.J., 
Verweij M.F.  (eds.) Ethics, Prevention, and Public Health.  Oxford: OUP, In Press. 
Verweij M. “What is ‘public’ in public health?” Dawson A.J., Verweij M.F.  (eds.) 
Ethics, Prevention, and Public Health.  Oxford: OUP, In Press. 
Wlodarczyk, Shickle D, Czabanowska K, Moran N (eds). . Public Health in European 
Countries – Selected ethical problems. Krakow: Jagiellonian University Press, In press. 
 
International meeting abstracts, oral presentations, posters 
2003 
Shickle D.  The Problem of Balancing Private and Public Interest: Developing a 
European Framework for Public Health Ethics.  Riflessione etica e ricerca scientifica.  
Produzione e diffusione di resorse informative.  Rome, 28 March 2003.   
2004 
Gylling H.  Paying for safety nets for the unlucky, the foolish, and the selfish.  UK 
Faculty of Public Health Annual Scientific Meeting,  Edinburgh, June 2004. 
Häyry M.  Arguments and Analysis in Bioethics.  Third North West Bioethics 
Roundtable (NorthWeb 3) meeting. Keele on 20 February 2004. 
Kelleher K.  Ethics of Public Health practice at the Royal College of Physicians of 
Ireland, Faculty of Public Health Medicine Summer Scientific Meeting.  Dublin, 20-
21 May 2004. 
Munthe C. The Goals of Public Health and the Value of Autonomy, Public Health 
2004: Annual Scientific Meeting of the UK faculty of Public Health, Edinburgh, June 
8-10, 2004. 
Munthe, C., Should Promotion of Autonomy be a Goal of Public Health?,  7th World 
Congress of the International Association of Bioethics, Sydney, November, 2004. 
Shickle D.  How do citizens of Europe perceive the trade-offs between private and 
public interest within public health policy? UK Faculty of Public Health Annual 
Scientific Meeting,  Edinburgh, June 2004. 
Shickle D.  Ethics of Public Health practice at the Royal College of Physicians of 
Ireland, Faculty of Public Health Medicine Summer Scientific Meeting.  Dublin, 20-
21 May 2004. 
Shickle D.  How do European Citizens Trade-Off private and Public Interest within 
Public Health Policy.  Seventh World Congress of Bioethics, Sydney, Australia, 9-12 
November 2004. 
Verweij M.  Justifying paternalism towards adolescents.  Paper tijdens World 
Congress of Bioethics; International Association of Bioethics, Sydney.  12 November 
2004. 
Verweij M.  Organization of the IAB/Interphen workshop Liberty-limiting 
interventions during global outbreaks – A discussion on George Annas’s human 
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rights framework for public health ethics.  Sydney, World Congress International 
Association of Bioethics.  9 November 2004. 
Verweij M.  Paternalism and Tobacco Discouragement.  Invited paper at Society of 
Applied Philosophy Workshop “Public health, ethical theory, and public goods”.  
Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge University, Cambridge.  12 July 2004. 
2005 
Verweij M.  Ethical principles for collective immunization programmes.  Congreso 
Nacional de la Asociación de Vacunología, Madrid.  12 November 2005. 
2006 
Czabanowska K., Shickle D., Włodarczyk C.  Society, Community As Constructions 
Based On Social Capital (SC) And Sense Of Community (SoC) Theory.  12th 
Qualitative Health Research Conference, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, 2-5 April 2006. 
Munthe C., The Goals of Public Health and the Ethics of Public Health Policy, Ethics, 
Philosophy and Public Health, Manchester, June 31-July 2, 2006. 
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Appendix 5: EuroPHEN Meetings 
 
Brussels Belgium 20-23 March 2003 
 
Barcelona Spain 6-9 November 2003 
 
Athens Greece 18-21 March 2004 
 
Edinburgh UK 11-13 June 2004 
 
Limerick Ireland 8-9 October 2004 
 
Rome Italy 21-24 April 2005 
 
Barcelona Spain 21-23 September 2005 
 
Hannover Germany 20-23 October 2005 
 
Krakow  Poland 24-25 February 2006 
 
Amsterdam Netherlands 12-14 May 2006 
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